Between 8 and 11 o'clock in the morning the men rested. At 11 o'clock we started on the way back. In the meantime I had looked at a part of the village. When at 11 o'clock the men got ready to move off, Bulgarian soldiers started to set the village on fire. My interpreter, a non-commissioned officer, came to me and reported this. I went out with a pistol and tried to prevent this burning down. There were language difficulties with the Bulgarians, and they prevented my attempt. And then something else started which was incomprehensible to me. It seemed impossible to get the people away from the fire. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner was standing nearby, and I approached him and asked him who had ordered the burning down of the village. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner evaded this direct question. I was rather excited because I had seen the dire poverty of these people and was terribly upset because innocent people were hit by this measure. Trifunovic had escaped in any case. The opponent did not fire one single shot, and in spite of this they had now started to burn down the village. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner said this is a band centre. It has to be burned down. I told Gruppenfuehrer Meissner in very strong words about the poverty of the population, and I emphasized that the military commander, on the occasion of our conference concerning the operation, had ordered nothing about the burning down of the village. And I asked Meissner whether he was prepared to take the responsibility. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner replied in strong terms and told me that was none of my business. I replied that the German Wehrmact would eventually be blamed for this burning down, and the responsible man for the German Armed Forces there was the Commanding General. He had not ordered this, and nevertheless he would afterwards have to bear the responsibility.
Meissner, who was known as a man of strong anti-Serbian tendencies, told me that it was incomprehensible to him that I should get excited about an incident like that. There was nothing that could stop this burning down. The Bulgarians had started to attempt to burn down the houses. However, it had been very difficult to set the houses on fire and therefore they had burned down the hay stacks. I had intended to report about this incident to the Military Commander and I, therefore, observed every detail concerning the burning down of the village. After a few hay stacks were on fire, hand grenades exploded that had been hidden there, and after the Bulgarians had succeeded in burning down the first few hay stacks and after the fires became more dangerous and further ammunition could explode, the burning down stopped. I talked again to Gruppenfuehrer Meissner and told him that now the may stacks and a few houses had been burned down. Now we have put one over on General Trifunovic, but we have not actually hit Trifunovic. We have hit the poor population and the cattle.
Q. Did you then report to General von Geitner praised me for my attitude towards Gruppenfuehrer Meissner and on my request he promised to support me in case Gruppenfuehrer Meissner was to undertake anything against me.
Q. And now, Witness, I would be interested to know how this affair was then reported and made use of in radio messages. How many houses and how many hay sheds were set on fire, and burned down, according to your observations?
A. Approximately 3 houses and 10 hay sheds were burned down. Two days after this operation General Trifunovic turned up in a radio message.
Q. And what did he assert?
A. He asserted that almost 200 houses were burned down, that the entire civilian population had been deported, and that there were scenes of rape etc. When We entered the village, for one thing, there was not a single man left in the village. The women and children who were there when we entered, remained there. According to my own observations there were no scones of rape. One to three weeks after Trifunovic's radio message we succeeded in diciphering one of Mihajlovic's radio messages, Sent to London. There was mention of a figure of more than 200 houses which had been burned down and, of course, that the whole civilian population had been deported and, there was also mention of the alleged scenes of rape. Radio London made use of this message in its transmissions for the Balkans and talked about many more than 200 houses being burned down. I myself then had the village photographed by a Stork.
Q. What do you mean by a "Stork"?
A. A Stork is an airplane , which was put at my disposal at that time by the OKW. There were three Stork planes, observer planes altogether, which were equipped for the determination of band radio transmitters.
Q. Witness, I then have a few concluding questions to put to you before I can finish with your examination. Could you ascertain whether the Serbian units also carried out reprisal measures and retaliation measures against Germans or could you not ascertain that in your official capacity?
A. From the radio exchange of communication no such facts could be gathered, but 1 know that subordinate leaders of Mihajlovic captured German soldiers or members of the organization Todt, and kept them under arrest and also treated them as hostages.
