A A As far as the so-called "Operation Admiral Polarkueste" was concerned, he commanded the Navy in the Arctic Sea. He was in no way subordinate but he was charged with the preparation of the defense of the coast and to work together with the Army. And in case of an enemy attack I had the right to give him certain orders, but, nevertheless, these orders could never refer to the so-called "floating units," that is, with regard to his ships.
Q Thus, the categorical denial that you had nothing to do at all with the German Navy isn't entirely true is it? In other words, under certain conditions you did have certain rights, isn't that right?
A Yes, and only with regard to "Admiral Polarkueste," with regard to the preparation and carrying out of the defense of the coast; with regard to the second part of the question, the relation of the units to cooperate with the Hermann evacuation staff. Hermann had the right to go to the representatives of the Navy and to try to get their support. And how far this request was or was not complied with, that was up to them, and, in addition, it was also up to their discretion to decide how much and in which way they complied with this request. But it was quite out of the question that orders were given.
Q Well, that being the case, General Rendulic, we will, now look at Document NOKW-098. This is being offered, Your Honors, as Prosecution Exhibit No. 609.
Now, Witness, you say there:
"The Commander-in-chief has forbidden continuation of the salvaging of goods in short supply from the evacuated territories by Norwegian police forces with Norwegian private individuals and at the same time ordered that salvaging is to take place through offices of Army and the Navy."
Now, will you explain how you can order anybody, unless he is to be under your command?
A That can only be explained in this way, that it means the Army offices have to call out the salvaging and at the same time the Navy is to be applied to for help when necessary. And with regard to the second paragraph, it states the Headquarters ArmyNarvik Branch that is the reinforced 19th Mountain Corps has been made responsible for the carrying out of this action, and that for this purpose that organization is to effect liaison with the Admiral of the Polar Coast.
Q Now, General, this document doesn't state that which you say. It plainly says that the Navy and the Army are being ordered to do a certain thing. You say that only the Army is being ordered, and the Navy is more or less being asked to cooperate. But the first paragraph doesn't say that at all. You're just reading that in there.
A Look. If you look at the address, you will see that it is an order which goes to the Headquarters Army-Narvik Branch, and then it goes for information to the Admiral of the Polar Coast. If the Admiral of the Polar Coast gets this paper then he knows that I want to tell him the following: I have given this order to my Army Headquarters Narvik, and I have also given him the order to effect liaison with the Admiral Polavkuste. Then, the Admiral of the Polar Coast knows that I am requesting him to support the Army Department. It doesn't say here that the Navy is ordered to carry that out, but in the first sentence it just states that it is ordered that nobody else has to carry out the salvaging other than the Army and the Navy and not, for instance, the Norwegian police forces or Norwegian private individuals. That is the sense of the contents of this paper, and I am convinced that if the compiler know that sometime this document would come to the attention of a Court he would have made this much clearer. This could not be an order to the Navy, because it went to the Admiral of the Polar Coast for information. I could not order the Admiral of the Polar Coast because he was not subordinate to me, and I just gave it to him for informational purposes so that he would know about the order to my Army Department, and he would learn in advance the request which the Army Department would make to him.
Q. Now, witness, a short time ago you said that in case of danger or invasion you had the right to give certain orders to the Navy.
A. Yes, this is correct.
Q. Wasn't that the danger all the time and wasn't the reason this danger existed the very reason that Finnmark was destroyed?
A. Of course there was a danger, but it wasn't acute, when the subordination of the Navy was regulated. The subordination had two parts: first, the preparation for the defense of the coast; and secondly, the carrying out of the defense. The preparations for the defense were being worked on all the time, and in this sphere the Admiral was also instructed to comply with my directives. The acute case of the defense of the coast never occurred during my time, so that subordination did not come into the question here.
Q. I still do not quite understand this, General. If the invasion wasn't acute, then why consider the destruction of Finnmark a military necessity? You can only do one or the other according to your own testimony.
A. No, I'm not talking about the invasion of Finnmark, but I'm talking about the invasion of the whole of Norway.
Q. But we are concerning ourselves right here only with Finnmark.
A. Yes, if you want it like that, then I'll limit myself to that.
Q. That's the only thing you're charged with.
A. Yes, well if the invasion isn't acute even today, then it could be acute tomorrow. The preparations had to be made. You know that against the invasion of the Atlantic Coast three years' work was done on its defense, and for two years before the beginning of the invasion there were many periods of time in which one assumed that this invasion was imminent, and one day it came.
