I have intercepted many radio messages, especially in the radio communications between Captain Kalabic -- I spell K a l a bi c -- and General Mihajlovic. Captain Kalabic had a large number of very bad elements who made themselves independent and went around robbing and plundering. Mihajlovic has often reprimanded Kalabic because of these facts and Kalabic denied any responsibility for these elements since he maintained that he did not have strict jurisdiction over all these people. In the radio exchange of messages between General Mihajlovic and the exile government in London, which we could decode to a certain extent, there were also several cases mentioned which referred to the denial of responsibility by Mihajlovic for those independent actions.
I would like to say the following concerning the Tito partisans. There was a clear distinction between those people and the Mihajlovic people. These people had a totally different training. The basic principle and prerequisites for them was their political ideological training. Orders and decoded radio messages contained the instruction to make use of every available opportunity to attack, and in one case which was particularly significant, Tito undertook an operation against Serbia and ordered that every available kind of camouflage should be used. The following happened on this occasion. In Mihajlovic's radio messages, his subordinate leaders reported that after the first fighting contact between Cetniks and partisans the partisans had stopped firing and men who said they were Cetniks arrived at the camp of the Cetniks and caused great disorder.
Q: Witness, can you remember that in the year 1942 a combat regulation for partisan warfare was captured and that you translated this regulation for partisan warfare into German and evaluated it? Can you remember these facts?
A: Yes, in 1942 in the Jastrebac Mountains, J a s t r e bac Mountains, Jastrebac.
Q: Was that an instruction for the Tito partisan units?
A: Yes, this was a regulation for the Tito partisans.
Q: Can you name us those points which struck you particularly when you looked at the regulations at the time?
A: I was very much interested in these regulations because already through my activity in radio communications I always was greatly interested in the thoughts and feelings of the opponent as well as in his intentions. I remember well the instructions which called for sabotage acts and surprise attacks. On this occasion it was demanded that as much use as possible be made of the terrain and it was stated that this was one of the main tasks. The preparation of surprise attacks was described in detail as to distribution of time, tasks etc. It was demanded that for camouflage insignia had to be removed, weapons were to be hidden and members had to be camouflaged as civilians. If a surprise attack was successful it was demanded that the enemy was to be annihilated, prisoners were only to be taken where it was necessary to interrogate them. Harsh and ruthless attitude towards the invader and the invasion was demanded as a necessity and described as a duty. A successful surprise attack was to be publicized and made known as the action of partisans. But unsuccessful surprise attacks wherever possible, whore there were Cetniks, were to be publicized as acts of the Cetniks.
Q: Witness, in this regulation for partisan warfare, was anything contained concerning the weapons, munitions, uniforms, etc. and if so what?
A: The partisans themselves were to make use of every possible camouflage as I stated before.
I mean they were to hide all arms, take off all identification etc. On the occasion of surprise attack it was demanded that weapons, munitions, uniforms and medical equipment of the enemy had to be placed in safe keeping under all circumstances.
Q: Witness, you said this regulation contained one provision that the enemy was to be annihilated to the last man?
A: Yes, indeed.
Q: Was anything contained in this regulation about the treatment of prisoners?
A: Successful attacks were to be so carried out that the enemy was annihilated down to the last man. Prisoners were only to be taken to the extent necessary for interrogation.
Q: This regulation of band warfare for the Tito partisans you saw yourself, did you?
A: Yes, I did. I saw them in Brod or Zagreb when I was stationed with the corps there.
Q: Did other people, too -- maybe your companions -- see this warfare regulation at the time?
A: I had been given this regulation for my office in order to look at it and I was not asked to return it.
Q: Witness, according to your own observation did the fighting methods of the partisan unit actually comply with these regulations, or was their actual method of fighting more humane? What do you know about that?
A: This partisan regulation was, generally speaking, adhered to by the partizans. The method of warfare was, therefore, a very harst one. From a number of radio communications of the partisans it could be seen that was so.
Q. Did you also intercept radio messages in which Tito ordered the partisan units to change uniforms wherever it was desirable in order to deceive the German units?
