A That means Bode.
Q Not General Bader?
A No, "B" for Bader is the lower one. That is the large "B". The small "B" is Bode, and the other initial is SCH for Schall.
Q I merely wanted to know if you knew whose initials they were.
A The Bode's and Chief and Bader's. On that day my initial could not even be on the document.
DR. SAUTER: B for Bader, and the one here is SCH (indicating) for Schall. There was no initial of Geitner on that document.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Herr von Geitner, we had stopped when discussing the question concerning General Bader's basic attitude, and the effect of his basic attitude concerning reprisal measures; on that occasion you told us that for many cases no reprisal measures were taken, and I shall now submit to you a document that is contained Document Book 24 on page 142. This is Document NOKW 1757. It is Exhibit 540. I repeat it, NOKW 1757, Exhibit 540, contained in Document Book 24 on page 142. Looking at this document and looking at the entries in the War Diary can you tell us in detail whether these documents show that actually for any terror acts no reprisal measures were taken. Can you prove that and give us an example, can you give us an example with figures?
A Yes. The document mentioned shows it is on page 143 of the German text.
THE PRESIDENT: What is it in the English?
DR. SAUTER: It is on page 184 of the English Document Book.
A (continued) This document shows that during the period from the 6th to 25th of February.
Q What year?
A Of the year 1943, that is during those 19 days, or maybe 20 days there were 224 incidents. The evaluation from the War Diaries on the 27 of December 1943 -- I correct myself 27 December 1942 until the 15 April 1943.......
MR. RAPP: Just a moment please. I believe your Honor the witness, unless I have misunderstood, said this period covered a period of 19 or 20 days, that he is referring to. I can't quite follow him, how the period from the 16 to 25 February amounts to 20 days? At least in my Document Book it says "losses from the 16 February". I am referring to page 186. 16 February to 25 February. That doesn't quite figure out the way the witness presented it.
THE WITNESS: 16 of February to 25 February, there are 9 days and 99 incidents of losses.
MR. RAPP: That is 9 days and not 19 or 20 days.
THE WITNESS: And after that in parenthesis we have a further 10 days, so that altogether we have 19 days. In the 9 days which are first mentioned we have 99 incidents, and in the 10 days mentioned later in parenthesis concerning the period from the 6 February to the 15th of February we have 125 cases, which means altogether 224 cases in 20 days. During the period of 27 December 1942 up until the 15 April 1943 there were 1319 incidents altogether, and that in three and a half months. As the Document 1756, which is Exhibit 542 shows, contained in Document Book 24, on page 152 shows, during the first 5 months 80 reprisal cases, or shall we say 80 surprise attacks were taken reprisal for and these reprisals concerned human lives. If one considers these previously mentioned 1319 cases which occurred in a period of three and a half months, let us round up these cases to a period of five months. Let's say 1500 cases occurred during five months, instead of saying 1700 as would have been the exact figure. If one calculates these figures then one would conclude that only 5 to 6 per cent, of all figures were taken reprisal for.
Q Witness -
A I have to say something else. Concerning the period of 27 December 1942 until the 15 April 1943, which I have previously mentioned, the German Armed Forces and its allies, as can be seen from the War Diaries, it shall be shown in excerpts to the Tribunal, had losses amounting to 271 dead, 315 wounded, 828 missing.
If we ignore the wounded and the missing and only deal with the dead, and if we calculate this figure over five months, we will arrive at 380 dead. Reprisal prisoners shown for the period of these five months amounted to, according to the document previously mentioned, 2332. That is not counting the wounded and not counting the missing, one would arrive at a ratio of one to six.
Q Witness, the statements which you just made on the basis of the documents seem rather important to me, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding I would like to repeat the following, and please, would you then tell me whether or not I am correct; you established, as you are telling us, in the first three and a half months of the year 1943, there were roughly 1329....
A 1319.
Q.- In three and a half months there were 1319 terror and sabotage acts and in the first five months of 1943, that is covering a period longer by six weeks, there were only 80 measures of reprisal, is that correct?
A.- Yes, 80 persons killed.
