Q But what was the aim which Col. von Geitner had in mind with this suggestion?
A Colonel von Geitner told me at the time if we could prevent it, we could get hold of the actual culprit.
Q And what was it he wanted to prevent on the other hand?
A I could not tell you that in detail, but it is my conviction that he wanted to save the little men with the bands and protect them against these harsh measures.
Q Witness, let us proceed about something else now. In this trial we have seen a document which is a report. This is a report, witness, by the O.K.H. General Staff of the Army, department of foreign army east, of 9 February, 1943. It was submitted as Document NOKW-1806, exhibit 539. I repeat, 1806, exhibit 539 and it is contained in volume 24 of the Prosecution on page 118 of the German edition. This is a report by the O.K.H. about the Mihajlovic movement. It is a very detailed report. I showed you the report yesterday, witness, do you remember what it said in it?
A Yes, I do indeed.
Q What can you tell the Court about the manner in which this report by the German Staff of the Army was drawn up?
A This report is something which was stolen more or less by the O.K.H. from a report compiled by me in July-August of 1942. I should say that at about that time Mihajlovic was just building up his movement and he prepared the rising in the event of a military collapse of Germany. He established his corps and brigades for that purpose and he had put area commanders in charge of the corps and he gave orders to the area commanders, as I said before, to wait for the order to rise up which was to come through the wireless. This was purely desk work and this whole organization of 52 brigades with seven or eight corps or even more was purely on paper. The whole scheme was based on the most impossible conditions and was as it were a far distant aim. Unfortunately the docu ments does not contain the maps which it should to show the mania of General Mihajlovic.
Q Witness, you say in other words that this report by the O.K.H. of 9 February 1943 has been stolen 80% to 90% from a work done by you; is that correct?
A Yes, indeed.
Q On what information did you base your work at the time?
A In June, July and August of 1942 a flock of wireless messages came in, in which the chief of staff of General Mihajlovic, General Ostojic, -- to spell it O-s-t-o-j-i-c developed, as I said, whole organization was on paper. In actual fact the D.B. movement was never built up in the way which was planned so well even from a General staff point of view. The fact was that these things which were down on paper had been born in the imagination of the officers under Mihajlovic and there they remained. I was rapped over the knuckles more than once by a number of agencies about that report because it seemed to be so exaggerated as to the strength of the movement under Mihajlovic. All I could say at the time was that it is my task to evaluate anything intercepted from Mihajlovic sources and if Mihajlovic has a plan of this sort on his mind, it is my task to inform the staffs about it. If O.K.H. should be taken in by this and should fall for these things, it simply will prove that in February of 1943 they finally copied this laboriously and passed it on as a product of their own. This is a situation as the one in the Balkans where within a week bands could almost completely dissolve and the picture change. At that time in 1943 the plan of Mihajlovic had long since been regarded as piece-meal failure by the high agencies in the Balkans. Then on top of this the O.K.H. report came in at a period of time when in other words this highly imaginative aim of Mihajlovic had become out of data for any concrete basis of action in the Balkans.
Q Witness, if I understood you correctly, you want to say this and please pay attention to what I am saying now and tell me if it is correct or not. What the report or the memorandum by the O.K.H. of 9 February 1943 says does not represent the actual strength of the Mihajlovic resistance movement at the time, but merely the plans which Mihajlovic developed in the event of Germany's collapse. Have I understood you correctly?
A Yes, indeed.
Q It is therefore possible to conclude from what the document says whether or not in the Mihajlovic movement at the time one should see a regular army in accordance with international law or would it not be possible in your opinion to conclude that? I ask you that because 80% or 90% of this memorandum is your own work.
A Of course I cannot give an expert opinion about international law, but as a soldier I am in a position to say, or at least as a soldier at the time, I can say that the whole report reflects the wishes and ideas of Mihajlovic, but it does not contain facts. Nor can one speak here of a regular army because after all there was an Armistice with Yugo Slovia and above all these people were not wearing uniforms.
