May I, in this connection, refer to one sentence in an address by the British Field Marshal Montgomery? If I am correctly informed, Montgomery, at the time when he was supreme Commander of the British Tone in Germany, signed the Control Council Law, on which the carrying our of these war crimes trials is based. There is a provision in this law which says that acting on orders would not protect one from punishment. This very same Field Marshal Montgomery, in July, 1946, said to his soldiers in Portsmouth the following: "The soldier is not the one to examine an order. Intelligence has no part in this. The nature of Democracy is freedom; the nature of soldiering is discipline. It is the duty of all soldiers to obey without any consideration."
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 1:30.
(THE COURT ADJOURNED AT 1220, to RESULT SESSION AT 1330)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 23 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DEFENDANT KURT von GEITNER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Herr von Geitner, while you were serving in Belgrade did you ever think about these reprisal orders? Did you ever consider the fact whether they were in accordance with International Law or whether they were, maybe, in violation of International Law?
A The idea that orders which were issued by the highest State authority could possibly not be in order or should possibly not be followed was far from my mind. If I remember correctly, I once discussed the question of reprisals with a jurist. I do not remember who he was. At the time I was told that reprisal measures were admissible, but I had to assume, under all circumstances, that my superior agencies which issued such orders were fully aware of their responsibility. The idea that a military leader would be punished and would be liable to punishment because he followed orders of that high authority was far from my mind. Even if we assume as a basis of the discussion paragraph 47, which has repeatedly been mentioned here, one must realize that these orders did not intend a crime. And furthermore, that a Chief of Staff should be called to account because he did not prevent the execution of orders which had been given to his commanders from higher headquarters, seemed something quite impossible to me.
Q Witness, you have experienced the conditions in Serbia for a number of years. You are telling us that you, as far as your own person was concerned, were opposed to and reprisal measures. Did you, now, on the basis of your personal observation and experiences gain the impression that these reprisal measures were actually necessary? If so, why?
A The conditions in that country were of a very special nature. After weeks or months of my residence in the Balkans I realized that these abnormal conditions could only be countered by harsh measures.
Harsh measures were a military necessity, and out of this consideration alone my two Commanders decided to carry out these measures. That the ratio of 1 to 50 somewhat bothered me and that I deliberated whether it was not possible to cope with the situation in a different manner was not a decision which I was in a position to make, it was one in which my Commanders were concerned, the question whether these Commanders could have coped with the situation by applying more lenient measures, I am not today in a position to say. In any case this question can only be answered in relation to the situation prevailing in those days. I must repeat that in three and half months there were 1,319 incidents. I myself thought a lot about the possibility of other methods. These other methods would either not have been effective, or as the measure mentioned yesterday, concerning the sentencing by summary court martial of bandits and band helpers on the basis of evidence delivered by the radio monitors' service, that was not possible because it was impossible. It was impossible to slow up the radio interception service for this purpose.
Q Did you not consider, during the whole period of your tenure in the Balkans, that one day you or your Commander would be reproached with the reprisal measures and reproached with the fact that such reprisal measures were not allowed according to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, but rather forbidden?
A I have already told you that. A jurist once told me expressly that reprisal measures were admissible. Besides I did not bear any responsibility. May I have thought about these things only for reasons of humanity. My Commander in Chief alone bore the military responsibility. I was only Chief of Staff and as such I was only his assistant.
Q Witness, if, for instance, one wanted to combat most of resistance, band-villages would you consider it correct that your Commanders should apply reprisal measures in these cases, or would you have rather considered it correct that airplanes should be used against such resistance and that planes should have bombed these villages?
A We considered these measures thoroughly, but we did not have the necessary strength in planes to take such a measure. Another reason I could give you -- that an air attack on towns and villages would have killed many more innocent people than was the case in the measures which we applied, because the people who were hit by the reprisal measures were also guilty. They were accessories owing to their sympathies and owing to the help which they afforded to the bands. And besides we considered the following:
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
The enemy air force which just then in 1943 started to bomb the German civilian population in a manner which had no equal and to kill tho German civilian population in that way by attacks frequently against objectives of no military importance and thus to attack women and children, innocent people. Such enemy-air forces at the time assisted these bands by dropping munitions and supplies each night. This action too was in contradiction to International law, because the bands after all wore franc-tireur and he who supports franc-tireur becomes guilty in tho same way as a franc-tireur itself. This consideration at the time took up much of our thoughts. I know, in discussions with General Bader, which always concerned the whole problem and not individual cases, again and again the General pointed out how the German civilian population suffered.
