I don't know what else you wanted to know. I forget what you asked me.
Q: I merely wanted to know whether you initialed only the copies which went in your files or whether you also initialed the copies going to the units.
A: It would happen in those cases that the order would go through my office. It happened but it happened infrequently, and then it would only be initialed by me. But in all cases where I received knowledge only after the event, I merely saw the copies and the orders contained in the diaries are copies where one doesn't even know whether they were signed at the same time as the original or whether they weren't.
Q: Witness, tell us whether it was customary in the German Army for a Commanding General to sign in his Own signature the original and the copies. That includes, of course, the copy which you subsequently kept in your filing cabinets.
A: It was customary for the Commanding General to sign with his full name the actual original order. Whether he signed the copies with his full name was not the case in many cases, but as a rule he merely initialed the copies -- not his copies but the one copy meant for the files.
Q: Witness, you told us on several occasions during your testimony in connection with the direct examination that you prevailed repeatedly on your Commanding General to use less severe methods towards the Serbain population. Is that correct?
A: On repeated occasions in conversations when principles were discussed I told my Commanding Officers that these measures were very severe such as they had been ordered from higher up and as they were regarded by the Commanding General as a military necessity.
I did that on a number of occasions. My Commanding Generals in most cases shared my opinion.
Q: You emphasized further in your testimony that in each instance your Commanding General turned you down because, at the time that you made these suggestions, acts of socalled sabatage increased both in severity and intensity. Is that correct?
A: It is not correct in the way it has been put just now. The Commanding Generals were only of the opinion that at the time they were in no position after sufficient deliberation and having made appraisal of the situation in the country, and taking into consideration the orders issued, to alleviate conditions at the time. An exception in this which I remember today is the case which occurred at the end of May 1943, I believe, where efforts were made to find methods to have things on a more moderate scale.
Q: Now, you did make your testimony somewhat different today. However, tell us whether or not it occurred to you at that time when you were turned down and yet these sabatage acts increased, that you may possibly have been using the wrong methods. Did that ever occur to you at that time and that, therefore, the Serbian population became more and more aroused toward the occupation power?
A: That is not so.
Q: I just ask you whether -
A: I know that dates exist when there was clearly a decrease in the incidents. That occurred in the summer and autumn of 1942/ and I mean decrease of the mere serious incidents/ and also in the autumn of 1945. The more serious incidents which necessitated retaliation were on the decrease at the time.
After all we had intercepted the wireless communications of Mihajlovic where he valued his subordinate units then not to take any more Measures which would make the Germans take retaliation measures. Therefore, what you said is not correct. -- I mean, that reprisal measures hardened or aroused the Serbian people.
Q: Witness, I want to take you over this again. I don't think you understood me. I didn't make a statement at all. I merely wanted to ask you whether it did occur to you at that time that you were using possibly the wrong methods and try to answer that question.
A: Well, it is not too simple to answer that question. I realized after some weeks or months of my service in Serbia that severe measures were necessary but I leave open the question whether it was necessary to act as they did. If I had not had that idea I would not have discussed with Commanding Generals whether it was not possible to have things more moderate.
Q: You told us that the senior troop commander substituted during longer periods of absence for your Commanding General and that during such time of substitution it was he who had the exclusive right and authority to order reprisal measures. Am I right?
A: Yes.
Q: Who advised such Acting Commanding Generals as far as the reprisal policy was concerned about the desires and wishes of the Commanding General? After all, these men were green and were green and were not familiar with the procedure in your head-quarters?
A: In order to speak about the last part of your question first, these men were not inexperienced and green. All of them had been in the area for some time and knew the orders which were relevant in this matter. I remember, forinstance, that a Divisional Commander who later on deputized for the Commanding General, on the occasion of a report to the Commanding General, came to see me and said he was much obliged to General Bader, that he was properly prepared to take the responsibility for these things.
Now, as for advising these men, I no longer remember whether in the Individual cases, whether the deputy when he was present himself for one first time in headquarters asked me to report to him or the other experts.
