Q. Now, concerning the reprisal measures which your commander had ordered and the reprisal measures which were carried out in your area, were these measures reported to Higher Headquarters? I am especially interested in the OKW.
A. The reprisal measures were reported. Either the order for the reprisal measures -- that is, the fact that the Military Commander had ordered reprisal measures -- was reported or it was reported that the measures had actually been carried out.
Q. Were these reprisal orders and measures of your Military Commander ever criticized by the OKW or any superior headquarters?
A. Never during my tenure.
Q. Who was it in your staff who drafted the reports to superior headquarters?
A. That was the first A.D.C. and on occasion also the Id. Then the reports were checked by the Ia as I have mentioned previously, they were submitted to the Commander. If nothing particular had been reported or if no decision was necessary, then they were submitted by the first A.D.C. or by the I-a.
Q. You mean submitted to the Commander?
A. Yes, to the commander. In all cases where the reports contained any particular items or in all cases where a decision of the Commander became necessary, I submitted the reports. As a rule the I-a was present.
Q. Now, concerning these reports which were made to higher headquarters were they signed by you as Chief of Staff? I don't mean, did you initial them, I mean did you sign them?
A. During the first period I just initialed them. However, in the fall of 1943 an order arrived stating that these reports had to bear a name, a full name. Then I ordered that in principle my name was to appear on the daily reports.
Q. What was the legal significance of your signing these reports to Higher Headquarters in your opinion?
A. If I signed a report it meant that I took over the responsibility for its correctness, the truthfulness of the incident reported as it had been submitted to us by lower commands.
Q. In your personal opinion by signing these daily reports, did you assume responsibility for the incidents which were reported in the daily reports?
A. No, never.
Q. If, therefore, a reprisal measure had been carried out and if this reprisal measure appeared in your report in order to be reported to superior headquarters, then it is your contention that through this report you do not assume any responsibility for the reprisal measures itself. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes. I did not assume responsibility for those measures which were reported in the daily report. According to German opinion, the responsibility for these facts was assumed solely by the Commander.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, this point is dealt with under figure "5" of an exhibit which I have already submitted. That is figure "5" of Document VIII which is Exhibit 6. In this passage the former General Halder discusses this point on page 18. It is contained on page 20 of the English document book. I am reading this figure.
"The significance of the signature of the Chief of Staff under a daily report to higher officers is in no way to be distinguished from the meaning of the signature of any other officers of the staff. The signer by this signature assumes responsibility for the correctness of the report but not the responsibility for the actions related in the report."
That is what Chief of Staff General Halder has to say on this subject.
A. May I say something else in this context?
Q. Please do.
A. In our staff when the Commander was present no daily report was ever issued unless the Commander himself had seen it. On a number of occasions he made alterations in the reports.
Q. Witness, you have told us that you were informed of the reprisal orders of your Commander and of all reprisal measures which were taken in your area. Were you earlier of the opinion, or maybe do you have the opinion today on the basis of this trial, that solely for the reason of this knowledge of what went on you are culpable?
A. No, Doctor, never; a pure knowledge of some fact can never imply a punishable action unless they are cases such as, to give an example, treason or high treason, where somebody is under an obligation to make use of his knowledge, but never in a case like mine.
Q. You have told us that you yourself had no connection with reprisal measures except that you reported also about them in your daily reports. I should now be interested to know, didn't you in spite of these facts endeavor to prevent reprisal orders or to mitigate reprisal measures or to influence your Commander, et cetera?
A. Yes, certainly. Of course, I did everything possible in order to achieve a mitigation in these matters. The fact that only part of these measures was at all reported to superior headquarters has already been mentioned by me. The Commander himself urged his expert to insist on keeping matters on as low a level as possible and I myself told the expert to do this although it was none of my business. I myself always emphasized to my commanders that there had to be a mitigation in these measures and they themselves shared this opinion but on the other hand, in view of the situation in the country, they could not close their eyes to the fact that such measures were a military necessity. I then tried on the occasion of the new formulation of the reprisal order by General Bader which he had ordered -- I mean this ned formulation was ordered by him -- on this occasion I tried to achieve a mitigation and I shall later refer to this again. At the time he told me, in view of the increase of incidents such as had occurred during the last period -- that is the time period which I mentioned, there were 425 incidents in 20 days -- I beg your pardon, there were 224 incidents in 20 days -- in view of this fact, he told me he could not decide on a mitigation of the measures.
