May it please the Tribunal, the next document which is Document Rendulic I, No. 31, is an affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar and for the moment I merely give it an identification number 32-A. I am not vet submitting it as evidence.
The next document -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, the Secretary-General's office advises me that the noting of a document for identification with the letter "A" sort of confuses their record. If you can refer to it as Exhibit 32 and indicate that it is not now being offered in evidence but to indicate that it will be later offered, perhaps that will clarify the records of the Secretary-General's office and the Archives' Office.
DR. FRITSCH: Certainly, your Honor; I only did it this way because it was up until now handled in this manner but, of course, I am very glad to follow the suggestion of the Tribunal.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I may like to ask the Assistant SecretaryGeneral if the objection from the Secretary-General's office is based on the fact that the prosecution has used the letter "A" to identify documents or merely because it confuses the issue as such. The reason I ask if documents are offered with the exhibit number and no additional identification, I may take a document down with me having it entered in my document book and I would have to wait sometimes -- at the present I think probably three to four days --to get the record to read whether or not this document was actually offered in evidence or not. I think it would be possibly more convenient for the Tribunal, the prosecution and the defense if we could have allocated to defense counsel a certain letter of the alphabet behind the number if a document is offered for identification only. Therefore, I want to know whether the objection pertains to the letter "A" because we have used them or just generally to any letter.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: It would be much more convenient for us, Your Honor, if we could, reserve this number--No. 32 in this case--that is, reserve the exhibit number for future reference.
MR. RAPP: Well, I appreciate that. That has already been stated, but I wonder if the Secretary General appreciates the fact that that entails a certain amount of more work for us, and I wonder if we possibly could settle that outside of the Courtroom if the Defense, and Prosecution, and a representative of the Secretary General get together and find out just what the difficulties are, if that meets with the approval of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection, as to how you mark the exhibit. I wish to call to the attention of the counsel, both the Prosecution and the Defense, that this matter has been referred to me, and it has been mentioned by a representative of the SecretaryGeneral's Office.
MR. RAPP: Very well, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: For the time being, then, shall we leave this 32-A, or...
DR. FRITSCH: Well, I'm not quite sure now, Your Honor, how we are to handle it. I would be very much obliged though if for today we could just leave it as it was up until now. From the letter A we can immediately see that something else had to be done.
THE PRESIDENT: We will leave it 32-A for the present, and before you have any other documents of this character work out something to the satisfaction of all concerned.
You may proceed.
DR. FRITSCH (Direct-examination Continued):
I shall submit a further document, which is Document Rendulic No. 1, No. 32, and it will be Exhibit No. 33. It is an affidavit by the Chief of Staff of the 5th SS Mountain Corps, by Otto Kumm. The affiant signed the affidavit in Dachau before an American interrogator. The date is the 19th of September 1947; the affidavit was given in the same form as we see it here.
The affiant deals with a Waffen-SS unit, which was subordinate to a Wehrmacht unit, and he points out that the reason for the subordination was an agreement between the Reich Fuehrer SS Himmler and the Commander in Chief of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, concluded in the year 1941. He continues to say: "In above agreement it was provided that members of the SS could only be tried by SS courts and members of the Army could only be tried by Army courts. As far as I am able to recall, this agreement was adhered to. The Commandant of a Wehrmacht Army was therefore neither able to exert any influence on legal proceedings against a member of the Waffen-SS, nor to confirm a verdict given by a court of the Waffen-SS. In summing up it must therefore be stated that the units of the Waffen-SS, which were subordinate to an Army unit, were only subordinate to same in regard to tactics, not however, in regard to jurisdiction or discipline."
May it please the Tribunal, I unfortunately have one more document today, which I would like to submit for identification only. And if I may ask for an exception and be allowed to give this document No. 33 once more the Exhibit No. 34-A, I assure the Tribunal that it will be the last instance.
MR. RAPP: I would like to sponsor Defense Counsel's request, if that is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Tribunal, the next document which I will submit is Document Rendulic I, Supplement No. 125. This will receive Exhibit No. 35--three, five. The Tribunal will recall that on direct-examination I pointed out that this document is Document No. NOKW-658, and, as such, it is contained in the documents of the Prosecution. I have only reproduced it here again in order to be able to submit those parts of the document which the Prosecution has not submitted. There is nothing else that I want to say in connection with this document.
THE PRESIDENT: In referring to Exhibit No. 35, Judge Burke and I, at least, did not get the reference to the particular document.