Q Witness, -
A If this supply by the planes had not occurred then during the shortest possible time the bands would have had to give up.
Q Witness, did your two commanders, General Bader and General Felber, take any remarks to you as to what purpose the two commanders pursued by applying these reprisal measures?
A The purpose of the reprisal measures was to break the back of the bands and their helpers and of the civilian population which sympathized with them, and to prevent them from carrying out those attacks which were in violation of International Law. These attacks were directed against German soldiers, against war important installations, against railroad tracks, -- they were also directed against those parts of the Serbian administration which were loyal to tho Germans. Besides the civilian population was, of course, to lose tho will to support the bands and thus tho organization of tho bands was to be made more difficult, and the final purpose was that a now flareup of the insurrection was to be prevented. An open insurrection would have cost the Serbian population more human lives and blood than all the reprisal measures of my commanders taken together.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Do you know whether such reprisal measures which were to be carried out wore prior to being carried out announced to the civilian population?
A It was repeatedly announced by proclamation that such measures would be taken in certain cases, besides the civilian population was informed through posters and newspaper articles of the execution of the measures. Sometimes all the names of the people shot were announced. Therefore, the civilian population could have no doubt regarding the fact that the commander was determined to defend himself, and his forces in this manner.
Q Witness, from the reports which you had or in any other manner, was it possible for you to ascertain whether this purpose of the reprisal measures, that is to prevent further terror acts, was actually achieved and if so to what extent?
A When I came to Serbia in the summer of 1942 Mihajlovic was at the time still resorting to all kinds of surprise attacks and sabotage acts against tho German installations. Then a few reprisal measures were taken and he started immediately to react. He warned his subordinate leaders not to carry out any counter-measures which could cause the German forces to take retaliation measures, and he begged them to consider the repercussions such measures would have on the Serbian population. He also asked them to consider the fact that he, as leader cf a National Movement, would lose prestige with the Serbian population because of these measures. His subordinate loaders did not always obey since on tho whole and discipline was bad, but he put in place of these open murders, etc. the so-called campaign of disobedience. By this I mean he asked his followers to deny the German administration their cooperation. The mayors were to resign so that the administration would find itself paralyzed. There are notes in the War Diaries to the effect that there were certain results achieved owing to these instructions. But at the same time he told his people, and this is significant, that they should only use sabotage if the Communists could Court No. V, Case No. VII.
be blamed for it in view of the situation, so that not his followers but his rivals would be blamed for whatever acts were carried out. I remember one incident well from those days, and this is only a small example, the railroad officials were told to let the oil run out of all the bearings of the machines and to put sand into them instead. That is just one detail which I remember because this instruction was often mentioned in his radio messages.
Q Witness-
A May I say something else -- this is just the first part -In January 1943 two German divisions were withdrawn from Serbia almost simultaneously. That was the 717th Division and the SS Division Prinz Eugen. Mihajlovic realized immediately that would weaken the German forces, and now something else occurred, he was approached and criticized by the British because of his lack of activity and he was pointed out as an example the activities of the Communists terror bands. As a result his movement became more active again and the consequences were that the incidents increased considerably, as we have heard during the earlier sessions of today, and of course this again had repercussions. This lasted until late in summer of 1943. At that time General Felber had decided to take several measures and almost suddenly sabotage acts and surprise attacks were discontinued. It did not actually discontinue, but it decreased considerably and it only started again very slowly at the time when Tito in the fall of 1943 and in January 1944, and finally in the month of March 1944 started his attempts to invade Serbia. There can be no doubt that an effect of the reprisal measures was clearly recognizable.
