We also had our bases in the fjords in those isolated localities and we maintained communication with them by boats.
Q. I would now like to talk about one specific place and that is Hammerfest. Will you please tell us the significance of Hammerfest?
A. We worked through all the possibilities which the enemy had concerning landings. On that occasion we again and again were confronted with the fact that Hammerfest would be the best point for supply for troops which had already landed. It would be a good starting point and would be a good place for distribution for the more detailed supplies to the other landing points in the fjords. Further, Hammerfest was situated in the vicinity of Highway 50. In order to get there all one had to do was to cross the narrow Kvaenangen Fjord and then one had an excellent road. The place itself could accommodate a strong regiment or even a division if necessary, This double significance of Hammerfest was a fact for an enemy in pursuit. You must not think that we destroyed wantonly or senselessly. Everything we did was dictated by the needs of the enemy. That was its necessity.
Q. And what was your attitude now toward the evacuation order?
A. I was fully aware of the facts of this evacuation order on the population but I also knew that the execution of the evacuation would mean a considerable burden to the army. In spite of this I had to obey the order. Concerning the necessity of carrying out destructions, my opinions coincided with the opinions of the OKW. It was a matter of course to me and everybody else that destructions had to be carried out. My opinion deviated from Hitler's opinion in the beginning only in the one factor.
I did not think it was absolutely necessary to transfer the copulation to other areas but I could not close my eyes to Hitler's reasons of military necessity. I could not deny that they were justified.
Jodl warned me too. He said this time I had better follow the evacuation order since Hitler insisted under all circumstances that this order be carried out. Furthermore, I knew -- and this is also contained in the OKW order -that the most decisive factor in this whole affair was the Reich Commissar in Norway. It was well known that he, this man, was very angry because the first evacuation order had not been carried out and now he would closely supervise all activities of the Army. It was therefore quite impossible not to obey this second evacuation order.
Finally, I had to tell myself that it would possibly be better for the population to be transferred to other areas rather than to spend the hard winter in the destroyed country. I participated in both winner battles in Russia. Therefore, I know what flight from cold means. I had to realize that the Russians, if they pushed up on us and if they confronted the choice of either saving themselves by using what remained in the way of shelter or sparing the population, it was certain that they would not spare the population. Therefore, in the final analysis it was the best thing for the population that they were removed.
Q. You were talking about the Reich Commissar for Norway. Will you give us the name of this man, please?
A. His name was Terboven.
Q. That is the same Terboven whom you have already mentioned?
A. Yes, he is.
Q. General, what were the measures you ordered for the evacuation?
A. I have to say something else first. The operation which had to be carried out by the army was possibly the most difficult land operation of the whole war. During those days I said to my Chief of Staff: "If sometime after this war you have to train general staff officers, than you will have to make this operation a basis of the training because it's impossible to think of anything more difficult." The army was spread over an area of 600 kilometers. That is, it was spread over a wiser area than, for instance, the Allied forces in France and these forces were more than a million man strong. The problem was to relieve this army out of an encirclement from three sides and that, in battle with a superior enemy. Then this army would have to be concentrated on two highways and, finally, it would have to march along only one highway. All that would have to be done on foot and in the Arctic winter. That meant an enormous task for my staff, a more difficult task cannot be imagined. I could not burden it further with the extensive work concerning the evacuation. Therefore, I formed a special staff for this operation -- that is, the evacuation.
Q. General, can you indicate to us on this map the area over which the Army was spread?
A. No, I am afraid I can't. The whole eastern part is missing.
Q. You said the eastern part of that area is not contained on the map?
A. Yes, that is what I said.
Q. Did the evacuation staff receive definite directives?
A. It received certain instructions mainly with respect to cooperation with other agencies of the Wehrmacht and with the Norwegian government.
I am afraid I don't know any details, that was the work of my Chief of Staff. All I know is that I emphasized particularly that the evacuation had to be carried out with all consideration for the population. Around that time I had learned unofficially for some time that after the army had went back to Norway I was to take over the post of the Commander-in-Chief ocer Norway and immediately after the evacuation order I received the official order for this transfer. I attached the greatest importance to good relations between myself and the Norwegian population. For this reason alone I insisted that the evacuation would not give any cause for misgivings amongst the population. You may also rest assured that if any kind of excesses became known to me, any unnecessary harshness or any inconsideration, I would have taken counter-measures immediately. I was not a man who would let himself be prevented from carrying out his intentions by some action of a subordinate agency.
