Courts 5 case 7
Q Now, witness, it is true, is it not, that in a division you don't have a chief-of-staff? Isn't that right?
A No, there is the Ia who was similar tasks to deal with as the Chief-of-Staff.
Q Witness, when you said no, did you mean that I was wrong or that I was right, that there is no Chief-of-Staff?
A No, I did not want to say that you were incorrect. I only said that there was no Chief-of-Staff, but that the Ia had some of the tasks which are the responsibility of a Chief-of-Staff at Higher Headquaters.
Q And the Staff, which a Division Commander has in a division is relatively small if you compare it to an Army or an Army group, isn't it?
A Yes, the staff of a Division contained 35 officers and officials.
Q Witness, you stated that you did not sign these various daily and evening reports. Now, that wasn't really your mission as a Commander of an Infantry Division. That was the mission of the Chief of the Office who issued this report, isn't that true? In other words --
A Yes, that is correct.
Q In other words, the fact that your signature doesn't appear on these reports doesn't mean that you didn't know then that was going on, do you?
A No, but it does not mean the contrary either. It does not mean that I actually know.
Q Witness, we will now turn over to the Norwegian picture. In connection with your examination, direct examination, about the evacuation of Finland and Finmark, you at one point stated that you laughed or your staff laughed at the OKW's suggestion to take Finnish hostages along with you. Did you make that statement?
A Yes.
Q Did you laugh because it was impossible or you did not believe it would be wise to take these hostages with your or did you laugh because you didn't take any hostages?
A No, I laughed because the authorities who issued the order were so badly informed that they did not see that there was no point and purpose in it at all. I did not see for what reasons we should have taken Finnish hostages with us.
Q Well, did you ever take any Finnish hostages? You only could take any with you if you had previously taken any.
A Finnish hostages were never taken. I found out later on about one case. In the town of Tornie. A few hostages were taken in order to prevent the Finns from shooting at the hospitals, but everything turned out all right. That is the only case of which I know in which hostages were mentioned at all in Finnland.
Q Witness, I don't quite understand you. At the beginning of your sentence, you said you didn't take any Finnish hostages and towards the end you said with the exception of one case which was called later on to your attention.
A Yes.
Q Will you please just answer me whether you took or whether you didn't take any and also -
A That is not a contradiction because when I said that we did not take any hostages with us, I was thinking of the OKW order which provided the taking along of hostages. Hostages were taken on one occasion for the protection of our own military hospitals against the firing of enemy in the little town Tornio near the Swedish border. This I only found from the documents here. Otherwise, I know of no such cases.
Q How come you only learned this here in Nuernberg?
A Well, I don't know. It is contained in the Diary and the Diary I did not read. The writer of this Diary, the author of this Diary, must have some special information about this fact.
Q Very well, Witness, then let's look at NOKW-060, being submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 607. Now, there was really no reason for you to have memory refreshed in Nuernberg on the basis of some secretary who kept your War Diary, was there? You yourself wrote a letter mentioning it.
A Naturally I could not remember this particular letter but after all this letter does not say of anything else, than I have said a few minutes ago. It deals with the combat, the fighting around Tornio which is near the Swedish border and it deals mainly with the safeguarding of our military hospitals and the passage of a German hospital train for which event the hostilities were to be temporarily stopped In order to exert pressure of the Finns, these hostages were aprehended The whole matter was successful; the military were transferred to Sweden; the hospital train went to Sweden and during all this time there were no hostilities of any kind and then the hostages were released. I did not say anything also, than is contained in this document.
Q The only other thing you said, witness, was that you took a few hostages, didn't you?
A Yes, that is true. That was my conviction until this moment, I thought it was a matter of 30 or 40.
Q Would you please let me finish my question and then answer me, if you would be so kind? Now, Witness, these hostages you arrested-where did they come from? I mean they were people who had anything to do with the act? Were they taken at random? Or do you recall where they came from?
A It says so here. "Kemi-Tornio"--that is the territory in which those military hospitals were situated. They were taken from this particular sector.
who they were, individually, I did not know.
