Then when in October the attacks against the XIXTh Corps started we were, after all, quite surprised that the Russians were in a position to emphasize their great numerical superiority, even in that barely negotiable terrain. And just around that date, a further order arrived. The four best Mountain Divisions were to be sent to the Continent, which meant more than half of the strength of the Army. These were events which could not possibly have been anticipated, and they naturally influenced our judgment of all problems at hand.
Q General, this order,--to distinguish between concepts which you mentioned,--did the action which was to take place on the basis of the order of the 4th of September have a code name?
A This movement was called "Nordlicht."
Q You were talking about the influence which became effective through the new situation which confronted you?
A This influence was seen particularly in the fact that the Army could not deny that the second evacuation order which had come in on the 20th of October was fully justified. Only the OKW was in a position to know what would be demanded of the Army in the future and which forces would be at the disposal of the Army for those purposes.
Q If you knew, a long time before the second evacuation order arrived, the Russian strength and counted on the Russians' moving up on you, why did you then not demand this order for evacuation and destruction?
A I never waited for orders which were a matter of course, and I never asked for orders in matters which I thought I could regulate myself. I knew quite well what I would have to do in accordance with the situation. If I had not received this second evacuation order of the 28th of October, then I intended to concentrate the population in a tolerable area of living space. The necessary sanitary installations were to be left for them, but everything else--the quarters which would have become available, the highways which existed, all bridges and harbor installations, and everything else-would have been destroyed.
The necessity of these measures was never doubted for a single instant by anybody.
Q One question in between, General: Were the Russian troops up to standard in a military respect?
A In the extreme North the Russians had to have excellent troops because the terrain and the climate were so very difficult, and because the German and the Finnish troops which confronted them were some of the best units which existed throughout this whole war. The Russians were excellent fighters, especially in rocky and forest areas. Their special units, such as the "Ski brigades," which were supplement by people from Siberia, ware excellent and they gave us considerable trouble.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrowmorning.
(THE COURT ADJOURNED AT 1630 to RESUME SESSION at 0930, 31 OCTOBER 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm Idst, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 31 October 1947, 0930. Judge Burke, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the Unites States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
LOH R RENDULIC DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, when we stopped we were discussing the question of Norway. I had asked you yesterday to give us a picture about the strength of the Russian forces and you told us they were technically and numberically superior to your forces; how did you imagine the Russians would follow you up?
A There were two possibilities as to how this could be done. First of all it was possible they could push on up Highway 50, which led from Kirkenes via Tana, then it was possible that they would move along the highway via Vbalov and finally there was the possibility to follow along the socalled Frontier Highway along the Finnish Swedish frontier.
Q General, would you be kind enough to look at the map and show us the most important points on it?
A One possibility would be to push up along Highway 50.
Q At this opportunity may I point out to the Tribunal that that is the highway which the Tribunal saw and used when it went to Norway, along Kirkenes to Hammerfest.
A Then it was possible to use the road to Ivalc, which joined Highway 50. The third possibility w s to push along via Rovanjemmi, along the Swedish Frontier Highway to to the Lyngen Fjord. Those were the three possibilities on the land route. A further possibility was to push up also by a sea operation, which we started in the area Murmans, which is roughly about here. (indicating.) The most suitable places for landing were the Fjords of Alta and Vorstwanger in the Southern part of Finnmark. In to this area the roads lead from Finnland, which the Finns could have used on the land route.
Q You are talking about landing operations, General; did you count on the possibility of such landing operations?
A Landings lead a great deal of advantage for the enemy, because to march through these grey districts in winter time on through the whole of Finnmark is extremely strenuous, and the Russians could have saved themselves this effort if they had carried out a pursuit operation at sea, which would have been considerable more simple. Such an operation had to be anticipated. The OKW also expected landings, even from the British, and they thought they would take place somewhere near Narvik, and at least half a dozen times we were told the opinion of the OKW concerning these landings. That can be frequently found in the War Diary of the Army which arrived here from Washington.