Besides, I know of at least one case which is typical. At that occasion a district commander rang me up on the telephone and told me that he had received General Bader's order to shoot reprisal prisoners because of a certain incident, and he said: "But I have no reprisal prisoners. There are none in my camp." I then suggested to him to report that they had been shot. Actually, however, they were not shot. I remember this case quite well.
Q. Herr von Geitner, if -
A. There is something else I would like to mention since we are talking about mitigations. In May of 1943 General Bader again thought over thoroughly whether anything could be done concerning this situation. I had discussed the situation with him. He asked to have a compilation made about the incidents which had occurred during the first five months. These are the very incidents to which I had referred previously. Even then he could not decide to lower the ration but at that time we found another solution and that was the solution of the mock shootings.
Q Witness, is that the point which was yesterday mentioned by the witness? I believe it was Dr. Bub.
A Yes, that is so.
Q Then I'll have this document submitted to you. That is an excerpt from the war diary of the Commanding General and Commander for Serbia. It is dated the 26th of May 1943. This excerpt is contained in Document 93 in Document Book VV, Geitner, and will eventually be submitted to the Tribunal as an exhibit. I have already used this document yesterday when the witness, Dr. Bub, was on redirect examination. Maybe you would like briefly to make your comments on the particular passage because it says there: "Commander, discussions with Chief, with Standartenfuehrer Dr. Schaeffer, with A.D.C. concerning new regulations, et cetera. Would you like to have a look at this document and tell us what you have to say about it?
A On the 28th of May the Commander had asked me to appear through our A.D.C. and he had also asked to have a survey submitted to him concerning the incidents of the last five months. This survey is contained in Document Book XXIV and it was discussed this morning. He thought of a mitigation of the reprisal measures and he thought of lowering the reprisal ratios and Bader and myself advocated this measure. However, he didn't think that these suggestions were suitable, this mainly in view of the propagandistic effect on the Serbian population. On the other hand, he also considered the fact that he was constantly watched by the Higher SS and Police Leader. This man was of the opinion that Bader was far too soft and he had repeatedly reported this, his opinion, to his superior headquarters. We know from General Felber's testimony that he on the occasion of his report to the OKW was told by Field Marshal Keitel that measures altogether too mild had been applied down therein the Southeast. Everybody was trying to find a solution. This solution which gave at least a certain relief was found in the mock shootings.
Q Whose idea was that, witness?
A Bader and I, myself, we discussed this question for a lengthy period and we passed on our suggestions to the Military Commander but there were some difficulties. First of all, Meissner was not to know anything about it. He was not present at the time and the Military Commander asked the Standartenfuehrer Schaefer who was the Commander of the Security Police, to attend. This man had a totally different attitude towards the Serbians than Meissner. He was not purely a Party man. He was an old member of the Criminal Police. His rank was that of an Oberregierungsrat. He also had full legal training which was by no means always the case with SD leaders. This man Schaefer was in complete opposition to Meissner, and it was Schaefer who was asked to attend a discussion in a small circle. The Military Commander took him into his confidence and they came to an agreement.
Now, concerning reprisal measures which were taken out in the country somewhere, it would not have been possible to carry out a measure which did not coincide with the posters which had been drawn up and the proclamations which were made to the population; but, in the case of the so-called central shootings of central measures it was possible to effect such measures through the Commander of the Security Police and, in consequence, the Military Commander decided to carry out such measures. The basis of this decision was the discussion of the 28th of May 1943. As a result of this discussion General Bader two days later -- I believe that must have been the 30th of May -- issued an order. If I may refer to this order now, it was supposed to be discussed later but it fits well into this context.
Q What is contained in this order? Maybe you can give us the document number.
A Yes, that is Document 340.
Q You mean NOKW-340?
A Yes, it's Exhibit 276. That is contained in Document XI on page 45 of the German text.
Q And when is that order dated?
A I believe it is dated the 30th of May, 1943. It is on page 54 of the English Document Book, Document NOKW-340, Exhibit 276.
Q The order is dated the 29th of May 1943?
A Yes, the 29th of May 1943.
Q Have you got the order?
A I don't believe I have got it.
Q I have got Document Book XI here. Maybe you would like to ascertain first of all when this discussion took place.