Q. Was it officially known to you how German prisoners of war were treated by the Serbian units or rather maltreated or killed, was that made known to you in an official way?
A. With the exception of the case of Captain Kirchner, which was mentioned directly in my radio exchange of messages, I only heard of the partly very bad treatment of German prisoners of war at the hands of the partisans. I heard of that only by way of talks with other officers.
Q. Witness, did you know whether during the second World War or after the Second World war, such reprisal measures as are dealt with here also threatened by other armies?
A. To answer this question is very difficult. I am not quite clear about the future consequences which an answer to this question would have for me personally.
JUDGE BURKE: Then you are not required to answer it. In that situation you will not be required to answer it by this Tribunal.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, may it please the Tribunal, I do not know whether I, as defense counsel, can be content with this answer of the witness.
The defense is here faced with a problem to show whether other armies too ordered reprisal measures.
JUDGE BURKE: That you nay ask in its appropriate time and place, but this witness will not be obliged to answer any question that he deems contrary to his immediate safety.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to tell you that this attitude of the Tribunal deprives me completely cf the possibility to get this question answered. Every witness who hears that he does not have to answer such questions will in the future maintain the point of view, "I prefer not to answer such questions." Your Honor, I do not know what the regulation is in American Law with regard to this point, but according to German law it is quite clear that a witness ha.s to answer such questions. According to German law he is not obliged to answer such a question only if by a truthful answer he exposes himself to punishment, and that without doubt is not the case here. We must not maintain the point of view that, for instance, the American or British authorities would take proceedings against a witness because he speaks the truth here. I am of the opinion that there is every cause to tell the witness that he is under the protection of the Tribunal if he tells the truth here before this Tribunal , and that a truthful statement is not of disadvantage to him, irrespective from which side. That is my personal opinion and I believe one cannot very well be of another opinion.
JUDGE BURKE: It is due to the fact that the Tribunal apparently believed the witness when he made the statement that he did.
You may proceed with something else and if the Tribunal decides to make a different ruling it will be announced at the conclusion of the afternoon's testimony.
I would like to ask the witness one question in the meantime.
BY JUDGE BURKE:
Q. Are you sincere in your statement sir, that you do not desire to answer this question for fear of possible future repercussions?
A. Yes, indeed.
JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 3:15.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Dr. Sauter, it is the considered opinion of the Tribunal that a witness who is under oath and who states that he hesitates to answer the question, which you have propounded, for reasons of his personal security, the Tribunal will leave the determination of his answer to himself. If he choses to answer, he may answer. If he chooses not to answer, the Tribunal will not insist that he answer the question.
Does the witness understand the statement of the Tribunal?
THE WITNESS: I have understood the decision.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, I will specify the question I put to you before. Let me ask you this and this is my final question to you; did you have personal knowledge that in July or August of 1945 in Stuttgart there were posters announcing reprisal measures in the ratio of one to twenty five; in the year 1946 there were in Berlin reprisals in the ratio of one to fifty; and in May 1945 there were in the Harz mountains in central Germany reprisals in the ratio of one to two hundred threatened; did you see those posters yourself? This I want to put to you as my final question?
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors will permit, I will merely ask that Dr. Sauter repeat the city he asked the witness the first time once again. I did not get that quite.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think he said Stuttgart.
DR. SAUTER; The first city, which I mentioned, was Stuttgart in Wuerttemberg, the second city was Berlin and the third locality, which is not a city, was the southern part of the Harz mountains in central Germany, I believe in Thuringia. The third location actually referred to the ratio of one to two hundred threatened to the population in public posters in a village called Gorjnzen in Thuringia. I assert that behind my question is the fact that the witness himself has seen those posters and that is the reason why I asked him the question.
THE WITNESS: I shall answer your question without hesitation.
but I would be grateful if, should there be an reprisals or repercussions directed against my person, I could invoke the protection of this Tribunal.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: To the extent of the powers of the Tribunal you will have its full protection. It is difficult to conceive of a situation where a reprisal or a repercussion should come to any man for telling the truth.