Q I would like to refresh your memory somewhat, witness. I am now introducing NOKW-066, Prosecution Exhibit 608. Now there, witness, you see that on the first of January 1944 Major Pickel reports--I mean the first of October, 1944, I am sorry-Major Pickel reports that the Finns attacked local bridges south of Kemi and that you lost nine prisoners and one dead. I don't see anything about a hospital. And then as a reprisal for this particular attack on this bridge, 120 hostages were taken amongst whom were two officers, two police officers, and leading personalities from industry or commerce. Would you explain that to us, please?
A There is nothing to explain or not much to explain. It is the same what is contained in the order. He didn't say that these hostages were taken as counter measure for the attack on the bridges , but the hostages were taken against what is enumerated under points 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. If I may read this, at 1800 hours, 120 hostages taken etc., leading personalities from economy, first, release of prisoners in Kemi; second release of German military hospitals in Tornio; third, free passage of a -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. We will take our noon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be adjourned until 1330 hours.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
TIE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Mr. Rapp.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, prior to the recess, we concerned ourselves with NOKW-066, and I would now like to ask you whether you can explain why specially two officers and two police officers are mentioned as part of 120 hostages taken? Has that, as far as you know, any significance?
A Well, may I explain the context?
Q Please go right ahead.
A Tornio is a small town near the Swedish frontier. It was there that we had our hospitals in large numbers because we wanted to have the wounded and ill sent away via Sweden. The Finns who remained calm in the first days of October and of whom I had liaison officers on my staff, made a surprise attack on the 1st of October on the small garrison in Tornio, shot at a few hospitals and prevented the sick from being transported away. The battalion commander who was in charge at Tornio reported the facts contained in this document. All he told us really is that in order to safeguard the hospitals, and the transport of the ill to Sweden, and also so that the illegally captured could be handed back, hostages were seized. What the battalion commander meant by stating that among those 120 hostages there were two officers and two police officers. I don't know. I would assume that he wanted to point out specially that among the hostages there were relatively influential people included. I don't know why this measure is supposed to be incriminating. The arrest of hostages under those conditions was entirely admissible under international law. I know that it served its purpose. Local arrangements was arrived at. The ill and sick and wounded were sent to Sweden. Prisoners were handed back, and the hostages were in any case released. That is all I can say about that and I should like to add, as far as the previous document is concerned, that it was addressed to a Col.
Willamo, and Col. Willamo was the chief of the Finnish liaison staff with my headquarters. The purpose of this letter must have been to inform the Finnish government of the fact that hostages had been apprehended and the purpose behind that measure. That is all I can say to that.
Q Witness, this fortnight warning you had about getting the German troops out of Finland -- when was that to expire?
A That fortnight was to come to an end on 15 September.
Q And the attacks on these various installations mentioned in Major Pickets report are dated the 1st of October, are they not?
A Yes.
Q That is two weeks after the time of grace you had to get out of Finland, isn!t it?
A Yes, but let me explain that to you, so that everything would be seen in its true light. I could not do that in a public meeting because these matters very possibly might cause international complications, but if you desire me to do so. I will explain it but not in a public session.
Q Witness, when were the nickel mines in Finland -- I believe the Kollosiaki nickel mines -- destroyed by the 20th Mountain Army?
A Well, when the area was evacuated, which must have been the middle of October, approximately, I am not quite sure -- yes, of course, the end of October.
Q You couldn't give us an approximate date a little closer than the one you have given?
A No, that would be difficult. It must have been the end of October.
Q Could you say whether it was before or after you received the OKW order for the destruction of Finnmark?
A I received two orders, one on the 4th of October which was the first order contained in Document Book XXII and the second on 28 October.
Q And of course having reference to the one dated the 28th of October?
A I am afraid I really can't, say, nor do I know what the significance of it was supposed to be because the destruction was already ordered on the 4th of October. When it was carried out, I really don't know.
Q Were these nickel mines of great importance to the German war effort?
