Q. What was your last military rank?
A. Since the 1st of April I was a Colonel in the General Staff.
Q. Herr von Varnbueler, the area of your Army towards the end of 1943 was Croatia, wasn't it? Did you consider the troops at the command of the 2nd Panzer Army adequate to occupy the area which was under the jurisdiction of the Army?
A. Yes, together with the forces of the allied Croatia, it seemed to me that our forces were adequate for area under our jurisdiction at that time.
Q. According to what principles did the 2nd Panzer Army conduct the fight against the partisans?
A. In accordance with purely military principles, the aim was to smash the fighting strength of the partisans. For this purpose smaller and largo scale operations were carried out constantly.
Q. Colonel, since not in every locality there was a German unit present where there in these inaccessible territories certain areas where partisans could gather together, if yes what did the 2nd Panzer Army and the Corps do against these gatherings of the partisans?
A. Also with regard to these areas operations were constantly planned and carried out. The aim was to get the bands to confront us in open battle and to destroy their supply bases.
Q. Were these operations successful?
A, On the whole they were, especially when we succeeded in getting the band to confront us in open battle which was difficult in the roadless and, to a large extent, mountainous territory. The destruction of existing supply bases and communication was almost in all instances successful so that especially with a view to war material the partisans had to rely on current supplies by the Allies. These supplies were for the most part sent by way of airplanes from the south and from the cast.
Q. Colonel, did the 2nd Panzer Army or the units subordinate to it have the possibility to reach all localities in their area?
A. Yes, by all means. Every German battalion did in the autumn of of 1944 reach every locality it wanted to reach through the whole area of the Army, This was proved by the operations against the partisans where, amongst others, we frequently succeeded in conquering Tito's headquarters.
Q. Did the designations sometimes used in Germans reports as "divisions" and "brigades" -- were these designations correct compared with the German concept of a division or a brigade?
A. No, they weren't . The stength f.i. of the so-called divisions changed frequently. At the best, they reached a strength of about 3,000 men whereas they quite frequently only counted about a few hundred men. However, in order to gain a proper picture of the enemy situation, it was expedient to use the same terms as were used by the enemy.
Q. Is it known to you that the OKW issued an order to the effect that these terms, brigades, etc. should not be applied?
A. I remember that these terms were not to be applied.
Q. Now, with respect to the partisans I would like to ask you another question. Were the partisans led in a uniform manner?
A. No, they weren't. There were several groups, independent groups and these groups fought against the Germans and even against other partisans.
Q. Did the partisans wear uniforms?
A. In many cases they wore individual pieces of military clothing of all kinds of nations. Most of them did not wear a proper uniform. In any case, they did not do that before the end of the year 1944.
Q. Did the partisans observe the laws and usages of war?
A. No, they did not. For instance, with respect to the treatment of prisoners, protection of the Red Cross, plunders and lootings, protection of the civilian population, et cetera, they did not observe the rules of war.
Q. We'll turn to that at a later point. At the moment I want to ask you another question.
Did the partisans wear their arms openly?
A. This would have been in contradiction with the principles of partisan warfare.
Q. Now, what was the attitude of the bands towards the population?
A. Every band supressed that part of the population which did not happen to be in sympathy with the band concerned.
Q. What I am interested in is the general attitude of the German agencies towards the policy of Dr. Ante Pavelic. What was the attitude of the German Envoy in Zagreb, Kasche, towards the policy of Pavelic?
A. He supported Pavelic's policy and also the policy of the Ustasha without any reservation.
Q. Can you give us one particular example with respect to this policy of Dr. Pavelic?
A. Could you please repeat the question?
Q. With respect to this policy as carried out by Dr. Pavelic towards these parts of the population which you mentioned, can you give us one specific characteristic?
A. A particular characteristic of this policy was the strong opposition against the Pravoslavs who lived in Croatia.
Q. Did General Rendulic agree with the attitude of the German Envoy Kaschce and with the attitude of Dr. Pavelic in this particular respect?
A. No, he didn't. General Rendulic considered his task to keep the country pacified and peaceful. For this purpose he had to prevent every persecution on one part of the population against another part of the population and he rejected these persecutions.
