Q. Witness, approximately from what day onward did you consider yourself an opponent of the Nazi government or the Nazi philosophy?
A. I was never 100% for the National Socialist ideology, but in view of these things such as the elimination of unemployment with new methods, one cannot take up the attitude; I turn down everything and I reject everything. I believe that even in the United States not all people were originally followers of the New Deal, but at the same time advantages were accruing therefore and you were in a position then to have a statesman at the helm who handled matters in a sensible manner , while we unhappily were not in that position as we found out later.
Q. Just to clear the whole chapter, will you please tell us whether or not you encountered any difficulties, because of your antiNazi background, in joining the Nazi party; in May, 1937, did you have any difficulties?
A. I don't quite see what you mean.
Q. Well then I will put it a little bit clearer, affidavits which you have submitted in addition to your own testimony indicate that you were an average rather unpolitically minded German who from the very beginning, certainly as far back as 1934 , got into some disagreement with the Nazi government and its philosophies, therefore, I am asking you whether or not you had any difficulties subsequently in joining the Nazi party in 1937?
A. Do you mean after 1937?
Q. No, when you applied to be admitted.
Q. I emphasize one more I did not apply, but I only signed an application for memberships after the Ortsgruppenleiter had called on me. I admit with perfect frankness to you that very soon I saw something rotten in the whole affair on the basis of the development of political relations in 1937. I first of all saw the elimination of unemployment and secondly which cannot be overlooked, I saw the recognition of the National Socialist state by all foreign governments and the interests with which National Socialism was received abroad, which was manifested most of all by the Olympic games in 1936.
Q. Now, witness, I am referring you now to NOKW 704, exhibit 217 in document book 9 on page 10 of the English, I don't know the German page, there General Bader, your Commanding General, analyzing your personality and performance of duty in connection with your service record and I quote:
"Considers you a National Socialist and General Staff officer of the old school. " And the defendant Foertsch in the same document considers you indispensable at the present time for Serbia.
Can you tell us anything about the true meaning of these entries or were they just another matter where the true meaning was deliberately camouflaged?
A. Whenever you described an officers character, a demand you had at that time was to comment on the fact whether or not he was a National Socialist. I believe that the addition N.S. at that time could not possibly be lacking in any of these qualifications. I think in most cases it had to be confirmed that not was he a National Socialist, but that he understood to pass on National. Socialist ideas. That, as I remember, at that time, a stipulation raised by the personnel officer. by the remark was made by General Foertsch that I was indispensable for Serbia, I don't know. He said on the stand that no change should be made.
Q. Witness, if I understood you right, you meant to say that every officer had to be judges, in addition to other qualifications, about his National Socialistic behavior or what his relation was to the Party; is that right and you state that was mandatory and had to be accomplished without fail?
A. That is what I was told at the time by the man who worked on personnel matters, the 2-A. I know that a regulation of that sort existed which later on was eliminated.
Q. Witness, you became Chief of Staff of the General Staff or as you call it Commando Staff of General Bader in 1942 in May; is that right?
A. Yes, in July.
Q. And when you reported for duty General Bader gave you the customary briefing and told you that he himself would decide all matters pertaining to reprisal measures; is that correct?
A. Yes, that he would have the decision and the orders to be given in the event of a retaliation measure as far as they concerned the taking of human live, if I remember correctly.
Q. Witness, you were asked whether or not you had read and studied both prior and during the war the booklet called "Handbook for the General Staff Service in the War" and you stated that you did read and study it ; is that right?
A. Not before the war but during the war I read it.
Q. Very well, you further stated that this particular booklet covers the topic of executive powers and jurisdiction of Commanders as distinguished from General Staff officers; is that right ?
A. Well, the Chief of the General Staff had to be consulted in all matters concerning the troops and the supply of troops; according to the regulations, he need not be consulted in questions pertaining to executive power.
Q. Now upon direct questioning by your defense counsel, you stated that this booklet contained specifically instructions which would cover reprisal measures as being the prerogative of a commander who holds the executive power, rather than the prerogative of a staff officer; did you make that statement?
A. Yes, executive power is vested with the commanding general.
Q. Now, witness, let me just try and analyze this question once more so that you have complete opportunity to be sure that you answer it correctly. I did not only ask you about the executive power being the prerogative of the commanding general, but I also asked you whether or not reprisal measures specifically as a part of the executive power are being mentioned in this booklet, as you stated upon being questioned by your defense counsel?