Q General, I will now have Document Book XXII shown to you. Would you like to turn up page 1 in your book there which is also page 1 of the English text? This is Document NOKW-1776. It is Exhibit 300. This is an excerpt from the OKW order to return to Norway for good. Up to that date the army had been under instructions to remain in Northern Lapland. This excerpt contains the order for the destruction of all installations which might be of use to the enemy. Would you please look at the third paragraph? There it is ordered that the able bodied population of Norway is to be taken along and to be put at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner for Labor Assignment. I want to know from you whether this part of the order and the part of the next paragraph -that is, the carrying along of Finnish hostages -- were these parts of the order carried out?
A No.
Q Would you continue, please.
A The handing over of the able bodies population to the Reich Commissioner for Labor never actually took place. That was an order issued from the "green table" which was given without knowledge of the situation, and where the carrying along of Finnish hostages is concerned I can only tell you that we laughed about this part of the order. That was completely out of the question.
Q Would you now in the same document book look at the following document which is Exhibit 501. This is document NOKW-114. It can be found on page 3 of the German and 4 of the English document book. This is an order by the army addressed to the 19th Mountain Army Corps. What was the purpose of this order and why was it necessary?
A The order ordered the destructions in the so-called Potsame territory, this is the eastern area in Northern Lapland. This area had to be coded by the Finns to Russia in 1944. Today this area is Russian territory. The order further states that reconnaissance has to be carried out concerning destructions in Norway. These measures were a matter of course, they did not have to be ordered.
Q Now, General, would you like to have a look at the following document which is Exhibit 302. You find it on page of the German document book and on page 6 of the English text. This is Document NOKW-097. Here the Army makes certain applications and requests to the OKW. Can you tell us why this was done?
A On the 4th of October the Army received the order to retreat to Norway. This task required quite a number of preparatory measures as, for instance, the subordination of those troops in Finmark which up to that date had been subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief for Norway. Further, there was another factor which I would like to point particularly. An agreement was to be reached between the Army and Navy High Command for Norway. The Army did not ask for a subordination but merely an instruction concerning cooperation and there was never any kind of subordination. We cannot assume that the OKW would do more than the Army asked them to do. Besides, in paragraph 4 we find the request to issue instructions concerning destruction of the nickel works, Kolloskioki. These instructions had to be given because after all these works were not under the Army but under the armaments ministry.
Finally, in paragraph 5 there is a request to the effect that the Quartermaster General of the 20th Mountain Army be appointed Evacuation Commissar. I would like to point this out because the English word "evacuation" does mean evacuation, but has nothing to do with what we meant in that particular instance when we talked about the evacuation of the population. This evacuation was not concerned with human beings but only with the property of the armed forces. Around this date, the 5th of October, there no such thing as the evacuation order existed.
Q Would you now look at the next exhibit which is 503? You find it on page 6 of the German and page 8 of the English document book. This is document -- I beg your pardon -- I withdraw this remark. It is -- I have a correction in my book concerning the document number.
I shall mention the corrected document, No. 754-PS. This document, General, is the Fuehrer order for the evacuation of population dated the 28th of October. You told us quite a number of tilings about the principles for this evacuation. Now I would like you to give us once again your comments on this order, and I want to particularly stress the question of the difference between this order and the one previously given.