A. Yes. As I have already explained previously, on the occasion of this one attach on Serbia, Tito ordered his elite division, the Serbian Proletarian division, to make use of every available manner of camouflage. It was the aim to advance towards the Bulgarian frontier in the area of Nish and, according to the well-known partisan tactics, that was not to be done by open fighting but by infiltration. The infiltration through the German lines and partly also through the Cetnik units was to be effected by taking off all identification by hiding all weapons and partly by wearing whatever uniform or clothing would be worn in whichever lines the partisans infiltrated.
Q. From intercepted radio messages of your department, was it further seen that the Tito partisans had appeared at Cetnik negotiations dressed up as Cetniks in order to spy on the Cetniks?
A. Yes, on the occasion of the Tito partisan operation mentioned, a number of subordinate leaders of Mihajlovic reported that the partisans after the first fighting contact went over to the Cetniks, pretended to be Cetniks and then attacked the Cetniks. In order to prevent this, Mihajlovic twice a day or one a day issued code words which were to be made known to the units.
Q. witness, did you establish any cases where partisans groups were clothed 80% in German uniforms and the rest in Bulgarian uniforms instead of appearing in Serbian uniforms?
A. Yes, in the Jastrebac Mountains.
Q. Maybe you will spell it again?
A. J a s t r e b a c. These mountains are located northwest of Nish, Partisans were dressed to 80% in German uniforms and the rest of them were clothed in Bulgarian uniforms. A few of them were Bulgarian deserters.
Q. Witness, if in intercepted radio messages there was some talk about German transports, et cetera being destroyed, what kind of language was customary in these Serbian radio messages?
A. In the Spring of 1944 there were for the first time some radio messages in Serbia from the partisans. Those reported their successes in the area of the Serbian-Bulgarian frontier as well as in the previously mentioned Jastrebac Mountains. They reported that they had blown up several railway lines and the elimination of German soldiers, Serbian traitors and Quislings was always reported under the word "slaughtered."
Q. Was an order of Tito known to you, and if so at what time to the effect, that in the future no futher German prisoners had to be killed?
A. In the Spring of 1944 a Tito order arrived at the headquarters of several corps in which he ordered that from now on no more German prisoners need be killed because an prisoner exchange center in agreement with the German forces had been installed south of Zagreb.
Q. Witness, were cases known to you as a consequence of your official activity that the Tito units rewarded or promoted men because they killed German prisoners?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you give us such a case?
A. I remember especially well one case in this connection because it was very sad. In late autumn of 1943 one day I received a number of telephone calls which had been received by my superior office with the OKW from Army Group F, the Ic, as well as from the military commander. I was to report immediately if I intercepted any message regarding the shooting down and capture of a German Captain Kirchner amongst the radio exchange between Mihajlovic and Tito.
Q. Just a minute -- who was Captain Kirchner? Why did these high quarters take interest in this Captain Kirchner?
A. Captain Kirchner was in a fighter unit and had the Oak Leaves decoration. As a fighter he had been shot down by American bomber units which returned either from Vienna or from Ploesti and the Reich Marshal had personally intervened on behalf of his bearer of the Oak Leaves.
A. This Capt Kirschner had been shot down, and already on the next day I had received a radio message in which Marshal Tito asked why this German officer, who was shot down, had been shot. The Commander of the brigade and his Commissar were to report immediately to Tito's staff. The reasons for the shooting were to be given by radio. The radio message which came as a consequence of this request showed that Captain Kirschner, after his landing by parachute, did not resist. He was taken to the staff of the brigade and was shot there after court martial proceedings, as was stated in the radio message, with the reason that he was an invader. A week later the name of this brigade commander and of the brigade Commissar were mentioned in connection with a proletarian brigade. The brigade Commander had been promoted in the meantime. These proletarian units wore Tito's crack units.
Q. Witness, you have said before that the Reich Marshal, that is Goering, was particularly interested in his Oak Leaves bearer. Maybe you can tell us, for the information of the Tribunal, whether it is correct that in the German Armed Forces the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross is one of the highest decorations for bravery.
A. The Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross was one of the highest decorations.
Q. For bravery?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, the name of this man was Captain Kirschner?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it later made known to you officially that the body of Captain Kirschner was found later with his throat cut and his eyes picked out?
A. It was not reported to me officially of course, but I did learn from the Ic Military Commander that Captain Kirschner was found after a search had been started by the unit. He was found slaughtered; his throat cut, and his eyes were put out.