Q: I just thought that these Acting Commanders would have been somewhat green in regard to reprisal measures. I didn't want to state that they were soldiers who didn't know their business. Now, who was then the person who advised them?
A: They knew about reprisal measures through tne order issued by the Commanding General.
Q: Go ahead, please. And you presume that from the nature and tenor of these orders which they received prior to the time that they became acting Commanders, they could deduce the policy of reprisal measures themselves; it was apparent in other words, they didn't need any more coaching?
A: They knew then in general, but needless to say, they asked questions when they did not want to make up their minds immediately: Now, how did General Bader handle these things?
Q: And when did they ask?
A: And when they asked me on those occasions I had to tell then how General Bader handled these tings. That was the obvious duty on the pert of the Chief of General Staff that he would introduce the temporary deputies to the way the General wonted things handled and to nothing else. I know of no case in which anyone would take advantage of tne fact that he was deputizing for the General and act independently with a policy of his own. That, militarily speaking, would be quite impossible in the German army.
Q: Since you didn't get with General Bader or Felber anywhere in using less severe methods, did you ever suggest co these Acting Commanders to not do anything or possibly wait until the Commanding General would return?
A: The latter would have taken too long as a rule and would not have complied with the wishes of the Commanding General. As I said before, it is regarded as entirely disloyal and impossible in the German Army for the Chief of Staff to take advantage of the absence of his commanding General to do something utterly different. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, presented this in an affidavit. The Chief of Staff was not on the same level as a Commanding General. He was and remained simply and assistant.
Q: Witness, during your interrogation by defense counsel you indulged in a number of mathematical statements and acrobatics and you stated that, for instance, during a period of three and a half months in the year of 1943 approximately 1329 sabotage and terror acts occurred.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a minute. I have been present in the Tribunal during his examination. I fail to recall his doing any acrobatics. Ask the question and secure your answer without personal observations.
Q: During your interrogation by defense counsel, you made a number of mathematical statements or allegations and you stated that during a period of three and a half months in the year 1943 approximately 1329 sabotage and terror acts occurred. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you further say that during a period of five months within the same year only 80 reprisal measures which ended in the less of human lives were taken in retaliation for these 1329 so-called sabotage and terror acts? Did you say that?
A: No. What I said was that these 80 cases of retaliation were in reference to five months, and that those three and a half months were contained in these five months; therefore, if you wish to compare those figures, you have to take these 1329 too, over a period of five months, rather than three and a half months and thereby you arrive at even more.
Q.- I have said the same thing, witness, and I am now merely trying to ascertain whether you made that statement. Now, did you want to say that the killing of civilians was the only method of retaliation known to you and applied by your headquarters at that time?
A.- I did not retaliate. There were also other methods, and probably these methods were not known to the Commanding General because they were more or less within the competence of the administrative sub-area headquarters, for instance, contributions.
Q.- How about the burning down of houses or whole villages?
A.- I don't know whether in that period of time a village was burned down as a retaliation measure. I do not recall any such thing at the moment, because the burning down of houses during combat is, according to the hand warfare regulations, a matter which can be ordered by any officer. The burning down of houses after combat, as a retaliation measure, is a matter which can be ordered by a captain in accordance with the band warfare regulations. As far as we in Serbia were concerned, the way we managed this thing was that the order to burn down houses could be given by only the senior officer in the field if he regarded it as a military necessity.
Q.- Now, we got somewhat off the subject, but you know that both General Bader and General Felber repeatedly ordered the burning down of villages or houses as a direct reprisal measure. You know that don't you?
A.- Yes, that has been ordered but only rarely.
Q.- All I want to know from you now is whether or not this type of reprisal measure was included in your mathetical calculations or not.
A.- These 80 cases for which retaliation measures were taken in those five months by order of the Commanding General concerned only, as far as I know and as far as it becomes clear from some statistics in your Document Book XXIV, retaliations by one taking of human lives.