Q Herr von Geitner, I am referring to the claim of the prosecution that the reprisal measures were without any effect -
A Will you please repeat?
Q The assertion of the prosecution is that reprisal measures were without any effect and secondly that reprisal measures pursued an entirely different purpose mainly to exterminate the Serbian population Court No. V, Case No. VII.
to a considerable extent because they were regarded as an inferior nation; is that assertion of the prosecution correct or not?
A There can be no question of that at all. I have already indicated the purpose of reprisal measures. If there had been peace and order in the country there would have been few reprisal measures. The summer months of 1942 can prove this assertion. If reprisal measures had, as I would want to put it, if reprisal measures or similar measures and I do not want to identify myself with these measures which were carried out, -- had to start again, if no harsh measures would have been taken, there would have been an open insurrection in Serbia which would have had entirely different consequences, than actually occurred. The Serbian population was in itself hit by these incidents. The Commanding General and Commander did not only intervene because of the surprise attacks on his soldiers and on the vital railroad lines on which the supply not only of 100,000 soldiers but also of a large part of the Greek population depended, he did not only intervene because of attacks on the ships on the Danube, or because of the disturbance of the German oil supplies from Roumania, or because of the wheat supplies, but he wanted to establish as a basis for law and order in the country a peaceful and content nation, and not a hungry nation. Just during the days of crisis in the spring months of 1943, when the German war situation in Russia and in Africa had deteriorated so considerably, which gave now incentive for the insurgents, just during that period it was shown clearly that the Serbian administration was not in a position to cope with the distribution of the food supplies in a manner which would supply above all the towns and the poorer population in the towns sufficiently.
JUDGE CARTER: It seems to me, Dr. Sauter, that this witness has wandered far from the question you asked him. You asked him about the charges of the prosecution that these reprisals were put into effect to designate the population, and we have gotten so far from that, it is hardly recognizable. I suggest you ask more questions, and have him answer more briefly and not have the narrative form of testimony here. We get too much that is not material. Can't you do that?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, Your Honor.
Q Witness, I have asked you before what you have to say to the fact that the Prosecution asserted that the reprisal measures were without any effect whatsoever, and had an entirely different purpose. That purpose was to exterminate the Serbian population, or to decimate it because the Serbs were considered an inferior nation. I would like to have you concentrate on this question and will you concern yourself with this problem as briefly as you possibly can?
A That reprisal measures were not without effect has already been said by me. What the actual purpose was I have also tried to state. That they are alleged to have had the purpose to decrease the Serbian population is completely wrong. The Commander wanted to preserve the Serbian Nation. The Serbian people, however, could not be preserved if all commands in charge of the distribution of food supplies, most of all for the poorer population in the cities, if these command units were attacked. I don't know whether in this particular context I should deal with my attitude towards the Serbians.
Q Witness, maybe you can briefly tell us whether you yourself considered the Serbian people an inferior nation, and whether you treated the people in accordance with such an attitude or what else. What was your attitude. Witness, while dealing with this problem will you please give your answer as briefly as possible, because one could actually talk for hours about this question, but we haven't got the time to do that, so please be as brief as possible?
A That there was hatred or a will of extermination towards the Serbian people in my mind was absolutely untrue. Far from it. I believe there has been testimony by General Felber and by other witnesses which point to this fact. I would like to describe my own attitude. My brother who was killed in the World War fought against the Serbs during the First World War, in 1915, and when I saw him for the last time during that World War shortly before he died he told me: "Those are the best enemies which we have ever confronted, not only as soldiers but also as human beings", and those last words of my brother who was killed I remembered at the time when I came down to Serbia, and I assert here that I have regarded the Serbian nation as an efficient, brave people, of a good moral attitude. Most of all the peasant population was of this good type. I have never nourished any feelings of hatred against them. My opinion was somewhat overshadowed by the realization that this nation, because it had been for centuries under other nations, amongst others under the Turkish yoke, that this nation had been made a nation of eternal rebels and conspirators, not only towards the outward enemy, but also as the history of the last century shows against its inner opponents, against its own Government.
Q Herr von Geitner, in this courtroom a witness once mentioned that you had recommended an administration intended to gain the favor of the Serbian people?