A Until then, they were of very great importance. It was only then that new nickel was found in the Reich and that nickel in the Petzamo area could be done without.
Q Could you say that one of the main missions of the 20th Mountain Army in Finland was to prevent that these nickel mines fall intact into the Russian hands?
A No, the task of the 20th Mountain Army in Lappland at the time when I took over consisted first in preventing a linking between the Western powers and the Russians in the extreme North; two, to cover up the rear of the Norwegian front; and three, in protecting the Northern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was of special importance to us because it was a testing ground for the U-boats and new weapons, and those were the tasks of the 20th Mountain Army. The fact that in that area there happened to be a nickel mine did not constitute the decisive and essential task of the army.
Q Did your Chief-of-Staff General Halder -- did he have the same information you had on what the main mission of the 20th Army was in Finland?
A I should assume so, yes. He must have shared that opinion. For a year at least, if not longer, before me, he had been Chief-ofthe-Army and had to know what the army had to do. On the 24th of June, 1944, I was introduced into those tasks by the OKW on the occasion when I took over my command.
Whether the Chief-of-Staff received it in the same wording at the time I don't know.
Q Witness, did you ever protest to General Jodl of the OKW, WEST, either after the first or the second evacuation order, that you did not consider this to be a military necessity?
A No. the first evacuation order I carried out in such a way as I thought to be necessary. That is, supported those people who wanted to take part in the evacuation to Southern Norway, regard to the second evacuation order, for me there was a conviction of the military necessity of the destructions, but also the destruction of part of the quarters. It was intended that the Norwegian population should be gathered in the necessary living space and then the buildings which were thus made free were to be destroyed; but under all circumstances it had to be prevented that when the enemy arrived he would find any quarters, because in these areas quarters and accommodation meant existence or non-existence.
A When the second evacuation order came, which ordered the evacuation of the entire population, then I had to say to myself that the OKW had judged correctly and placed a correct demand. I had no reason in this situation to make a particularly energetic protest. I certainly spoke with Jodl and told him that from my point of view it was not indispensable. We could gather all the population together and then the greater part of the area would be made free and could then be destroyed. I also urged this solution but it was refused.
Q Witness, as a matter of fact what did you do or what was actually carried out? Was the Finnmark totally or only partially destroyed in your opinion?
A Total destruction was impossible, without doubt very much was not destroyed.
Q Those parts which were not destroyed, was that on account of any consideration you showed for the Norwegians or merely because you did not have enough men or material to carry it through one hundred percent?
A Well, the destruction, for instance, in the far north, could not be carried out entirely because the pressure of the Russians was too great, and there was no time and no opportunity to do it. And what considerations played a part with the troops in not destroying something I really can't say.
Q Could you tell us what was not destroyed?
A Kirkenes, for instance, was not destroyed. The towns of Vardoe and Vardsoe on the Arctic Ocean, and many places on the fjords. Those are the ones I know. And what was destroyed in Kirkenes was destroyed by the Russian air force, not by German measures; otherwise, I don't know what else was not destroyed. I thought that Hammerfest, for instance, was not entirely destroyed. I found that out only later on from the documents here.
Q Witness, did any part of the Norwegian population ever come to you or to any representative of the XXth Army and beg them that you save them from the Bolshevists?
A No, certainly not.
Q Nov, most of your orders and those of the OKW show that the German Army took it upon themselves to be more or less the protector of the Norwegians from the Bolshevists. Was that merely an assumption which you more or loss put there gratuitously to give your evacuation a propaganda value?
A No, that refers to the Hitler order of the 28th of October; and there I would like to ask whether it is wrong if one tries to save people from Bolshevism?
Q Witness, you stated that the German Navy, which was stationed in Norway, was not at all under your command. Did you make that statement?
A Yes, that is also true. With the limitation that those parts which were on land, for instance, the coastal batteries -- these parts were subordinate to the Army for the movement, that is, for the march, which is quite natural because this movement was one of the most complicated affairs which one can imagine.