Q.- But you do agree, do you not, that there are other methods of reprisal which were employed by the Commanding General Serbia besides the taking of human lives?
A.- Yes, there were also other methods, The only question is what the Commanding General regarded as military necessity in certain events.
Q.- Witness, these 80 reprisal measures, which ended in the loss of human lives, did you reach that figure on the basis of documents submitted by the Prosecution which refreshed your memory, or did you reach that because you knew that anyhow?
A.- Let me answer the last part of your question first. I knew very little from that period of time. After I was taken into custody I no longer thought back to that period of time. I thought of my profession and my family. This figure of 80 has come back to my memory or rather I read this figure of 80 in a document contained in Volume XXIV, Volume XXIV of your document books. These are 80 individual cases. The figure of people killed of course is much higher.
Q.- Witness, do you know whether the OKW orders, which you received during your two years in Serbia and which in turn dealt with reprisal measures, specifically stated that only General Bader or General Belber or anybody in the rank of a Commanding General could order reprisal measures?
A.- That did not become clear from the OKW orders, but General Bader in his area in Serbia, had ordered that only he was authorized to order retaliation measures which would involve the taking of lives. During my time I do not remember one single case in which this order of General Bader was not observed in Serbia.
Q.- You stated that from May, 1943, on certain so-called shadow or mock executions were instituted. Is that correct?
A.- Yes.
Q.- Witness, it is perfectly clear to me, on the basis of your statements, that these shadow executions wore obviously aimed to preserve Serbian lives. However, I would like you to clear up what causes motivated General Bader to institute such shadow executions. Why, in other words, was he suddenly interested in preserving Serbian lives?
A.- A soldier is not a soldier in order to kill people, but there beats in every soldier a human heart, General Bader, as I stated on direct-examination, suffered profoundly from these things. First of all, the question now was will he try, according to the proposals which you have quoted to have less retaliations carried out, He felt that, for reasons of propaganda, this would not be feasible towards the population, but he wanted to try this by actually having less people shot and then publishing the whole figure on posters. This was how he arrived at that decision.
Q.- In other words he was largely motivated by humane considerations A.- Yes, he tried something out.
Q.- A consideration that possibly International Law had been violated was not given or stated?
A.- That consideration was left by General Bader to those who had ordered him to take such measures. If the OKW issued orders of this sort General Bader had not and did assume that, from a legal point of view, no objections could be raised to these things. Reprisals are allowed according to the Hague Land Warfare Regulations. The extent of a reprisal measure, I think, is left to discretion and military necessity.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURSE: Mr, Rapp, at this time we'll take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is now recessed until 3:15.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Mueller-Torgow representing General Felmy. Your Honors, I would like to see my client excused from the sessions of Tuesday and Wednesday for the purpose of preparing his case.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well. You may proceed, Mr. Rapp.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) DEFENDANT VON GEITNER BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, before the recess, you stated that the legality of these orders was never doubted by your headquarters inasmuch as they had come to you from the OKW. Is that right?
A Yes, it is. We were of the opinion that anything that came from the UKW had been examined so thoroughly that the legality could never be doubted.
Q Did your Commanding General ever discuss the legal issues involved with his legal adviser?
A I am sure that he did that. When I arrived, the orders had long been in existence, and all these matters were already in the process of being carried out.
Q Do you know whether or not in each instance he consulted his legal adviser?
A Whom do you mean by "legal adviser?"
Q I mean his legal adviser. There was, I understand, a type of staff judge-advocate attached to your headquarters. Is that correct?
A There was attached to the agency of the Military Commander a small court martial, that is correct. Whether he ever consulted this court martial counselor I do not know because I had no contact with matters of a court martial nature.
Q Witness, I understand that. I was not talking about court martials as such. I was talking about whether or not you knew that he Court No. V, Case No. VII.
had talked to his legal adviser about the legality of these execution orders in each instance as they were ordered?