Q. What were General Rendulic's relations with the German Envoy in Zagreb, Kasche like?
A. For the reasons mentioned, it was not a good one. I myself witnessed one occasion in the headquarters where General Rendulic and Kasche had a conference. This conference ended without any result.
The differences of opinion were so great that the discussions did not always stick to actual facts.
Q. Before we were talking about one characteristic of this policy which was persued by Pavelic and which was supported by Kasche and you talked about his policy towards the Pravoslavs. Maybe you can tell us in one sentence what kind of policy this was and what General Rendulic's attitude was towards this policy.
A. General Rendulic regarded the Pravoslavic policy as a danger of inciting some parts of the population against other parts of the population in the area of his Army and he took strict measures against this possibility. I remember that he took steps against the instigational proclamations of newspapers which were directed against the Pravoslavs. He made representations with the Government and with the German Envoy in Zagreb. He threatened to confiscate the newspapers in his Army area in the event that the newspapers would continue their policy.
Q. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army give directives to the Croatian Government?
A. No, he could not. Croatia was a sovereign state.
Q. I will now turn to another set of questions and that is the Italian problem. May I assume that it is know to you that the Italians left the alliance in September? Did you at any time have negotiations with the Italians which later resulted in the capitulation of the Italians?
A. No. I myself made no negotiations of this kind but I was present when the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army, General Rendulic, negotiated with the Italians. These negotiations were conducted in order to secure an orderly capitualtion by the Italians.
Q. When and where did these negotiations take place?
A. As far as I remember, they took place on the 10th of September 1943, in the Hotel Dalti in Tirana.
Q. And who conducted the negotiations on the part of the Italians?
A. General Dalmazzo. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the 9th Italian Army and therefore he was a legitimate negotiator.
Q. And how did these negotiations develop?
A. The Italian Commander-in-Chief, General Dalmazzo, appeared in company of a few other officers in answer to an invitation which he had received in the morning. He appeared on the afternoon of the 10th of September, 1943, in the hotel which I mentioned in Tirana. He was received by General Rendulic. This was done with all military tact and everything was done not to hurt the soldierly honor of the Italians.
Q. Are you in a position to give us an example for this manner in which the Italians were treated?
A. Yes, I remember quite clearly how General Rendulic personally got rid of a few too insistant film reporters and had them expelled from the room where the negotiations took place. These reporters were to film the negotiations for the news reels. I can appreciate such a gesture, especially since I personally experienced a similar situation in May, 1945, carried out on the part of an American General in Ludwigslust.
Q. What was the tenor of the negotiations, Colonel?
A. It was only natural that the negotiations were concluded in a formal manner, but in an absolutely correct manner. The individual items were first of all translated into the Italian language and subsequently they were commented on. On that occasion, it was particularly pointed out that the exact carrying out of the conditions especially with respect to the delivering up of arms and motor vehicles, was in the foremost interest of the Italians, since only then could the transport of the Italians take place in an orderly manner from the far away stations.
Q. Colonel, I believe we can talk just a little faster. Now on the part of the Italians, was any particular request voiced.
A. Yes, I remember that, for instance, General Dalmazzo attached particular importance to the fact that he retained his guard of honor. Of course, he was allowed to do that.
Q. Did the Italian representative accept the conditions then, and if so how?
A. Yes. He signed the conditions.
Q. Were there any provisions contained in the capitulation for the event that the Italians would not observe the conditions of the capitulation?
A. Yes. Amongst others, in case that the Italians would render we weapons and motor vehicles unusable or would sell them or would let them fall into the hands of the bands special sanctions wore provided.
Q. And what kind of sanctions were provided?
A. In certain quotas which I no longer remember, shooting were threatened.
Q. And for what reason did the Germans attach importance to this provision?
A. It had to be avoided that the partisans would be strengthened by these military instruments which were so very valuable to them.
On the other hand, the Italians also attached importance to the fact that they could keep their hand weapons and could make further use of their motor vehicles. This was of importance to them because they had to load all their instruments on special railway stations and the terrain was difficult to negotiate.
Q. Did you leave to expect and did you expect the Italians to fight against the German Armed Forces either alone or together with the partisans?