Is it in your next Book?
DR. FRITSCH: Yes, it is contained in Supplement I, and it is No. 125. It is the first document in the supplementary document book. The cover page says "Document Book No. I Supplement." Your Honor, I don't dare submit the next document, which is No. 126, because that would break my promise not to submit a further identification document, but unfortunately I am not in a position to submit this document as evidence because so far it is not complete. Therefore, I shall have, at this point, to conclude the presentation of my documents. I would, however, like to stress that the Translation Department has promised me to balance of the translated documents within a very short period of time so that I shall be able, for sure, to submit all evidence during my case in chief, which I have available at the moment. I would now like, with the permission of the Tribunal, to turn to the problems of Norway. I have, for purposes of identification, fixed a map on the wall here, a map of Norway. It is unfortunate that I cannot submit a better map, but I think that, on the whole, we don't need that map, and when we do, it will be sufficient.
Q General, how did your assignment in the Nordic area come about? I think, to begin with, you were sent to Northern Finland. How did that come about?
A In the Spring of 1944 the Finns had entered into negotiations with the Russians, and these negotiations did not lead to any results. In June of the year 1944 a Russian offensive had started. This had taken place on the Southern Finnish frontier along Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border. This offensive had a number of successes in the beginning. The moral in Finland had so far been quite a depressed one, and it was to be expected that the Finns would enter into new negotiations with the Russians. In this situation General Dietl had an airplane accident. Up till then he had been the Commander in Chief of the XXth mountain in Lappland. General Dietl was a personality who was much esteemed in Finland.
I believe all this took place on the 23rd of June. During the night, or the 24th of June, I received the order to report on the 24th of June at the Fuehrer's Headquarters. On that day I was given the post of the Commander in Chief over the XXth Mountain Army in Lappland.
Q That was the relation between Germany and Finland at that time?
A Germany and Finland waged a common war against Russia. The German mountain Army and the Finnish Army fought side by side on the Finnish border, In spite of this there was no pact or alliance between those two countries. The two countries only acted out of a common interest against the common enemy on the basis of military agreements.
Q That was the military situation generally when you arrived in Finland?
A On a front of about 1200 Km East of the Finnish Eastern border there was the XXth mountain Army from the Arctic sea towards the middle of Finland, and then came the Finnish Army. There was no common leadership. The Finnish Army was led by the Marshal of Finland, Freiherr von Mannerheim. The front of the Mountain Army was comparatively quiet. A war of position of a normal kind was going on here. The Army itself was stationed in two large groups, with two corps in the South of Lappland, that is the middle of Finland; and one corps was on the coast of the Arctic Sea. Between those two large groups there were no other forces. The width and depth was 400 Km, and this area was rocky or jungle-like. For all practical purposes it was not possible to cross it.
Q Was this question of terrain which you just mentioned of any special significance and importance concerning the battles and the later events ?
A Yes, it was of quite decisive importance. In the whole area of Lappland, which is the Northern part of Finland, and the area of my Army, three-quarters of the country was covered with jungles, which could not be negotiated. The area was rocky or swampy. Towards the North, up to the Arctic Sea, there was tundra and entirely rocky areas. This was very important considering the fact that the area could not be negotiated because there were only very few roads in this area. In Lappland there were, for all practical purposes, only three highways-the so-called Arctic Sea highway which ran from North to South through Lappland and which was about 600 Km long; and in the South of Lappland there were two highways, each of which led to one of the corps stationed there. All these highways met in Rovanjemmi, which is in Southern Lappland, a locality near the polar circle and from there two roads led to the Swedish frontier, to the so-called frontier highway which went along the Swedish frontier to Norway to the Lyrgen fjords.
Q how did the political situation in Finland develop after all that?
AAt the beginning of August the Finnish Government had resigned, and the Finnish President had founded a new government. The head of this government was Mannerheim. This government soon entered into new negotiations with Russia. The Finns loyally informed us of this pact. We expected that this time the negotiations with the Russians would lead to success. We expected that Finland would leave the alliance.
Q That would be the situation then confronting the XXth Mountain Army?
A The situation had necessarily to be extremely difficult if one considers the fact that from the Arctic Sea, on the Eastern coast of Finland, the front led down to the South and that in the centre of Finland the German Mountain Army was joined by the Finnish Army, then in the event of Finland's leaving the alliance very suddenly a deep, open, uncoverered flank would arise; which was 400 Km deep.