Q Does that also apply to German Air Corps units which were land based?
A That refers in exactly the same way to the German Air Force, but nevertheless, with the extension that I was also justified to order the Air Force with regard to its tactical employment?
Q Now, I'm having particular reference to the unit which was designated as "Admiral Polarkueste," and to those units which were charged to assist the evacuation staff of Colonel Hermann in the seagoing evacuation of the population. And my question is, wasn't that part of the German Navy under your command?
A A As far as the so-called "Operation Admiral Polarkueste" was concerned, he commanded the Navy in the Arctic Sea. He was in no way subordinate but he was charged with the preparation of the defense of the coast and to work together with the Army. And in case of an enemy attack I had the right to give him certain orders, but, nevertheless, these orders could never refer to the so-called "floating units," that is, with regard to his ships.
Q Thus, the categorical denial that you had nothing to do at all with the German Navy isn't entirely true is it? In other words, under certain conditions you did have certain rights, isn't that right?
A Yes, and only with regard to "Admiral Polarkueste," with regard to the preparation and carrying out of the defense of the coast; with regard to the second part of the question, the relation of the units to cooperate with the Hermann evacuation staff. Hermann had the right to go to the representatives of the Navy and to try to get their support. And how far this request was or was not complied with, that was up to them, and, in addition, it was also up to their discretion to decide how much and in which way they complied with this request. But it was quite out of the question that orders were given.
Q Well, that being the case, General Rendulic, we will, now look at Document NOKW-098. This is being offered, Your Honors, as Prosecution Exhibit No. 609.
Now, Witness, you say there:
"The Commander-in-chief has forbidden continuation of the salvaging of goods in short supply from the evacuated territories by Norwegian police forces with Norwegian private individuals and at the same time ordered that salvaging is to take place through offices of Army and the Navy."
Now, will you explain how you can order anybody, unless he is to be under your command?
A That can only be explained in this way, that it means the Army offices have to call out the salvaging and at the same time the Navy is to be applied to for help when necessary. And with regard to the second paragraph, it states the Headquarters ArmyNarvik Branch that is the reinforced 19th Mountain Corps has been made responsible for the carrying out of this action, and that for this purpose that organization is to effect liaison with the Admiral of the Polar Coast.
Q Now, General, this document doesn't state that which you say. It plainly says that the Navy and the Army are being ordered to do a certain thing. You say that only the Army is being ordered, and the Navy is more or less being asked to cooperate. But the first paragraph doesn't say that at all. You're just reading that in there.
A Look. If you look at the address, you will see that it is an order which goes to the Headquarters Army-Narvik Branch, and then it goes for information to the Admiral of the Polar Coast. If the Admiral of the Polar Coast gets this paper then he knows that I want to tell him the following: I have given this order to my Army Headquarters Narvik, and I have also given him the order to effect liaison with the Admiral Polavkuste. Then, the Admiral of the Polar Coast knows that I am requesting him to support the Army Department. It doesn't say here that the Navy is ordered to carry that out, but in the first sentence it just states that it is ordered that nobody else has to carry out the salvaging other than the Army and the Navy and not, for instance, the Norwegian police forces or Norwegian private individuals. That is the sense of the contents of this paper, and I am convinced that if the compiler know that sometime this document would come to the attention of a Court he would have made this much clearer. This could not be an order to the Navy, because it went to the Admiral of the Polar Coast for information. I could not order the Admiral of the Polar Coast because he was not subordinate to me, and I just gave it to him for informational purposes so that he would know about the order to my Army Department, and he would learn in advance the request which the Army Department would make to him.
Q. Now, witness, a short time ago you said that in case of danger or invasion you had the right to give certain orders to the Navy.
A. Yes, this is correct.
Q. Wasn't that the danger all the time and wasn't the reason this danger existed the very reason that Finnmark was destroyed?