Q.- All right, 80 reprisal measures, and that gives a ratio of about 5 to 6 per cent, of incidents which were actually retaliated, and you counted the German dead -
A.- I said German and Allies.
Q.- All right, German and allies, and if we count in the missing as well we find there were 1314 who were either killed or wounded or missing, as a consequence of such terror acts, and with these 1314 German losses during a time, over a period of approximately five months, we have 2332 Serbians killed?
A.- Yes.
Q.- Did I understand you correctly?
A.- Yes. And there is one more thing I would like to mention in order to clarify the matter completely. This also included losses during all combat action. That is why I left out the wounded and missing when I made my calculation.
Q.- Do I understand you correctly then 1314 German losses include all losses, that is German losses in combat actions?
A.- Yes.
Q.- How high would you calculate those roughly?
A.- That is difficult to say today.
Q.- I see.
A.- Not very much actually occurred in that time.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal the compilation which shows these figures which Herr von Geitner mentioned will be found later in Document Book Geitner IV, and it will be Document 81. I have there made excerpts from the War Diaries which we received from Washington, and I have compiled these excerpts according to assets and liabilities and with this compilation in hand the Tribunal will be in a position to check whether Herr von Geitner's statements of today are correct.
JUDGE CARTER: Before we leave this exhibit might I ask the witness if I understood him correctly, when he said these German losses included losses in combat?
THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed.
JUDGE CARTER: And do you mean that reprisals were carried out for the loss of German soldiers in combat?
THE WITNESS: There were no measures taken, but I have not counted the wounded and the missing who in the normal procedure would also be retaliated for. I did not take those into account at all, and that should be a compensation, because just during these first three months of 1943 there were hardly any operations in Serbia. Operations were few because we had to give up two whole divisions, and we had to shift our men around and we were rather weak at the time.
Q. Witness, concerning the attitude of the Chief of Staff towards his commander, do you in this respect share the opinion of General Foertsch, which he expressed on his examination and which expresses that the responsibility is a matter of the commander, but not of the Chief of Staff?
A.- Yes.
DR. SAUTER: In this context I shall then offer a further exhibit. This will be a further affidavit of the Former Chief of Staff Halder, dated August 27, 1947. This is contained in Document Book Geitner I, Document 9 contained page 19, the affidavit has been properly sworn, and I offer it as Exhibit 7. For reasons of time saving I would like the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. On the whole it coincides with statements which were contained in documents which were offered for General Foertsch.
JUDGE CARTER: At this time Dr. Sauter we will take our morning recess.
(Thereupon a 15 minute recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, who deputized for the military commander if he was absent from Belgrade?
A In case the commander was absent for a longer period, the deputizing for him was regulated by letting the senior troop commander deputize for him.
Q Were you not as chief of staff his deputy?
A No, I could only deputize for him if he was absent for a very short period if he ramained in his home area. Only in that case could I deputize for him with regard to the current matters. By this I mean matters which had already been decided, on, but concerning all matters which had already been deceded on, but concerning all matters which needed a decision on the part of the commander I could not deputize for him unless the situation happened to be such that a decision was immediately necessary. In that case I was even obliged to make a decision. Such a situation, however, did not occur during my tenure in Serbia.
Q Who was the man who deputized in matters concerning the executive powers, i.e. concerning legal matter and concerning reprisal matters for the military commander when he was absent from Belgrade?
A That was in all cases the senior troop commander who was designated for that task.
Q You yourself never deputized for him?
A I myself had no judicial authority whatsoever and therefore I could not deputize for him in a judicial capacity.
Q Concerning this particular problem, if it please the Tribunal, I wish to read a further passage from an exhibit which has already been offered as exhibit 6. This is document 8 contained in document book 1 Von GEitner. For implicity's sake I would ask you to take judicial notice of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 on page 16 which reads as follows:
During the commander's absence the Chief of Staff was bound to defend the commander's fundamental views also in the face of a temporary deputy.