Q Witness, do you know anything about the facts or do you know anything about the tendencies in the resistant movement under Mihajlovic in the autumn of 1942 and in what sense they changed in the spring of 1943; do you, on the basis of your wireless interception have reliable knowledge about that?
A In the autumn of 1942 the Mihajlovic movements started on a downward trend, because the German troops had in some cases been highly successful in their operations against them and these people were short of arms and ammunition, the troops were exhausted and they wanted to go back to their families. Then we intercepted this wireless message, which I mentioned before regarding the problems of retaliation, where Mihajlovic ordered that attacks on German troops, supply units, communication stations, etc.
, were reduced to a minimum because of the retaliation measures. In the spring of 1943 a large number of British liaison officers parachuted into the area. It was their task first of all to train the Cetnik Bands to sabotage acts; second, to find out what they needed in the way of ammunition, arms, clothes and money; third, intelligence service directed against the Wehrmacht; fourth, reports about the military and political ability of the Cetnik bands and fifth to report about the military and political situation in the Balkans.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Now, I think at this time witness we will discontinue until 1:30 o'clock.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1:30 o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, October 21, 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue.
DR. SAUTER: Before the recess you described to the Tribunal that as of April, 1943, the insurrection movement in Serbia had reached a stronger degree. You stopped when you were just about to tell us that British or other Allied fliers had parachuted down in order to support the insurgent movement. Maybe you would like to repeat your last answer so that we may better recall in which context your answer was given.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: It will not be necessary to repeat it. The Tribunal is endowed with the ordinary sense of memory. We recall distinctly what he said, so if you will start with the point where he left off and continue it will save your time and the time of the Tribunal.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, you told us that many fliers, I believe they were British ones, parachuted down in the Balkan area. Now, according to your knowledge of the conditions, can you tell us what happened to the Allied fliers?
A. These Allied, i.e. British liaison officers with Draja Mihajlovic had to carry out their missions down there. Several of those British officers and enlisted men were captured. From the date of their arrival with the Draja Mihajlovic units a stronger sabotage activity on the part of the Draja Mihajlovic bands started. Mihajlovic ordered in his radio messages that sabotage acts should be carried out. But he also ordered that the Communists or Partisans respectively should be proclaimed as the authors of the sabotage acts through posters and proclamations. Mihajlovic gave his reasons at the end of these radio messages and said that this camouflage should be effected in order to make the German Armed Forces take reprisal measures with respect to Communists.
Q. Witness, can you give us several example cases where British fliers, who had parachuted down in order to support the insurgent movements were captured by the German troops; of how many such cases do you know?
A. There were about six officers who were captured, five of them I saw myself. A number of enlisted men and non-commissioned officers were also captured and I saw those too partly. I also talked with them.
Q. What happened to these people, these English fliers?
A. After they had bean interrogated, they were made German Prisoners of War and they were sent to camps in Germany.
Q. Can you give us names of such British fliers?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. Names of some who became Prisoners of War and were sent to German to camps?
A. Before May of 1942, that was the date of arrival in Belgrade, a Captain or Major Laurence was captured. I know that from talks and reports of a number of German officers who had seen Laurence. Laurence was kept in a kind of honorary confinement at the staff of Military Commander. He took his meals in the Casino of the staff of the Military Commander. What he said impressed me deeply, it was: "Four times I have been captured by the Germans and every time I have broken out again. I can guarantee and assure you in a short time I will have disappeared again." This British officer; in spite of this statement of his, was brought to Germany into a prisoner of war camp.
In 1943 in North East Serbia, Captain Hargreaves, I will spell it, H-a-r-g-r-ea-v-e-s, was captured. He was a New Zealander. A Polish officer who was dressed in a British uniform and who had the commission to incite the Polish laborers in Bor to escape and to build up a Polish army in Yugoslavia, was shot during combat action.
Captain Hargreaves came to Belgrade and was transferred to the S.D. for interrogation and after he had been interrogated by field police officers, that is the police of the army, he was sent to Germany to a prisoner of war camp.