But I can't prepare something today only if I know to one hundred percent that the occasion is going to arrive. This is against every military fundamental, one musn't work only on the certain; one must also prepare for the probable and the possible. Otherwise every military leadership would just be a game.
Q. Now, General, from what date onward did this acuteness of which you are speaking now recede? when did it become less important?
A. During my time this danger never receded.
Q. I thought you told us in the direct-examination that as of about November 15 you didn't think from that day on that very much could happen?
A. I said there that from about the end of November onwards I no longer counted on a pursuit of the Russians via the land route through Finnmark, but I did not say that I no longer counted on a landing after this time.
Q. Now, Witness, tell us if this Colonel Hermann had to ship the population away, who furnished him with the shipping space, and supposedly the Navy refused to give him that shipping space, what did Colonel Hermann do then?
A. The shipping space was put at his disposal through the Reich Commissar for Shipping, through the Reich Commissar for Norway, and to a rather limited extent through the Navy. The Army itself had no ships.
Q. I presume that the duty of the German Navy in that connection was to escort these convoys, am I right--primarily?
A. I assume that; I don't know details about it.
Q. Now suppose the Navy had refused to do that, where would Colonel Hermann go if he had to get a decision?
A. He would have come to me, and I would have had to turn to the OKW, and I would have to ask the OKW to do something about it, but such an occurrence never took place. I can't remember anything about it.
Q. Witness, was the destruction of Hammer Fest a part of the operation "Northern Light", or was it later?
A. The destruction task -the operation "Northern Light" was the movement of the XXth Mountain Army from uppland through Finnmark into the positions behind the Lyngen-fjord. This operation bore the code name of "Nordlicht." The destructions as such had nothing directly to do with the this operation. They were to be carried out through rear troops and others, only when and if the destroyed objects were no longer of use to the marching troops. That is the operation "Nordlicht," and the destructions ran parallel,-partly even they followed one another, so to speak.
Q. Now, do you know how many times Hammerfest was destroyed?
A. How many times? It can only be destroyed once.
Q. In other words, you know of only one destruction, is that correct?
A. A town can be destroyed only once.
Q. Witness, will you please answer my question? The question was whether you know only once of this destruction.
A. I can't answer; I only know about a destruction of Hammerfest. Of course, it wasn't all carried out at once. It was carried out in many stages.
Q. Well, now, just what do you mean by that, now?
A. As to why the people did it like that I don't know.
Q. Witness, I didn't ask you why they did it that way, I merely asked you what you meant when you said it wasn't done all at once--it was done several times. What do you mean by that? Within a very short period?
A. I only know what I read about it in the Norwegian documents, and in these documents it states that one part was destroyed on such and such a date, and then that these installations etc, were destroyed on such and such a date, and that further destructions were carried out at another time, and most of them were carried out at a time when I was no longer in Norway. So this is the sense in which I meant that the town wasn't all destroyed at once.
Q. And that particular statement is what I have reference to when I said, how many times was Hammerfest destroyed. I should have said raided and, in connection with such raids, subsequently destroyed?
A. What do you mean by attack?
MR. RAPP: (To interpreter) Did you translated "raided" as "angegriffen"?
INTERPRETER: Yes.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. There's a little difference between that and attack.
Who is responsible for the destruction of Hammerfest, General Rendulic?
A. The 20th Mountain Army is responsible for the destruction of Hammerfest.
Q. General, was it ever planned that the indigenous population of Finnmark was to return to Finnmark when it became pretty definite that the Russians would not follow up?
A. No. Without doubt it was not intended that the Norwegians would return to Finnmark before the end of the war, but these were all matters which were not within my sphere and in which I had no decision and no influence.
Q. Why?
A. If today Hitler orders that Finnmark is to be destroyed and to be evacuated for that reason, firstly, in order to render impossible a following up or a landing of the enemy or to make it more difficult and, secondly, to protect the population from Bolshevism and, thirdly (which was told to me orally,) in order to prevent an exile government making its fixed headquarters on Norwegian soil, then these reasons, of course, only no longer exist at the end of the war. And I could have absolutely no influence whatever on bringing the population back again, because the reasons for their evacuation had to exist until the end of the war.
Q. You weren't, by any means, afraid that a premature return of the population to Finnmark could have possibly a bad propaganda effect in foreign countries if these people should discover prematurely the extent of the destruction?
A. No, I never had any ideas of that kind at all. This affair was a concluded affair and it was only planned to continue it after the war.