THE WITNESS: I am extremely grateful to the Court and I shall now answer the question.
Shortly before the end of the war, I was with the Army Signal School in Halle on the Saale. There we were used against the approaching Americans and we were overtaken by them immediately underneath the Kyffhaeuser mountains. I was not taken prisoner and at night I made my way behind the American lines attempting to establish contact with the German troops. I got stuck in the Harz mountains and there the civilian population fed us, they would bring us a little food now and again. It was there that I heard something about a poster in the village of Gorenzen. I shall spell it again because I think Dr. Sauter has misspelled the village, G-o-r-e-n-z-e-n.
The civilian population begged and implored us in fact, "Don't for God's sake shoot at an American soldier." On the other hand, it was somewhat difficult for me, as I only had a pistol left. The civilians nevertheless told us that reprisals at the ratio of one to two hundred would be carried out. When I asked them how they knew that, they told me there was a poster in the village to that effect. Later on in daylight I went into the village, although there was a danger that the Americans might drive through and I read the poster which was posted on the village school in an old frame, which had formerly been used by the Hitler Youth or very young Hitler boys. It was a yellow poster and threatened the shooting of two hundred Germans in the event that one single American should be killed by Germans.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, perhaps you can tell the Tribunal and describe so that a foreigner can also form an impression where this village of Gorenzen is situated; where is it; in Germany?
A Gorenzen is situated in the southern part of the Marz mountains, it is not very far from Eisenach.
Q Is it near Weimar, that is perhaps better known?
A Weimar is further to the west, but I think Nordhausen and Sangerhausen are better known names. It is a distance of about thirty or forty kilometers from Nordhausen and about 80 or 90 kilometers from Sangerhausen.
Q In order to make this quite clear; you saw the poster with your own eyes, did you?
A Yes, I read it myself.
Q Did other people whom you know also read the poster?
A Yes, they did indeed. An officer, whom I know, who was together with me at the time also read it, and in the village there are a number of acquaintances of mine who also saw the poster.
Q Now, when you read the poster, who occupied the village at that time?
A The village was then occupied by the Americans. It might have been the 7th or 8th Army Corps. The men wore a double colored circle bearing the Roman Numeral VII or VIII. I believe it was ah Artillery Corps because there were mainly artillery stationed there.
Q And you say that the poster was printed on yellow paper?
A Yes.
Q With black lettering?
A Yes.
Q Do you know whether at the top of the poster there was any address; for instance: To the Inhabitants of this or that, or something of that sort?
A No, I cannot tell you that. All I did was to remember this deeply moving ratio of one to two hundred.
Q Can you tell me, witness, if this poster was entirely printed?
A Yes.
Q It was all printed out then?
A The poster was printed, the signature was...
MR. RAPP: I suggest that Dr. Sauter permit the witness to tell what he saw and stop suggesting the answer to the question. I think in this case it is of interest, we don't want Dr. Sauter's opinion, but the witness' opinion and what he saw.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think it is advisable, Dr. Sauter, to permit the witness, who is a man of more than average intelligence to tell what he saw. It evidently made a powerful impression on him and he should remember even the most minute details. Just ask him to state what he saw.
DR. SAUTER: May I point out that first of all I made the witness tell us the whole thing, what he saw, which he did.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: With the assistance of the Tribunal. He is not an unwilling witness, he has exercised his choice of giving the testimony. I think if you will simply ask him the question to describe the poster, that he is amply equipped to do it, Dr. Sauter.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, is there anything else which you would like to add about the poster, anything you have failed to mention so far?
A Then I returned to Stuttgart.
Q Noo I mean the poster in Gorenzen.
A I said, there was this ratio of one to two hundred and the signature was General Eisenhower.
Q I beg your pardon?
A It was signed by General Eisenhower.
Q General signed it. What can you tell us about the poster in Stuttgart?
A When I returned from the Harz to Stuttgart where my family was living, I saw a poster in Stuttgart not very far from the Olgastrasse, which had been posted by the French and that fixed the ratio at one to twenty five should one French soldier be killed by the Germans.
