v. Geitner was a declared follower of conciliatory policy towards the Serbs and was on the opinion that the occupation should weigh as lightly as possible on them. He never directed me to proceed severely against the Serbs.
"von. Geitner was in sharp personal opposition to the Plenipotentiary General for Economics (GBW) and the Higher SS and Police Leader. He considered these two persons responsible for the unfortunate conditions. In my presence he called them "Liars, profiteers, criminals etc.," "I informed v. Geitner of a communication, given to me by the Serb Minister of the Interior Dinic, that Bulgarian soldiers had committed excesses against the Serbian population.
Von Geitner then protested most severely to the responsible Bulgarian offices in regard to these incidents.
"I have often heard v. Geitner say that the German military forces were much to weak to guarantee peace in Serbia.
"I know v. Geitner as an extremely correct officer who lived modestly and in a reserved manner; I can not believe that he was ordered or covered any cruelties or that, in regard to the shooting of hostages, he has influenced General Bader unfavorably."
This affidavit also has been duly sworn to and certified by a Camp Officer. I shall then turn to Document No. 73 which we find on page 76 of the original of Document Book III von Geitner. I shall offer this Document under Exhibit No. 39. This is an affidavit by Dr. Joerg-Wilhelm Hammer who has already given the affidavit No. 33 which is the first document in Document Book III. This Dr. Hammer was the leading medical officer with the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia from 10 April 1932 until 1 September 1933. Dr. Hammer describes in Document No. 73 the efforts of the German administration and, above all, of Herr von Geitner concerning the medical care for the Serbian population.
I recommend these statements to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. The document has been duly sworn to and certified. I shall now turn to document No. 76. This is an affidavit given by the affiant Erwin Branmueller. This affidavit is contained on page 79 of the original of Document Book III von Geitner and I shall offer it under Exhibit No. 60. In this affidavit, Document No. 76, Exhibit 60, the affiant Erwin Braunmueller describes the efforts on the part of the German administration in Serbia, which were also the efforts of the defendant von Geitner, to better the economic conditions in Serbia. They also tried to keep the destruction at the withdrawal of the German troops from Serbia at a minimum and to avoid them if at all possible.
This affidavit is offered as a contribution for the opinion of the Tribunal concerning the assertion of the Prosecution that a plan existed for the extermination of the Serbian people and for the destruction of Serbian economy. This affidavit is to show the Tribunal that even at the time when the German troops withdrew from Serbia, everything was done to avoid destruction as far as these were not an absolute military necessity. The affidavit is further to show that the charge made by the prosecution could more justly be made against the partisan units because of their sabotage acts than against von Geitner. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this affidavit. It has been duly sworn to and certified.
The next affidavit is concerned with economic problems. This is Document No. 77. It is contained on page 83 of the original of Document Book III von Geitner and I shall offer it under Exhibit No. 61. This is an affidavit given by the affiant Keyser who on the basis of his activities in the Balkans has a clear insight into the economic conditions in the Balkans.
He was in a position to have insight on the increase of the economic situation. He was also in a position to make statements concerning the destruction made through the sabotage acts of the partisans. On page 87, in the last passage of his affidavit, he summarizes his impression, I shall therefore read this last sentence on page 87 of the original, which reads as follows:
"The examples show that, contrary to the assertions of the prosecution, measures for the protection of the economic potential and the economic order wore taken by the Germans, even at the cost of sacrificing German blood. This aim was continuously interfered with by the insurgents, especially those of the coal mines, are bound to have far-reaching consequences for the peace-time economy."
The next document is a very brief document. It is given by General Gullmann, whom we have previously mentioned; and who was active as Commanding General in Albania, Document 78, contained on page 88 of the original of the document book III for Geitner, I shall offer under Exhibit 62. This document is. to prove that the German Wehrmacht did everything in its power to help the civilian population. The affiant, General Gullmann, who was German Plenipotentiary General in Albania, was subordinate to the Military Commander Southeast, and worked under his directives. The following document, the Document 79, contained on page 90 of the original document book III for Geitner, will be offered under Exhibit 63. This is an excerpt from Document NOKW 1412, which is the War Diary of the Commanding General and Commander Serbia. This again is to show the care which was given to the Serbian civilian population. This is to be proved from one specific example -
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I am merely asking if Dr. Sauter could clean up something for me. In the index this document is referred to as an excerpt of Document NOKW 1412. On page 90 it is referred to as an extract from NOKW 1942. I would like to ask Dr. Sauter which one of these two documents he has reference to, so that we may make corrections accordingly.