There was no binding order to that effect, but this obligation certainly follows from the need felt in all the armies to preserve uniformity and continuity of leadership regardless of a temporary absence of the commander. Thus, the Chief could not possibly suggest, in an individual case, to the deputy of his commander a way of acting contrasting basically with the ideas held by his commander, the less so when this line had been fixed by orders from superior commands and the commander himself had fixed his basic attitude by orders given to subordinate commands. Rather was it the duty of the chief to direct the attention of any representative of the commander, who wanted to deviate basically from the line so far in forces, to the dissonance that would thus be created. Any other action would have rightly incurred for him the reproach of disloyalty.
And I shall also read the immediately preceding paragraph on page 16. It starts with the words:
The Chief of Staff of a command authority was the first adviser of this commander in questions of tactical leadership and supply. In these fields he was automatically his deputy, whenever the commander was not in a position to decide himself and there was not another deputy in office appointed explicitly. The field of personnel policy, the field of judicial administration and the field of executive power were outside the province of the advisory duty of the Chief of Staff, which was limited to the sphere of General staff technical matters. That, of course, did not prelude the possibility of a commander discussing such matters with his Chief, if he deemed it appropriate. In these fields no provision was made for the Chief of Staff to act automatically as the commander's deputy, oat the contrary, for these fields an authorized deputy had to be appointed explicitly by the superior office in case of the commander's absence. As a rule, it was the highest-ranking troop commander, but it might also have been that the Chief of Staff was entrusted with this task by the superior office, it he appeared to be suitable according to ability and seniority. Then, what authority, e.g. that to act as the judicial authority, had to be conferred to him expressly.
Q Thus far I have read the expert opinion of the former German Chief of the General Staff, General Halder; I now ask you witness do you completely agree with this opinion of General Halder?
A Yes.
Q I see, and did these cases occur when you were appointed deputy of the absent commander by the superior office?
A No.
Q There were no such cases ever?
A No, there were not.
Q If the commander was absent from Belgrade, what were the names of the generals who deputized for him during your tenure?
A One time General Hinghofer deputized for him.
Q What is his name?
A Kinghofer, I will spell it H-i-n-g-h-o-f-e-r. On another occasion General Dippolt, D-i-p-p-o-l-d. On another occasion Major General Juppe, J-u-p-p-e. On another occasion, General Lontschar, L-o-n-t-s-c-h-a-r. General Geib at one time deputized for General Felber, G-e-i-b.
Q Witness, you have told us that you yourself did not order reprisal measures, but today you told us or maybe it was yesterday that you were informed of the reprisal measures of your commander or of his deputy; is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q How were you regularly informed of this?
AAs a rule through the experts, who told me about the commander's decision.
Q I believe you were also informed about reprisal measures, which the troops, the administrative sub-area headquarters or the police carried out?
A Yes those measures which were ordered by the military commander. I was informed about those measures by the daily reports.
Q Is it correct then that all reports which came in from the troops came to your attention?
A Yes, that is correct. The reports came in during the late hours of the morning and were looked through by the 01, and then the draft for our daily report was compiled. This draft was checked by the I-A and it was then submitted to me. I checked it and then it was submitted to the military commander.
Q. Now, concerning the reprisal measures which your commander had ordered and the reprisal measures which were carried out in your area, were these measures reported to Higher Headquarters? I am especially interested in the OKW.
A. The reprisal measures were reported. Either the order for the reprisal measures -- that is, the fact that the Military Commander had ordered reprisal measures -- was reported or it was reported that the measures had actually been carried out.
Q. Were these reprisal orders and measures of your Military Commander ever criticized by the OKW or any superior headquarters?
A. Never during my tenure.
Q. Who was it in your staff who drafted the reports to superior headquarters?
A. That was the first A.D.C. and on occasion also the Id. Then the reports were checked by the Ia as I have mentioned previously, they were submitted to the Commander. If nothing particular had been reported or if no decision was necessary, then they were submitted by the first A.D.C. or by the I-a.
Q. You mean submitted to the Commander?
A. Yes, to the commander. In all cases where the reports contained any particular items or in all cases where a decision of the Commander became necessary, I submitted the reports. As a rule the I-a was present.
Q. Now, concerning these reports which were made to higher headquarters were they signed by you as Chief of Staff? I don't mean, did you initial them, I mean did you sign them?