A That is correct.
Q What can be understood by this statement?
A I was under the impression and of the opinion that it should be possible to win the Serbs to our side, and there were the first signs for such a winning over. These first signs were seen in the circles of the Nodic Government, in the circles of the Serbian voluntary corps, and in other circles.
Q. Herr Von Geitner, now concerning the bands, I would be interested to know whether you were of the opinion that these Serbian bands were the legal representatives of the old Yugo Slavian army or were you of a different opinion?
A. This idea that the bands were the continuation of the Old Yugo Slav army was one which seemed absurd to me. The Yugo Slavian army had capitulated, every person who illegally after this capitulation was found with weapons or even in uniform was in my opinion - and this was a general opinion - to be regarded as a franc-tireur.
Q. Concerning the chapter of "bands in Serbia," is there anything else you would like to say; anything which has so far not been said by any of the witnesses or are you in conformity with the testimony or other witnesses concerning this point?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I don't think such a question is proper, that is an invitation to speak on any subject. I think you should limit the question yourself and expect a responsible answer.
THE WITNESS: May I answer, or should I not answer?
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. No, you are not to answer this question.
We now turn to a different chapter. During the time of your activities in Serbia did you have anything to do at all with the Jewish question?
A. In Serbia I had nothing whatsoever to do with the Jewish question. I remember and this can also be seen from the documents that once there came a teletype from the plenipotentiary commanding general in Albania to the effect that the S3 division Skanderbeg, which was stationed in Pristina or somewhere near there had arrested three hundred Jews.
Q. May it please the Tribunal this document is document NOKW 668, which is exhibit 440. It is contained in document book 18 of the prosecution, the page in the German text is 87 and the page in the English text is 88. Herr Von Geitner, this is a daily report of the military commander Southeast addressed to the commander in chief southeast and it concerns an action of the division Skanderberg; is this the report you mean?
A. Yes, it is. This fact was made known to us by a report of the plenipotentiary commanding general for Albania. I don't know who it was at that time.
Q. I am just informed that it is page 89 of the English text, it is document book 18, page 89 of the English text.
A. This report was passed on in order to characterize the situation. The division Skanderberg was an SS division and as such it was subordinate neither to the plenipotentiary commending general in Serbia nor the military commander Southeast. The plenipotentiary commanding general for Albania turned in this matter to the plenipotentiary SS leader to the Albania government, who in turn was not subordinate to the plenipotentiary commanding general, and he complained. The SS leader replied and told him at the time that he would take care of the matter and that is all that I know about this particular affair.
Q. Then you yourself personally had nothing to do with this affair ever?
A. No.
Q. And you had no responsibility for this matter?
A. No.
Q. Herr Von Geitner, I shall then have to show you another document. This one is also concerned with the persecution of the Jews. It is contained in document book XVII of the prosecution. The document concerned is NOKW 692, it is exhibit 422. You find it in document book 17 of the prosecution, page 86 of the German text and page 110 of the English text. This is an administrative report of the military commander Greece, and it is addressed to the military commander southeast, that is your office, the office were you worked, among other things there is some mention about the confiscation of Jewish property in Athens and the transfer of the trusteeship of this property to the Greek government; did you have nothing to do with that?
A. No, I only learned about this matter here. The report from the military commander Greece is not the general situation report, it is rather a situation report of the military government of Greece and we received it in our office for the Military administration with the military commander southeast. I was never informed of any of these facts and I had nothing to do with them, as it was purely an administrative matter.
Q. As chief of staff did you have anything to do with police matters and were there ever any conflicts.regarding responsibility between you and the Higher SS and Police leader?