DR. SAUTER: Just a moment, please, while I check on it.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
DR. SAUTER: Just a moment, please. May it please the Tribunal, in the German version it reads, on page 90, as it should, "Extract from Document NOKW 1412." In the English Version it is Very strange that in place of the figure 1512 it gives the figure 1942. I would like the Tribunal to make a. correction here. It should read 1412, extract from NOKW 1412. The figure 1942 was obviously put down when the document was copied by the English typist and mistakenly taken for the figure 1952. It is given further below in which it reads War Diary of Commander in Chief and Commander in Serbia, November 1952." This is a typographical error in the English.
JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal has noted the discrepancy, and has corrected the record accordingly in the English document book. The correction has been made.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Your Honor. The last document in Document Book III for Geitner is Document 80. We find this on page 92 of the original, and this document will be offered under Exhibit 65. This again is an excerpt from the repeatedly mentioned German Army Manual for the General, Staff in wartime, the so-called "Red Donkey". This excerpt reproduces the provisions concerning the so-called executive power. Those articles of the service regulations arc offered in order to shout the Tribunal that executive power was bound to the holder of it. That is the person who held judicial authority, and that this power cannot be transferred. These excerpts arc further to prove that the Chief of Staff, in accordance with the provisions, is not responsible for orders regarding executive power, because other officials, according to the regulations are responsible for this. Further, there was in Serbia a special Chief of the Administration Staff with whom the Commander would have had to confer. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this article of the Service Regulations, which has already been mentioned in another connection. May it please the Tribunal, this for the moment finishes my presentation of documents concerning the case of the defendant Geitner. I have already stated there will be one further document book in one or two volumes. This document book is being translated at the present, and has not yet been submitted. This further document book deals with two specific points. One, with the War Diaries, which we received from Washington, and two, with a detailed attitude on the part of von Geitner concerning all those documents, which during the course of these proceedings have been connected with him.
However, I do not wish to bring all these documents in detail here. I therefore ask the Tribunal to allow me to reserve the right to reproduce these documentary points at a later date to the Tribunal as evidence. If at that time the prosecution wishes to cross-examine Herr von Geitner concerning these further documents, I am, of course, in agreement with this procedure.
MR. RAPPL: Your Honor, I examined the two affidavits which are given by the defendant Geitner in Document Book IV, and I have no objection, in order to same time, that they be introduced at the convenience of Dr. Sauter. However, the document book, as such, should not be considered admitted despite the fact that Dr. Sauter says that is all the document book contains. It does contain other matters, and if and when Dr. Sauter decides to introduce that book I will deal with it at that time.
JUDGE BURKE: Is that satisfactory for the presentation of your material, Dr. Sauter? It seems logical? Very well.
DR. SAUTER: I now conclude the presentation of my documentary evidence.
MR. RAPPL: Your Honor, I have only one question -- I would like to ask Dr. Sauter, when he intends, as far as his presentation of the case where Geitner is concerned, to submit the additional document book. Just to avoid that we may have to go back to the Geitner case again.
JUDGE BURKE: Obviously he can't present them until he has them.
MR. RAPPL: Well, that is quite clear to me, Your Honor, but I cm pointing out the fact that if these documents are delayed for an appreciable amount of time, we would have to come back again to Geitner, and to cross-examine on matters which are contained in these document books. I am not trying to find out if it is a matter of today or tomorrow or a matter of practically weeks. That is my question.
JUDGE BURKE: Would you be able to throw any light on this, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: This morning I am afraid I shall not have those two document books available, because they are still being translated. But I should imagine it would be the same procedure as was used in the other trials. I am afraid it will not be possible in this trial to avoid the fact that there will be further documents submitted delayed for one or the other defendants, which came in later or which at least were not translated when the case was presented. This document book IV for Geitner will be translated at this later date, and then can be presented at this later date, and at that point the prosecution will be in a position to deal with it, and I am afraid it will be the same with all the defendants.