A. During the first period I just initialed them. However, in the fall of 1943 an order arrived stating that these reports had to bear a name, a full name. Then I ordered that in principle my name was to appear on the daily reports.
Q. What was the legal significance of your signing these reports to Higher Headquarters in your opinion?
A. If I signed a report it meant that I took over the responsibility for its correctness, the truthfulness of the incident reported as it had been submitted to us by lower commands.
Q. In your personal opinion by signing these daily reports, did you assume responsibility for the incidents which were reported in the daily reports?
A. No, never.
Q. If, therefore, a reprisal measure had been carried out and if this reprisal measure appeared in your report in order to be reported to superior headquarters, then it is your contention that through this report you do not assume any responsibility for the reprisal measures itself. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes. I did not assume responsibility for those measures which were reported in the daily report. According to German opinion, the responsibility for these facts was assumed solely by the Commander.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, this point is dealt with under figure "5" of an exhibit which I have already submitted. That is figure "5" of Document VIII which is Exhibit 6. In this passage the former General Halder discusses this point on page 18. It is contained on page 20 of the English document book. I am reading this figure.
"The significance of the signature of the Chief of Staff under a daily report to higher officers is in no way to be distinguished from the meaning of the signature of any other officers of the staff. The signer by this signature assumes responsibility for the correctness of the report but not the responsibility for the actions related in the report."
That is what Chief of Staff General Halder has to say on this subject.
A. May I say something else in this context?
Q. Please do.
A. In our staff when the Commander was present no daily report was ever issued unless the Commander himself had seen it. On a number of occasions he made alterations in the reports.
Q. Witness, you have told us that you were informed of the reprisal orders of your Commander and of all reprisal measures which were taken in your area. Were you earlier of the opinion, or maybe do you have the opinion today on the basis of this trial, that solely for the reason of this knowledge of what went on you are culpable?
A. No, Doctor, never; a pure knowledge of some fact can never imply a punishable action unless they are cases such as, to give an example, treason or high treason, where somebody is under an obligation to make use of his knowledge, but never in a case like mine.
Q. You have told us that you yourself had no connection with reprisal measures except that you reported also about them in your daily reports. I should now be interested to know, didn't you in spite of these facts endeavor to prevent reprisal orders or to mitigate reprisal measures or to influence your Commander, et cetera?
A. Yes, certainly. Of course, I did everything possible in order to achieve a mitigation in these matters. The fact that only part of these measures was at all reported to superior headquarters has already been mentioned by me. The Commander himself urged his expert to insist on keeping matters on as low a level as possible and I myself told the expert to do this although it was none of my business. I myself always emphasized to my commanders that there had to be a mitigation in these measures and they themselves shared this opinion but on the other hand, in view of the situation in the country, they could not close their eyes to the fact that such measures were a military necessity. I then tried on the occasion of the new formulation of the reprisal order by General Bader which he had ordered -- I mean this ned formulation was ordered by him -- on this occasion I tried to achieve a mitigation and I shall later refer to this again. At the time he told me, in view of the increase of incidents such as had occurred during the last period -- that is the time period which I mentioned, there were 425 incidents in 20 days -- I beg your pardon, there were 224 incidents in 20 days -- in view of this fact, he told me he could not decide on a mitigation of the measures.
Besides, I know of at least one case which is typical. At that occasion a district commander rang me up on the telephone and told me that he had received General Bader's order to shoot reprisal prisoners because of a certain incident, and he said: "But I have no reprisal prisoners. There are none in my camp." I then suggested to him to report that they had been shot. Actually, however, they were not shot. I remember this case quite well.
Q. Herr von Geitner, if -
A. There is something else I would like to mention since we are talking about mitigations. In May of 1943 General Bader again thought over thoroughly whether anything could be done concerning this situation. I had discussed the situation with him. He asked to have a compilation made about the incidents which had occurred during the first five months. These are the very incidents to which I had referred previously. Even then he could not decide to lower the ration but at that time we found another solution and that was the solution of the mock shootings.