AAs far as I know, he discussed the matter in every individual instance with the expert you mentioned who worked on the matter and this expert also would be a legal man.
Q Witness, to come hack to the shadow executions, I understood you to say that before they could be put into practice, some kind of an understanding had been reached with the SD. Is that correct?
A Before this matter was introduced, the Military Commander had to confer with the Commander of the S.D. that is correct. The individual cases were only known to the Military Commander and to the Commander of the SD. Not even I knew about it.
Q I understood you further to say that to even approach Meyssner in connection with your contemplated shadow execution was considered impossible by your Commanding General, is that right?
A You are talking about alleged shadow shootings. They were not only alleged shadow shootings; they were an actual fact. They were carried out. Meyssner could not be approached in this matter.
Q I didn't say "angeblich." I said "contemplated."
Witness, will you explain very briefly, if you can, why a representative of Meyssner's office had to be called into the Commanding General's confidence, why you couldn't do it by yourselves. I just wanted to have that once more crystallized.
A Only a very small circle could know about these things. This small circle of people could only exist in Belgrade. In Belgrade, as far as I remember, the Military Commander could only have executions ordered and executed by the SD--that is, according to my memory. I may be mistaken. The Commander had taken confidence to Schaefer up to a point. When Meyssner was on leave, Schaefer showed a tendency towards moderation more so than Meyssner. For that reason, he asked this man to come to confer with him, and he discussed matters with him. I don't even know how this whole thing was initiated. I believe the first dis Court No. V, Case No. VII.
cussion took place on the 28th of May according to the War Diary, that was the first discussion where I was present too and that was long after Schaefer had been with the Commander.
Q Witness, did the dual channel system of reporting--that is one channel through the SD to Himmler and another channel through your Heeresgruppe to the OKW-have anything to do with the fact that General Bader wanted to cover both tracks?
AAs far as I remember, and I believe I am fairly accurate here, General Bader only had one channel for his daily reports. This channel went to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast.
Q Witness, I realize that, but what I meant--there was also another channel which was in charge of Meyssner or Schaefer which General Bader did not control. Is that right?
A Yes, that is correct. There were even more channels than that.
Q Let's just confine ourselves to these two I have at the present time selected for discussion. And I therefore ask you whether or not one of the reasons Schaefer was called into Bader's confidence was the fact that Bader was afraid, possibly afraid, a different reporting through the SS channels may embarrass him? And expose his scheme? Do you think that there was another reason?
A It was certainly not the main reason. I believe that the main reason was the confidence which Bader had in Schaefer and in this confidence it was included that Schaefer would not report any differently. That is what I assume.
Q In other words, witness, would you say without Schaefer's knowledge of your plans and his agreement to cooperate with your Commanding General, your scheme would have been hopeless from the beginning. Is that what you want to say, witness? Or at least very difficult?
A In any case, that seemed the only possible way to the Commander.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Witness, according to your own testimony, you described this Dr. Schaefer and I quote your own testimony now. "A man who took an entirely different position towards the Serbian people than Meyssner. He was not a true party member. He was an old criminal police official, holding the rank of an Qberregierungsrat who had complete legal training which was usually uncommon among SD leaders. He was opposed to Meyssner. The Commanding General took this man into his confidence and received his concurrence." Did you make that statement, witness?
A Yes, I have.
Q You knew Dr. Schaefer personally, witness?
A Yes, I did.
Q Did you ever discuss with Schaefer racial problems--that is, for instance, Schaefer's attitude toward the Reich's policy in connection with the Jews? Did you ever talk to him about that?
A Not that I remember.
Q In appraising Schaefer's character and personality, based on your own judgment, would you consider Schaefer of being capable of committing criminal and inhuman action against Jews?
A You said that I emphasized Schaefer's character here. I contrasted Schaefer's character with that of Meyssner's and I put in contrast his attitude towards the Serbian population to that of Meyssner. He had a completely different attitude towards the Serbian population.