A. As far as retaliation measures are concerned, there is nothing mentioned in the hand Book for General Staff Officers.
Q. Thank you, that's just what I wanted to know.
A. All that it mentions is hostages.
Q. Witness, in outlining your duties as Chief of Staff, you mentioned matters of supply operations, training and organization of troops as your main duty; is that right?
A. Yes, those were matters where I had to be consulted and called in.
Q. Were these individual topics with which you concerned yourself not closely connected with partisan warfare and reprisal measures in order to enable you to do intelligent and logical planning at least to a certain degree?
A. These matters were linked with the combating of partisans, in what way they were allegedly linked to retaliation measures I cannot see at all, because in these things there cannot be any planning because if the population remained calm, my Commander in Chief had no opportunity or occasion to order retaliation measures. These things did not go according to plans.
Q. Now, witness,firstly, as a matter of fact the population was not quiet, and secondly, you stated yourself, did you not, that you had to be informed about everything that was going on in Serbia in order to be an effective Chief of Staff?
A. Yes, I had to know everything that went on.
Q. And that is what I meant when I talked about planning.
A. Being informed about the situation surely has nothing to do with planning of retaliation measures.
Q. Witness, I am not talking about the planning of reprisal measures, I am talking obviously about your over-all planning of employment of troops, of supplies and other military matters which were no doubt in some way effected by partisan warfare and reprisal measures; is that right or not?
A. What reprisal measures had to do with this here, I don't quite see.
Q. All right, we'll cover that later. Witness, were you in fact the Senior Staff Advisor to your Commanding Generals, that is Bader and Felber?
A. I was the first adviser of my commanders, preferably in the matters which I have described and which you have repeated. It did happen temporarily that there was a more senior officer around, but he was not Chief of Staff you see.
Q. Nevertheless, witness, you were the senior advisor to the Commanding General in your position as Chief of Staff; is that correct or not?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. Now , did both of your commanders, that is Bader as well as Felber, generally rely on your judgment?
A. No, both of them were really old active soldiers of some years of service. General had joined the army roughly in about 1902 at the same time as I and had been on active service all the time. He was entirely initiated in all problems. General Felber was a few years younger than I, but had been an officer all the time. A general staff officer, even a chief of staff to an army group, had no reason to rely in everything on me, They were themselves sufficiently initiated in these matters, more than was I, who was an officer in the reserve who had a profession at home and who two or three times a week kept extensive correspondence with his home problems. In no sense of the word was the position such that I would have attempted to force my Commanders to follow my ideas, or that my commanders would have said, whatever Geitner orders will be done. For this they were far too much soldiers and men.
Q. Witness, did these two men show you all their confidence, in other words, did you enjoy the confidence of your two commanding generals?
A. I believe I must say that I did enjoy the confidence of my commanders, but that t did not mean that my commanders would have given me "carte blanche". They always wanted to know what was going on and I very strictly observed this and did not attempt to do things, important things, of which they knew nothing.
Q. Nevertheless, witness, it is true that you remained down there for more than two years and there was no talk of relieving you, was there, in your position as Chief of Staff?
A. Another party attempted to get rid of me.
Q. Well, I meant from the side of your Commanding General?
A. Not that I know of, General Bader after all had given me suffi cient qualifications to be the chief of an active corps, which showed that he would have parted with me had I been called away.
Q. Now, witness, you are not trying to state that any Commanding General would not recommend anybody for higher tasks, merely because he wants to hang on to him, do you?
A. I did not say that.
Q. Well you said that General Bader recommended you to be even the Chief of Staff of a corps, and you used this recommendation to tell us that there was possibly some basis for getting rid of you by kicking you upstairs?
A. That is not what I wanted to say.
Q. Will you tell us what you wanted to say?
A. What I wanted to say was that General Bader would have released me if I had become Chief of Staff to an active corps. In other words he did not regard me as entirely indispensable.
Q. Very well. Now, witness, this Handbook for the General Staff Service, which you know, states or emphasizes rather that the close coordination and cooperation between the Chief of Staff and his Commander is a prerequisite for any undertaking which is to be successful; is that correct witness ?
A. Quite correct, but with entirely different tasks and functions.
Q. Now, witness, I have not attached anything to this very simple question, I was merely trying to ask you whether I was quoting or misquoting this book?
A. Yes, but it was up to the Commanding General to have a clear mind for the really big decisions and the definite orders necessary there to. It was up to the Chief of Staff to keep the staff together by the most intensive work in detail in order to make the tasks of the Commanding General easier, in other words the chief of staff had a task which was to say the least was of secondary importance and worked himself to death on behalf of the Commanding General.