Q. Were you present at the interrogation of this British officer?
A. Concerning the expert questions of radio messages and radio transmissions, I myself interrogated Captain Hargreaves.
Q. Do you know of any other officers who were shot down and then transferred to Germany into Prisoner of War camps?
A. You mean fliers who were shot down; I know nothing of that. I do know of two crews of American four engine bombers who did manage to got through. There was some talk about them in a radio message, but nothing was undertaken against them. However, in Southern Serbia in the late summer of 1943 a British Captain and another officer with two or three non-commissioned officers were captured. I did not know those officers through radio interceptions, I only talked to them briefly, but I do know that they came to German and were put into prisoner of war camps.
One further case, is known to me, in late fall of 1943 or it may have been the beginning of 1944, on the occasion of a large scale operation the Tito partisans, a British liaison officer who was also a captain whom I believe was stationed with the second Tito corps was captured. I have also talked with this captain briefly and he told me the following: the corps with which he was stationed had an unwritten law saying that no Fascist prisoners were to be taken. I asked him what he had done against this unwritten law and he said that he objected against it but without success and it had only contributed to his isolation. This officer too was later made a German prisoner of war.
Q. Witness, can you give us an explanation why these officers were sent to prisoner of war camps and why the so-called commando order was not applied concerning these British officers; you know what the commando order is, don't you
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Will you please answer the question then?
A. I know the commando order for one reason, because it was mentioned in an army report and because one day I got to know of it through my own channel, that is through my regiment in Athens.
I have repeatedly inquired whether the Commando order was applicable for these offices. The then Ic, Captain of the Cavalry, Fuerst Wrede -- I spell it, W r e d e -- told me that the Commando Order was not applicable to these officers, although they trained the bands for sabotage acts and put the explosives and other means at their disposal and although they also requested supplies by air. Despite all these facts they were not treated in accordance with the Commando Order.
Q: Was the Commando order valid in the Balkans at all?
A: I don't know that, but from practical experience, I learned that apparently it was not valid.
Q: Witness, from your activity in the Balkans, do you know anything about the fact whether the partisan units of that time were considered military units in the sense of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare? I am especially interested in the fact of whether they wore uniforms, whether their insignia were recognizable from a distance, whether they carried arms openly, whether they were under one responsible leadership and other things like that. What do you know about all these facts from your own experience?
A: I would like to say the following. We have to divide up this question into two categories. There is for one thing the Mihajlovic movement and for another thing the Tito partisans. The Mihajlovic movement was led by former Jugoslav officers. They were very rarely found in uniform. The men and N.C.O's for the most part also wore no uniform. Generally, they walked around in civilian clothes; they did not wear insignia which could be seen from a larger distance. A responsible leadership they had only in part, but their discipline was not good by any means because individual parts of the bands became independent and requisitioned things and these requisitions were not always carried out in a very humane manner.
I have intercepted many radio messages, especially in the radio communications between Captain Kalabic -- I spell K a l a bi c -- and General Mihajlovic. Captain Kalabic had a large number of very bad elements who made themselves independent and went around robbing and plundering. Mihajlovic has often reprimanded Kalabic because of these facts and Kalabic denied any responsibility for these elements since he maintained that he did not have strict jurisdiction over all these people. In the radio exchange of messages between General Mihajlovic and the exile government in London, which we could decode to a certain extent, there were also several cases mentioned which referred to the denial of responsibility by Mihajlovic for those independent actions.
I would like to say the following concerning the Tito partisans. There was a clear distinction between those people and the Mihajlovic people. These people had a totally different training. The basic principle and prerequisites for them was their political ideological training. Orders and decoded radio messages contained the instruction to make use of every available opportunity to attack, and in one case which was particularly significant, Tito undertook an operation against Serbia and ordered that every available kind of camouflage should be used. The following happened on this occasion. In Mihajlovic's radio messages, his subordinate leaders reported that after the first fighting contact between Cetniks and partisans the partisans had stopped firing and men who said they were Cetniks arrived at the camp of the Cetniks and caused great disorder.
Q: Witness, can you remember that in the year 1942 a combat regulation for partisan warfare was captured and that you translated this regulation for partisan warfare into German and evaluated it? Can you remember these facts?