A. Yes, we had to expect this, at least with respect to parts of the Italian soldiers.
Q. Colonel, did anything become known to you about sanctions actually having been carried out?
A. I remember no such case.
Q. Did the Italian Army Group d'Est carry out the concluded capitulation terms?
A. Yes, with the exception of the Division Bergamo near Split, and the troops which were under General Roncaglia's command; General Roncaglia refused to carry out the capitulation which had been ordered to him by General Dalmazzo. General Dalmazzo stated that he could not force General Roncaglia, and this of course resulted in a very dangerous situation. The example of General Roncaglia could easily be followed by others.
Q. One other question. Was General Roncaglia subordinate to General Dalmazzo?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. And what was the situation which resulted from the conditions you described just now for the 2nd Panzer Army?
A. The Second Panzer Army which was separated by hundreds of kilometers from the place of the incident learned about these events mostly only briefly by radio messages.
According to these reports, the situation seemed quite a dangerous one to us, because also the Division Taurinense rejected the capitulation. This division was in Potgorica and was subordinate to Roncaglia. It was necessary that this situation be changed immediately and this could be done by eliminating General Roncaglia.
Q. And will you please tell us now what it was that General Rendulic actually ordered?
A. General Rendulic, as far as I remember, consented to the shooting of General Roncaglia which was demanded by the Divisional Commander concerned. However, he made the reservation that General Roncaglia should only be shot if: (a) General Roncaglia insisted on his opposition, and (b) if it was not guaranteed that he could securely be transported into a prisoner-of-war camp.
Q. Now to deal with Division Bergamo near Split, Colonel, this division as you said was the second source of opposition against Dalmazzo. What were the events connected with this division?
A. This Division Bergamo near Split did not carry out the capitulation terms. It joined the partisans in that area in their fight against us; because of this fact and because of the fact that the territory was so difficult to negotiate we only succeeded after strong reinforcements and after a long period of time and under high losses of our own forces to break this opposition and to capture the division.
Q Herr von Varnbueler, do you still remember how many officers and men were taken prisoner?
A There might have been roughly about 300 officers and 8,000 men.
Q And what happened to the 300 officers?
A I remember that the troops, which were embittered by the hard fighting which had caused high losses, intended to shoot the 300 officers as had been ordered by the Fuehrer.
Q Was this Fuehrer order carried out?
A Not, it was not. A summary court martial procedure was carried out, and in accordance with this procedure the persons who bore most of the guilt, which was about one-sixth of the total number, were sentenced to death, and, as far as I remember, were shot.
Q Do you know, Herr von Varnbueler, who it was who prevented that all of the 300 officers be shot?
A Who caused this shooting not to be carried out, this shooting which had been orderly by the Fuehrer, I cannot tell you any longer today. But without doubt this amendment of the Fuehrer order must have been done on the instigation and decision of a superior agency.
Q Do you know whether it was General Rendulic who ordered that?
A I don't know it for certain any longer, but I would assume that it was he because his consent was necessary for this amendment.
Q Colonel, I will now show you Document No. NOKW-509, which is Prosecution Exhibit 340. This is on page 11 of the German text abd Page 15 of the English text. The Document Book is No. XIV. This is an order of who Second Panzer Army, dated the 15th of September 1943. Can you tell us briefly how this order came about?
A The order originates from a period when the second Panzer Army started its activities in the Balkans. The second Panzer Army, at that time, did not know whether all troops subordinate to it in this area conducted the fight against the partisans in accordance with uniform directives.
Besides the Second Panzer Army had to take steps to insure that further units which arrived newly in the area would get the proper directions with respect to the warfare against the partisans. That is the reason why the order which we have in front of us here was issued. All it means is that it is a summary of the regulations which existed before the Second Panzer Army took over the command.
Q In this same Document Book, Colonel, and under the same Exhibit number, but on Page 15 of the German text and Page 21 of the English text, we have another order.
A Yes, I have it.
Q Would you look at Paragraph 2, under Figure 1 of this order, where it says, "The Army has issued orders that captured members of bands, hostages, and evacuees are not to be transferred until further notice." How did this order come about?