Q. Now, witness , you will admit won't you that there is a lot of difference between what is printed in a book and what actually happens in practice; isn't that right?
A. No, it need not be so at all.
Q. Allright, now suppose you have a Commander or a Commanding General who is very aggressive, very independent and a very busy -body type of a fellow, and you as a Chief of Staff are then obviously relegated to something less than a secondary position; is that right?
A. That , of course, depends entirely on the personalities involved.
Q. Allright.
A. But a Chief of Staff is always, at the most, of secondary importance, that was what I thought of my position, and that has been borne out by affidavits on several occasions. I did not push myself forward.
Q: I know that witness, but all I wanted to get from you was the fact that a lot depended on the personalities and that, you said, is a fact.
Now, witness, we will leave that topic and now I want to ask you something about these initials and signatures on those orders and letters and so forth. You went into great detail the other day explaining to us at great length the difference in putting your initials on an order before it was signed by your Commanding General. Now I want to find out from you whether or not you made this statement for the purpose of telling us What when you put your initial on an order, after it was signed by your Commanding General, only then and at that moment did you receive knowledge of the contents of this order. Would you clear that point up for us, please?
Did you understand my question?
A: Perhaps I may repeat. Do you want to know what is meant when I put my initials underneath an order which had been signed already by a Commanding General?
Q: Not exactly, witness. I tried to narrow it down a little bit. I was asking you specifically whether you wanted to say that your initial, after your Commanding General had signed the letter, meant that only then you knew the contents of such an order or letter. That was the specific question I would like you to clear up for us.
A: I don't quite follow you.
Q: Now, let me give you an example, witness. I understand you to say that when your initial was on a letter before it was signed by your Commanding General you checked such letter for form, accuracy, military procedure and the like when it reached your desk -- you then initialed it which did, according to your testimony, not entail any responsibility on your part, and you forwarded it to your Commanding General for signature.
That's the one procedure you told us. Can we agree on that?
A: No, something highly important has been omitted here. What has been omitted is that I would only initial an order before it went to the Commanding General if I knew that order coincided with the wishes of the Commanding General, that it coincided also with the order from higher up, and that it was correct as far as form went.
Q: I concede you that point, witness. Now, the next point I am trying to ask you is this; suppose you did not initial such a letter before your General signed it but you initialed it after your General signed it -- that is, actually you saw it then the first time -- was it then at that moment that you received the first time knowledge of the contents of this order or letter? That is the question -- the answer I wanted.
A: That happened very frequently in the case of reprisal measures.
Q: Very well. However, it is true, is it not, that you received your knowledge in either case prior to the execution of the reprisal measures, is it not?
A: That is not always true.
Q: Very well then, give us one exception.
A: It occurred that reprisals by the Commanding General reached me only when I looked through the files which were about to be filed away.
Q: Now, one more question about these initials: did you merely initial only the copies which you retained at your headquarters or did you initial also the original which went to the units?
A: If the Commanding General had made up his mind to take reprisal measures for an occurrence, and if he asked the expert working on these problems to put down an order in writing then it would happen.
I don't know what else you wanted to know. I forget what you asked me.
Q: I merely wanted to know whether you initialed only the copies which went in your files or whether you also initialed the copies going to the units.
A: It would happen in those cases that the order would go through my office. It happened but it happened infrequently, and then it would only be initialed by me. But in all cases where I received knowledge only after the event, I merely saw the copies and the orders contained in the diaries are copies where one doesn't even know whether they were signed at the same time as the original or whether they weren't.
Q: Witness, tell us whether it was customary in the German Army for a Commanding General to sign in his Own signature the original and the copies. That includes, of course, the copy which you subsequently kept in your filing cabinets.
A: It was customary for the Commanding General to sign with his full name the actual original order. Whether he signed the copies with his full name was not the case in many cases, but as a rule he merely initialed the copies -- not his copies but the one copy meant for the files.
Q: Witness, you told us on several occasions during your testimony in connection with the direct examination that you prevailed repeatedly on your Commanding General to use less severe methods towards the Serbain population. Is that correct?
A: On repeated occasions in conversations when principles were discussed I told my Commanding Officers that these measures were very severe such as they had been ordered from higher up and as they were regarded by the Commanding General as a military necessity.
I did that on a number of occasions. My Commanding Generals in most cases shared my opinion.
Q: You emphasized further in your testimony that in each instance your Commanding General turned you down because, at the time that you made these suggestions, acts of socalled sabatage increased both in severity and intensity. Is that correct?