A In this order it is stated that Finnmark be evacuated and installations there be destroyed, It can be seen from this order that the Reich Commissar was the man mainly responsible for this order. The military necessities are emphasized, the necessity for the evacuation, as well as for the destruction. There is one sentence which I would like to draw to your attention. It is the last sentence in the second paragraph, and it reads: "Compassion for the civilian population is uncalled for." This sentence should not be regarded as an invitation to take harsh measures. It is to be understood in connection with the next sentence, which is the first sentence of the next passage, where it says, "The troops carrying out this order must be made to understand that within a few months the Norwegians will be thankful for having been saved from Bolshevism etc., and that the whole operation is in the interest of the Norwegians." It had to be expected that people would be kind and would comply with requests of individual Norwegians to exempt them from evacuation, and that these men would not know that thus they would face a deathly danger. There is one thing which I can add here, and that is that there was an oral explanation of this order to the effect that Hitler attached particular importance to the measures ordered for Finnmark because he counted on the Exile Government's landing and settling in Finnmark, if this area was left completely intact. At this occasion I received the warning from Jodl which I have previously mentioned. The warning was to the effect that this time I had better carry out the evacuation, and it was pointed out to me that the Reich Commissar played an important part in this affair.
Q In order to clarify this complex, which was this evacuation order? Was it the first or the second order?
A This was the second evacuation order.
Q Now, on Page of your Document Book and on Page 10 of the English Document Book XXII, you find a document under Exhibit No. 504, This is document No. NOKW-086. This is the order issued by the Mountain Army for the evacuation.
Would you, first of all, give us your comments on the distribution list?
A Yes, this is my order, issued by me for the evacuation. The distribution list shows the following: This was issued as an order to three corps. They were the corps connected with the evacuation. It went to the most southern corps for information, this corps had no connection with the evacuation. The fourth copy went for information purposes to the Air Force and to the Navy. These two agencies were not under the Army. And it went for information to the Armed Forces Commander Norway and to the Reich Commissioner for Norway, and these two agencies were, of course, not subordinated to the Army either.
Q General, would you now give us some individual comments on this order, particularly would you please answer the following question? Is this order identical with Hitler's order?
A This order was composed on the basis of Hi. tier is order and, of course, it is in the nature of things that it contains more details than Hitler's order did. Under passages one and two, the communication which was given in Hitler's order is reproduced, and I would like to say the following in this connection: According to our regulations point one of every order had to contain the enemy position. Point two was to reproduce the order by the superior agency as literally as possible. In this instance there was no enemy and, therefore, the communication contained in the original order was reproduced in passages one and two as literally as possible. Apart from this the order contains general directives for the carrying out of the evacuation. There are a few details here which I would like to point out as, for instance, that only people able to carry out marches are to be put on treks. Therefore, the order was not given in the way as it might be assumed from those papers which we received from Norway, that people were herded together and were just driven down Highway 50. But instead it gives here quite a number of welfare measures for the benefit of the population. These were then explained in detail in the first evacuation orders of the Evacuation Staff which I signed myself.
This order is, unfortunately, not amongst these documents. There is something I would like to point out from passage six, and that is that the ships which were used for the evacuation were property of the Reich Commissar, as sit is expressed here. There were quite a few disagreeable matters there as can be seen from the Norwegian documents, but the Army had no influence on these ships. I would particularly like to emphasize passage seven. This point states my intention and my wish for the evacuation to be carried out. It says here, "I request all offices concerned to carry out this evacuation in a sense of a relief action for the Norwegian population. Though there be necessities here and there to be severe all of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to keep them alive." A person who orders something like this cannot desire cruelty and ruthlessness, but I am not in a position to put a general next to every lance corporal to make sure that the orders are carried out in a proper way.
Q General, will you now please turn to the next exhibit --- Exhibit No. 505? This is also contained in Document Book XXII, on Page 12 of the German text and on Page 13 of the English text. This document is numbered NOKW_48. It is a "top secret" document. Did you have anything to do with this matter, General?
A This is an order by the OKW, addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Navy. This order shows that the Commander in Chief of the Navy received this order on the 30th of November 1944. Therefore, this order has to be dated prior to that date, that is the 30th of November 1933. The order contains a number of directives and instructions to the Armed Forces Commanders in Norway and Denmark, concerning the achievement of several measures with the Reich Commissars. All I wanted to say in this connection is that this order could not have anything to do with me because I did not become Armed Forces Commander for Norway until the 18th of December of that year.
I neither gained knowledge of this order nor did I carry it out in any respect.