That one was signed by - I am not quite certain here, but I think it was signed by General Lattre de Tassigny.
Q Do you know anything else about that poster?
A. I hoard a number of things, that in the French zone even today there are posters up with the ratio from one to ten to one to fifty. That is hearsay, I have not seen it myself.
Q And what about the third poster, the third poster about which I have asked you concerning Berlin; I mean in 1946, the ratio of one to fifty; what can you tell us about that?
A. In 1946 there was in the "Neue Zeitung", a German newspaper, a brief report about Berlin and it said that there the ratio had been had been fixed from one to fifty by the Russians. That was announced that this would apply if former members of the Hitler Youth would continue to shoot at officers of the Communist party and that fifty hostages would be taken from the internment camps where Naxis were interned. That is what "Neue Zeitung" said and surely that could be found somewhere.
Q. I have no further questions to the witness. Thank you very much.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Are there further questions by defense counsel to the witness? No indication being made, Mr. Rapp will you cross-examine the witness.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP: Thank you, Your Honor.
A. Do you speak English, witness?
A. Not very well.
Q. Your last rank was that of a first lieutenant; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And how long were you in the German army before you reached that rank?
A. I joined in 1933 and in 1942 I became a lieutenant and Shortly after became a first lieutenant. I am an officer who rose from the ranks.
Q. How long did it take you to become a first lieutenant?
A. About nine years.
Q. Now then, through May of 1942 and. 1944 you were in Belgrade; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. How many times during that time were you at the front?
A. In the Balkans there was not a real front, in that sense of the word usually meant by front, these Were battles of material, and operations. If you mean by front, simply contacting the enemy, I took part on several occasions in operations, and I am afraid I could not give you the number of the times I took part in these operations?
Q. But your main duty was that of a signal intercept officer?
A. Yes, that was my duty.
Q. Now, witness, did you ever go to a General Staff School?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever in fact a General Staff Corps Officer?
A. No, the German General Staff.....
Q. That will be enough. You were not a General Staff Corps officer; is that right?
A. No, I was not a member of the General Staff.
Q. Thank you. Now you stated I believe that as far as you know and to the best of your power of observation, the then chief of staff, General von Geitner or Colonel von Geitner, did not overstep his directives or authorities as a Chief of Staff; did you say that?
A. As far as I am in a position to judge. I can answer year question in the affirmative.
Q. Have you ever seen the directives, which were given to General von Geitner?
A. No, I did not see them.
Q. Now witness, the next question: did you ever participate at the meetings between the Commanding General and his staff officers?
A. No, I never took part in these meetings.
Q. Now, who was the Commanding General or Military Commander Of Serbia when you came to Belgrade?
A. It was General Bader.
Q. And who was his successor?
A. General Felber succeeded him.
Q. Now, what was the main source of all of the information and knowledge which you have obtained in the Southeastern theater?
A. The whole source from which we received our wireless messages were the wireless communications of the radio stations under Mihajlovic from where he sent messages to his subordinate unit and as I mentioned before, the final communications to London, to the exile government and in the case of the partisans, wireless communications between Tito and his subordinate units and among the subordinate units themselves.
Q. Witness, now did you ever suspect at any time during your tour of duty that the enemy knew that you were listening in?
A. Yes, the British officers warned Mihajlovic constantly to the effect that the Germans were listening in and deciphering the messages. Mihajlovic's comments were that this was entirely impossible as he believed firmly that the Germans were unable to find the keys, or at least the source for the keys only through treason.
Q. Well, now did you believe everything that you heard?
A. Yes.
Q. And did your Commanding General or the person to whom you reported believe everything they got from you in the nature of these reports?
A. At the beginning my work was received with scepticism because people could not understand how these original wireless messages by the enemy could be listened in and deciphered and then submitted to the Commander or at least to the responsible officer.
A. General Bader was the most skeptical officer of the whole lot and I once explained to him how the thing was done from the interception until the final evaluation. I showed him this active example, one message which he listened in to himself. And another proof for this was that directives for sabotage were particularly addressed to Tito's forces--namely , to blow up the Kuma -Belgrade Railway Line.