Q. Did you expect your generals and officers who served under your command to concern themselves solely with the military aspect of the evacuation, or did you expect these officers also to take the political views of the Reich in connection with the evacuation into consideration?
A. No, the officers, also the commanding general, had to carry out orders and had to make no political considerations.
Q. Well then, let's look at NOKW 115 the way you felt at that time. Your Honor, this is Prosecution Exhibit 610. Now, we'll go over this document together.
Now, you said previously that you weren't afraid of the fact that a premature return of the population to Finnmark could have an adverse propaganda effect. You said you didn't take that at all into consideration. It's practically absurd of me to ask such a question of you. And then you said that you never asked your generals to consider political questions. They were to only pay attention to military matters. Never mind politics. Now, let's look how it looks in fact, at that time, General Rendulic. You said:
"Dear Reich Commissioner:
"The agreement made by Oberst Hermann to bring back Norwegian police into the evacuated territories, after the evacuation for the purpose of salvaging goods which are scarce, came to my knowledge only some time civilians later. I would never have given my consent. Private Norwegian joined up with the police force without it being possible to control them. It goes without saying that soldiers, living in localities and in houses which have been evacuated by the civilian population and condemned to destruction, behave and carry on differently than in localities where they are obliged to have regard for the civilian population.
The natives of the evacuated territories, who go back there for some reason or other, thus obtain an impression which is only too apt to give further impetus to the inflammatory propaganda which arose on account of the evacuation. One must, of course, reckon on reports on the subject and probably also on photographs made by people who have come back from salvaging scarce goods."
Well, let's first talk about this first phase. Just how this document ties in with your statement you have made just previously.
A. With regard to this I would like to say the following. You asked me what I thought about the return of the population into Finnmark and I told you that I didn't think about this at all because such a return could only take place at the end of the war.
Q. Just a minute, General Rendulic. Before we go any further. I think you cited me not quite correctly. I have the question still in front of me and I asked you whether or not you were afraid that a premature return of the population to Finnmark may have a bad propaganda effect in foreign countries when the extent of the destruction was prematurely discovered. That's what I asked you and nothing else.
A. Yes, that's the same, and I answered that there was no thought about this at all because a return of the population was not counted upon until the end of the war. By your question, I understood the return of the would population, when they found out that they could go back to their homeland because the Russians were not following on, perhaps in the year 1945 or 1946, but I was not thinking about the return of individual people, isolated people as mentioned here in this document. I could have no fear of propaganda from those parts of the population which I meant in the answer - that is, the whole population of Finnmark, because the return of these people did not come into the question at all.
And I didn't think about the return of individual people, of course, in my answer. I was only thinking about the entire return, and the fact that the return of individual people was not welcomed is, naturally a matter of course because those are the sources of propaganda which one had to avoid, and which I have also stated here.
Q. Now, general, let's look at the next paragraph:
"All this is neither in the interests of my army nor in the political interests of the Reich. For this purely political reason I approved of the measures taken by the Army Abteilung Narvik and cannot permit the action which is now contemplated. I leave therefore taken steps for the salbaging of scarce goods from the evacuated territories to be carried out through the offices of the army and navy and for these goods to be put at the disposal of your office in Tromsoe."
Then the last paragraph says:
"I require of my generals and other leaders that, within the sphere of their activities they always take into consideration and represent the political interests of the Reich. It goes without saying that I myself act according to the same principles. The close intermingling of political points of view with the tasks of the Wehrmacht do not, therefore, make it possible in this sense to acknowledge any exclusive competency in the political sphere."
Now, I would say that this letter you wrote then doesn't entirely give with your testimony you just gave us a few minutes ago.
A. Yes, it agrees insofar as with former statement I meant that a general had to obey orders without allowing himself to be influenced by political considerations. I mean, in the carrying-out of his orders. But the fact that in his actions, when not acting on orders, can and must be influenced by the political interests of the Reich is a matter of course, but only in the carrying out of orders he must not allow himself to be influenced by political considerations. Only when he acts independently. And furthermore this is a friendly letter to the Reich Commissioner which shows the circumstances I was in.
Q. And you got away with it, didn't you?
A. Of course.
Q. Now, general, I have reference to German document book or, rather, to the Document Book 23, page 89 in the English, 83 in the German. 89 in English, 83 in German.
Hour Honors it won't be too tremendously important at this time if you have it here or not. Are you now on page 83, witness?
A Yes.