JUDGE BURKE: Dr. Sauter, has the Document Book to which you refer passed through the regular channels and is it now in the process of translation and mimeographing?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well. The Tribunal will recess at this time until 1:30.
(Thereupon a recess was taken until 1:30 p.m.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours)
JUDGE BURKE: We will proceed.
DR.SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, I have finished my examination of the defendant von Geitner.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well, Mr. Sauter.
Cross-examination, Mr. Rapp?
MR. RAPP: Yes, your Honor, if the Tribunal please, I would possibly suggest that the defense counsel might like to ask some other questions of the defendant von Geitner first.
JUDGE BURKE: Do any of the other defense counsel wish to interrogate the witness von Geitner?
MR. RAPP: In the Tribunal pleases, the marshal should be instructed to call the defendant von Geitner on the witness stand.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
MR. RAPP: Does the Tribunal consider the witness Geitner still under oath?
JUDGE BURKE: Of course.
CURT RITTER von GEITNER CROSS -EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, you stated that you were removed as leader of an SA Brigade in the year 1934 on account of your demonstrated lack of political philosophy towards the National Socialist movement, is that correct.
A. No. that I said was that as the leader of the Standarte I was dismissed or removed. I remained in the SA, and I retained my rank which I had been given shortly before then, and the addition was made ZV, at the disposal. But I was no longer used as the leader of a unit. The reason given at the time was that I was, as the leader of an SA unit, not suitable.
Q. For lack of sympathy towards the National Socialistic cause, is that right?
A. I was a member of the old German National Party, a member of the Stahlhelm , Steel Helmet, and not a tested national socialist.
Q. Very well. Now, witness, in this Document I, Ex. I, which was submitted on your behalf, six affiants stated you were relieved of this position 6 February 1934, for lack of sympathy for the National Socialistic cause, is that right?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. You further stated that you entered the Nazi party with the effective date as of May 1, 1937?
A. I joined the party with a retroactive date as from May 1, 1937.
Q. Very well. Now, you also stated that as one of the reasons for joining the Nazi Party, you gave the success of that party to do away with the awful unemployment problem; did you make that statement?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. In other words, when you entered the Nazi party the problem of unemployment was already solved to a very great degree at that time, if I understand you right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the way Hitler solved the unemployment problem of the Nazi Party impressed you to such a degree that you thereupon voluntarily joined the party; am I right in understanding that?
A. First, it wasn't really voluntarily, because there was a certain amount of pressure from the point of my position as plant manager, which was used by the Ortsgruppenleiter, for exercising pressure, and secondly, the reason which you have just mentioned, I have mentioned myself, made this decision easier for me, because I knew the misery in Germany, namely the misery caused by unemployment , above all in a small town in a densely populated but very poor district, and I saw in the elimination of employment, the main problem of that period, when in 1932 and 1933 about six million people were in the streets.
Q. I certainly don't want you to restrain yourself to answer any and all questions --
JUDGE BURKE: Any restraint to be placed upon the witness will be placed upon him by the Tribunal. If you have any objection to make either as to his response or to the methods employed by the witness, you communicate that to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal, if it sees fit will admonish the witness.
MR. RAPP: Very well, Your Honor, I have no objection as far as the witness testimony is concerned, I merely want to control the witness so he won't run off and we may possibly make better progress in time that way. I asked him a very specific question, and I don't want him to get into all these points.
JUDGE BURKE: Well, if he considered the question of sufficient importance to give a detailed answer,that is his privilege.
MR. RAPP: Very well.
Q. You may continue witness.
A. On the other hand I wish to state that also in the United States the most frightful unemployment prevailed, and that that unemployment was eliminated at that time by completely new methods which up to then had never been used in the United States, namely under the New Deal, and if anyone tackled that problem in Germany , the the unemployment had become much more acute than in the rich United States, and the more widely populated states, and if one saw this - and I myself had to suffer from it in my own firm, because on account of the bad business of my clients I had to reduce labor temporarily, one had to see in the removal of unemployment a success.
Q. Did it ever occur to you, witness, at that time, that the unemployment problem was largely solved because Germany was preparing for aggressive war?
A. No, no. As far as I was concerned no aggressive war was prepared for. As far as I was concerned Germany was put into a position where she could defend herself.