Q. Witness, we will turn to something else now. Is it correct that in the summary of 1943, on the occasion of a large-scale mopping-up operation, the staff headquarters of General Mihajlovic was occupied by German troops? Is that correct?
A. Yes, in the summer of 1943, on the occasion of a large operation near the areas of Uzice (I spell it: U-Z-I-C-E) and Cacak (C-A-C-A-K) the staff headquarters of Mihajlovic was occupied.
Q. Witness, is it correct that on this occasion all the radio material of the British liaison officers was found and deciphered?
A. A few kilometers away from Mihajlovic's staff headquarters there was the staff of the British. They were disturbed by the German troops and left everything behind. They had to escape. On this occasion we found all their radio material and secured it. I received all this information at the time for evaluation.
Q. I would now be interested, Witness, to know what was seen from this radio material which was captured at the staff of these British liaison officers. What could be seen regarding the question of whether these British liaison officers themselves regarded the partisan units as regular belligerents within the scope of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. Maybe you can tell us this briefly.
A. I'd like to correct the question, inasmuch as these were not partisan units, but Cetnik units. Because the partisans were Tito's and the Cetniks were Mihajlovic's men. The British officers were stationed with Mihajlovic and they had a number of radio messages which showed the evaluation and judgment of the individual Cetnik leaders and also the total judgment concerning the Cetnik bands. That was the most important part. Of course there were also any number of requests for material and personal radio messages. I believe that the evaluation and judgment of the Cetnik officers in the Cetnik bands is of interest here.
Q. Yes, and what was seen from these documents?
A. Summarizing, I can say the following about the contents of the radio messages regarding the judgment of the officers by the British.
They were boastful; honesty and straightforwardness were conceptions which were not or only rarely known to them. Apart from a few single ones they were national-minded up to fanatic Chauvinism. For the most part they were clearly antibolshevist. In the summer of 1943, at that time, they could not be used for actions against the German Armed Forces and only some subordinate leaders could be used for sabotage acts, but even these would have to be bribed first. The judgment of the Cetnik bands was the following: Usable, to 100% for a people's insurrection in case of a military collapse of Germany, and all Cetniks were directed against such a military collapse of Germany, and all propaganda work was directed in this direction as well. British liaison officers said the following concerning the military use of these Cetnik bands: Their opinion could be described as we regarded a hopeless undertaking. The British officers were commissioned to look after supply of weapons and ammunitions and, therefore, they had to voice an opinion concerning this. And they said the following is not uniform and is inadequate. There is not sufficient ammunition; uniforms are not available; only civilian clothes are available, and only a few bad ones at that; officers' training was insufficient, and training was insufficient, and training of the men and N.C.O's was even worse. For these reasons they stated that a military employment of the Cetniks was impossible.
Q. That, then, was the opinion and judgment of the British officers made in the summer of 1943?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, from these reports which you found in the camp of the British liaison officers could anything be seen regarding the relation between the Cetnik and the Tito units?
A. Colonel Bailey....
Q. Please spell.
A. B-A-I-L-E-Y- Bailey. Colonel Bailey was the leader of the British liaison officers. His assignment was to get the Cetniks to collaborate with the partisans. Mihajlovic, whose attitude principally was very anti-Bolshevist, resisted strongly, and he said personally to Baily that he had tried to meet him half way and said that everything would be done.
However, he instructed his subordinate leaders to show the same attitude towards the British liaison officers and to say that contact and negotiation with the Communist units will be carried out. However, he ordered the old orthodox attitude towards Bolshevism and to keep to that attitude. Under all circumstances contact between the British and the Communist was to be prevented.
Q. Witness, in the material which you captured at the time, did you find anything concerning the detailed tasks which the British liaison officers were to carry out when stationed with the bands in Serbia?
A. As far as I can recollect I have already dealt with this subject before the luncheon recess.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think that is correct, Dr. Sauter, and also some other things which at some length you have pursued.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Did you then ascertain how this activity of the British liaison officers changed towards the Cetnik units with which they were stationed?
A. In the autumn of 1943 the Commander for the Middle East issued an order stating that the British officers were to make contact with the partisans and they were to discontinue their activity with the Mihajlovic units. They were to start with their old tasks and commissions when contacting the partisans.