A It took place on the 28th.
Q The discussion which was laid down in the War Diary took place on the 28th, and the order just quoted by the Defendant was dated the 29th of May, one day later. It is on Page 45.
A Yes, I have it, on page 45.
Q It is on Page 54 of the English Document Book.
A I believe it must have been on the 29th of May. At that time I went to Berlin to the OKW. The contents of the document were known to me, and also the form which the General intended to apply. He had taken into his confidence only the 01, Schaefer and me. The General issue an order which said, under Figure 1, "that persons which were to serve as retaliation prisoners and were to be arrested to a larger extent should be taken in accordance with Paragraph 3, section 6 of the pertinent order." This pertinent order is the basic order concerning reprisal measures, dated the 28th of February.
Q Of what year?
A Of 1943. This order was mentioned previously. This paragraph meant that the lists were to be used which were deposited with the Serbian district chiefs. Those lists showed the band sympathizers etc. Under Figure 2, it was pointed out that concerning reprisal cases which were not of so severe a nature, collective punishment had to be used more frequently, according to figure 2 Paragraph 3.
Q Witness, what kind of collective measures are those?
A This means, for instance, fines, burning down of houses, etc.
Q Witness, those then were punishments which had nothing to do with the killing of persons?
A That is correct. And then it says it does not fulfill the need of speedy reprisal if the carrying out of reprisal measures was delayed for weeks, owing to lack of hostages. In case a sufficient, number of hostages were not available in the area of the administrative sub-area headquarters, application is to be made for the central execution of reprisal measures by the Commander of the Security Police, at the same time as the application for reprisal measures. This application is to be made at the latest, if the execution cannot be carried out within one week after issuance of the reprisal order.
But under no circumstances should the central executions by the Commander of the Security Police become habitual, since only reprisal measures carried out within the area of the scene of the incident have shown themselves to be effective. And then, we have another passage which is a clear camouflage passage: "In order to counteract the view which has appeared suddenly amongst the population that reprisal measures are only published on posters and are not carried out, the entire number ordered to be shot is to be shot to death from time to time at the scene of the incident. This central shooting in Belgrade, as the Commander has adopted here as a solution and as he has put down in his own order, was, at the time, the only possibility to carry out such mock executions without anybody suspecting anything. I do not know anything about individual cases. The Commander did not let me participate in these matters any more than in any other of his decisions concerning retaliations. I only know that from time to time he asked the leader of the SD to appear at his office. This was Schaefer, the man previously mentioned, and he discussed everything with him in detail. The relation between Schaefer and Meyssner deteriorated more and more. Finally Meyssner forbade Schaefer to have any contact whatsoever with me. I had only used Schaefer to exchange news and information.
Q This then is the problem of mock shooting?
A Yes.
Q Witness, did your Commander, with or without your influence, endeavor at any time to make representations to higher headquarters in order to achieve a mitigation with respect to reprisal measures?
A The Commander was subordinate to the Commander in Chief Southeast. And in such matters he had to confer with the Commander in Chief Southeast.
Q Who was that at the time?
A That was General Loehr.
Q Will you please repeat your last answer?
A In such cases he had to confer with the Commander in Chief Southeast. That was, in those days. General Loehr.
Q And what was the result?
A I know that those two had long discussions. I also know that he once was in Saloniki. One of these discussions concerned his intention to resign. I have already mentioned this. He discussed that with me. I told him that I could well understand the General if he did that, but again and again I appealed to his soldierly training and ideals, and thus he got the point of view that he could not leave after all.
Q Witness, you have told the Tribunal that you, for your own person, were opposed to such reprisal measures and so was your commander at heart. Did you exert any influence on your Commander, to the effect that he should simply refuse to obey in these matters?
A Doctor, to refuse obedience on the part of a soldier towards an order, and that in war-time which was based on the will and wish of the Supreme Commander, and not only of the Supreme Commander but also of a man who in actual fact was the personification of the entire staff, such a disobedience would have been contrary to all soldierly discipline. If I, as Chief of Staff would have recommended to my Commander to commit an act of disobedience with respect to such an order, that would have had very severe consequences, maybe not for me, but for my Commander. A few days ago the question was put here, "Was there ever an occasion where generals were shot because they did not obey orders?" And the case of General von Ziehlberg was mentioned in this connection. I can. add one other case, and that is the case of General Graf Sponeck.