I never recommended an aggressive war or was enthusiastic about an aggressive war. In the rearmament of that period I saw nothing but the possibility for Germany to defend herself.
Q. Very well, witness, now just answer the question as to whether or not you realized that the unemployment problem was solved through rearmament; whether it was for a defensive or an aggressive war , we will forget for the time.
A. No, that also is not correct. All other possible achievements were made, the Reich Autobahn and the Reich highways were built, which had little to do with military matters. Furthermore, a system was introduced in Germany to promote export by voting bonuses for export, whereby on the one hand for every export you had to pay a certain amount of money, and on the other hand expert prices were kept low. In other words, it was not rearmament alone which made all this possible.
Q. Witness, approximately from what day onward did you consider yourself an opponent of the Nazi government or the Nazi philosophy?
A. I was never 100% for the National Socialist ideology, but in view of these things such as the elimination of unemployment with new methods, one cannot take up the attitude; I turn down everything and I reject everything. I believe that even in the United States not all people were originally followers of the New Deal, but at the same time advantages were accruing therefore and you were in a position then to have a statesman at the helm who handled matters in a sensible manner , while we unhappily were not in that position as we found out later.
Q. Just to clear the whole chapter, will you please tell us whether or not you encountered any difficulties, because of your antiNazi background, in joining the Nazi party; in May, 1937, did you have any difficulties?
A. I don't quite see what you mean.
Q. Well then I will put it a little bit clearer, affidavits which you have submitted in addition to your own testimony indicate that you were an average rather unpolitically minded German who from the very beginning, certainly as far back as 1934 , got into some disagreement with the Nazi government and its philosophies, therefore, I am asking you whether or not you had any difficulties subsequently in joining the Nazi party in 1937?
A. Do you mean after 1937?
Q. No, when you applied to be admitted.
Q. I emphasize one more I did not apply, but I only signed an application for memberships after the Ortsgruppenleiter had called on me. I admit with perfect frankness to you that very soon I saw something rotten in the whole affair on the basis of the development of political relations in 1937. I first of all saw the elimination of unemployment and secondly which cannot be overlooked, I saw the recognition of the National Socialist state by all foreign governments and the interests with which National Socialism was received abroad, which was manifested most of all by the Olympic games in 1936.
Q. Now, witness, I am referring you now to NOKW 704, exhibit 217 in document book 9 on page 10 of the English, I don't know the German page, there General Bader, your Commanding General, analyzing your personality and performance of duty in connection with your service record and I quote:
"Considers you a National Socialist and General Staff officer of the old school. " And the defendant Foertsch in the same document considers you indispensable at the present time for Serbia.
Can you tell us anything about the true meaning of these entries or were they just another matter where the true meaning was deliberately camouflaged?
A. Whenever you described an officers character, a demand you had at that time was to comment on the fact whether or not he was a National Socialist. I believe that the addition N.S. at that time could not possibly be lacking in any of these qualifications. I think in most cases it had to be confirmed that not was he a National Socialist, but that he understood to pass on National. Socialist ideas. That, as I remember, at that time, a stipulation raised by the personnel officer. by the remark was made by General Foertsch that I was indispensable for Serbia, I don't know. He said on the stand that no change should be made.
Q. Witness, if I understood you right, you meant to say that every officer had to be judges, in addition to other qualifications, about his National Socialistic behavior or what his relation was to the Party; is that right and you state that was mandatory and had to be accomplished without fail?
A. That is what I was told at the time by the man who worked on personnel matters, the 2-A. I know that a regulation of that sort existed which later on was eliminated.
Q. Witness, you became Chief of Staff of the General Staff or as you call it Commando Staff of General Bader in 1942 in May; is that right?
A. Yes, in July.
Q. And when you reported for duty General Bader gave you the customary briefing and told you that he himself would decide all matters pertaining to reprisal measures; is that correct?
A. Yes, that he would have the decision and the orders to be given in the event of a retaliation measure as far as they concerned the taking of human live, if I remember correctly.
Q. Witness, you were asked whether or not you had read and studied both prior and during the war the booklet called "Handbook for the General Staff Service in the War" and you stated that you did read and study it ; is that right?
A. Not before the war but during the war I read it.
Q. Very well, you further stated that this particular booklet covers the topic of executive powers and jurisdiction of Commanders as distinguished from General Staff officers; is that right ?