A The very conscientious working LXIXth Reserve Corps, under General Dehner, says, in the first part of this first paragraph, expressly that it refers to the order of the Second Panzer Army, dated the 15th of September. For this reason it is not possible that in the period between the 15th of September and the period when the order of the LXIXth Corps appeared, which was the 6th of October 1943, that another order had been issued, which ordered that captured members of bands, hostages, evacuees, etc. were not to be transferred until further notice.
Q Do you still remember this army order in its details?
A No, I can only reconstruct the facts from this order here and from the mention of these two dates.
Q Colonel, with regard to the question of the evacuation of the islands I shall show you Document Book XVI of the Prosecution. We are concerned with Document No. NOKW-674, which is on Page 104 of the German text and on Page 33 of the English text, Prosecution Exhibit 381.
Do you know this order?
A Yes, I know this order. I signed it myself as a deputy.
Q From the contents of this order it can be seen that you wanted to strengthen the defense of the islands. Which were the measures you considered necessary for this purpose? In your opinion was there an absolute necessity for these measures?
A There was an absolute necessity for these measures. The Army ordered the Corps concerned, which were stationed near the coast: 1) that the entire maleable-bodied population of the Adriatic islands were to be transferred to the mainland immediately and 2) in the event of a landing the evacuation of the territory immediate adjacent to the coast was to be prepared, this territory was to be cleared of all the population.
Q Was this a matter purely for the Army to decide?
A No, the consent of the Croatian Government had to be secured for these measures, and it is quite obvious that in this case the Croatian Government had consented. The Second Panzer Army had here, as in all other similar cases, to let the Croatian agencies participate in its measures.
Q And how were the Croatian agencies contacted?
A They were contacted as ordered through official channels by the Plenipotentiary German General in Croatia. He contacted the Criatian ministeries concerned.
In this case I suppose it was the Croatina Ministry for Armed Power which he contacted. And may be one or two other mysteries.
Q Colonel, the evacuation order dated the 13th of February 1944 which you talked about before was this order actually carried out at all--at any time?
A No, the order was not carried out in this form, because at the conclusion of my activity in the Balkans, which was the fall of 1944, there were able-bodied men in the Dalmation Islands.
The order for the evacuation was something of an ideal solution which never was achieved in actual fact. This aim was attempted in the endeavor to achieve as much security as possible in the coastal areas.
The second Panzer Army fully realized that this attempted optimum could never be fully achieved if alone for technical reasons.
Q Which are the technical reasons you mean?
A There was above all the transport situation. We did not have sufficient shipping space, nor did we have the necessary number of trucks and gasoline, etc. Besides, the airplane situation was already very unfavorable for us in those days. It was not possible to carry out large scale movements of ships or of motor vehicles by day at that time.
Q And how was this order actually carried out?
A Only part of the able bodied male population was evacuated from the Dalmation Islands. As I have already stated, I know that as late as the fall of 1944, able-bodied male population remained in these islands. To the best of my recollection, only a small part of the population to be evacuated, so that the bulk of the population remained in the islands. As far as able bodied male population was evacuated, it worked later on under Croatian organizations.
Q Colonel, you still have Document Book 16 of the Prosecution in front of you, haven't you? Please look at page 146 which is page 101 of the English text. This is document NOKW 1445. It is Exhibit 395. This is an entry into the war diary, made by the 15th Corps and you can see from this entry that 5,000 men, fit for military service, have to be evacuated from the Split. Is this entry known to you and what made this measure necessary? Just in Split.
A Split was a particularly endangered locality near the Coratian coast. Because of its terrain, it almost invited an enemy landing. Split is one of the few Dalmation ports which is suitable for larger vessels. The population of Split contained, according to our information, a large number of band members or of men fit for military service whose attitude was friendly towards the Allies. In the event of sudden Allied landing which was to be expected at any time these men would mean a considerable danger for countering the enemy landings. Therefore, it was an absolute military necessity to evacuate Split of these elements.
Q And what was the extent of the evacuations that actually took place?
A The evacuations could only be carried out to a small extent because the screening of the population with respect to band members band suspects, etc., of course, took a long time. I consider it improbable that more than about two thousand men were evacuated from Split, if even this number was achieved.