Q Were the prerequisites for such a landing good for the Russians, such a landing as you expected, would take place?
A Yes, we knew that in the Kola Bay there was a great number of ships, hundreds of thousands of tons which were part of the convoys which come through the Artie Sea to Murmansk about twice a month. Those were conveys of about 50 to 60 freighters, protected by battleships, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and other auxiliary vessels. The Kola Bay was reconnoit ered towards the end of September. We saw there a great number of ships, battleships cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc.
, and those, without doubt, were British vessels, because it was well known the Russians only had one battleship in the Artic Sea.
Q General, if I mention to you the figure 230,000 tons of shipping, which I found in one Diary, as said to have been assembled in the Kola Bay, would that be sufficient to carry out a large landing operation?
A Yes, 230,000 tons, can undoubtedly transport six to eight divisions, but this number of tons reported here is not the maximum of what the Russians would be in a position to use, because twice a month another convey of 100,000 to 200,000 tons of convoy vessels arrived in the Kola Bay. Also we learned towards the end of September or beginning of October, (I don't remember the exact date, its in the War diaries). We learned that these convoys, which up until then had been sent by the Russians with British support, were led by the British admirally from the end of September onwards and a landing operation would have been supported through the fact that the allies had in the extreme North undoubted supremacy on Sea and in the air, and those were the best prerequisites that they could possibly have for a landing.
Q Were there other factors as well?
I am mainly thinking about the question of Swedish neutrality; neutrality; did you in this respect have to anticipate any difficulties?
A Yes, we had to anticipate a violation of Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier. It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to do the same as we had demanded from them in 1941. In that year we had, with the consent of the Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier. It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to let them do the same as we had demanded. Of course, that could have only been an operation of secondary importance which would have mainly been directed against the area near Narvik.
The main operation was to be expected as against southern Finnmark.
Q In Southern Finnmark is a landing operation dependent on the season?
A No, it is not dependent on the climate, because under the influence of the Gulf stream the fjords do not freeze up. Also there is not very much snow in those districts in winter, but it is quite cold. It was known that the Russians as well as to the Finns were extremely well-equipped for this winter climate.
Q General, if I may summarize your statements, you said that the Army found itself in an extremely difficult position; did the difficult position have any effect on the morale of the troops?
A Yes, it had a considerable effect on the morale of the troops. Everybody was aware of the difficulty of the position. From censorship of soldiers mail we learned that the morale of the soldiers sometimes bordered on panic. We found letters written by soldiers in which they said that a "second Stalingrad is in preparation", "the Army is doomed", "When we freeze in with the Artie winter we will freeze as Russian prisoners".
Q Did the Russian propaganda and if so to what extent, make use of this situation?
A The Russian propaganda made very clever use of this situation. Above all they tried to make the men distrust their leaders. Very soon after Finland left the allies, by radio as well as by leaflets they spread the news that the Commander in Chief of the Mountain Army was an Austrian and he wanted this Army to fall into the hands of the Russians, but this fact was discovered and his withdrawal and dismissal was to be expected. In connection with the events of 20 July 1944 and the consequences of this event, which had only happened a short time before, this propaganda found fertile soil. There was a very dangerous crisis amongst the soldiers especially with regard to confidence in their leaders which could have led to a catastrophe if the Army or parts of it came into difficult situations. In order to counteract the effects of the Russian propaganda, Hitler, on the 17 September, decorated me with the Golden Cross of Honor, and thus the effect of the propaganda was counteracted immediately.
Q General, when were you convinced that the Russians would not push up on the land route via Northern Finnmark?
A I cannot tell you exactly when I became convinced of that fact. I assume it was towards the latter part of November.
Q Well, what was it you ascertained at that time?
A It had become known that the Russians had only followed us up past tho Kirkenes with weak forces.
At first however, we had to assume that he wanted to wait and gain time in order to allow things to settle down and to consolidate his forces, after many weeks of hard fighting, which had cost him many losses, and as one is apt to do as a rule when one prepares a new operation.