A. Of course there was a danger, but it wasn't acute, when the subordination of the Navy was regulated. The subordination had two parts: first, the preparation for the defense of the coast; and secondly, the carrying out of the defense. The preparations for the defense were being worked on all the time, and in this sphere the Admiral was also instructed to comply with my directives. The acute case of the defense of the coast never occurred during my time, so that subordination did not come into the question here.
Q. I still do not quite understand this, General. If the invasion wasn't acute, then why consider the destruction of Finnmark a military necessity? You can only do one or the other according to your own testimony.
A. No, I'm not talking about the invasion of Finnmark, but I'm talking about the invasion of the whole of Norway.
Q. But we are concerning ourselves right here only with Finnmark.
A. Yes, if you want it like that, then I'll limit myself to that.
Q. That's the only thing you're charged with.
A. Yes, well if the invasion isn't acute even today, then it could be acute tomorrow. The preparations had to be made. You know that against the invasion of the Atlantic Coast three years' work was done on its defense, and for two years before the beginning of the invasion there were many periods of time in which one assumed that this invasion was imminent, and one day it came.
But I can't prepare something today only if I know to one hundred percent that the occasion is going to arrive. This is against every military fundamental, one musn't work only on the certain; one must also prepare for the probable and the possible. Otherwise every military leadership would just be a game.
Q. Now, General, from what date onward did this acuteness of which you are speaking now recede? when did it become less important?
A. During my time this danger never receded.
Q. I thought you told us in the direct-examination that as of about November 15 you didn't think from that day on that very much could happen?
A. I said there that from about the end of November onwards I no longer counted on a pursuit of the Russians via the land route through Finnmark, but I did not say that I no longer counted on a landing after this time.
Q. Now, Witness, tell us if this Colonel Hermann had to ship the population away, who furnished him with the shipping space, and supposedly the Navy refused to give him that shipping space, what did Colonel Hermann do then?
A. The shipping space was put at his disposal through the Reich Commissar for Shipping, through the Reich Commissar for Norway, and to a rather limited extent through the Navy. The Army itself had no ships.
Q. I presume that the duty of the German Navy in that connection was to escort these convoys, am I right--primarily?
A. I assume that; I don't know details about it.
Q. Now suppose the Navy had refused to do that, where would Colonel Hermann go if he had to get a decision?
A. He would have come to me, and I would have had to turn to the OKW, and I would have to ask the OKW to do something about it, but such an occurrence never took place. I can't remember anything about it.
Q. Witness, was the destruction of Hammer Fest a part of the operation "Northern Light", or was it later?
A. The destruction task -the operation "Northern Light" was the movement of the XXth Mountain Army from uppland through Finnmark into the positions behind the Lyngen-fjord. This operation bore the code name of "Nordlicht." The destructions as such had nothing directly to do with the this operation. They were to be carried out through rear troops and others, only when and if the destroyed objects were no longer of use to the marching troops. That is the operation "Nordlicht," and the destructions ran parallel,-partly even they followed one another, so to speak.
Q. Now, do you know how many times Hammerfest was destroyed?
A. How many times? It can only be destroyed once.
Q. In other words, you know of only one destruction, is that correct?
A. A town can be destroyed only once.
Q. Witness, will you please answer my question? The question was whether you know only once of this destruction.
A. I can't answer; I only know about a destruction of Hammerfest. Of course, it wasn't all carried out at once. It was carried out in many stages.
Q. Well, now, just what do you mean by that, now?
A. As to why the people did it like that I don't know.
Q. Witness, I didn't ask you why they did it that way, I merely asked you what you meant when you said it wasn't done all at once--it was done several times. What do you mean by that? Within a very short period?
A. I only know what I read about it in the Norwegian documents, and in these documents it states that one part was destroyed on such and such a date, and then that these installations etc, were destroyed on such and such a date, and that further destructions were carried out at another time, and most of them were carried out at a time when I was no longer in Norway. So this is the sense in which I meant that the town wasn't all destroyed at once.
Q. And that particular statement is what I have reference to when I said, how many times was Hammerfest destroyed. I should have said raided and, in connection with such raids, subsequently destroyed?