Q. Witness, we don't have to go into all these details, I just asked you a plain question, whether or not your commanding general also believed in these radio messages, and you told me at first not and I would just like to know now when they started to believe in them, just by date approximately.
A. I did not say "no" to your question. What I said was that people were Sceptical, but later on I was able to convince them within a week or a fortnight because we had this enormous flood of wireless messages coming in.
Q. Very well. Now you did state this afternoon prior to the recess that you witnessed the burning down of several houses which I believe you stated were ordered by Gruppenfuehrer Meissner and you later on had the opportunity to hear this very report over radio of the enemy. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have other opportunities to check as far as these radio messages arc concerned in such a very fine way?
A. Yes, in some cases we heard reports about successes both on Mijajlovic and Tito's stations, and the daily reports which reached the commanding general formed the basis for checking this.
Q. Did you believe this type of report as given over the enemy radio, or did you believe they were exaggerated?
A. Reports about successes by both movements, needless to say, always exaggerated. Failure would be minimized but that is typical of the Balkan mentality and we got used to it as time went on.
Q. In other words, witness, you believed as far as these intercept messages were concerned what you wanted to believe, and you discarded that what you obviously didn't want to believe.
Is that right?
A. In this whole work I started something which I always expected our press to live up to and still do today; namely; that very often they would quote the verbatim speeches of the people concerned because that shows what was on his mind, and then, I can judge his mentality. That is the reason why in my reports I frequently quoted what was actually s aid with the result that the officer who was reading it through always knew that on such and such a day Mihajlovic said this or that or the other as he thought along those lines. I did not edit these things.
Q. You told the court that General von Geitner was not in charge or responsible for so-called reprisal measures. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is what I said.
Q. And you mentioned the name of some particular First Lieutenant -- I can't recall his name right now -- who had direct access to the Commanding General, is that right, in matters pertaining to reprisal measures?
A. Yes, it was 1st Lieutenant Bode.
Q. Very well. Now, did you state also that General von Geitner; however, was constantly interested in the general scope pertaining to reprisal measures, he talked to you about it and with his friends and through these friends you heard that in a hearsay way? Is that right?
A. I and my acquaintances would not discuss the opinions held by the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General. We only would discuss facts, because, as I have said just now, I was always highly sceptical as to opinions of individuals about other individuals because, after all, they were always colored.
Q. There is no disagreement as far as the statement is concerned that you have just made, but I just wanted to ask you whether or not it is true that General Geitner talked to you and to your friends about reprisal measures, though you told us that he had nothing to do with it.
A. In the case of the Mihajlovic order in Autumn 1942 to reduce attacks on Germans to a minimum, I mentioned that I discussed this with the then Colonel von Geitner.
Q. Now, witness, a lot of the information that you have given us this morning and this afternoonisn't really based on your own knowledge, is it?
A. I gave this information today, by virtue of my knowledge from the wireless messages which came in, and wherever I talked about details concerning the staff, when I myself was present, I do not recall having mentioned the opinions held by others. If I did, I stressed that I only heard it at the time.
Q. Now, witness, do you suppose the Commanding General in Serbia entrusted this lieutenant with the task of administering these reprisal measures because the Chief of Staff was unwilling to do this?
A. No, it was my impression -- or, in fact, I know --- that this was one of the most delicate tasks and the Commanding General intended to work on it himself and for that he wanted to relieve the Chief of Staff of further work. He was overworked as it was. And , as the whole matter was entirely within the jurisdiction of the highest judicial authority, he appointed a special expert.
Q. Now, witness, about this last statement you made regarding the threat of reprisal measures in Thuringia and Berlin, did I understand you right to say that at that time this particular town was still within the American Zone? Is that right?
A. Yes, it was at the time, by the end of April, May and June 1945.
Q. And at that time did I understand you right to say that Stuttgart was then still in the French Zone?
A. Stuttgart was first occupied by French troops and was occupied by them until about June of that year. I think that the French troops had to withdraw behind the line of demarcation, as I would call it, which was drawn, I believe, by the Autobahn Stuttgart-Ulm.