This would be even more dangerous because the best roads from Southern Finland, led to unprotected road junction of Rovanjemmi, and to the Swedish frontier highway. The loss of Rovanjemmi to strong Russian motorized forces and that fact that these forces might reach the Swedish frontier highway, which then led straight to Norway, had to lead to a catastrophe, for the mountain army.
Q Were any provisions prepared for these events, and, if so, which ones?
A Naturally, everything possible was prepared. The proper forces were withdrawn and put up in preparedness. We had to block the roads which led from Southern Finland. We had to dynamite all bridges and mine the roads to the greatest possible extent. All this we had to do to prevent, wherever possible, the enemy breaking into the practically unprotected flank of the army. Of course this could only be prepared in order not to provoke the Finns and also possible not to provoke the Russians. But it was prepared in the smallest detail.
Q Now, was anything known about the armistice conditions which were to be expected on the basis of the negotiations?
A No, unfortunately nothing was known about this. We did know, from the negotiations which had taken place earlier, that they had not been successful because of two conditions which the Russians had imposed. The first condition was that the Russians wanted to occupy Finland; the second condition was that the Russians demanded that the Finns were to fight against us. He tried to do everything to get clues about the terms of the armistice because that would be extremely important to know in good time. We were not successful in our attempts, and as late as the 2nd of September, the day when the Finnish Army signed the armistice conditions, I had a long talk with Mannerheim, in which, of course, we did not discuss the armistice which was already a fact. But I thought that I was right in the impression that the Finns would, this time, accept the condition to fight against us.
Q And how did the situation actually develop?
A On the 3rd of September the armistice between Finland and Russia was concluded. Finland broke off all relations with Germany and demanded that the German troops be withdrawn from Finland within 14 days.
Q Was this demand to withdraw the troops within 14 days feasible from a military point of view?
A That demand could not be carried out. The demand obviously had the purpose of forcing the Finns to fight against us. In order to evacuate Finland, the troops had to carry out marches of 800 to 1000 Km--marches on foot. This would have meant marching unceasingly for 5 to 6 weeks. Such an enormous effort could not be expected of the troops in such a climate and at that time of the year and in such a terrain as I have described. The soldiers would have been able to bear up under this effort, but the horses would not have been able to do it. And the mountain Army had very many horses because everything had to be carried out on horseback. In addition we have to consider the fact that there were many stores which had to be carried off, and, finally, we have to consider that the troops just didn't march off like that. The enemy would prevent them from marching off and involve them in combat actions which actually did take place. The combat actions which took place, in order to get the fountain Army out of that area, took 5 to 6 weeks, and if one is fighting one cannot, after all, march. It was more than three months until finally the last man of the German Army had left Finland, and we tried to expedite matters as much as we possibly could, especially in consideration of the approaching winter.
Q General, you will remember that a representative of the Prosecution has stated here that this period of 14 days was better than no time at all? Would you consider that statement correct?
AAnybody who has any insight into the conditions of the roads there, the fighting situation, and what the leadership of an Army needed, would probably not make such a remark. Those 14 days to us only meant that we could evacuate to Germany the depots and the medical stores which we had in Southern Finland.
We could not do anything with these stores there because we had so much that we didn't know what to do with it all. After all, the Army had been provided for for a period of nine months. These 14 days had no influence at all on the condition of the Army; it had even less influence because the Russians did not feel themselves bound by this time limit. They attacked already as early as the 8th of September.
Q General, will you, very briefly, indicate the next event which occurred so that we may gain a picture of the situation?
AAs peculiar as this might sound, when we were concerned with a retreat we were first of all, busily engaged in building up a new front, a front with a depth of 400 Km. be succeeded in doing this in 4 to 5 days. Then, we started transporting and evacuating. On the 7th of September the first troop movement was carried out. We succeeded in withdrawing the two Soughern corps without the Russians knowing it. The Russians followed, and from that date on they attached continuously. Crises developed. The troops had already marched off had to return in order to relieve the others. But, on the whole, our movement was successful. The obvious purpose of the Russian attacks was to tie us and the Army down, to force us to fight, and to destroy us with their superior forces. From the point of view of military leadership the Russian actions were entirely correct. It was the Russian endeavor to use all available means to reach the road junction of Rovanjemmi, in order to overtake us from the rear and thus reach the highway near the Swedish frontier before we could. The battle, to prevent this Russian intention, which sometimes lasted for hours, meant to us existence or non-existence of the Army. And it succeeded.