Q. Witness, from your activity do you know of any cases which show that the reports of the partisan units concerning German measures were exaggerated or even direct lies? And can you give us one or more examples for these facts?
A. A characteristic example was an operation which the German Armed Forces undertook for the capture of General Trifunovic--T-R-I-F-U-N-O-V-I-C, Trifunovic. He was Mihajlovic's main political man. We knew their exact station and in a larger operation which we undertook there were two to two and a half battalions. We intended to encircle Trifunovic and capture him. I participated in this operation in order to secure Trifunovic's radio station and also make sure of all the coding keys available. When we entered the village early in the morning Trifunovic had already left. This operation had been prepared by the military commanders. During the early morning hours Gruppenfuehrer Meissner appeared personally. He was the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Between 8 and 11 o'clock in the morning the men rested. At 11 o'clock we started on the way back. In the meantime I had looked at a part of the village. When at 11 o'clock the men got ready to move off, Bulgarian soldiers started to set the village on fire. My interpreter, a non-commissioned officer, came to me and reported this. I went out with a pistol and tried to prevent this burning down. There were language difficulties with the Bulgarians, and they prevented my attempt. And then something else started which was incomprehensible to me. It seemed impossible to get the people away from the fire. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner was standing nearby, and I approached him and asked him who had ordered the burning down of the village. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner evaded this direct question. I was rather excited because I had seen the dire poverty of these people and was terribly upset because innocent people were hit by this measure. Trifunovic had escaped in any case. The opponent did not fire one single shot, and in spite of this they had now started to burn down the village. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner said this is a band centre. It has to be burned down. I told Gruppenfuehrer Meissner in very strong words about the poverty of the population, and I emphasized that the military commander, on the occasion of our conference concerning the operation, had ordered nothing about the burning down of the village. And I asked Meissner whether he was prepared to take the responsibility. Gruppenfuehrer Meissner replied in strong terms and told me that was none of my business. I replied that the German Wehrmact would eventually be blamed for this burning down, and the responsible man for the German Armed Forces there was the Commanding General. He had not ordered this, and nevertheless he would afterwards have to bear the responsibility.
Meissner, who was known as a man of strong anti-Serbian tendencies, told me that it was incomprehensible to him that I should get excited about an incident like that. There was nothing that could stop this burning down. The Bulgarians had started to attempt to burn down the houses. However, it had been very difficult to set the houses on fire and therefore they had burned down the hay stacks. I had intended to report about this incident to the Military Commander and I, therefore, observed every detail concerning the burning down of the village. After a few hay stacks were on fire, hand grenades exploded that had been hidden there, and after the Bulgarians had succeeded in burning down the first few hay stacks and after the fires became more dangerous and further ammunition could explode, the burning down stopped. I talked again to Gruppenfuehrer Meissner and told him that now the may stacks and a few houses had been burned down. Now we have put one over on General Trifunovic, but we have not actually hit Trifunovic. We have hit the poor population and the cattle.
Q. Did you then report to General von Geitner praised me for my attitude towards Gruppenfuehrer Meissner and on my request he promised to support me in case Gruppenfuehrer Meissner was to undertake anything against me.
Q. And now, Witness, I would be interested to know how this affair was then reported and made use of in radio messages. How many houses and how many hay sheds were set on fire, and burned down, according to your observations?
A. Approximately 3 houses and 10 hay sheds were burned down. Two days after this operation General Trifunovic turned up in a radio message.
Q. And what did he assert?
A. He asserted that almost 200 houses were burned down, that the entire civilian population had been deported, and that there were scenes of rape etc. When We entered the village, for one thing, there was not a single man left in the village. The women and children who were there when we entered, remained there. According to my own observations there were no scones of rape. One to three weeks after Trifunovic's radio message we succeeded in diciphering one of Mihajlovic's radio messages, Sent to London. There was mention of a figure of more than 200 houses which had been burned down and, of course, that the whole civilian population had been deported and, there was also mention of the alleged scenes of rape. Radio London made use of this message in its transmissions for the Balkans and talked about many more than 200 houses being burned down. I myself then had the village photographed by a Stork.
Q. What do you mean by a "Stork"?
A. A Stork is an airplane , which was put at my disposal at that time by the OKW. There were three Stork planes, observer planes altogether, which were equipped for the determination of band radio transmitters.