Q. That question was simply whether or not you know if a t that time Stuttgart was still administered by the French. If you don't know it just say so.
A. Stuttgart at that period of time was no longer administered by the French but by the Americans. There were however, French troops and French administrative officials still in Stuttgart and it was those who had to withdraw behind the line of demarcation.
Q. Now, you did say that the proclamation in Stuttgart was signed by a French officer? Is that right?
A. Yes, the second part; one part was in German and the other in French.
Q. And on the German part he didn't sign his name?
A. Oh, yes, he did.
Q. I understood you to say that only the other part was signed by the French.
A. No, what I add was that the poster was in two languages. On the one side there was French; on the other, German. Both were signed by the officer concerned, - in printed letters, of course.
Q. I don't quite get you, witness. Now, you mean on one side it was signed by a Frenchman and on the other side the French name was translated into German?
A. The announcement of the ration was in French on one side of the poster and had been translated into German on the other.
Q. We are now talking about the signature.
A. The signature in both cases, as far as I can remember, was "Lattre de General Tassigny-- and I think Army of the Rhine and Danube, I think. I only remember that dimly.
Q. Now, where did you see.in Berlin this alleged proclamation?
A. I did not go to Berlin. This knowledge of the ratio of 1 to 50 I received from the "Neue Zeitung."
Q. Oh, I see. You don't remember the date or the approximate month and year that that appeared?
A. I remember that it was in 1946.
Q. You couldn't narrow it down a little bit. It's got, I would say, about 180 to 200 issues.
A. No, I am unable to do that, I am afraid, but I think I could get hold of the newspaper in some archives.
Q. Where is this archive you are talking about?
A. I hope that German libraries keep the "Neue Zeitung" and collect the copies, so that one could go to a library and find the copy in the archives.
Q. Now, witness, have you been in the areas of Stuttgart and Gorensen yourself and you saw these proclamations with your own eyes? Is that right?
A. Yes, that is quite true.
Q. Now, as you were there have you heard that there had been any riots or civil commotion or unrest in that area so that such proclamations were put up?
A. No, there were no risings or cases of unrest and the German soldiers who were not prisoners were sensible enough, thank goodness, not to be involved in small acts of sabotage and petty attacks which would not have influenced the bigger at all.
Q. Now, I presume, then witness, that General Eisenhower published this proclamation and somebody in that town put it on the wall gratuitously and just so in case something may happen which never did happen.
Is that right?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Is that a question, an observation or a prognostication?
MR. RAPP: I will phrase it in a question, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
Q. Witness, what did you think was the purpose , then, of this proclamation if there had been no unrest?
A. How I understood the proclamation was to show the German people a tough fist, so to speak, that in the event of small acts the effect would be enormous, and that it was merely a threat.
Q. Very well, then -- what was the purpose of the proclamation the German army posted in the Southeast theatre?
A. Same purpose.
Q. And in other words,they were not carried out?
A. Well, the 1 to 200, you mean, or the thing by the Germans?
Q. I just say since you said that, it was the same -- I just asked you whether or not in the Southeast such threats were not carried out.
A. The threats were carried out just as much, but they did not lead to any result.
Q. Just what do you mean by "genau so."
A. Posters were posted on the walls just as much -- namely, that for one murdered soldier 50 people would be shot; but the shock lasted only for a brief period of time and then the attacks would start on German soldiers.
Q. Witness, let's not beat around the bush. You know, and I'm sure understand my question perfectly clear. Now, for your benefit I shall try now to repeat it again. You stated that the proclamations allegedly seen by you were in the nature of threats. I am referring to the proclamations which you have seen in Gorenzen and Stuttgart respectively. Now, I am asking you whether or not proclamations as you have seen them in the Southeast theater were mere threats or whether they were actually carried out; that is to say, people were executed at a ratio from anywhere 2 to 1 to 50 to 1. Do you understand that question?