Q Did the Russian attack now remain restricted to the Southern parts of the Army?
A No, 3 weeks later an especially well prepared attack was made against the XIXth Corps on the Arctic Sea. This was a mistake on the part of the Russian leadership, which was incomprehensible to me. It was a mistake to carry out these two attacks at different times so that it became possible for us to counter the Russian superiority by withdrawing forces from the Southern group and putting them at the disposal of the Corps near the Arctic Sea, and thus support this Corps. These forces succeeded in relieving the XIXth Corps and getting it out of the Russian encirclement.
Q General, is this the XIX Army Corps which was east of Kirkenes?
A Yes, this was the XIX Corps which was east of Kirkenes, about 150 Km east of Kirkenes.
Q Who commanded it?
A The General of the Mountain Troops, Jodl, who appeared here as a witness for the Prosecution.
Q And now when did the first order arrive to evacuate Northern Norway?
A To the best of my recollection that must have taken place towards the latter half of September.
Q And how was this order carried out?
A We carried out this order very loosely. The Army order at that time, was to retreat towards approximately the center of Lappland, and there to halt. We felt strong enough to defeat all attacks in this position, and we made this evacuation a voluntary one by supporting those Northern Norwegians who wanted to get away.
Q Did this situation change later on, and, if so, for what reasons?
A This situation changed later for several reasons. Principally on the 4th of October we received an order saying that we were not to remain in Lappland, but instead the Army was to be led back to a position near the Lyngen-Fjord in Norway. That meant to us a movement of about 800 to 1000 Km, which would necessarily last far into the Arctic winter.
Then when in October the attacks against the XIXTh Corps started we were, after all, quite surprised that the Russians were in a position to emphasize their great numerical superiority, even in that barely negotiable terrain. And just around that date, a further order arrived. The four best Mountain Divisions were to be sent to the Continent, which meant more than half of the strength of the Army. These were events which could not possibly have been anticipated, and they naturally influenced our judgment of all problems at hand.
Q General, this order,--to distinguish between concepts which you mentioned,--did the action which was to take place on the basis of the order of the 4th of September have a code name?
A This movement was called "Nordlicht."
Q You were talking about the influence which became effective through the new situation which confronted you?
A This influence was seen particularly in the fact that the Army could not deny that the second evacuation order which had come in on the 20th of October was fully justified. Only the OKW was in a position to know what would be demanded of the Army in the future and which forces would be at the disposal of the Army for those purposes.
Q If you knew, a long time before the second evacuation order arrived, the Russian strength and counted on the Russians' moving up on you, why did you then not demand this order for evacuation and destruction?
A I never waited for orders which were a matter of course, and I never asked for orders in matters which I thought I could regulate myself. I knew quite well what I would have to do in accordance with the situation. If I had not received this second evacuation order of the 28th of October, then I intended to concentrate the population in a tolerable area of living space. The necessary sanitary installations were to be left for them, but everything else--the quarters which would have become available, the highways which existed, all bridges and harbor installations, and everything else-would have been destroyed.
The necessity of these measures was never doubted for a single instant by anybody.
Q One question in between, General: Were the Russian troops up to standard in a military respect?
A In the extreme North the Russians had to have excellent troops because the terrain and the climate were so very difficult, and because the German and the Finnish troops which confronted them were some of the best units which existed throughout this whole war. The Russians were excellent fighters, especially in rocky and forest areas. Their special units, such as the "Ski brigades," which were supplement by people from Siberia, ware excellent and they gave us considerable trouble.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrowmorning.
(THE COURT ADJOURNED AT 1630 to RESUME SESSION at 0930, 31 OCTOBER 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm Idst, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 31 October 1947, 0930. Judge Burke, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the Unites States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
LOH R RENDULIC DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, when we stopped we were discussing the question of Norway. I had asked you yesterday to give us a picture about the strength of the Russian forces and you told us they were technically and numberically superior to your forces; how did you imagine the Russians would follow you up?
A There were two possibilities as to how this could be done. First of all it was possible they could push on up Highway 50, which led from Kirkenes via Tana, then it was possible that they would move along the highway via Vbalov and finally there was the possibility to follow along the socalled Frontier Highway along the Finnish Swedish frontier.
Q General, would you be kind enough to look at the map and show us the most important points on it?
A One possibility would be to push up along Highway 50.