A: It is not correct in the way it has been put just now. The Commanding Generals were only of the opinion that at the time they were in no position after sufficient deliberation and having made appraisal of the situation in the country, and taking into consideration the orders issued, to alleviate conditions at the time. An exception in this which I remember today is the case which occurred at the end of May 1943, I believe, where efforts were made to find methods to have things on a more moderate scale.
Q: Now, you did make your testimony somewhat different today. However, tell us whether or not it occurred to you at that time when you were turned down and yet these sabatage acts increased, that you may possibly have been using the wrong methods. Did that ever occur to you at that time and that, therefore, the Serbian population became more and more aroused toward the occupation power?
A: That is not so.
Q: I just ask you whether -
A: I know that dates exist when there was clearly a decrease in the incidents. That occurred in the summer and autumn of 1942/ and I mean decrease of the mere serious incidents/ and also in the autumn of 1945. The more serious incidents which necessitated retaliation were on the decrease at the time.
After all we had intercepted the wireless communications of Mihajlovic where he valued his subordinate units then not to take any more Measures which would make the Germans take retaliation measures. Therefore, what you said is not correct. -- I mean, that reprisal measures hardened or aroused the Serbian people.
Q: Witness, I want to take you over this again. I don't think you understood me. I didn't make a statement at all. I merely wanted to ask you whether it did occur to you at that time that you were using possibly the wrong methods and try to answer that question.
A: Well, it is not too simple to answer that question. I realized after some weeks or months of my service in Serbia that severe measures were necessary but I leave open the question whether it was necessary to act as they did. If I had not had that idea I would not have discussed with Commanding Generals whether it was not possible to have things more moderate.
Q: You told us that the senior troop commander substituted during longer periods of absence for your Commanding General and that during such time of substitution it was he who had the exclusive right and authority to order reprisal measures. Am I right?
A: Yes.
Q: Who advised such Acting Commanding Generals as far as the reprisal policy was concerned about the desires and wishes of the Commanding General? After all, these men were green and were green and were not familiar with the procedure in your head-quarters?
A: In order to speak about the last part of your question first, these men were not inexperienced and green. All of them had been in the area for some time and knew the orders which were relevant in this matter. I remember, forinstance, that a Divisional Commander who later on deputized for the Commanding General, on the occasion of a report to the Commanding General, came to see me and said he was much obliged to General Bader, that he was properly prepared to take the responsibility for these things.
Now, as for advising these men, I no longer remember whether in the Individual cases, whether the deputy when he was present himself for one first time in headquarters asked me to report to him or the other experts.
Q: I just thought that these Acting Commanders would have been somewhat green in regard to reprisal measures. I didn't want to state that they were soldiers who didn't know their business. Now, who was then the person who advised them?
A: They knew about reprisal measures through tne order issued by the Commanding General.
Q: Go ahead, please. And you presume that from the nature and tenor of these orders which they received prior to the time that they became acting Commanders, they could deduce the policy of reprisal measures themselves; it was apparent in other words, they didn't need any more coaching?
A: They knew then in general, but needless to say, they asked questions when they did not want to make up their minds immediately: Now, how did General Bader handle these things?
Q: And when did they ask?
A: And when they asked me on those occasions I had to tell then how General Bader handled these tings. That was the obvious duty on the pert of the Chief of General Staff that he would introduce the temporary deputies to the way the General wonted things handled and to nothing else. I know of no case in which anyone would take advantage of tne fact that he was deputizing for the General and act independently with a policy of his own. That, militarily speaking, would be quite impossible in the German army.
Q: Since you didn't get with General Bader or Felber anywhere in using less severe methods, did you ever suggest co these Acting Commanders to not do anything or possibly wait until the Commanding General would return?
A: The latter would have taken too long as a rule and would not have complied with the wishes of the Commanding General. As I said before, it is regarded as entirely disloyal and impossible in the German Army for the Chief of Staff to take advantage of the absence of his commanding General to do something utterly different. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, presented this in an affidavit. The Chief of Staff was not on the same level as a Commanding General. He was and remained simply and assistant.
Q: Witness, during your interrogation by defense counsel you indulged in a number of mathematical statements and acrobatics and you stated that, for instance, during a period of three and a half months in the year of 1943 approximately 1329 sabotage and terror acts occurred.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a minute. I have been present in the Tribunal during his examination. I fail to recall his doing any acrobatics. Ask the question and secure your answer without personal observations.