Q Was it possible to reconnoiter the Russian positions so that you could be informed about them?
A Drying the decisive period of time as of the middle of November for practical purposes it was no longer possible to reconnoiter. airbases had all been transferred to Norway. The nearest one was in Butevos, which is about 1,000 kilometers distant from the Murmansk railway. Around about that time daylight lasted only a very few hours each day. The Artic night had already extended over the majority of the 24-hours. Therefore, in such a great distance for a flight and with the very short period of daylight, it was not possible to reconnoiter the movements along the Murmansk railway thoroughly.
Q General, would you be kind enough to show us on this occasion the distances on the map?
A Butevos is here. (indicating) I would like to point out at this point, Your Honor, that in Butevos we had in the meantime made an interim landing. That would have been the distance of the approach for reconnoitering the movements along the Murmansk railway.
Q Therefore, you would have had to fly over Sweden and Finland and would have had to fly around this area?
A We would have had to fly over the whole of Finland.
Q When was it certain to you that Russia had withdrawn forces from our former Lapland Front?
A The first news concerning this fact was received towards the beginning of December. It was a communication from Army Group North which was stationed near the E st Prussian Frontier, and it had been confronted by a division which up to that time had confronted my front in Lapland. We did not receive any further news concerning any other forces.
My front in Lapland faced about 30 Russian divisions, and the Finnish Front faced the same number. These forces would have in any case been far too strong in the very restricted area in Finnmark. The withdrawal of forces from the Lapland area could not give us any information concerning the real intents of the Russians in Finnmark. How many forces the Russians actually did withdraw never became known to us, and I do not know it to this day.
Q And for what reason did you after that period continue the evacuation and the destruction?
A The evacuation had, at that date, been actually carried out for all practical purposes. The report concerning the evacuation is dated the 25 November. Therefore, it can be assumed that around that date it has been concluded. The destruction which was carried out also in the Southern area of Finnmark had to be continued, because moving up on Highway 50 was not the only possibility which was open to the Russians. The even more likely operation as of November would have been a landing in Southern Finnmark.
Q Why were the destructions which you carried out not restricted to the villages along Highway 50?
AAt first sight one might suppose that marching troops would only need the localities along the march route for quarters, but that is not the case. Even in districts which are densely populated there were and are many villages, like for instance, in the center of Russia. The villages along the march route were never sufficient for the accommodating of the marching troops.
Instead these troops had to use also those places which were a good distance away from the march route, and they had to take into account the great strain of the march, when it was necessary to quarter them in houses, et cetera, and that would have undoubtedly been necessary at that time in Finnmark because of the climate. If the weather is good those extra marches can be saved by spending the night in tents right on the road.
DR. FRITSCH: May it pleast the Tribunal, I would like to submit a photostat of this map for information purposes because it is rather difficult to see the map.
Q. General, how about inhabited locations along the coast and along the fjords?
A. The inhabited localities along the coast and along the fjords were of the same significance. One has to consider the fact that Highway 50 led partly immediately along the coast and partly was very near the coast. It further has to be considered that an army does not only march; it also has to live, especially when it is supposed to prepare an attack. Then the army is apt to spread over the whole country. Not only the troops have to accommodated but there are also many installations to be taken care of such as work shops, hospitals, depots, installations for supply; and for all these installations everything that was there concerning houses, et cetera, was necessary to accommodate all these operations and that was the military significance of the apparently far distant inhabited localities.
Q. Did that also apply for the fishing villages which were way up in Norway?
A. Yes, the same fact applied to them. As a rule, they could only be reached by cutters or boats. These were the most important means of transportation in that district.
We also had our bases in the fjords in those isolated localities and we maintained communication with them by boats.
Q. I would now like to talk about one specific place and that is Hammerfest. Will you please tell us the significance of Hammerfest?