Q Maybe you'd spell the name for us.
A S-P-O-N-E-C-K--Sponeck. Besides, God knows, my position was not high enough nor strong enough to recommend to my Military Commander any disobedience, especially in view of the position of the enemy. There must be no disobedience in purely military matters during war-time, least of all in cases where this disobedience would be directed against the head of the state, irrespective of one's own attitude toward this head of the State.
May I, in this connection, refer to one sentence in an address by the British Field Marshal Montgomery? If I am correctly informed, Montgomery, at the time when he was supreme Commander of the British Tone in Germany, signed the Control Council Law, on which the carrying our of these war crimes trials is based. There is a provision in this law which says that acting on orders would not protect one from punishment. This very same Field Marshal Montgomery, in July, 1946, said to his soldiers in Portsmouth the following: "The soldier is not the one to examine an order. Intelligence has no part in this. The nature of Democracy is freedom; the nature of soldiering is discipline. It is the duty of all soldiers to obey without any consideration."
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 1:30.
(THE COURT ADJOURNED AT 1220, to RESULT SESSION AT 1330)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 23 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DEFENDANT KURT von GEITNER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Herr von Geitner, while you were serving in Belgrade did you ever think about these reprisal orders? Did you ever consider the fact whether they were in accordance with International Law or whether they were, maybe, in violation of International Law?
A The idea that orders which were issued by the highest State authority could possibly not be in order or should possibly not be followed was far from my mind. If I remember correctly, I once discussed the question of reprisals with a jurist. I do not remember who he was. At the time I was told that reprisal measures were admissible, but I had to assume, under all circumstances, that my superior agencies which issued such orders were fully aware of their responsibility. The idea that a military leader would be punished and would be liable to punishment because he followed orders of that high authority was far from my mind. Even if we assume as a basis of the discussion paragraph 47, which has repeatedly been mentioned here, one must realize that these orders did not intend a crime. And furthermore, that a Chief of Staff should be called to account because he did not prevent the execution of orders which had been given to his commanders from higher headquarters, seemed something quite impossible to me.
Q Witness, you have experienced the conditions in Serbia for a number of years. You are telling us that you, as far as your own person was concerned, were opposed to and reprisal measures. Did you, now, on the basis of your personal observation and experiences gain the impression that these reprisal measures were actually necessary? If so, why?
A The conditions in that country were of a very special nature. After weeks or months of my residence in the Balkans I realized that these abnormal conditions could only be countered by harsh measures.
Harsh measures were a military necessity, and out of this consideration alone my two Commanders decided to carry out these measures. That the ratio of 1 to 50 somewhat bothered me and that I deliberated whether it was not possible to cope with the situation in a different manner was not a decision which I was in a position to make, it was one in which my Commanders were concerned, the question whether these Commanders could have coped with the situation by applying more lenient measures, I am not today in a position to say. In any case this question can only be answered in relation to the situation prevailing in those days. I must repeat that in three and half months there were 1,319 incidents. I myself thought a lot about the possibility of other methods. These other methods would either not have been effective, or as the measure mentioned yesterday, concerning the sentencing by summary court martial of bandits and band helpers on the basis of evidence delivered by the radio monitors' service, that was not possible because it was impossible. It was impossible to slow up the radio interception service for this purpose.
Q Did you not consider, during the whole period of your tenure in the Balkans, that one day you or your Commander would be reproached with the reprisal measures and reproached with the fact that such reprisal measures were not allowed according to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, but rather forbidden?
A I have already told you that. A jurist once told me expressly that reprisal measures were admissible. Besides I did not bear any responsibility. May I have thought about these things only for reasons of humanity. My Commander in Chief alone bore the military responsibility. I was only Chief of Staff and as such I was only his assistant.
Q Witness, if, for instance, one wanted to combat most of resistance, band-villages would you consider it correct that your Commanders should apply reprisal measures in these cases, or would you have rather considered it correct that airplanes should be used against such resistance and that planes should have bombed these villages?