Q Norway Exhibit 522. It seems that you didn't quite understand why this document was an exhibit and it is indicative that you thought this document was held against you because you signed it "Long Live the Fuehrer."
A Yes; this is rather obvious.
Q That wasn't our intention at all. However, the purpose, and I just want to explain that to you, that this document has been included is because it fixes the exact date, that is to say the 18th of December 1944 on which you, General Rendulic, became Armed Forces Commander Norway, and as of that day you are consequently responsible for all matters which were undertaken by the German Armed Forces until such day that you relinquished that command. It was only for that purpose that we have included this document to fix the day when you became Armed Forces Commander. It wasn't in there because we thought that it was criminal to say "Long Live the Fuehrer." I thought I owed you this explanation.
A Yes, I understand that, but I don't understand why it was never doubtful that I had become Armed Forces Commander Norway on the 18th of December and otherwise your interpretation is not correct if you say that from this period onwards I was responsible for all the actions of the Wehrmacht in Norway; I was responsible for all the actions of the 20th Mountain Army and my tasks as Armed Forces Commander rested merely in the preparation for the defense of the country and in this connection I had corresponding rights over other parts of the Wehrmacht. My tasks consisted further in the direction of the defense of the country, here also with the corresponding rights in regard to the other parts of the Wehrmacht, but as to my responsibility, I was only and entirely responsible as far as my Army was concerned.
Q You see, Witness, you say that you were only responsible as far as the 20th Army was concerned, but as Armed Forces Commander in personal union Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army you were also in fact senior Armed Forces Commander in Norway were you not?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q I have no further questions, Your Honor, on cross examination.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
- REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q General, there are only a few questions I want to clarify in redirect examination, I would like to begin with Norway. There was mention made here of Hammerfest. You talked about progressive destrictions. My question is: was Hammerfest only damage in the course of the destructions carried out by the German Wehrmacht, was Hammerfest also attacked by Allied units?
A There were a few air attacks, but as far as I know they were unimportant. The destructions were carried out for the most part by the Wehrmacht.
Q And when did the last destructions take place. Do you know?
AAccording to the documents in February 1944.
Q Might I just ask you here when you gave up your command as Armed Forces Commander in Norway.
A On the 13th of January 1944.
Q Excuse me, which year.
A 1945.
Q I think, General, you said it wrongly before?
A Yes, it was February 1945.
Q And now I would like to deal quite briefly with Exhibit No. 610 the letter to the Reich Commissar. Have you still got the letter there?
A No, But I know it quite well.
Q Do you know whether this letter by you was preceded by some letter or action on the part of the Reich Commissioner or something of that kind?
A Yes, I know that when Colonel Hermann reported his agreement he had entered upon with the Reich Commissar, I forbade him to carry it out and I forbade police and individual persons to salvage scarce goods from the evacuated areas.
Of course, Hermann had to inform the Reich Commissioner to this effect, whereupon the Reich Commissioner sent me a teletype reproaching me for mixing myself up in this affair and this letter was my answer.
Q And in this letter did he reproach you or did he establish that these were political affairs which were entirely for him to handle?
A Yes, those remarks were no doubt made otherwise there would have been no reason for me to answer him.
Q General, with regard to the question whether such letters were usual I would like to ask you one question: Did you sign this letter yourself?
A I think it is a teletype. Does not that show from the document.
Q Yes, it is a teletype. Then I will withdraw this question. - I now submit to you Prosecution Exhibit 606 again and first of all General, I would ask you to tell us again when you were Divisional Commander of the 52nd Infantry Division in Russia.
A The division was in Russia under my command from the 26th of June 1941 until the 22nd of October 1942.
Q Then in this document which has already been discussed by Mr. Rapp there is particular mention of the Partisans. At that time, did you have hard fightings with the Partisans?
A The fight against the Partisans in Russia was one of the greatest burdens for the Army and meant a great danger for all the rear installations of the Army. We had continual fights with the Partisans.
Q And now were there also Commissars among the Partisans? Or was the term "Commissar" as it is mentioned in daily orders confined to the Russian troops?
A The fact that Commissars were also to be found amongst Russian Partisans as Commissars of the Partisans is not known to me but amongst the Partisans there were also Russians who had escaped from captivity and also Russian Commissars, and this can be seen from this document. In this document there is a certain entry, the report of the column leader, the supply officer 152, where he talks about the shooting of a Commissar.
Q Might I just ask you to state where this passage is for the purpose of the record.