A. What do you mean by attack?
MR. RAPP: (To interpreter) Did you translated "raided" as "angegriffen"?
INTERPRETER: Yes.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. There's a little difference between that and attack.
Who is responsible for the destruction of Hammerfest, General Rendulic?
A. The 20th Mountain Army is responsible for the destruction of Hammerfest.
Q. General, was it ever planned that the indigenous population of Finnmark was to return to Finnmark when it became pretty definite that the Russians would not follow up?
A. No. Without doubt it was not intended that the Norwegians would return to Finnmark before the end of the war, but these were all matters which were not within my sphere and in which I had no decision and no influence.
Q. Why?
A. If today Hitler orders that Finnmark is to be destroyed and to be evacuated for that reason, firstly, in order to render impossible a following up or a landing of the enemy or to make it more difficult and, secondly, to protect the population from Bolshevism and, thirdly (which was told to me orally,) in order to prevent an exile government making its fixed headquarters on Norwegian soil, then these reasons, of course, only no longer exist at the end of the war. And I could have absolutely no influence whatever on bringing the population back again, because the reasons for their evacuation had to exist until the end of the war.
Q. You weren't, by any means, afraid that a premature return of the population to Finnmark could have possibly a bad propaganda effect in foreign countries if these people should discover prematurely the extent of the destruction?
A. No, I never had any ideas of that kind at all. This affair was a concluded affair and it was only planned to continue it after the war.
Q. Did you expect your generals and officers who served under your command to concern themselves solely with the military aspect of the evacuation, or did you expect these officers also to take the political views of the Reich in connection with the evacuation into consideration?
A. No, the officers, also the commanding general, had to carry out orders and had to make no political considerations.
Q. Well then, let's look at NOKW 115 the way you felt at that time. Your Honor, this is Prosecution Exhibit 610. Now, we'll go over this document together.
Now, you said previously that you weren't afraid of the fact that a premature return of the population to Finnmark could have an adverse propaganda effect. You said you didn't take that at all into consideration. It's practically absurd of me to ask such a question of you. And then you said that you never asked your generals to consider political questions. They were to only pay attention to military matters. Never mind politics. Now, let's look how it looks in fact, at that time, General Rendulic. You said:
"Dear Reich Commissioner:
"The agreement made by Oberst Hermann to bring back Norwegian police into the evacuated territories, after the evacuation for the purpose of salvaging goods which are scarce, came to my knowledge only some time civilians later. I would never have given my consent. Private Norwegian joined up with the police force without it being possible to control them. It goes without saying that soldiers, living in localities and in houses which have been evacuated by the civilian population and condemned to destruction, behave and carry on differently than in localities where they are obliged to have regard for the civilian population.
The natives of the evacuated territories, who go back there for some reason or other, thus obtain an impression which is only too apt to give further impetus to the inflammatory propaganda which arose on account of the evacuation. One must, of course, reckon on reports on the subject and probably also on photographs made by people who have come back from salvaging scarce goods."
Well, let's first talk about this first phase. Just how this document ties in with your statement you have made just previously.
A. With regard to this I would like to say the following. You asked me what I thought about the return of the population into Finnmark and I told you that I didn't think about this at all because such a return could only take place at the end of the war.
Q. Just a minute, General Rendulic. Before we go any further. I think you cited me not quite correctly. I have the question still in front of me and I asked you whether or not you were afraid that a premature return of the population to Finnmark may have a bad propaganda effect in foreign countries when the extent of the destruction was prematurely discovered. That's what I asked you and nothing else.
A. Yes, that's the same, and I answered that there was no thought about this at all because a return of the population was not counted upon until the end of the war. By your question, I understood the return of the would population, when they found out that they could go back to their homeland because the Russians were not following on, perhaps in the year 1945 or 1946, but I was not thinking about the return of individual people, isolated people as mentioned here in this document. I could have no fear of propaganda from those parts of the population which I meant in the answer - that is, the whole population of Finnmark, because the return of these people did not come into the question at all.