Q Colonel, now to deal with some other questions. Is the socalled Commissar Order known to you?
A Yes.
Q In your opinion, did the Commissar Order apply to the theater of war in the Balkans?
A No, I don't believe it was for this theater. Apart from that, the time when I came to the Balkans, which was at the same time when the Second Panzer Army got to the Balkans, it had already been rescinded.
Q Please, have another look at Document Book 16. Will you turn to Page 112 in this document book, which is page 65 of the English text. This is document NOKW 1339, Exhibit 384 of the prosecution. Will you briefly tell us, first of all, what this document is?
A This is a page taken from an activity report of a Group of the Secret Field Police. The report is made out for the month of February, 1944.
Q And what was the purpose of these activity reports?
A The paper which I have hear is not actually an activity report. It is just part of such an activity report. On the whole activity reports were to give account of the activity of one agency for a certain period of time.
Q Colonel, we are then here concerned with a statistic survey. How was the Army interested in this activity report?
A From my point of view, it couldn't be interested in it at all and it also could have no influence on these things. As far as the activity reports of the Secret Field Police were concerned, I was only interested in the passages concerning the atmosphere among the troops which could for instance, be seen from the censorship of the letters written by the soldiers, and of a survey of the criminal acts committed by the troops. Of course, I was also interested in the enemy situation as far as it could be reported by the Secret Field Police. In respect to police measures that were taken by the Secret Field Police, on their own initiative, this could not be influenced in any way by the Army and this seems to be such a summary of police measures. I would like to point out here that the Secret Field Police had two channels of command, one of which, the factual and police channel was completely independent of the Army.
Q Colonel, I have a few more questions of a general nature to put to you. Are you familiar with the entries into the war diaries?
A Yes, I am.
Q Can you tell us briefly how these war diaries were drawn up?
A The war diary was kept by the ADC (aide do camps). This was one of the many tasks which the ADC had. Usually a younger reserve officer was in charge of this war diary. For this purpose, he had all kinds of notes concerning conferences, long distance telephone conversations, etc., and thus he complied a draft for a war diary in the little time his other activities left him. These drafts for war diaries as, for instance, the draft by the operational department, were then submitted to me as the Ia. Unfortunately, they accumulated to a great extent before I found the time to even given them a cursory glance, on the whole, I approved them en masse. The Chief of Staff found himself in the very same position because the war diaries of several departments of the Army High Command accumulated on his desk.
It was quite impossible for him to work thoroughly through all of them and he could not do it if his staff had to cope with much work.
Q Colonel, my question actually is driving at the following had these ADC's (aide de camps), who were actually in charge of these war diaries, undergone a particular training?
A No. They were in no way particularly trained.
Q Can you tell us anything with respect to the objectiveness of these war diary entries?
A I am sure that the ADC's tried to be objective. However, their youthful exuberance and their endeavor to emphasize the achievements of their own troops and to describe as drastically as possible the difficulties of their own theater of war, as well as their insufficient training, influenced the war diaries with regard to the objectiveness. In my opinion, this influence was an unfavorable one in many instances.
Q And now, one more question. What was approximately the extent of the mail received daily with the second Panzer Army?
A There might have been about six hundred to eight hundred documents that were received daily.
Q And about how many pages roughly?
A Something like two thousand pages.
Q There are no further questions which I want to put at the moment to this witness on direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You may examine the witness, Dr. Laternser.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. May it please the Tribunal, there are only a few questions that I want to put to the witness, on behalf of Field Marshal von Weichs. Colonel, in connection with the last point which you discussed with my colleague Dr. Fritsch, the point concerning the war diaries, there is one further question I want to put to you. Do you mean to say then that the contents of the war diary actually represent the opinion of the Aide de Camps or did it occur at the time that the Chief of Staff or the Ia or even the Commander in Chief dictated ..........
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I object to this line of questioning; Dr. Laternser is asking the witness leading questions so that the witness may definitely pick any answer he like to.
DR. LATERNSER: May it please the Tribunal, I have included so many possibilities in this question that no one can say it is a leading question.