Q. Witness, I then have a few concluding questions to put to you before I can finish with your examination. Could you ascertain whether the Serbian units also carried out reprisal measures and retaliation measures against Germans or could you not ascertain that in your official capacity?
A. From the radio exchange of communication no such facts could be gathered, but 1 know that subordinate leaders of Mihajlovic captured German soldiers or members of the organization Todt, and kept them under arrest and also treated them as hostages.
Q. Was it officially known to you how German prisoners of war were treated by the Serbian units or rather maltreated or killed, was that made known to you in an official way?
A. With the exception of the case of Captain Kirchner, which was mentioned directly in my radio exchange of messages, I only heard of the partly very bad treatment of German prisoners of war at the hands of the partisans. I heard of that only by way of talks with other officers.
Q. Witness, did you know whether during the second World War or after the Second World war, such reprisal measures as are dealt with here also threatened by other armies?
A. To answer this question is very difficult. I am not quite clear about the future consequences which an answer to this question would have for me personally.
JUDGE BURKE: Then you are not required to answer it. In that situation you will not be required to answer it by this Tribunal.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, may it please the Tribunal, I do not know whether I, as defense counsel, can be content with this answer of the witness.
The defense is here faced with a problem to show whether other armies too ordered reprisal measures.
JUDGE BURKE: That you nay ask in its appropriate time and place, but this witness will not be obliged to answer any question that he deems contrary to his immediate safety.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to tell you that this attitude of the Tribunal deprives me completely cf the possibility to get this question answered. Every witness who hears that he does not have to answer such questions will in the future maintain the point of view, "I prefer not to answer such questions." Your Honor, I do not know what the regulation is in American Law with regard to this point, but according to German law it is quite clear that a witness ha.s to answer such questions. According to German law he is not obliged to answer such a question only if by a truthful answer he exposes himself to punishment, and that without doubt is not the case here. We must not maintain the point of view that, for instance, the American or British authorities would take proceedings against a witness because he speaks the truth here. I am of the opinion that there is every cause to tell the witness that he is under the protection of the Tribunal if he tells the truth here before this Tribunal , and that a truthful statement is not of disadvantage to him, irrespective from which side. That is my personal opinion and I believe one cannot very well be of another opinion.
JUDGE BURKE: It is due to the fact that the Tribunal apparently believed the witness when he made the statement that he did.
You may proceed with something else and if the Tribunal decides to make a different ruling it will be announced at the conclusion of the afternoon's testimony.
I would like to ask the witness one question in the meantime.
BY JUDGE BURKE:
Q. Are you sincere in your statement sir, that you do not desire to answer this question for fear of possible future repercussions?
A. Yes, indeed.
JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 3:15.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Dr. Sauter, it is the considered opinion of the Tribunal that a witness who is under oath and who states that he hesitates to answer the question, which you have propounded, for reasons of his personal security, the Tribunal will leave the determination of his answer to himself. If he choses to answer, he may answer. If he chooses not to answer, the Tribunal will not insist that he answer the question.
Does the witness understand the statement of the Tribunal?
THE WITNESS: I have understood the decision.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, I will specify the question I put to you before. Let me ask you this and this is my final question to you; did you have personal knowledge that in July or August of 1945 in Stuttgart there were posters announcing reprisal measures in the ratio of one to twenty five; in the year 1946 there were in Berlin reprisals in the ratio of one to fifty; and in May 1945 there were in the Harz mountains in central Germany reprisals in the ratio of one to two hundred threatened; did you see those posters yourself? This I want to put to you as my final question?
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors will permit, I will merely ask that Dr. Sauter repeat the city he asked the witness the first time once again. I did not get that quite.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think he said Stuttgart.
DR. SAUTER; The first city, which I mentioned, was Stuttgart in Wuerttemberg, the second city was Berlin and the third locality, which is not a city, was the southern part of the Harz mountains in central Germany, I believe in Thuringia. The third location actually referred to the ratio of one to two hundred threatened to the population in public posters in a village called Gorjnzen in Thuringia. I assert that behind my question is the fact that the witness himself has seen those posters and that is the reason why I asked him the question.