A We considered these measures thoroughly, but we did not have the necessary strength in planes to take such a measure. Another reason I could give you -- that an air attack on towns and villages would have killed many more innocent people than was the case in the measures which we applied, because the people who were hit by the reprisal measures were also guilty. They were accessories owing to their sympathies and owing to the help which they afforded to the bands. And besides we considered the following:
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
The enemy air force which just then in 1943 started to bomb the German civilian population in a manner which had no equal and to kill tho German civilian population in that way by attacks frequently against objectives of no military importance and thus to attack women and children, innocent people. Such enemy-air forces at the time assisted these bands by dropping munitions and supplies each night. This action too was in contradiction to International law, because the bands after all wore franc-tireur and he who supports franc-tireur becomes guilty in tho same way as a franc-tireur itself. This consideration at the time took up much of our thoughts. I know, in discussions with General Bader, which always concerned the whole problem and not individual cases, again and again the General pointed out how the German civilian population suffered.
Q Witness, -
A If this supply by the planes had not occurred then during the shortest possible time the bands would have had to give up.
Q Witness, did your two commanders, General Bader and General Felber, take any remarks to you as to what purpose the two commanders pursued by applying these reprisal measures?
A The purpose of the reprisal measures was to break the back of the bands and their helpers and of the civilian population which sympathized with them, and to prevent them from carrying out those attacks which were in violation of International Law. These attacks were directed against German soldiers, against war important installations, against railroad tracks, -- they were also directed against those parts of the Serbian administration which were loyal to tho Germans. Besides the civilian population was, of course, to lose tho will to support the bands and thus tho organization of tho bands was to be made more difficult, and the final purpose was that a now flareup of the insurrection was to be prevented. An open insurrection would have cost the Serbian population more human lives and blood than all the reprisal measures of my commanders taken together.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Do you know whether such reprisal measures which were to be carried out wore prior to being carried out announced to the civilian population?
A It was repeatedly announced by proclamation that such measures would be taken in certain cases, besides the civilian population was informed through posters and newspaper articles of the execution of the measures. Sometimes all the names of the people shot were announced. Therefore, the civilian population could have no doubt regarding the fact that the commander was determined to defend himself, and his forces in this manner.
Q Witness, from the reports which you had or in any other manner, was it possible for you to ascertain whether this purpose of the reprisal measures, that is to prevent further terror acts, was actually achieved and if so to what extent?
A When I came to Serbia in the summer of 1942 Mihajlovic was at the time still resorting to all kinds of surprise attacks and sabotage acts against tho German installations. Then a few reprisal measures were taken and he started immediately to react. He warned his subordinate leaders not to carry out any counter-measures which could cause the German forces to take retaliation measures, and he begged them to consider the repercussions such measures would have on the Serbian population. He also asked them to consider the fact that he, as leader cf a National Movement, would lose prestige with the Serbian population because of these measures. His subordinate loaders did not always obey since on tho whole and discipline was bad, but he put in place of these open murders, etc. the so-called campaign of disobedience. By this I mean he asked his followers to deny the German administration their cooperation. The mayors were to resign so that the administration would find itself paralyzed. There are notes in the War Diaries to the effect that there were certain results achieved owing to these instructions. But at the same time he told his people, and this is significant, that they should only use sabotage if the Communists could Court No. V, Case No. VII.
be blamed for it in view of the situation, so that not his followers but his rivals would be blamed for whatever acts were carried out. I remember one incident well from those days, and this is only a small example, the railroad officials were told to let the oil run out of all the bearings of the machines and to put sand into them instead. That is just one detail which I remember because this instruction was often mentioned in his radio messages.
Q Witness-
A May I say something else -- this is just the first part -In January 1943 two German divisions were withdrawn from Serbia almost simultaneously. That was the 717th Division and the SS Division Prinz Eugen. Mihajlovic realized immediately that would weaken the German forces, and now something else occurred, he was approached and criticized by the British because of his lack of activity and he was pointed out as an example the activities of the Communists terror bands. As a result his movement became more active again and the consequences were that the incidents increased considerably, as we have heard during the earlier sessions of today, and of course this again had repercussions. This lasted until late in summer of 1943. At that time General Felber had decided to take several measures and almost suddenly sabotage acts and surprise attacks were discontinued. It did not actually discontinue, but it decreased considerably and it only started again very slowly at the time when Tito in the fall of 1943 and in January 1944, and finally in the month of March 1944 started his attempts to invade Serbia. There can be no doubt that an effect of the reprisal measures was clearly recognizable.
Q Herr von Geitner, I am referring to the claim of the prosecution that the reprisal measures were without any effect -
A Will you please repeat?