Q Just one second, witness. I didn't say that you praised Schaefer. I merely quoted what you said about him. If you yourself want to deduce from such quotations that you yourself appraised him that is all right with me. I just wanted to have that straight. Now continue.
A You mentioned the word "appraised". What Schaefer did prior to that date or what he did without it being reported to the Commanding General is not known to me. He was in any case an SS leader and an SD leader. In any case, he did not take me into his confidence.
Q Witness, it becomes incumbent that you either make one state Court No.V, Case No. VII.
mant or the other. I was quoting you what you said about Dr.Schaefer, I believe last Friday. On the basis of this character analysis which you gave, I asked you whether or not in your judgment this man was capable of committing crimes and inhuman acts against the Jaws?
A I don't know that.
Q Very well then. Do you know whether or not during the time that you were in Balgrada, Schaefer was involved in the extermination of Jaws in Balgrade. Do you know about that?
AAt the time when I was in Belgrade, I did not hear anything about the extermination of Jews. That never happened during my tenure in Balgrada. There was never any talk about it.
Q Witness, that was the territory of the SD about which you had no knowledge. Is that correct?
A We were not to have any knowledge about this. When the Highest SS and Polica Leader was assigned to his post, it was expressly stated that he had to work with secret police methods.
Q Witness, I am now showing you a document. Your Honors, this is 501-PS. It is being submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 599. In order to throw some true light on the character of this Dr. Schaefer who cooperated with your Commanding General in the so-called shadow executions, I have handed you now a document which deals with the extermination of Jaws through gas wagons. That is to say, Jews were harded into the back of these vans and exterminated through the poison gases. Will you read this document once?
A Do you want me to read it out loud?
Q You don't have to read it all aloud. We will go over it anyhow. The German copy of this original, as now in the hands of defense counsel, may not be complete but it will be in a few minutes. The English copy is complete.
Now, witness, you will see for yourself that these are various letters and telegrams addressed to the Reichssicharheitshauptamt talking about the repair and additional equipment needed in connection with Court No. V, Case No. VII.
these gas vans, and somewhere towards the end of this communication, you will find a telegram signed by Dr. Schaefer and sent from Belgrade. Have you found that telegram, witness?
A Yes, I have. Yes, I have got the telegram here. It is signed by Schaefer Obersturmbannfuehrer.
Q And you also will note that the major to whom this telegram is addressed happened to work in the same office that the original letter on top of this document I have shown you was also addressed to. In other words, it leaves very little question that he is talking in this telegram about special missions, meaning exterminations, in connection with these gas vans and that he is now sending them to Berlin to have them repaired, All I wanted to prove to you, witness, is the fact that whether you knew it or not, this Dr. Schaefer was involved in the extermination of Jews in Belgrade. He was, in fact, the same Dr. Schaefer which you have told the Court agreed with your Commanding General in carrying out these mock executions and was opposed to Meyssner and was not a Nazi of the old line. Is there anything you wanted to say in connection with this document?
A This is something completely new to me. The dates mentioned in these documents lie before my time. I never heard anything about these things. During the time of my tenure, I never gained any knowledge concerning the facts that Jews were shot in Belgrade or should I say Jews were exterminated in that area. It is possible that that happened at an earlier date but I have never heard anything and I never knew anything of these gas vans and similar things.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q You said that the purpose of showing you this document was primarily to tie up Dr. Schaefer with Jewish extermination, do you understand that?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Witness, there is a marked discrepancy between your testimony and the testimony of General Felber-
JUDGE BURKE: I think that is scarcely the method to pursue in cross-examination. If this witness has testified to other statements of facts on other occasions and now is testifying to another statement of facts, you have a right to interrogate on that. The other method is not recognized as a proper method of cross-examination.
Q Witness, General Felber, as a witness before this Tribunal, stated that he himself was the "father", so to speak or "father of the thought", of these shadow executions, and that they did not commence prior to October 12, 1943. This statement of General Felber can be found in the court transcript of August 11, on page 1721. You stated that these shadow executions were instituted by General Bader, and commenced sometime later in May or the beginning of June; will you explain to us the difference in these two statements?