Q At this opportunity may I point out to the Tribunal that that is the highway which the Tribunal saw and used when it went to Norway, along Kirkenes to Hammerfest.
A Then it was possible to use the road to Ivalc, which joined Highway 50. The third possibility w s to push along via Rovanjemmi, along the Swedish Frontier Highway to to the Lyngen Fjord. Those were the three possibilities on the land route. A further possibility was to push up also by a sea operation, which we started in the area Murmans, which is roughly about here. (indicating.) The most suitable places for landing were the Fjords of Alta and Vorstwanger in the Southern part of Finnmark. In to this area the roads lead from Finnland, which the Finns could have used on the land route.
Q You are talking about landing operations, General; did you count on the possibility of such landing operations?
A Landings lead a great deal of advantage for the enemy, because to march through these grey districts in winter time on through the whole of Finnmark is extremely strenuous, and the Russians could have saved themselves this effort if they had carried out a pursuit operation at sea, which would have been considerable more simple. Such an operation had to be anticipated. The OKW also expected landings, even from the British, and they thought they would take place somewhere near Narvik, and at least half a dozen times we were told the opinion of the OKW concerning these landings. That can be frequently found in the War Diary of the Army which arrived here from Washington.
Q Were the prerequisites for such a landing good for the Russians, such a landing as you expected, would take place?
A Yes, we knew that in the Kola Bay there was a great number of ships, hundreds of thousands of tons which were part of the convoys which come through the Artie Sea to Murmansk about twice a month. Those were conveys of about 50 to 60 freighters, protected by battleships, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and other auxiliary vessels. The Kola Bay was reconnoit ered towards the end of September. We saw there a great number of ships, battleships cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc.
, and those, without doubt, were British vessels, because it was well known the Russians only had one battleship in the Artic Sea.
Q General, if I mention to you the figure 230,000 tons of shipping, which I found in one Diary, as said to have been assembled in the Kola Bay, would that be sufficient to carry out a large landing operation?
A Yes, 230,000 tons, can undoubtedly transport six to eight divisions, but this number of tons reported here is not the maximum of what the Russians would be in a position to use, because twice a month another convey of 100,000 to 200,000 tons of convoy vessels arrived in the Kola Bay. Also we learned towards the end of September or beginning of October, (I don't remember the exact date, its in the War diaries). We learned that these convoys, which up until then had been sent by the Russians with British support, were led by the British admirally from the end of September onwards and a landing operation would have been supported through the fact that the allies had in the extreme North undoubted supremacy on Sea and in the air, and those were the best prerequisites that they could possibly have for a landing.
Q Were there other factors as well?
I am mainly thinking about the question of Swedish neutrality; neutrality; did you in this respect have to anticipate any difficulties?
A Yes, we had to anticipate a violation of Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier. It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to do the same as we had demanded from them in 1941. In that year we had, with the consent of the Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier. It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to let them do the same as we had demanded. Of course, that could have only been an operation of secondary importance which would have mainly been directed against the area near Narvik.
The main operation was to be expected as against southern Finnmark.
Q In Southern Finnmark is a landing operation dependent on the season?
A No, it is not dependent on the climate, because under the influence of the Gulf stream the fjords do not freeze up. Also there is not very much snow in those districts in winter, but it is quite cold. It was known that the Russians as well as to the Finns were extremely well-equipped for this winter climate.
Q General, if I may summarize your statements, you said that the Army found itself in an extremely difficult position; did the difficult position have any effect on the morale of the troops?
A Yes, it had a considerable effect on the morale of the troops. Everybody was aware of the difficulty of the position. From censorship of soldiers mail we learned that the morale of the soldiers sometimes bordered on panic. We found letters written by soldiers in which they said that a "second Stalingrad is in preparation", "the Army is doomed", "When we freeze in with the Artie winter we will freeze as Russian prisoners".
Q Did the Russian propaganda and if so to what extent, make use of this situation?
A The Russian propaganda made very clever use of this situation. Above all they tried to make the men distrust their leaders. Very soon after Finland left the allies, by radio as well as by leaflets they spread the news that the Commander in Chief of the Mountain Army was an Austrian and he wanted this Army to fall into the hands of the Russians, but this fact was discovered and his withdrawal and dismissal was to be expected. In connection with the events of 20 July 1944 and the consequences of this event, which had only happened a short time before, this propaganda found fertile soil. There was a very dangerous crisis amongst the soldiers especially with regard to confidence in their leaders which could have led to a catastrophe if the Army or parts of it came into difficult situations. In order to counteract the effects of the Russian propaganda, Hitler, on the 17 September, decorated me with the Golden Cross of Honor, and thus the effect of the propaganda was counteracted immediately.