A. We worked through all the possibilities which the enemy had concerning landings. On that occasion we again and again were confronted with the fact that Hammerfest would be the best point for supply for troops which had already landed. It would be a good starting point and would be a good place for distribution for the more detailed supplies to the other landing points in the fjords. Further, Hammerfest was situated in the vicinity of Highway 50. In order to get there all one had to do was to cross the narrow Kvaenangen Fjord and then one had an excellent road. The place itself could accommodate a strong regiment or even a division if necessary, This double significance of Hammerfest was a fact for an enemy in pursuit. You must not think that we destroyed wantonly or senselessly. Everything we did was dictated by the needs of the enemy. That was its necessity.
Q. And what was your attitude now toward the evacuation order?
A. I was fully aware of the facts of this evacuation order on the population but I also knew that the execution of the evacuation would mean a considerable burden to the army. In spite of this I had to obey the order. Concerning the necessity of carrying out destructions, my opinions coincided with the opinions of the OKW. It was a matter of course to me and everybody else that destructions had to be carried out. My opinion deviated from Hitler's opinion in the beginning only in the one factor.
I did not think it was absolutely necessary to transfer the copulation to other areas but I could not close my eyes to Hitler's reasons of military necessity. I could not deny that they were justified.
Jodl warned me too. He said this time I had better follow the evacuation order since Hitler insisted under all circumstances that this order be carried out. Furthermore, I knew -- and this is also contained in the OKW order -that the most decisive factor in this whole affair was the Reich Commissar in Norway. It was well known that he, this man, was very angry because the first evacuation order had not been carried out and now he would closely supervise all activities of the Army. It was therefore quite impossible not to obey this second evacuation order.
Finally, I had to tell myself that it would possibly be better for the population to be transferred to other areas rather than to spend the hard winter in the destroyed country. I participated in both winner battles in Russia. Therefore, I know what flight from cold means. I had to realize that the Russians, if they pushed up on us and if they confronted the choice of either saving themselves by using what remained in the way of shelter or sparing the population, it was certain that they would not spare the population. Therefore, in the final analysis it was the best thing for the population that they were removed.
Q. You were talking about the Reich Commissar for Norway. Will you give us the name of this man, please?
A. His name was Terboven.
Q. That is the same Terboven whom you have already mentioned?
A. Yes, he is.
Q. General, what were the measures you ordered for the evacuation?
A. I have to say something else first. The operation which had to be carried out by the army was possibly the most difficult land operation of the whole war. During those days I said to my Chief of Staff: "If sometime after this war you have to train general staff officers, than you will have to make this operation a basis of the training because it's impossible to think of anything more difficult." The army was spread over an area of 600 kilometers. That is, it was spread over a wiser area than, for instance, the Allied forces in France and these forces were more than a million man strong. The problem was to relieve this army out of an encirclement from three sides and that, in battle with a superior enemy. Then this army would have to be concentrated on two highways and, finally, it would have to march along only one highway. All that would have to be done on foot and in the Arctic winter. That meant an enormous task for my staff, a more difficult task cannot be imagined. I could not burden it further with the extensive work concerning the evacuation. Therefore, I formed a special staff for this operation -- that is, the evacuation.
Q. General, can you indicate to us on this map the area over which the Army was spread?
A. No, I am afraid I can't. The whole eastern part is missing.
Q. You said the eastern part of that area is not contained on the map?
A. Yes, that is what I said.
Q. Did the evacuation staff receive definite directives?
A. It received certain instructions mainly with respect to cooperation with other agencies of the Wehrmacht and with the Norwegian government.
I am afraid I don't know any details, that was the work of my Chief of Staff. All I know is that I emphasized particularly that the evacuation had to be carried out with all consideration for the population. Around that time I had learned unofficially for some time that after the army had went back to Norway I was to take over the post of the Commander-in-Chief ocer Norway and immediately after the evacuation order I received the official order for this transfer. I attached the greatest importance to good relations between myself and the Norwegian population. For this reason alone I insisted that the evacuation would not give any cause for misgivings amongst the population. You may also rest assured that if any kind of excesses became known to me, any unnecessary harshness or any inconsideration, I would have taken counter-measures immediately. I was not a man who would let himself be prevented from carrying out his intentions by some action of a subordinate agency.