A I do not know any more exactly when these shadow shootings had commenced. I had heard of them already before General Felber made statements, and I was quite aware of that fact here. I arrived only at the correct date in reading the War Diary and in the War Diary it says quite clearly, "Shadow shootings", and on the basis of reading that I remembered that was the first time this occurred.
Q And when was that, witness?
A It was on the 28 and 29 of May 1942.
Q How do you explain the fact, General Felber moved it back to October 12, 1943, and claimed the authorship of this scheme, inasmuch as you were at that time without interruption the Chief of Staff to both offices?
A I don't know. In any case the problem already played an im Court No. V, Case No. VII.
portant part by the end of May 1942. It is possible that after Meyssner returned it was pushed into the background, but there is no doubt already at that date, in May 1942, these things occurred.
Q Witness, you said that in order to make shadow executions successful so-called central executions had to be carried out in Belgrade, is that right?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q And those central executions in Belgrade took place, if I understand you correctly, in spite of the fact that the alleged acts of sabotage for which these executions were a reprisal measure, occurred several dozen or a hundred kilometers away from Belgrade, is that right?
A Yes, that is correct, but several hundred kilometers.....
Q Some distance?
A Yes, some distance.
Q In other words, would you say that many people were executed in Belgrade, who had no personal knowledge of acts which occurred somewhere else; they did not participate in them and of course they could not prevent them, is that right?
A That may be correct. The prisoners might have been selected according to the order of the Commander from the circles where the perpetrators originated. If possible people were selected who came from the district where the sabotage acts, etc. had occurred.
Q In your testimony you further say that such central executions took place only after the local Feldkommandanten run short in numbers of reprisal prisoners or hostages who were in their local jails, is that right?
A That is the way the commander ordered it.
Q Now, isn't it true, witness, that more often than not these jails were filled to capacity?
A I don't know that. I had no connection with that.
Q There was no report system at your headquarters whereby the Feldkommandanten had to report to you what their actual strength Court No. V, Case No. VII.
was, that is their own troops or those they held from the enemy for purposes of rations, supplies and other things?
A I cannot remember that I received any reports concerning the strength of the reprisal camps.
Q You would admit, wouldn't you, that it is quite important as a food problem for any quartermaster to know how many people he has to feed, or did these prisoners have to supply themselves?
A I don't know the facts precisely, but I believe that the reprisal prisoners had to be supplied by the Serbian authorities. I cannot remember exactly how the order was worded. Besides I was only interested in the supply situation of the troops, not of the reprisal prisoners.
Q Did you care what the people you held got to eat, if anything?
A I would like to refer back to the order. I believe the supply was a matter of the Serbian authorities.
Q Witness, how long were these shadow executions carried out, that is to say until to which date, approximately?
A I don't know that, because I was not informed concerning these facts and concerning the individual cases.
Q Weren't such facts apparent from the War Diary?
A In the War Diary it is only stated that on the 23 May certain shadow shootings took place, and that is reported as a fact, I don't know how often that occurred, and when that occurred, because that was merely a matter between the military commander and Schaefer.
Q Witness, did you ever hear of an instance whereby the local Feldkommandanten ordered immediate reprisal measures on the spot and got General Bader's and General Felber's agreement ex post facto?
A I do not remember any such an incident.
Q. Would you consider it possible?
A In accordance with the orders which were given this should be impossible.
Q Did at any time the SD or the military units which were Court No. V, Case No. VII.
affected through these acts of sabotage send representatives to any of these executions, to see to it that they were properly carried out?
A I don't know that.
Q You never heard of any such instance?
A Not that I remember.
Q Witness, you stated that the SD usually selected the execution victims, is that correct?
AAs far as I know the basic order of General Felber states that I believe the local headquarters Commandants, the police and also the Serbian District Superintendents, who had certain lists concerning these people had to participate in the selection.