Q The assertion of the prosecution is that reprisal measures were without any effect and secondly that reprisal measures pursued an entirely different purpose mainly to exterminate the Serbian population Court No. V, Case No. VII.
to a considerable extent because they were regarded as an inferior nation; is that assertion of the prosecution correct or not?
A There can be no question of that at all. I have already indicated the purpose of reprisal measures. If there had been peace and order in the country there would have been few reprisal measures. The summer months of 1942 can prove this assertion. If reprisal measures had, as I would want to put it, if reprisal measures or similar measures and I do not want to identify myself with these measures which were carried out, -- had to start again, if no harsh measures would have been taken, there would have been an open insurrection in Serbia which would have had entirely different consequences, than actually occurred. The Serbian population was in itself hit by these incidents. The Commanding General and Commander did not only intervene because of the surprise attacks on his soldiers and on the vital railroad lines on which the supply not only of 100,000 soldiers but also of a large part of the Greek population depended, he did not only intervene because of attacks on the ships on the Danube, or because of the disturbance of the German oil supplies from Roumania, or because of the wheat supplies, but he wanted to establish as a basis for law and order in the country a peaceful and content nation, and not a hungry nation. Just during the days of crisis in the spring months of 1943, when the German war situation in Russia and in Africa had deteriorated so considerably, which gave now incentive for the insurgents, just during that period it was shown clearly that the Serbian administration was not in a position to cope with the distribution of the food supplies in a manner which would supply above all the towns and the poorer population in the towns sufficiently.
JUDGE CARTER: It seems to me, Dr. Sauter, that this witness has wandered far from the question you asked him. You asked him about the charges of the prosecution that these reprisals were put into effect to designate the population, and we have gotten so far from that, it is hardly recognizable. I suggest you ask more questions, and have him answer more briefly and not have the narrative form of testimony here. We get too much that is not material. Can't you do that?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, Your Honor.
Q Witness, I have asked you before what you have to say to the fact that the Prosecution asserted that the reprisal measures were without any effect whatsoever, and had an entirely different purpose. That purpose was to exterminate the Serbian population, or to decimate it because the Serbs were considered an inferior nation. I would like to have you concentrate on this question and will you concern yourself with this problem as briefly as you possibly can?
A That reprisal measures were not without effect has already been said by me. What the actual purpose was I have also tried to state. That they are alleged to have had the purpose to decrease the Serbian population is completely wrong. The Commander wanted to preserve the Serbian Nation. The Serbian people, however, could not be preserved if all commands in charge of the distribution of food supplies, most of all for the poorer population in the cities, if these command units were attacked. I don't know whether in this particular context I should deal with my attitude towards the Serbians.
Q Witness, maybe you can briefly tell us whether you yourself considered the Serbian people an inferior nation, and whether you treated the people in accordance with such an attitude or what else. What was your attitude. Witness, while dealing with this problem will you please give your answer as briefly as possible, because one could actually talk for hours about this question, but we haven't got the time to do that, so please be as brief as possible?
A That there was hatred or a will of extermination towards the Serbian people in my mind was absolutely untrue. Far from it. I believe there has been testimony by General Felber and by other witnesses which point to this fact. I would like to describe my own attitude. My brother who was killed in the World War fought against the Serbs during the First World War, in 1915, and when I saw him for the last time during that World War shortly before he died he told me: "Those are the best enemies which we have ever confronted, not only as soldiers but also as human beings", and those last words of my brother who was killed I remembered at the time when I came down to Serbia, and I assert here that I have regarded the Serbian nation as an efficient, brave people, of a good moral attitude. Most of all the peasant population was of this good type. I have never nourished any feelings of hatred against them. My opinion was somewhat overshadowed by the realization that this nation, because it had been for centuries under other nations, amongst others under the Turkish yoke, that this nation had been made a nation of eternal rebels and conspirators, not only towards the outward enemy, but also as the history of the last century shows against its inner opponents, against its own Government.
Q Herr von Geitner, in this courtroom a witness once mentioned that you had recommended an administration intended to gain the favor of the Serbian people?
A That is correct.
Q What can be understood by this statement?
A I was under the impression and of the opinion that it should be possible to win the Serbs to our side, and there were the first signs for such a winning over. These first signs were seen in the circles of the Nodic Government, in the circles of the Serbian voluntary corps, and in other circles.