Q General, I will now have Document Book XXII shown to you. Would you like to turn up page 1 in your book there which is also page 1 of the English text? This is Document NOKW-1776. It is Exhibit 300. This is an excerpt from the OKW order to return to Norway for good. Up to that date the army had been under instructions to remain in Northern Lapland. This excerpt contains the order for the destruction of all installations which might be of use to the enemy. Would you please look at the third paragraph? There it is ordered that the able bodied population of Norway is to be taken along and to be put at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner for Labor Assignment. I want to know from you whether this part of the order and the part of the next paragraph -that is, the carrying along of Finnish hostages -- were these parts of the order carried out?
A No.
Q Would you continue, please.
A The handing over of the able bodies population to the Reich Commissioner for Labor never actually took place. That was an order issued from the "green table" which was given without knowledge of the situation, and where the carrying along of Finnish hostages is concerned I can only tell you that we laughed about this part of the order. That was completely out of the question.
Q Would you now in the same document book look at the following document which is Exhibit 501. This is document NOKW-114. It can be found on page 3 of the German and 4 of the English document book. This is an order by the army addressed to the 19th Mountain Army Corps. What was the purpose of this order and why was it necessary?
A The order ordered the destructions in the so-called Potsame territory, this is the eastern area in Northern Lapland. This area had to be coded by the Finns to Russia in 1944. Today this area is Russian territory. The order further states that reconnaissance has to be carried out concerning destructions in Norway. These measures were a matter of course, they did not have to be ordered.
Q Now, General, would you like to have a look at the following document which is Exhibit 302. You find it on page of the German document book and on page 6 of the English text. This is Document NOKW-097. Here the Army makes certain applications and requests to the OKW. Can you tell us why this was done?
A On the 4th of October the Army received the order to retreat to Norway. This task required quite a number of preparatory measures as, for instance, the subordination of those troops in Finmark which up to that date had been subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief for Norway. Further, there was another factor which I would like to point particularly. An agreement was to be reached between the Army and Navy High Command for Norway. The Army did not ask for a subordination but merely an instruction concerning cooperation and there was never any kind of subordination. We cannot assume that the OKW would do more than the Army asked them to do. Besides, in paragraph 4 we find the request to issue instructions concerning destruction of the nickel works, Kolloskioki. These instructions had to be given because after all these works were not under the Army but under the armaments ministry.
Finally, in paragraph 5 there is a request to the effect that the Quartermaster General of the 20th Mountain Army be appointed Evacuation Commissar. I would like to point this out because the English word "evacuation" does mean evacuation, but has nothing to do with what we meant in that particular instance when we talked about the evacuation of the population. This evacuation was not concerned with human beings but only with the property of the armed forces. Around this date, the 5th of October, there no such thing as the evacuation order existed.
Q Would you now look at the next exhibit which is 503? You find it on page 6 of the German and page 8 of the English document book. This is document -- I beg your pardon -- I withdraw this remark. It is -- I have a correction in my book concerning the document number.
I shall mention the corrected document, No. 754-PS. This document, General, is the Fuehrer order for the evacuation of population dated the 28th of October. You told us quite a number of tilings about the principles for this evacuation. Now I would like you to give us once again your comments on this order, and I want to particularly stress the question of the difference between this order and the one previously given.