A It is not the shooting of a Commissar in the sense of the Fuehrer order according to which all Commissars were to be shot, but this Commissar is correspondingly characterized in this report. The report states local inhabitants reported a Russian to the unit who had the position of a Commissar of the Communist Party in the supreme supervisory council and he was said to have shot at German soldiers. The information gained through the interrogation of many witnesses and through the finding of his weapons which he had hidden, gave proof for the accusation. It was known to him as well as to all the witnesses that a civilian who was found with his weapon in his hand during the fighting is a franctireur and according to International laws is to be shot.
By reason of the presentation of evidence the facts of the case were given and I had the man shot," In my opinion the execution was justified, thought did not know anything about it, but in no case was it a shooting by reason of the Commissar Order according to which a commissar captured during fighting is to be shot.
Q. General, please look at the order of the 6th September 1941 or rather the report under that date that is on the next page, page 3 of the document at the top. We had a short time before discussed that commissars went over to the partisans, that is they escaped from German captivity and went over to the partisans, did these commissars then fight on the side of the partisans, do you know of any such cases?
A. Of course they always then fought on the aide of the partisans.
Q. And is there anything about this on the report quoted by me of 6 September 1941?
A. Yes, it is quite clear, because that report states that Communist functionaries, 2 commissars and 36 partisans were captured and shot near Meulikehi, and these commissars who were shot here also weren't commissars within the meaning of the Fuehrer Order. That is, they were also not commissars captured and shot during regular combat, but they were partisans and as they had previously been commissars, it is particularly mentioned here. But they were not shot because they were commissars, they were shot because they were partisans. I think these are the only two points, in which commissars are mentioned at all in this long report. I would also like to stress here that my testimony and the affidavits of the two regimental commanders which were also read, are not connected at all with this document, because here partisans are being shot and not commissars. The fact that they formerly had been commissars has nothing to do with the fact that they were being shot as partisans.
DR. FRITSCH: I have no further questions on redirect examination.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I have no recross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions on the part of counsel for the defense?
Apparently not. The witness may be excused.
Pardon me just a minute. Do either of my associates desire to make any inquiries?
JUDGE CARTER: I have none.
JUDGE BURKE: I have none.
THE PRESIDENT: You may be excused.
( Witness excused.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I now intend to call the witness Freiherr von Varnbuhler and to examine him here. I would like to ask for the permission of the Tribunal to have this witness called.
THE PRESIDENT: I am informed that this witness is now not accessible, and it will take several minutes to get him up here. Perhaps we should take our recess at this time.
We will recess for 15 minutes.
THE MARSHAL: Court will be in recess for 15 minutes.
(Thereupon a 15 minute recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
FREIHERR von VARNBUEHLER, a witness? took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn.
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. Witness, will you please tell the Tribunal your full name?
A. Freiherr von Varnbuehler.
Q. Would you please be kind enough to spell your name?
A. Von Varnbuehler.
Q. When and were were you born?
A. On the 1st of May, 1907 in Ulm on the Danube.
Q. And were are you now residing?
A. I am a British P.W. under American custody and at present I am stationed in a camp in Neustadt near Marburg.
Q. Kerr von Varnbuehler, were you at any time a member of the Nazi party?
A. No.
Q. Will you please describe quite briefly your military career?
A. In 1926 I became a soldier in a Cavalry Regiment, there I was Chief of a Squadron. Then I attended the War Academy. During, the war I was leader of a company and besides I had various assignments in the General Staff of the troops. Among the assignments was the one of Chief of the 68th Corps in September 1944. My last assignment was that of a Chief of Staff of an Army.
Q. And since what date did you have any official contact with General Rendulic?
A. Since the time when he took over the 35th Corps in Russia, that was in the fall of the year 1942.
At that time I was Ia of an Infantry Division, subordinate to the 35th Corps.
Q. Were you also subordinate to General Rendulic in the Balkans?
A. Yes, since the 5th of July 1943 I was Ia of the 2nd Panzer Army. General Rendulic commanded this Army since the date when the army arrived in the Balkans, that was the end of August 1943.
Q. What was your task as the Ia of an army, in this case as the Ia of 2nd Panzer Army?
A. The Ia of an Army was in charge of the Operational Department of the Army High command. The I-c was subordinate to him as expert on the enemy situation, not in his capacity as intelligence officer. The Ia was in charge of the Operational Department, the troop leadership and the organizational questions with regard to operational troops, sub-divisions, training, accommodations, transfers of all kinds. The army Ia was subordinate to the Chief of Staff and acted also as his deputy.