A. I myself had nothing whatever to do with police matters. When I came to Belgrade there was the system of the Higher SS and Police leader next to the system of the military commander. The Higher SS and Police leader Meyssner soon after I got there became known to me as a very stubborn man, as a man who hated everything connected with Serbia and Serbians and as a man with whom it was difficult to discuss matters. As I have already said, he was subordinate to the military commander only concerning his own person and not concerning his staff. He received his directives concerning matters of police security directly from Himmler and regarding the purpose which was connected with his appointment, I would like to refer to a document which has already been shown to General Foertsch. That is exhibit 529 contained in document book 24 on page 67 of the German version. According to this document the combatting of the insurgents was to be carried out through a far flung net of spies and through brutal political measures and measures of a secret police nature. After the highest SS and police leader had been appointed, these measures were to be applied to the largest extent possible.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, the document which the defendant has just mentioned is exhibit 529. This is document NOKW 1669. It is contained in document book 24 on page 103 of the English text.
Now, witness, in connection with Meyssner, I should like to ask you; do you remember an order from Bader, which was issued during your time? As a matter of fact it was issued on 10 October 1942 and it concerned the treatment of captured insurgents?
A. Yes.
Q. It is document NOKW 1722, that is contained in document book 9, it is exhibit 228, pages 66 and 67 of the German text and on page 51 of the English text.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I find document 1722 which Dr. Sauter is referring to in document book 24.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is also on page 51 of document book 9, the same NOKW 1722.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q No. 1722 that is the document I am referring to; witness, do you remember this order?
A Yes this order or rather the development of this order is the best proof of the fact that Meissner spied on the military commander and it also proves the fact that he intirgued against him with his chief Himmler. The military commander had, followed a suggestion of mine, transported a number of Draja Mihajlovic leaders, who were obviously insurgents to a German prisoner of war camp and Meissner had demanded that his vehicles be free of any military check-up. In turn we received a teletype from the O.K.W. asking us to account for these two facts. The teletype contained a statement to the effect that the higher SS and police cader was to be called in inquestions concerning the treatment of insurgents. This fact led up to the order which is contained on page 66 of the German text. It starts on the bottom of that page. This is a new version of a former order which Bader had issued. As far as I know this previous order originated from a time prior to my arrival in the Balkans. It originated,on 25 March 1942.
JUDGE CARTER: If the witness is going to refer to a document, let us have it identified.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, what are the contents of this document?
THE WITNESS: It is on page 66 of the German text and it says there....
JUDGE CARTER: That does not help us, Dr. Sauter, we don't have the German text, where is it found in the English?
DR. SAUTER: The English text is contained in document book 9. On page 51 of the English text we find this document. It is still document NOKW 1722, exhibit 228 contained in document book 9 on page 51.
JUDGE CARTER: Yes I have it, but where is the witness reading from?
DR. SAUTER: Witness, have you got the document in front of you and what is the page you are reading from?
THE WITNESS: I am reading from page 2 of the document here, figure 1.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Is that the order of 10 October 1943?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Alright, that is on page 52 of the English.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q This communication starts on page 6 of the original and then it says: "Headquarters 10 October 1942," (that is page 53 of the English text.). On the lefthand side it says Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Branch Ia No. 5310/42 Secret. Subject: "Treatment of captured insurgents in Serbia." Then we have figure 1, altogether we have four passages and the witness v. Geitner is concerned with figure 1. It is on page 53 of the English text.
A "A person encountered carrying arms or assisting insurgents during combat actions is to be hanged or to be shot dead as a matter of principle. Leaders, political commissars and couriers are to be interrogated first of all if possible in collusion with S.D."
Under figure 2, it says:
"Insurgents taken outside of combat actions, insurgents who have surrendered giving up their arms, persons arrested under suspicion of belonging to the insurgent movement, of having aided and abetted the insurgents or in any other manner cooperated with the insurgents are in general to be turned over to the Commander of the Security Police."
Now we have a sentence which after a long discussion with the Higher SS and Police leader was incorporated into this order on my request and on my initiation. This sentence is not contained in the old version of the order and it reads:
"This does not infringe upon the authority of the Commander of Administrative Sub Headquarters to instigate and execute court-martial procedure."
Now the next paragraph, three, was unfortunately not incorporated in this document by the prosecution. It reads as follows:
"The commander of the Security Police clarifies the facts. If he considers that the basis is given for a court martial procedure, Then the prisoners will be transferred to the summary court martial or the competent administrative sub area headquarters. The procedure is to be expedited as much as possible. A strict standard is to be applied."