A: Yes, in 1942 in the Jastrebac Mountains, J a s t r e bac Mountains, Jastrebac.
Q: Was that an instruction for the Tito partisan units?
A: Yes, this was a regulation for the Tito partisans.
Q: Can you name us those points which struck you particularly when you looked at the regulations at the time?
A: I was very much interested in these regulations because already through my activity in radio communications I always was greatly interested in the thoughts and feelings of the opponent as well as in his intentions. I remember well the instructions which called for sabotage acts and surprise attacks. On this occasion it was demanded that as much use as possible be made of the terrain and it was stated that this was one of the main tasks. The preparation of surprise attacks was described in detail as to distribution of time, tasks etc. It was demanded that for camouflage insignia had to be removed, weapons were to be hidden and members had to be camouflaged as civilians. If a surprise attack was successful it was demanded that the enemy was to be annihilated, prisoners were only to be taken where it was necessary to interrogate them. Harsh and ruthless attitude towards the invader and the invasion was demanded as a necessity and described as a duty. A successful surprise attack was to be publicized and made known as the action of partisans. But unsuccessful surprise attacks wherever possible, whore there were Cetniks, were to be publicized as acts of the Cetniks.
Q: Witness, in this regulation for partisan warfare, was anything contained concerning the weapons, munitions, uniforms, etc. and if so what?
A: The partisans themselves were to make use of every possible camouflage as I stated before.
I mean they were to hide all arms, take off all identification etc. On the occasion of surprise attack it was demanded that weapons, munitions, uniforms and medical equipment of the enemy had to be placed in safe keeping under all circumstances.
Q: Witness, you said this regulation contained one provision that the enemy was to be annihilated to the last man?
A: Yes, indeed.
Q: Was anything contained in this regulation about the treatment of prisoners?
A: Successful attacks were to be so carried out that the enemy was annihilated down to the last man. Prisoners were only to be taken to the extent necessary for interrogation.
Q: This regulation of band warfare for the Tito partisans you saw yourself, did you?
A: Yes, I did. I saw them in Brod or Zagreb when I was stationed with the corps there.
Q: Did other people, too -- maybe your companions -- see this warfare regulation at the time?
A: I had been given this regulation for my office in order to look at it and I was not asked to return it.
Q: Witness, according to your own observation did the fighting methods of the partisan unit actually comply with these regulations, or was their actual method of fighting more humane? What do you know about that?
A: This partisan regulation was, generally speaking, adhered to by the partizans. The method of warfare was, therefore, a very harst one. From a number of radio communications of the partisans it could be seen that was so.
Q. Did you also intercept radio messages in which Tito ordered the partisan units to change uniforms wherever it was desirable in order to deceive the German units?
A. Yes. As I have already explained previously, on the occasion of this one attach on Serbia, Tito ordered his elite division, the Serbian Proletarian division, to make use of every available manner of camouflage. It was the aim to advance towards the Bulgarian frontier in the area of Nish and, according to the well-known partisan tactics, that was not to be done by open fighting but by infiltration. The infiltration through the German lines and partly also through the Cetnik units was to be effected by taking off all identification by hiding all weapons and partly by wearing whatever uniform or clothing would be worn in whichever lines the partisans infiltrated.
Q. From intercepted radio messages of your department, was it further seen that the Tito partisans had appeared at Cetnik negotiations dressed up as Cetniks in order to spy on the Cetniks?
A. Yes, on the occasion of the Tito partisan operation mentioned, a number of subordinate leaders of Mihajlovic reported that the partisans after the first fighting contact went over to the Cetniks, pretended to be Cetniks and then attacked the Cetniks. In order to prevent this, Mihajlovic twice a day or one a day issued code words which were to be made known to the units.
Q. witness, did you establish any cases where partisans groups were clothed 80% in German uniforms and the rest in Bulgarian uniforms instead of appearing in Serbian uniforms?
A. Yes, in the Jastrebac Mountains.
Q. Maybe you will spell it again?
A. J a s t r e b a c. These mountains are located northwest of Nish, Partisans were dressed to 80% in German uniforms and the rest of them were clothed in Bulgarian uniforms. A few of them were Bulgarian deserters.