THE WITNESS: I shall answer your question without hesitation.
but I would be grateful if, should there be an reprisals or repercussions directed against my person, I could invoke the protection of this Tribunal.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: To the extent of the powers of the Tribunal you will have its full protection. It is difficult to conceive of a situation where a reprisal or a repercussion should come to any man for telling the truth.
THE WITNESS: I am extremely grateful to the Court and I shall now answer the question.
Shortly before the end of the war, I was with the Army Signal School in Halle on the Saale. There we were used against the approaching Americans and we were overtaken by them immediately underneath the Kyffhaeuser mountains. I was not taken prisoner and at night I made my way behind the American lines attempting to establish contact with the German troops. I got stuck in the Harz mountains and there the civilian population fed us, they would bring us a little food now and again. It was there that I heard something about a poster in the village of Gorenzen. I shall spell it again because I think Dr. Sauter has misspelled the village, G-o-r-e-n-z-e-n.
The civilian population begged and implored us in fact, "Don't for God's sake shoot at an American soldier." On the other hand, it was somewhat difficult for me, as I only had a pistol left. The civilians nevertheless told us that reprisals at the ratio of one to two hundred would be carried out. When I asked them how they knew that, they told me there was a poster in the village to that effect. Later on in daylight I went into the village, although there was a danger that the Americans might drive through and I read the poster which was posted on the village school in an old frame, which had formerly been used by the Hitler Youth or very young Hitler boys. It was a yellow poster and threatened the shooting of two hundred Germans in the event that one single American should be killed by Germans.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, perhaps you can tell the Tribunal and describe so that a foreigner can also form an impression where this village of Gorenzen is situated; where is it; in Germany?
A Gorenzen is situated in the southern part of the Marz mountains, it is not very far from Eisenach.
Q Is it near Weimar, that is perhaps better known?
A Weimar is further to the west, but I think Nordhausen and Sangerhausen are better known names. It is a distance of about thirty or forty kilometers from Nordhausen and about 80 or 90 kilometers from Sangerhausen.
Q In order to make this quite clear; you saw the poster with your own eyes, did you?
A Yes, I read it myself.
Q Did other people whom you know also read the poster?
A Yes, they did indeed. An officer, whom I know, who was together with me at the time also read it, and in the village there are a number of acquaintances of mine who also saw the poster.
Q Now, when you read the poster, who occupied the village at that time?
A The village was then occupied by the Americans. It might have been the 7th or 8th Army Corps. The men wore a double colored circle bearing the Roman Numeral VII or VIII. I believe it was ah Artillery Corps because there were mainly artillery stationed there.
Q And you say that the poster was printed on yellow paper?
A Yes.
Q With black lettering?
A Yes.
Q Do you know whether at the top of the poster there was any address; for instance: To the Inhabitants of this or that, or something of that sort?
A No, I cannot tell you that. All I did was to remember this deeply moving ratio of one to two hundred.
Q Can you tell me, witness, if this poster was entirely printed?
A Yes.
Q It was all printed out then?
A The poster was printed, the signature was...
MR. RAPP: I suggest that Dr. Sauter permit the witness to tell what he saw and stop suggesting the answer to the question. I think in this case it is of interest, we don't want Dr. Sauter's opinion, but the witness' opinion and what he saw.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think it is advisable, Dr. Sauter, to permit the witness, who is a man of more than average intelligence to tell what he saw. It evidently made a powerful impression on him and he should remember even the most minute details. Just ask him to state what he saw.
DR. SAUTER: May I point out that first of all I made the witness tell us the whole thing, what he saw, which he did.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: With the assistance of the Tribunal. He is not an unwilling witness, he has exercised his choice of giving the testimony. I think if you will simply ask him the question to describe the poster, that he is amply equipped to do it, Dr. Sauter.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, is there anything else which you would like to add about the poster, anything you have failed to mention so far?
A Then I returned to Stuttgart.
Q Noo I mean the poster in Gorenzen.
A I said, there was this ratio of one to two hundred and the signature was General Eisenhower.
Q I beg your pardon?
A It was signed by General Eisenhower.
Q General signed it. What can you tell us about the poster in Stuttgart?
A When I returned from the Harz to Stuttgart where my family was living, I saw a poster in Stuttgart not very far from the Olgastrasse, which had been posted by the French and that fixed the ratio at one to twenty five should one French soldier be killed by the Germans.