Q Would you now please turn to Page 14 of your Document Book, which is Page 16 of the English Document Book? This is Exhibit 506, and the Document is No. N0KW-090. General, this is the evacuation report "Hermann." We did not want to go into the details of this report because it is known to everybody, but please turn to Page 5 and have a look at Paragraph 4, which is contained on that page. There is some talk here about a shelling of the village of Kjoelle, which was supposed to have been carried out by units of the Navy. What is the connection between the Army and the Navy? Was there a relation of subordination of the Navy under the XXth Mountain Army?
A No, the Navy was in no respect subordinate to the XXth Mountain Army. This shelling of the village I cannot imagine, even on the basis of this report, could, at the best, have become known to me after the fact on the basis of this report, but I did not remember the incident concerned here. I don't know what the report is talking about. The Norwegian document show one incident where a Navy vessel fired on some people with machine guns, and one woman was killed on this occasion. Maybe it is this incident that is meant here. I don't know any details. In any case this naval unit was not subordinate to me.
Q. We will now turn to Document Book XXIII. Do you have the Document Book there, General? Please turn to page 13 in your Document Book, which is page 12--one, two, in the English text. This is Exhibit 514, which is Document Norway 4. It is a communication to the Corps headquarters of the XXth Mountain Army. Would you please give us your comments on this communication?
A. A divisional commander comments here on the possibilities of the evacuation. The letter is dated the 29th of October 1944. It is strange that this communication has a receipt stamp of the XIXth Army Corps, dated the 31st of December 1944. The XIX Corps had been frequently on the move during that period, and I can only imagine that this communication, which is of no particular importance, got delayed and never actually, reached my knowledge.
Q. In this same Document Book would you please turn to page 30, which is page 23 of the English Document Book. This is Document Norway 8, land it has been submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit 517. It is a report dated the 4th of January 1945. Will you briefly give us your comments please?
A. It is a report from a division to the XIXth Corps. This report did not go any further than the XIXth Corps, and, therefore, I did not gain knowledge of it. The purpose of the report was to gather material to counteract the strong radio propaganda from abroad, directed against the so-called atrocities of the evacuation. I can only say that I subscribe to every line of this report. All I would like to point out particularly is page 2 of the report, which shows clearly that the town of Hammerfest was almost completely evacuated on the basis of voluntary abdications. On page 3, which is page 30 of the English text, it is pointed out that the BBC asked the Norwegian population not to comply with the evacuation order, but instead to withdraw into the valleys and there these people would have died. In the next passage it is mentioned that one attempt had been made to find the people who had been left behind, and that they were then evacuated. There is some talk here about relief actions for those who had remained behind.
Of course these actions were reported in the Norwegian reports, but they were distorted by hatred. The term "relief action" for this population was used in the same manner by the Norwegian witness here, General Dahl, because he too had exhausted all his activities in such relief actions for those parts of the populartion which had escaped the evacuation. There is nothing else I have to say.
Q. General, this brings us to Exhibit 519, which is on page 54 of your Document and on page 60--six, zero--of the English Document Book. This is Document Norway No. 10. It is the proclamation to the population for evacuation which has been repeatedly mentioned here. Who drafted this proclamation?
A. It was drafted by the Reich Commissar in Oslo. My staff was asked by telephone for my agreement, and I was asked to sign my name on the document. And, of course, I could not refuse this request, particularly since there is nothing illegal contained in this proclamation. I would like to point out that the third passage of the proclamation has not been translated in the English document book and this passage reads as follows: "The German occupation authorities for this reason show themselves prepared to support the evacuation carried out by the Norwegian Government. It will be supported with all means at the disposal of the German agencies.
Q. Then, will you please turn to page 83 in your Document Book -eight, three, which is 89--eight, nine--of the English text. This is Exhibit 522, Document Norway No. 13. It is an Order of the Day where you make it known to the troops that you have taken over the post of the Commander in Chief for Norway. You were charged with this order under Count 2. Will you please give your comments on it?
A. Well, I don' t see why I am charged with it. All I do hero is to announce to the troops and to other command authorities that I have been made Armed Forces Commander of Norway, and it is a matter of course that this has to be done. In such orders, which are rather formal, it is common usage to conclude then with, "Long Live the Fuehrer."