Q Witness, is that the point which was yesterday mentioned by the witness? I believe it was Dr. Bub.
A Yes, that is so.
Q Then I'll have this document submitted to you. That is an excerpt from the war diary of the Commanding General and Commander for Serbia. It is dated the 26th of May 1943. This excerpt is contained in Document 93 in Document Book VV, Geitner, and will eventually be submitted to the Tribunal as an exhibit. I have already used this document yesterday when the witness, Dr. Bub, was on redirect examination. Maybe you would like briefly to make your comments on the particular passage because it says there: "Commander, discussions with Chief, with Standartenfuehrer Dr. Schaeffer, with A.D.C. concerning new regulations, et cetera. Would you like to have a look at this document and tell us what you have to say about it?
A On the 28th of May the Commander had asked me to appear through our A.D.C. and he had also asked to have a survey submitted to him concerning the incidents of the last five months. This survey is contained in Document Book XXIV and it was discussed this morning. He thought of a mitigation of the reprisal measures and he thought of lowering the reprisal ratios and Bader and myself advocated this measure. However, he didn't think that these suggestions were suitable, this mainly in view of the propagandistic effect on the Serbian population. On the other hand, he also considered the fact that he was constantly watched by the Higher SS and Police Leader. This man was of the opinion that Bader was far too soft and he had repeatedly reported this, his opinion, to his superior headquarters. We know from General Felber's testimony that he on the occasion of his report to the OKW was told by Field Marshal Keitel that measures altogether too mild had been applied down therein the Southeast. Everybody was trying to find a solution. This solution which gave at least a certain relief was found in the mock shootings.
Q Whose idea was that, witness?
A Bader and I, myself, we discussed this question for a lengthy period and we passed on our suggestions to the Military Commander but there were some difficulties. First of all, Meissner was not to know anything about it. He was not present at the time and the Military Commander asked the Standartenfuehrer Schaefer who was the Commander of the Security Police, to attend. This man had a totally different attitude towards the Serbians than Meissner. He was not purely a Party man. He was an old member of the Criminal Police. His rank was that of an Oberregierungsrat. He also had full legal training which was by no means always the case with SD leaders. This man Schaefer was in complete opposition to Meissner, and it was Schaefer who was asked to attend a discussion in a small circle. The Military Commander took him into his confidence and they came to an agreement.
Now, concerning reprisal measures which were taken out in the country somewhere, it would not have been possible to carry out a measure which did not coincide with the posters which had been drawn up and the proclamations which were made to the population; but, in the case of the so-called central shootings of central measures it was possible to effect such measures through the Commander of the Security Police and, in consequence, the Military Commander decided to carry out such measures. The basis of this decision was the discussion of the 28th of May 1943. As a result of this discussion General Bader two days later -- I believe that must have been the 30th of May -- issued an order. If I may refer to this order now, it was supposed to be discussed later but it fits well into this context.
Q What is contained in this order? Maybe you can give us the document number.
A Yes, that is Document 340.
Q You mean NOKW-340?
A Yes, it's Exhibit 276. That is contained in Document XI on page 45 of the German text.
Q And when is that order dated?
A I believe it is dated the 30th of May, 1943. It is on page 54 of the English Document Book, Document NOKW-340, Exhibit 276.
Q The order is dated the 29th of May 1943?
A Yes, the 29th of May 1943.
Q Have you got the order?
A I don't believe I have got it.
Q I have got Document Book XI here. Maybe you would like to ascertain first of all when this discussion took place.
A It took place on the 28th.
Q The discussion which was laid down in the War Diary took place on the 28th, and the order just quoted by the Defendant was dated the 29th of May, one day later. It is on Page 45.
A Yes, I have it, on page 45.
Q It is on Page 54 of the English Document Book.
A I believe it must have been on the 29th of May. At that time I went to Berlin to the OKW. The contents of the document were known to me, and also the form which the General intended to apply. He had taken into his confidence only the 01, Schaefer and me. The General issue an order which said, under Figure 1, "that persons which were to serve as retaliation prisoners and were to be arrested to a larger extent should be taken in accordance with Paragraph 3, section 6 of the pertinent order." This pertinent order is the basic order concerning reprisal measures, dated the 28th of February.