Q. Witness, if in intercepted radio messages there was some talk about German transports, et cetera being destroyed, what kind of language was customary in these Serbian radio messages?
A. In the Spring of 1944 there were for the first time some radio messages in Serbia from the partisans. Those reported their successes in the area of the Serbian-Bulgarian frontier as well as in the previously mentioned Jastrebac Mountains. They reported that they had blown up several railway lines and the elimination of German soldiers, Serbian traitors and Quislings was always reported under the word "slaughtered."
Q. Was an order of Tito known to you, and if so at what time to the effect, that in the future no futher German prisoners had to be killed?
A. In the Spring of 1944 a Tito order arrived at the headquarters of several corps in which he ordered that from now on no more German prisoners need be killed because an prisoner exchange center in agreement with the German forces had been installed south of Zagreb.
Q. Witness, were cases known to you as a consequence of your official activity that the Tito units rewarded or promoted men because they killed German prisoners?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you give us such a case?
A. I remember especially well one case in this connection because it was very sad. In late autumn of 1943 one day I received a number of telephone calls which had been received by my superior office with the OKW from Army Group F, the Ic, as well as from the military commander. I was to report immediately if I intercepted any message regarding the shooting down and capture of a German Captain Kirchner amongst the radio exchange between Mihajlovic and Tito.
Q. Just a minute -- who was Captain Kirchner? Why did these high quarters take interest in this Captain Kirchner?
A. Captain Kirchner was in a fighter unit and had the Oak Leaves decoration. As a fighter he had been shot down by American bomber units which returned either from Vienna or from Ploesti and the Reich Marshal had personally intervened on behalf of his bearer of the Oak Leaves.
A. This Capt Kirschner had been shot down, and already on the next day I had received a radio message in which Marshal Tito asked why this German officer, who was shot down, had been shot. The Commander of the brigade and his Commissar were to report immediately to Tito's staff. The reasons for the shooting were to be given by radio. The radio message which came as a consequence of this request showed that Captain Kirschner, after his landing by parachute, did not resist. He was taken to the staff of the brigade and was shot there after court martial proceedings, as was stated in the radio message, with the reason that he was an invader. A week later the name of this brigade commander and of the brigade Commissar were mentioned in connection with a proletarian brigade. The brigade Commander had been promoted in the meantime. These proletarian units wore Tito's crack units.
Q. Witness, you have said before that the Reich Marshal, that is Goering, was particularly interested in his Oak Leaves bearer. Maybe you can tell us, for the information of the Tribunal, whether it is correct that in the German Armed Forces the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross is one of the highest decorations for bravery.
A. The Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross was one of the highest decorations.
Q. For bravery?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, the name of this man was Captain Kirschner?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it later made known to you officially that the body of Captain Kirschner was found later with his throat cut and his eyes picked out?
A. It was not reported to me officially of course, but I did learn from the Ic Military Commander that Captain Kirschner was found after a search had been started by the unit. He was found slaughtered; his throat cut, and his eyes were put out.
Q. Witness, we will turn to something else now. Is it correct that in the summary of 1943, on the occasion of a large-scale mopping-up operation, the staff headquarters of General Mihajlovic was occupied by German troops? Is that correct?
A. Yes, in the summer of 1943, on the occasion of a large operation near the areas of Uzice (I spell it: U-Z-I-C-E) and Cacak (C-A-C-A-K) the staff headquarters of Mihajlovic was occupied.
Q. Witness, is it correct that on this occasion all the radio material of the British liaison officers was found and deciphered?
A. A few kilometers away from Mihajlovic's staff headquarters there was the staff of the British. They were disturbed by the German troops and left everything behind. They had to escape. On this occasion we found all their radio material and secured it. I received all this information at the time for evaluation.
Q. I would now be interested, Witness, to know what was seen from this radio material which was captured at the staff of these British liaison officers. What could be seen regarding the question of whether these British liaison officers themselves regarded the partisan units as regular belligerents within the scope of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. Maybe you can tell us this briefly.