That is done in all countries. I don't see what is incriminating in this.
Q. Now, let us turn to Exhibit 512, which is on page 5 of the German text and on page 4 of the English text of this same Document Book. It is a report of a police official. It is page 5 of the German text and page 4 of the English text, the same Document Book. The Document is Norway No. 2. This is a report by a police official in Vadsoe. Did you ever gain knowledge of the things mentioned in this document?
A. No, I never gained knowledge of them. The action described here seems to be identical with the shelling by the Naval units, which was mentioned in the report "Hermann," but apart from that there is nothing I can say about this whole document.
Q. General, in this context there is one other question which has been touched upon earlier. What became known to you of actions during evacuation which might be objected to.
A. Reports of the troops did not bring anything of this kind to my knowledge, and practically that could not be expected of them either. But the British radio, the Russian radio, the Swedish radio, and the Swedish press did bring certain incidents to my attention. All kinds of things were asserted in these reports, and I had every single assertion followed up. I intended to take a large-scale countermeasure against such excesses if they really bad occurred, but all these assertions turned out to be mere inventions, or else they were matters in which neither the Army nor the troops had been guilty. I would like to give an example.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. We'll rake our morning recess at this time.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN)
31 0ct.-M-JP-8-1-Love (Int. Evand)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may continue, Dr. Fritsch.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, first of all we have dealt with the military documents concerning Norway and now we are dealing with some documents which I would like to describe as civilian ones. Before the recess I asked you what you have to say about objectionable occurrences in connection with the carrying out of the evacuation and you stated that in particular you received information about these things from the foreign press but that these reports were either terribly exaggerated or else distorted. Now I would like you to continue with describing these things. Please, would you do so.
A. I just wanted to quote an example of Russian propaganda. The Russian radio reported when the Russian troops came into the neighborhood of Kirkones they found Norwegians living in cases, norwegians who were sick and had no medicines, etc. and they added that in such a condition the Germans left the Norwegians behind, but to this I could only say that people concerned were people who had resisted being evacuated and they had arrived in this condition through their own fault. Another report was in the Swedish press. Some Norwegians were found frozen to death in the Swedish-Norwegian frontier area. They had insufficient clothing and had marched through the mountains and so were frozen to death. These were cleanly people who did not want to be evacuated and had resolved by themselves to find their way to Sweden and against this too the Army was powerless; and then the Swedish press brought a report about the fact that during the evacuation the Germans carried out such ruthless destruction that they set a house on fire in which there was old man and the name of the locality was also given. In order to get this straight I ordered an investigation under military law. This was carried out by the XIX Corps and in all details, it was shown clearly that no house had been set on fire unless it had been previously searched in all corners. In this way the propaganda accusations went on, but not in one single case did I find any justified reason.
Q. General, please turn to page 19 of the document book XXIII, English page 17; this is document No. 516. Excuse me, Exhibit No. 516. This contains a report of the City Engineer of Hammerfest which has been accepted here for whatever probative value it may have. In this connection I am only interested to know when Hammerfest was destroyed.
A. From the report it can be seen that the destruction started at the beginning of November, and that in January and February the destructions continued.
Q. Now with regard to the last document we are going to deal with here, this is Exhibit No. 521, German page 68, and English page 71. It is document No. 12. This document contains a calculation of the war damages in Finmark. Can you please comment briefly to this question.
A. In order to comment on the war damages, of course, there is of course, the basis missing the basic documents. From this report it can be assumed however, that some items contain the total war damages and then that the original damage figures were even increased in later corrections. From these reports it can also be seen that in Norway until the preparation for this trial tarted, nobody thought about these damages at all, and therefore these calculations bear the characteristics of great speed and superfluity, and from the date it can also be seen that these calculations were very quickly made for the purpose of this trial, and I think that these facts speak for themselves.