Q General, when were you convinced that the Russians would not push up on the land route via Northern Finnmark?
A I cannot tell you exactly when I became convinced of that fact. I assume it was towards the latter part of November.
Q Well, what was it you ascertained at that time?
A It had become known that the Russians had only followed us up past tho Kirkenes with weak forces.
At first however, we had to assume that he wanted to wait and gain time in order to allow things to settle down and to consolidate his forces, after many weeks of hard fighting, which had cost him many losses, and as one is apt to do as a rule when one prepares a new operation.
Q Was it possible to reconnoiter the Russian positions so that you could be informed about them?
A Drying the decisive period of time as of the middle of November for practical purposes it was no longer possible to reconnoiter. airbases had all been transferred to Norway. The nearest one was in Butevos, which is about 1,000 kilometers distant from the Murmansk railway. Around about that time daylight lasted only a very few hours each day. The Artic night had already extended over the majority of the 24-hours. Therefore, in such a great distance for a flight and with the very short period of daylight, it was not possible to reconnoiter the movements along the Murmansk railway thoroughly.
Q General, would you be kind enough to show us on this occasion the distances on the map?
A Butevos is here. (indicating) I would like to point out at this point, Your Honor, that in Butevos we had in the meantime made an interim landing. That would have been the distance of the approach for reconnoitering the movements along the Murmansk railway.
Q Therefore, you would have had to fly over Sweden and Finland and would have had to fly around this area?
A We would have had to fly over the whole of Finland.
Q When was it certain to you that Russia had withdrawn forces from our former Lapland Front?
A The first news concerning this fact was received towards the beginning of December. It was a communication from Army Group North which was stationed near the E st Prussian Frontier, and it had been confronted by a division which up to that time had confronted my front in Lapland. We did not receive any further news concerning any other forces.
My front in Lapland faced about 30 Russian divisions, and the Finnish Front faced the same number. These forces would have in any case been far too strong in the very restricted area in Finnmark. The withdrawal of forces from the Lapland area could not give us any information concerning the real intents of the Russians in Finnmark. How many forces the Russians actually did withdraw never became known to us, and I do not know it to this day.
Q And for what reason did you after that period continue the evacuation and the destruction?
A The evacuation had, at that date, been actually carried out for all practical purposes. The report concerning the evacuation is dated the 25 November. Therefore, it can be assumed that around that date it has been concluded. The destruction which was carried out also in the Southern area of Finnmark had to be continued, because moving up on Highway 50 was not the only possibility which was open to the Russians. The even more likely operation as of November would have been a landing in Southern Finnmark.
Q Why were the destructions which you carried out not restricted to the villages along Highway 50?
AAt first sight one might suppose that marching troops would only need the localities along the march route for quarters, but that is not the case. Even in districts which are densely populated there were and are many villages, like for instance, in the center of Russia. The villages along the march route were never sufficient for the accommodating of the marching troops.
Instead these troops had to use also those places which were a good distance away from the march route, and they had to take into account the great strain of the march, when it was necessary to quarter them in houses, et cetera, and that would have undoubtedly been necessary at that time in Finnmark because of the climate. If the weather is good those extra marches can be saved by spending the night in tents right on the road.
DR. FRITSCH: May it pleast the Tribunal, I would like to submit a photostat of this map for information purposes because it is rather difficult to see the map.
Q. General, how about inhabited locations along the coast and along the fjords?
A. The inhabited localities along the coast and along the fjords were of the same significance. One has to consider the fact that Highway 50 led partly immediately along the coast and partly was very near the coast. It further has to be considered that an army does not only march; it also has to live, especially when it is supposed to prepare an attack. Then the army is apt to spread over the whole country. Not only the troops have to accommodated but there are also many installations to be taken care of such as work shops, hospitals, depots, installations for supply; and for all these installations everything that was there concerning houses, et cetera, was necessary to accommodate all these operations and that was the military significance of the apparently far distant inhabited localities.
Q. Did that also apply for the fishing villages which were way up in Norway?
A. Yes, the same fact applied to them. As a rule, they could only be reached by cutters or boats. These were the most important means of transportation in that district.