A. Well, the Chief of the General Staff had to be consulted in all matters concerning the troops and the supply of troops; according to the regulations, he need not be consulted in questions pertaining to executive power.
Q. Now upon direct questioning by your defense counsel, you stated that this booklet contained specifically instructions which would cover reprisal measures as being the prerogative of a commander who holds the executive power, rather than the prerogative of a staff officer; did you make that statement?
A. Yes, executive power is vested with the commanding general.
Q. Now, witness, let me just try and analyze this question once more so that you have complete opportunity to be sure that you answer it correctly. I did not only ask you about the executive power being the prerogative of the commanding general, but I also asked you whether or not reprisal measures specifically as a part of the executive power are being mentioned in this booklet, as you stated upon being questioned by your defense counsel?
A. As far as retaliation measures are concerned, there is nothing mentioned in the hand Book for General Staff Officers.
Q. Thank you, that's just what I wanted to know.
A. All that it mentions is hostages.
Q. Witness, in outlining your duties as Chief of Staff, you mentioned matters of supply operations, training and organization of troops as your main duty; is that right?
A. Yes, those were matters where I had to be consulted and called in.
Q. Were these individual topics with which you concerned yourself not closely connected with partisan warfare and reprisal measures in order to enable you to do intelligent and logical planning at least to a certain degree?
A. These matters were linked with the combating of partisans, in what way they were allegedly linked to retaliation measures I cannot see at all, because in these things there cannot be any planning because if the population remained calm, my Commander in Chief had no opportunity or occasion to order retaliation measures. These things did not go according to plans.
Q. Now, witness,firstly, as a matter of fact the population was not quiet, and secondly, you stated yourself, did you not, that you had to be informed about everything that was going on in Serbia in order to be an effective Chief of Staff?
A. Yes, I had to know everything that went on.
Q. And that is what I meant when I talked about planning.
A. Being informed about the situation surely has nothing to do with planning of retaliation measures.
Q. Witness, I am not talking about the planning of reprisal measures, I am talking obviously about your over-all planning of employment of troops, of supplies and other military matters which were no doubt in some way effected by partisan warfare and reprisal measures; is that right or not?
A. What reprisal measures had to do with this here, I don't quite see.
Q. All right, we'll cover that later. Witness, were you in fact the Senior Staff Advisor to your Commanding Generals, that is Bader and Felber?
A. I was the first adviser of my commanders, preferably in the matters which I have described and which you have repeated. It did happen temporarily that there was a more senior officer around, but he was not Chief of Staff you see.
Q. Nevertheless, witness, you were the senior advisor to the Commanding General in your position as Chief of Staff; is that correct or not?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. Now , did both of your commanders, that is Bader as well as Felber, generally rely on your judgment?
A. No, both of them were really old active soldiers of some years of service. General had joined the army roughly in about 1902 at the same time as I and had been on active service all the time. He was entirely initiated in all problems. General Felber was a few years younger than I, but had been an officer all the time. A general staff officer, even a chief of staff to an army group, had no reason to rely in everything on me, They were themselves sufficiently initiated in these matters, more than was I, who was an officer in the reserve who had a profession at home and who two or three times a week kept extensive correspondence with his home problems. In no sense of the word was the position such that I would have attempted to force my Commanders to follow my ideas, or that my commanders would have said, whatever Geitner orders will be done. For this they were far too much soldiers and men.
Q. Witness, did these two men show you all their confidence, in other words, did you enjoy the confidence of your two commanding generals?
A. I believe I must say that I did enjoy the confidence of my commanders, but that t did not mean that my commanders would have given me "carte blanche". They always wanted to know what was going on and I very strictly observed this and did not attempt to do things, important things, of which they knew nothing.
Q. Nevertheless, witness, it is true that you remained down there for more than two years and there was no talk of relieving you, was there, in your position as Chief of Staff?
A. Another party attempted to get rid of me.
Q. Well, I meant from the side of your Commanding General?
A. Not that I know of, General Bader after all had given me suffi cient qualifications to be the chief of an active corps, which showed that he would have parted with me had I been called away.
Q. Now, witness, you are not trying to state that any Commanding General would not recommend anybody for higher tasks, merely because he wants to hang on to him, do you?