Q. And now a few general questions; until when were you Commander in Chief in Norway?
A. Until January 13, 1945.
Q. And then where did you go?
A. Then I had the supreme command of Army Group North during the battle in East Prussia.
Q. And then later on you took over Army Group South, when was that?
A. Before that I had Army Group Kurland in the 6th Kurland battle,a and last of all I was in charge of Army Group South.
Q. Army Group South was in operation against whom?
A. Army Group South was in operation against the Russians in the area between Czechslovakia and Yugoslavia, and later on individual units fought against the Americans, who came from the rear , from the West into the back of the Army Group.
Q. And when did you cease hostilities?
A. I stopped fighting on the 7th of May, 0900 hours, and this was against the Americans, and then I gave the order to the four armies of the Army Group that on the evening of the 7th they should withdraw from the Russian Front, and should retreat towards the west.
Q. And with which American General did you negotiate?
A. I negotiated with General Walker, the Commanding General of the 20th American Tank Corps, deputizing for General Patton, the Commander in Chief of the 3rd American Army.
Q. And then when were you made a prisoner of war?
A. On the 7th of May I gave myself up as prisoner of war to the Americans.
Q. What are you now?
A. I am convinced that I am still a prisoner of war.
Q. And did you sign a statement to the effect that you were in agreement with your release from being a prisoner of war?
A. No, it wasn't like that. I signed the release certificate at the beginning of January together with 5 or 6 other officers. We gave the signature only under the threat of disciplinary measures if we should refuse to sign. The signatures were given under protest.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honors, at the moment I have no further questions on direct examination to the witness. I have had the intention to submit at this point the documents which I still have to submit, and these documents were promised me by the Translating Division for this morning, but I just heard that they won't be ready until this evening, and therefore I would like to place the witness at the disposal of the prosecution for cross-examination.
JUDGE BURKE: Are there any questions by other defense counsel?
DR. LATERNSER: First of all I have a few questions I would like to ask the witness as defense counsel for Field Marshal List.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. General, in November 1938 you were Chief of the General Staff of the 17th Army Corps?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And during the first three November days of 1938 did you experience the excesses taken against the Jews in Vienna?
A. I experienced them insofar as we read it in the newspapers the next day.
Q. General, do you remember which instructions were issued at that time by Field Marshal List to members of the Army in his area of Command?
A. The Group v.hose chief I was, as soon as this news arrived, contacted all garrisons in the Province and all barracks in Vienna in order to find out whether the Army had taken part in these excesses and right in the middle of this activity there came an order of the then General List, who was in charge of the group in Vienna to which the troops were subordinate, and this order read: "It must be prevented under all circumstances that members of the Army take part in these excesses and members against whom it can be proved that they have taken part in these excesses are to be punished by way of the severest measures."
Q. General, were you also during the Polish campaign Chief of the 17th Army Group?
A. Yes, I was Chief of the Corps also during the Polish Campaign.
Q. And at this time was this Corps also subordinate to Field Marshal List?
A. The Corps was subordinate to the 14th Army and this was led by Field Marshal List.
Q. Do you know that at that time individual excesses were carried out by the police against the civilian population and against the Jews in Poland?
A. I can remember that individual reports came in from other commands that through police units in one locality a Synagogue had been set on fire.
Q. And in this connection did you ever receive any kind of Army order from Field Marshal List or any kind of directives?
A. There was no written order, but my commanding general was told through General List on the telephone, that he should take special notice of the events taking place in the rear area of the Corps in order to prevent excesses by people who did not belong to the Army.
Q. And now I have a few questions which I would like to ask the witness on behalf of Field Marshal von Weichs; General, did the 2nd Panzer Army, an addition to the order of December 22, 1943, Exhibit 379, receive directions from the Commander in Chief Southeast with regard to reprisal measures?
A. As far as I remember this was the only order which came from the Army Group to the Army in this respect.
Q. At the beginning of 1944 did the reprisal measures decrease within your Army sphere?
A. Yes, they decreased to such an extent that even the Prosecution stated this in its opening statement.
Q. And now a few questions with regard to the treatment of the Italians after their capitulation; did the Commander in Chief Southeast issue an order according to which one staff officer and 50 men of every division, who had sold weapons, were to be shot and 10 men of every company that had vehicles rendered unusable?
A. No, the Commander in Chief Southeast did not issue any such order nor did any office in the Balkans including myself. That is pure imagination, in my opinion.