THE PRESIDENT: Objection will be overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Colonel, I will now ask you then to please answer this question.
A. There was of course the possibility that the Ia or the Chief of Staff or a Commander in Chief could personally take an interest in the war diaries. I testified only to my own personal experiences and of course I have no insight as to what happened in other agencies where I did not work.
Q. Did you at any time experience the case that a Chief of Staff or even a Commander in Chief interested himself personally in the keeping of the war diaries and their content?
A. As I have said previously I have not experienced any such instances.
Q. Colonel, in your area were there any Commando operations?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you give us examples for these operations?
A. There were on the Island of Lissa in the Adriatic Sea, British Commando troops. These troops carried out constantly or at least frequently, Commando Operations against our bases on the Dalmatian Coast.
Q. Do you remember one specific example in this connection?
A. Yes, I remember one outstanding example where we succeeded in capturing a close relative of the then British Prime Minister Churchill. I remember this incident because I happened to gain possession of a photostat where the then First Lieutenant Churchill expresses his thanks for the very decent treatment which he had received.
Q. Lt. Colonel Churchill; not First Lieutenant.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you still have a photostat of this communication?
A. No, unfortunately I do not have it anymore because it was taken away from me when I was taken prisoner together with all my other documents.
Q. Do you know of any case where on the occasion of a Commando operation when prisoners were made members of this Commando were shot?
A. I don't remember one single case of that nature. But I do remember that we had considerable difficulties in camouflaging these British prisoners we made and which were all members of Commandos. We found it very difficult to camouflage their capture with respect to reports to Higher Headquarters in order to avoid inquiries.
Q. This leads me to one other point, Colonel. Do you know the expression "camouflaged reports"?
A. Yes.
Q. What did this term mean?
A. "Camouflaged reports" were reports which tried to circumvent the issue, an issue which could not be stated openly.
Q. Did these "camouflaged reports" occur frequently or not so very frequently?
A. In the Balkans they were unfortunately quite a frequent occurrence.
Q. And what was the reason for these camouflaged reports one preliminary question, though, Colonel. What did these camouflaged reports have reference to?
A. They referred to certain questions where the troops did not want to express anything definite to Higher Headquarters.
Q. Do you know of instances where these camouflaged reports referred to reprisal measures?
A. I cannot remember any details but I think it is quite probable that such reports were made, but I am not in a position to say anything in this connection.
Q. With your agency then, if I understand you correctly, it was well know that such camouflaged reports were sent from lower units to Higher Headquarters?
A. Yes.
Q. Was anything done against it?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because we saw ourselves forced to pass on such camouflaged reports to Higher Headquarters and therefore we were grateful when we received them from lower units already in this camouflaged form.
Q. Now one last point. Are any incidents know to you which took place in the Spring of the year 1944 which were allegedly caused by members of the SS Division Prinz Eugen?
A. Yes, I remember that the Croatian Government made representations to the Army because on the occasion of such an operation which took place on the West of the Narenta excesses had taken place on the part of the SS Division Prinz Eugen.
Q. Why do you use the term "excess"? What kind of incidents were concerned?
A. At that time it was said that inhabitants had been killed and villages burned down.
Q. Who received these reports?
A. The Army Headquarters received them.
Q. And what measures were taken as the result of these reports?
A. The Commander in Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army who in this respect was not the superior of the SS Division, approached the Commanding General of the Vth SS Corps, Obergruppenfuehrer Phelps; he asked him to conduct court martial investigation of these incidents.
Q. Why did he want investigations to be made; had the SS Division gone too far?
A. Yes, that had to be assumed by the Army on the basis of reports which the Army had received.
Q. The Army then assumed that the SS Division had gone too far?
A. Yes.
Q. And who was it that ordered the court martial procedure, rather I would like to put it this way, what was it that the Army ordered?
A. As I have said before the Commander in Chief of the Army approached the Commander in Chief of the Vth Corps and asked him to straighten out the matter by way of a court martial procedure.
Q. And what was the result of this request to the SS?
A. First of all the result was a negative one. What I mean is that the Commanding General of the Vth SS Corps informed the Army that it had been proved that none of the participants were guilty.