Q: During your interrogation by defense counsel, you made a number of mathematical statements or allegations and you stated that during a period of three and a half months in the year 1943 approximately 1329 sabotage and terror acts occurred. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you further say that during a period of five months within the same year only 80 reprisal measures which ended in the less of human lives were taken in retaliation for these 1329 so-called sabotage and terror acts? Did you say that?
A: No. What I said was that these 80 cases of retaliation were in reference to five months, and that those three and a half months were contained in these five months; therefore, if you wish to compare those figures, you have to take these 1329 too, over a period of five months, rather than three and a half months and thereby you arrive at even more.
Q.- I have said the same thing, witness, and I am now merely trying to ascertain whether you made that statement. Now, did you want to say that the killing of civilians was the only method of retaliation known to you and applied by your headquarters at that time?
A.- I did not retaliate. There were also other methods, and probably these methods were not known to the Commanding General because they were more or less within the competence of the administrative sub-area headquarters, for instance, contributions.
Q.- How about the burning down of houses or whole villages?
A.- I don't know whether in that period of time a village was burned down as a retaliation measure. I do not recall any such thing at the moment, because the burning down of houses during combat is, according to the hand warfare regulations, a matter which can be ordered by any officer. The burning down of houses after combat, as a retaliation measure, is a matter which can be ordered by a captain in accordance with the band warfare regulations. As far as we in Serbia were concerned, the way we managed this thing was that the order to burn down houses could be given by only the senior officer in the field if he regarded it as a military necessity.
Q.- Now, we got somewhat off the subject, but you know that both General Bader and General Felber repeatedly ordered the burning down of villages or houses as a direct reprisal measure. You know that don't you?
A.- Yes, that has been ordered but only rarely.
Q.- All I want to know from you now is whether or not this type of reprisal measure was included in your mathetical calculations or not.
A.- These 80 cases for which retaliation measures were taken in those five months by order of the Commanding General concerned only, as far as I know and as far as it becomes clear from some statistics in your Document Book XXIV, retaliations by one taking of human lives.
Q.- But you do agree, do you not, that there are other methods of reprisal which were employed by the Commanding General Serbia besides the taking of human lives?
A.- Yes, there were also other methods, The only question is what the Commanding General regarded as military necessity in certain events.
Q.- Witness, these 80 reprisal measures, which ended in the loss of human lives, did you reach that figure on the basis of documents submitted by the Prosecution which refreshed your memory, or did you reach that because you knew that anyhow?
A.- Let me answer the last part of your question first. I knew very little from that period of time. After I was taken into custody I no longer thought back to that period of time. I thought of my profession and my family. This figure of 80 has come back to my memory or rather I read this figure of 80 in a document contained in Volume XXIV, Volume XXIV of your document books. These are 80 individual cases. The figure of people killed of course is much higher.
Q.- Witness, do you know whether the OKW orders, which you received during your two years in Serbia and which in turn dealt with reprisal measures, specifically stated that only General Bader or General Belber or anybody in the rank of a Commanding General could order reprisal measures?
A.- That did not become clear from the OKW orders, but General Bader in his area in Serbia, had ordered that only he was authorized to order retaliation measures which would involve the taking of lives. During my time I do not remember one single case in which this order of General Bader was not observed in Serbia.
Q.- You stated that from May, 1943, on certain so-called shadow or mock executions were instituted. Is that correct?
A.- Yes.
Q.- Witness, it is perfectly clear to me, on the basis of your statements, that these shadow executions wore obviously aimed to preserve Serbian lives. However, I would like you to clear up what causes motivated General Bader to institute such shadow executions. Why, in other words, was he suddenly interested in preserving Serbian lives?
A.- A soldier is not a soldier in order to kill people, but there beats in every soldier a human heart, General Bader, as I stated on direct-examination, suffered profoundly from these things. First of all, the question now was will he try, according to the proposals which you have quoted to have less retaliations carried out, He felt that, for reasons of propaganda, this would not be feasible towards the population, but he wanted to try this by actually having less people shot and then publishing the whole figure on posters. This was how he arrived at that decision.
Q.- In other words he was largely motivated by humane considerations A.- Yes, he tried something out.
Q.- A consideration that possibly International Law had been violated was not given or stated?
A.- That consideration was left by General Bader to those who had ordered him to take such measures. If the OKW issued orders of this sort General Bader had not and did assume that, from a legal point of view, no objections could be raised to these things. Reprisals are allowed according to the Hague Land Warfare Regulations. The extent of a reprisal measure, I think, is left to discretion and military necessity.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURSE: Mr, Rapp, at this time we'll take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is now recessed until 3:15.
(A recess was taken.)