A In this order it is stated that Finnmark be evacuated and installations there be destroyed, It can be seen from this order that the Reich Commissar was the man mainly responsible for this order. The military necessities are emphasized, the necessity for the evacuation, as well as for the destruction. There is one sentence which I would like to draw to your attention. It is the last sentence in the second paragraph, and it reads: "Compassion for the civilian population is uncalled for." This sentence should not be regarded as an invitation to take harsh measures. It is to be understood in connection with the next sentence, which is the first sentence of the next passage, where it says, "The troops carrying out this order must be made to understand that within a few months the Norwegians will be thankful for having been saved from Bolshevism etc., and that the whole operation is in the interest of the Norwegians." It had to be expected that people would be kind and would comply with requests of individual Norwegians to exempt them from evacuation, and that these men would not know that thus they would face a deathly danger. There is one thing which I can add here, and that is that there was an oral explanation of this order to the effect that Hitler attached particular importance to the measures ordered for Finnmark because he counted on the Exile Government's landing and settling in Finnmark, if this area was left completely intact. At this occasion I received the warning from Jodl which I have previously mentioned. The warning was to the effect that this time I had better carry out the evacuation, and it was pointed out to me that the Reich Commissar played an important part in this affair.
Q In order to clarify this complex, which was this evacuation order? Was it the first or the second order?
A This was the second evacuation order.
Q Now, on Page of your Document Book and on Page 10 of the English Document Book XXII, you find a document under Exhibit No. 504, This is document No. NOKW-086. This is the order issued by the Mountain Army for the evacuation.
Would you, first of all, give us your comments on the distribution list?
A Yes, this is my order, issued by me for the evacuation. The distribution list shows the following: This was issued as an order to three corps. They were the corps connected with the evacuation. It went to the most southern corps for information, this corps had no connection with the evacuation. The fourth copy went for information purposes to the Air Force and to the Navy. These two agencies were not under the Army. And it went for information to the Armed Forces Commander Norway and to the Reich Commissioner for Norway, and these two agencies were, of course, not subordinated to the Army either.
Q General, would you now give us some individual comments on this order, particularly would you please answer the following question? Is this order identical with Hitler's order?
A This order was composed on the basis of Hi. tier is order and, of course, it is in the nature of things that it contains more details than Hitler's order did. Under passages one and two, the communication which was given in Hitler's order is reproduced, and I would like to say the following in this connection: According to our regulations point one of every order had to contain the enemy position. Point two was to reproduce the order by the superior agency as literally as possible. In this instance there was no enemy and, therefore, the communication contained in the original order was reproduced in passages one and two as literally as possible. Apart from this the order contains general directives for the carrying out of the evacuation. There are a few details here which I would like to point out as, for instance, that only people able to carry out marches are to be put on treks. Therefore, the order was not given in the way as it might be assumed from those papers which we received from Norway, that people were herded together and were just driven down Highway 50. But instead it gives here quite a number of welfare measures for the benefit of the population. These were then explained in detail in the first evacuation orders of the Evacuation Staff which I signed myself.
This order is, unfortunately, not amongst these documents. There is something I would like to point out from passage six, and that is that the ships which were used for the evacuation were property of the Reich Commissar, as sit is expressed here. There were quite a few disagreeable matters there as can be seen from the Norwegian documents, but the Army had no influence on these ships. I would particularly like to emphasize passage seven. This point states my intention and my wish for the evacuation to be carried out. It says here, "I request all offices concerned to carry out this evacuation in a sense of a relief action for the Norwegian population. Though there be necessities here and there to be severe all of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to keep them alive." A person who orders something like this cannot desire cruelty and ruthlessness, but I am not in a position to put a general next to every lance corporal to make sure that the orders are carried out in a proper way.
Q General, will you now please turn to the next exhibit --- Exhibit No. 505? This is also contained in Document Book XXII, on Page 12 of the German text and on Page 13 of the English text. This document is numbered NOKW_48. It is a "top secret" document. Did you have anything to do with this matter, General?
A This is an order by the OKW, addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Navy. This order shows that the Commander in Chief of the Navy received this order on the 30th of November 1944. Therefore, this order has to be dated prior to that date, that is the 30th of November 1933. The order contains a number of directives and instructions to the Armed Forces Commanders in Norway and Denmark, concerning the achievement of several measures with the Reich Commissars. All I wanted to say in this connection is that this order could not have anything to do with me because I did not become Armed Forces Commander for Norway until the 18th of December of that year.