Q Of what year?
A Of 1943. This order was mentioned previously. This paragraph meant that the lists were to be used which were deposited with the Serbian district chiefs. Those lists showed the band sympathizers etc. Under Figure 2, it was pointed out that concerning reprisal cases which were not of so severe a nature, collective punishment had to be used more frequently, according to figure 2 Paragraph 3.
Q Witness, what kind of collective measures are those?
A This means, for instance, fines, burning down of houses, etc.
Q Witness, those then were punishments which had nothing to do with the killing of persons?
A That is correct. And then it says it does not fulfill the need of speedy reprisal if the carrying out of reprisal measures was delayed for weeks, owing to lack of hostages. In case a sufficient, number of hostages were not available in the area of the administrative sub-area headquarters, application is to be made for the central execution of reprisal measures by the Commander of the Security Police, at the same time as the application for reprisal measures. This application is to be made at the latest, if the execution cannot be carried out within one week after issuance of the reprisal order.
But under no circumstances should the central executions by the Commander of the Security Police become habitual, since only reprisal measures carried out within the area of the scene of the incident have shown themselves to be effective. And then, we have another passage which is a clear camouflage passage: "In order to counteract the view which has appeared suddenly amongst the population that reprisal measures are only published on posters and are not carried out, the entire number ordered to be shot is to be shot to death from time to time at the scene of the incident. This central shooting in Belgrade, as the Commander has adopted here as a solution and as he has put down in his own order, was, at the time, the only possibility to carry out such mock executions without anybody suspecting anything. I do not know anything about individual cases. The Commander did not let me participate in these matters any more than in any other of his decisions concerning retaliations. I only know that from time to time he asked the leader of the SD to appear at his office. This was Schaefer, the man previously mentioned, and he discussed everything with him in detail. The relation between Schaefer and Meyssner deteriorated more and more. Finally Meyssner forbade Schaefer to have any contact whatsoever with me. I had only used Schaefer to exchange news and information.
Q This then is the problem of mock shooting?
A Yes.
Q Witness, did your Commander, with or without your influence, endeavor at any time to make representations to higher headquarters in order to achieve a mitigation with respect to reprisal measures?
A The Commander was subordinate to the Commander in Chief Southeast. And in such matters he had to confer with the Commander in Chief Southeast.
Q Who was that at the time?
A That was General Loehr.
Q Will you please repeat your last answer?
A In such cases he had to confer with the Commander in Chief Southeast. That was, in those days. General Loehr.
Q And what was the result?
A I know that those two had long discussions. I also know that he once was in Saloniki. One of these discussions concerned his intention to resign. I have already mentioned this. He discussed that with me. I told him that I could well understand the General if he did that, but again and again I appealed to his soldierly training and ideals, and thus he got the point of view that he could not leave after all.
Q Witness, you have told the Tribunal that you, for your own person, were opposed to such reprisal measures and so was your commander at heart. Did you exert any influence on your Commander, to the effect that he should simply refuse to obey in these matters?
A Doctor, to refuse obedience on the part of a soldier towards an order, and that in war-time which was based on the will and wish of the Supreme Commander, and not only of the Supreme Commander but also of a man who in actual fact was the personification of the entire staff, such a disobedience would have been contrary to all soldierly discipline. If I, as Chief of Staff would have recommended to my Commander to commit an act of disobedience with respect to such an order, that would have had very severe consequences, maybe not for me, but for my Commander. A few days ago the question was put here, "Was there ever an occasion where generals were shot because they did not obey orders?" And the case of General von Ziehlberg was mentioned in this connection. I can. add one other case, and that is the case of General Graf Sponeck.
Q Maybe you'd spell the name for us.
A S-P-O-N-E-C-K--Sponeck. Besides, God knows, my position was not high enough nor strong enough to recommend to my Military Commander any disobedience, especially in view of the position of the enemy. There must be no disobedience in purely military matters during war-time, least of all in cases where this disobedience would be directed against the head of the state, irrespective of one's own attitude toward this head of the State.