A. I'd like to correct the question, inasmuch as these were not partisan units, but Cetnik units. Because the partisans were Tito's and the Cetniks were Mihajlovic's men. The British officers were stationed with Mihajlovic and they had a number of radio messages which showed the evaluation and judgment of the individual Cetnik leaders and also the total judgment concerning the Cetnik bands. That was the most important part. Of course there were also any number of requests for material and personal radio messages. I believe that the evaluation and judgment of the Cetnik officers in the Cetnik bands is of interest here.
Q. Yes, and what was seen from these documents?
A. Summarizing, I can say the following about the contents of the radio messages regarding the judgment of the officers by the British.
They were boastful; honesty and straightforwardness were conceptions which were not or only rarely known to them. Apart from a few single ones they were national-minded up to fanatic Chauvinism. For the most part they were clearly antibolshevist. In the summer of 1943, at that time, they could not be used for actions against the German Armed Forces and only some subordinate leaders could be used for sabotage acts, but even these would have to be bribed first. The judgment of the Cetnik bands was the following: Usable, to 100% for a people's insurrection in case of a military collapse of Germany, and all Cetniks were directed against such a military collapse of Germany, and all propaganda work was directed in this direction as well. British liaison officers said the following concerning the military use of these Cetnik bands: Their opinion could be described as we regarded a hopeless undertaking. The British officers were commissioned to look after supply of weapons and ammunitions and, therefore, they had to voice an opinion concerning this. And they said the following is not uniform and is inadequate. There is not sufficient ammunition; uniforms are not available; only civilian clothes are available, and only a few bad ones at that; officers' training was insufficient, and training was insufficient, and training of the men and N.C.O's was even worse. For these reasons they stated that a military employment of the Cetniks was impossible.
Q. That, then, was the opinion and judgment of the British officers made in the summer of 1943?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, from these reports which you found in the camp of the British liaison officers could anything be seen regarding the relation between the Cetnik and the Tito units?
A. Colonel Bailey....
Q. Please spell.
A. B-A-I-L-E-Y- Bailey. Colonel Bailey was the leader of the British liaison officers. His assignment was to get the Cetniks to collaborate with the partisans. Mihajlovic, whose attitude principally was very anti-Bolshevist, resisted strongly, and he said personally to Baily that he had tried to meet him half way and said that everything would be done.
However, he instructed his subordinate leaders to show the same attitude towards the British liaison officers and to say that contact and negotiation with the Communist units will be carried out. However, he ordered the old orthodox attitude towards Bolshevism and to keep to that attitude. Under all circumstances contact between the British and the Communist was to be prevented.
Q. Witness, in the material which you captured at the time, did you find anything concerning the detailed tasks which the British liaison officers were to carry out when stationed with the bands in Serbia?
A. As far as I can recollect I have already dealt with this subject before the luncheon recess.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think that is correct, Dr. Sauter, and also some other things which at some length you have pursued.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Did you then ascertain how this activity of the British liaison officers changed towards the Cetnik units with which they were stationed?
A. In the autumn of 1943 the Commander for the Middle East issued an order stating that the British officers were to make contact with the partisans and they were to discontinue their activity with the Mihajlovic units. They were to start with their old tasks and commissions when contacting the partisans.
Q. Witness, from your activity do you know of any cases which show that the reports of the partisan units concerning German measures were exaggerated or even direct lies? And can you give us one or more examples for these facts?
A. A characteristic example was an operation which the German Armed Forces undertook for the capture of General Trifunovic--T-R-I-F-U-N-O-V-I-C, Trifunovic. He was Mihajlovic's main political man. We knew their exact station and in a larger operation which we undertook there were two to two and a half battalions. We intended to encircle Trifunovic and capture him. I participated in this operation in order to secure Trifunovic's radio station and also make sure of all the coding keys available. When we entered the village early in the morning Trifunovic had already left. This operation had been prepared by the military commanders. During the early morning hours Gruppenfuehrer Meissner appeared personally. He was the Higher SS and Police Leader.