Under figure 4 we read the following:
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, may I suggest for the purpose of possibly gaining some time since we all can read that the witness be instructed to merely possible refer to these figures rather than read again in the record providing they appear already in the record.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q I believe that one can only understand what is contained under figure 3 correctly if one knows the whole order, the whole order consists of four passages and the defendant is just about to read the last passage. It would already have been read out at this time had we not been interrupted.
A The contents of the last passage deals with those persons who are not liable to a court martial procedure. They are to be released as acquitted or sent to a prisoner of war camp. Convicted persons will be made available, for the Plenipotentiary General fer Economics to procure voluntary work for him or they will be deported for compulsory labor by the commander of the security Police in accordance with the degree of their guilt. Those are people who are not sufficiently suspected for a court martial procedure.
In connection with this order I would like to make the following statement. The strong emphasis on the court martials can be traced back to my instigation. This was done in opposition to the wishes of the Higher SS and Police leader.
This order was then passed on through official channels via the armed forces commander southeast to the O.K.W. and it was accompanied by a note saying only persons can be sent to a prisoner of war camp who have not been convicted, but who for reasons of precaution should be deported from Serbia. This sentence again represents a camouflage because in actual fact even after that date there were convicted Draja Mihajlovic followers who were sent to German prisoner of war camps. I know that because on the occasion of such a transport some people of that type escaped us and because I was reproached because of their escape. Because of this escape, Meissner was informed about the whole incident.
Q. Witness, I would now like to conclude these general statements and I would like to turn to some specific cases which you are charged with by the prosecution.
Under Count 5-e of the indictment you are charged as being responsible or co-responsible for the shooting of 10 Communists as reprisal for sabotage acts around the date of the 7th of March 1943 and this was to have happened south of Topola. I think we are concerned here with the Document NOKW-1360 which is Exhibit 264. It is contained in Document Book XI on page 2 of the German text and on page 1 of the English text.
Did you play any part in that affair?
A. I did not play any part. It is an order which was given by my Military Commander. The reprisal measures were taken because apparently the main communication line which passed through there to the south had been destroyed. That was why the reprisal measures had been taken.
Q. Did you issue this order?
A. No.
Q. How come, then, that you are charged with it?
A. I was only informed of it.
Q. Will you please observe the fact that you have to make a pause before you answer?
You were informed of this order after the act?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you initial this order?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what this action actually was?
A. It was the destruction of an important communication line, telephone line.
Q. This is an a military installation?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And the shooting of the 10 Communists, was that a reprisal measure?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And you were only informed of it after the action had happened?
A. Yes, I learned about it after the Military Commander had ordered the measure.
Q. I will then deal with the next count of the indictment. This is 5-f of the indictment. In this count you are being connected with a case of 350 Communist who were allegedly executed as reprisal for the murder of 3 German custom officials. That was to have happened around the 27th of June 1943. I think this refers to Document NOKW-380 which is Exhibit 283, contained in Document Book 11 on page 58 of the German text and page 74 of the English text. Were you connected with this affair in any way?
A. This question is not very simple to answer. First of all, the assertion of the prosecution is not correct. The prosecution talks about the shooting of 250 Communists as a reprisal measure for the murder of 3 German custom officials. In actual fact, this measure was a result of the murder of German custom officials and also a result of the shooting at a leave train, Sofia-Nish, on which occasion 3 Bulgarian soldiers were killed and 2 more wounded. This document concerns -
Q. Just a minute. I want to mention the numbers. These are the the Documents NOKW-341-m, which is Exhibit 275. It is contained in Document Book 11 on page 43 under "a". That is the order concerning the murder of the German custom officials. The other order, the one referring to the 3 Bulgarian soldiers who were killed and the 2 Bulgarian soldiers who were wounded, this other order, is NOKW-340, which is Exhibit 276 contained in Document Book XI on page 44, of the German, page 54 of the English text.
Witness, can you tell us for how many dead and for how many wounded in total the reprisal measure was taken?
A. The reprisal measure was taken for 6 killed and 2 wounded.
Q. Then there were 8 people in all?