A. I did not say that.
Q. Well you said that General Bader recommended you to be even the Chief of Staff of a corps, and you used this recommendation to tell us that there was possibly some basis for getting rid of you by kicking you upstairs?
A. That is not what I wanted to say.
Q. Will you tell us what you wanted to say?
A. What I wanted to say was that General Bader would have released me if I had become Chief of Staff to an active corps. In other words he did not regard me as entirely indispensable.
Q. Very well. Now, witness, this Handbook for the General Staff Service, which you know, states or emphasizes rather that the close coordination and cooperation between the Chief of Staff and his Commander is a prerequisite for any undertaking which is to be successful; is that correct witness ?
A. Quite correct, but with entirely different tasks and functions.
Q. Now, witness, I have not attached anything to this very simple question, I was merely trying to ask you whether I was quoting or misquoting this book?
A. Yes, but it was up to the Commanding General to have a clear mind for the really big decisions and the definite orders necessary there to. It was up to the Chief of Staff to keep the staff together by the most intensive work in detail in order to make the tasks of the Commanding General easier, in other words the chief of staff had a task which was to say the least was of secondary importance and worked himself to death on behalf of the Commanding General.
Q. Now, witness , you will admit won't you that there is a lot of difference between what is printed in a book and what actually happens in practice; isn't that right?
A. No, it need not be so at all.
Q. Allright, now suppose you have a Commander or a Commanding General who is very aggressive, very independent and a very busy -body type of a fellow, and you as a Chief of Staff are then obviously relegated to something less than a secondary position; is that right?
A. That , of course, depends entirely on the personalities involved.
Q. Allright.
A. But a Chief of Staff is always, at the most, of secondary importance, that was what I thought of my position, and that has been borne out by affidavits on several occasions. I did not push myself forward.
Q: I know that witness, but all I wanted to get from you was the fact that a lot depended on the personalities and that, you said, is a fact.
Now, witness, we will leave that topic and now I want to ask you something about these initials and signatures on those orders and letters and so forth. You went into great detail the other day explaining to us at great length the difference in putting your initials on an order before it was signed by your Commanding General. Now I want to find out from you whether or not you made this statement for the purpose of telling us What when you put your initial on an order, after it was signed by your Commanding General, only then and at that moment did you receive knowledge of the contents of this order. Would you clear that point up for us, please?
Did you understand my question?
A: Perhaps I may repeat. Do you want to know what is meant when I put my initials underneath an order which had been signed already by a Commanding General?
Q: Not exactly, witness. I tried to narrow it down a little bit. I was asking you specifically whether you wanted to say that your initial, after your Commanding General had signed the letter, meant that only then you knew the contents of such an order or letter. That was the specific question I would like you to clear up for us.
A: I don't quite follow you.
Q: Now, let me give you an example, witness. I understand you to say that when your initial was on a letter before it was signed by your Commanding General you checked such letter for form, accuracy, military procedure and the like when it reached your desk -- you then initialed it which did, according to your testimony, not entail any responsibility on your part, and you forwarded it to your Commanding General for signature.
That's the one procedure you told us. Can we agree on that?
A: No, something highly important has been omitted here. What has been omitted is that I would only initial an order before it went to the Commanding General if I knew that order coincided with the wishes of the Commanding General, that it coincided also with the order from higher up, and that it was correct as far as form went.
Q: I concede you that point, witness. Now, the next point I am trying to ask you is this; suppose you did not initial such a letter before your General signed it but you initialed it after your General signed it -- that is, actually you saw it then the first time -- was it then at that moment that you received the first time knowledge of the contents of this order or letter? That is the question -- the answer I wanted.
A: That happened very frequently in the case of reprisal measures.
Q: Very well. However, it is true, is it not, that you received your knowledge in either case prior to the execution of the reprisal measures, is it not?
A: That is not always true.
Q: Very well then, give us one exception.
A: It occurred that reprisals by the Commanding General reached me only when I looked through the files which were about to be filed away.
Q: Now, one more question about these initials: did you merely initial only the copies which you retained at your headquarters or did you initial also the original which went to the units?
A: If the Commanding General had made up his mind to take reprisal measures for an occurrence, and if he asked the expert working on these problems to put down an order in writing then it would happen.