THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Witness may proceed from the point where the Tribunal interrupted him to announce the recess.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, I asked you before the recess how it was that you met Herr von Geitner, and you told us that in 1942 you had been transferred to Serbia. Now, there is one question which I want to anticipate. When did you join the Army?
A. On the 1st of April 1933 I joined the Signal Corps IV in Potsdam.
Q. Were you a professional soldier, or were you in the reserves?
A. I was a professional soldier.
Q. And when war broke out you were still with the Army in 1939?
A. Quite.
Q. What was your rank at the time, and what was your position?
A. When war broke out I was an N.C.O. and a wireless operator at a wireless reception station.
Q. And to where were you transferred or promoted in the war?
A. In 1940 I became a Sergeant, a Feldwebel, and in the spring of 1941 I was transferred to the Front in order to become an officer with a unit serving at the Front. This unit was stationed in Athens, and there in 1942 I was promoted to Lieutenant.
Q. With what unit was that, Herr Wollny? Was it the Infantry, the Artillery, or what?
A. No, it was a Signal detachment. My exact designation was Commander of the Intercepting Units in the Southeast.
Q. And when did you go to Belgrade?
A. In May of 1942 a Signal platoon and I went to Belgrade.
Q. How long were you in charge of this platoon?
A. I stayed with that unit until December, 1943. Then I became chief of the Signal Reconnaissance Company 621. My platoon was assigned to that company. And in May, 1942 I was transferred to Finland.
Q. To Finland?
A. Yes, to Finland.
Q. Witness, did you not make a mistake there? You said just now in May, 1942 t at you had been transferred to Finland in 1942.
A. I'm sorry; I should have said in May, 1944.
Q. May, 1944? I see.
And where was that company stationed of which you were in charge?
A. Immediately in Belgrade.
Q. In Belgrade itself you mean?
A. Yes.
Q. And you yourself were in Belgrade, in other words, from May, 1942 until May, 1944?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Then you said you were in charge of a Signal platoon and later on in charge of a reconnaissance company. Can you give the Tribunal a brief description of what that unit did under your command? What were its tasks?
A. The task was monitoring. That is to say, a constant listening in on wireless communications, their deciphering, and an evaluation of what we had intercepted, and a passing on of this information to the tactical staffs.
Q. If I have understood you correctly you and your company were in charge of the whole of the wireless communications of the partisan units. You monitored those did you?
A. Yes, it was my duty to watch wireless communications between the bands under Mihajlovic, as well as Tito's partisans.
Q. Did you yourself know all the languages required, or did you have people under you who spoke those languages?
A. No, I had about twenty interpreters.
Q. And how was it that in that position you yourself came into contact with the Defendant General von Geitner?
A. In May, 1942 I had to train my unit in Belgrade, and as I was entirely independent I had to contact another unit for economic reasons.
For that reason I reported to the Signal officer above me, who was under the Military Commander Serbia, who granted me all support and economic assistance. The senior Signal officer introduced me to the then Colonel von Geitner, who was Chief of Staff, and I reported to him. I had to report orally to him and explain why I was present in Belgrade and give an idea of my duties.
Q. Now, as for the results of your intercepting wireless communications, did you report currently to the agency of the Commander in Serbia?
A. Yes, I had a fixed distribution list beyond which I was not to go. This was an OKW agency, an Army group, a military commander, and later on also the Security Service in Belgrade.
Q. Now, you and your unit, that is to say, your Signal platoon, and later on the reconnaissance company, were you subordinate to the Commander in Chief Serbia?
A. No, I was entirely independent. Only from an economic point of view was I attached to the Commander in Chief.
Q. But if I understand you correctly you had to report to the Commander for Serbia?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. To whom did you report in fact, at the office of the Commander for Serbia?
A. To the Ic, the expert working on enemy matters.
Q. Ic? The expert working on enemy matters. Did you report the results of your monitoring also to the Chief of the General Staff, to the then Colonel von Geitner, in other words?
A The channels were as follows: The T-c would pass on my results to Col. von Geitner, then I myself frequently informed Col. von Geitner, whenever I met him about the latest news.
Q Did you see Herr von Geitner very frequently during your two years in the Balkans or was it only occasionally and briefly; what can you tell us about that?
A I talked to Col. von Geitner, as he was at the time, very frequently as we were living in the immediate neighborhood, in the same street, and from a service point of view we had the same contacts.
Q Now, during those talks with Herr von Geitner did you gain precise and detailed insight to the extent that you yourself could state an opinion about his character and his way to comply with his official duties?
A I was a Lieutenant and a 1st Lieutenant at that time, and I believe that despite the difference in rank I am entitled to such an opinion.
Q Did Herr von Geitner talk to you only about service matters exclusively or did he talk to you about other matters as well, not only service matters?
A The situation in the Balkans, as it was at the time, scarcely afforded the opportunity to discuss personal matters. The enormous number of daily occurrences and the enormous flock of daily news which I had to pass on the basis of radio messages that were intercepted, entailed that he and I actually only discussed Balkan matters very frequently.
Q Did you talk to the other officers of that agency also and frequently, and did you gather from them how the other officers judged Chief of Staff von Geitner?
A Yes, I went to see the military commander daily to report to him and to hear from him whether there were any special requirements. That was how I came into frequent contact with the other officers.
Q What was your impression, witness, from your own conversations with Herr von Geitner and also from your talks with the other officers as to the character of Herr von Geitner, particularly as regards to whether or not he observed his orders, whether he was ambitious, etc.; perhaps you can tell us something about that?
A General von Geitner was a wise and considerable officer. I considered him to be a guarantee for peace and order in Serbia. His aim was to pursue well considered principles of a constructive police of reconstruction. The special condition in the Balkans led to the fact that these really noble aims were frustrated by the lower principles of the others and as far as my knowledge of Herr von Geitner goes there was no ambitious thirst for power in him. This was not one of his features. There was the petty competition amongst the various higher agencies in Serbia to be considered and also the unstable public opinion in Serbia the flourishing black market and sinster rumors or slogans. Moreover there were these partisan methods and atrocities indulged in by the partisans whatever their origins were, their complete ruthlessness in the choice of their means to achieve temporary successes. The partisans had no heart for the sufferings of the population. All this prevented any positive reconstruction work in Serbia.
Q Witness, did you from your own observations gain the impression that Col. von Weichs, as he was at the time, strictly observed his orders, particularly those coming from his commanding officer, or was it your impression that the contrary was true?
A To overstep his jurisdiction seems to me out of the question so far as Herr von Geitner is concerned, because quite automatically he would thereby have come into some conflict with the competencies of other agencies. As far as other agencies were concerned, the Plenipotentiary General for Economic Affairs for instance would immediately have complained to Goering, or in the case of Gruppenfuehrer Meissner he would have complained to Himmler immediately.
And as to his staff, Herr von Geitner was far too good a soldier to trespass his authority as far as his commanding general was concerned.
Q Witness, from your conversations with the defendant von Geitner could you gain any insight as to what von Geitner's attitude towards the Serbia people was?
AAs far as that is concerned I can quote a conversation with Herr von Geitner about the Serbian people. General von Geitner had a very high opinion of the Serbs. He regarded them as the best human material in the Balkans, as a nation as human beings and as soldiers, as well. And after all we had a Bulgarian troop with us in our area, and the Prussians of the Balkans, as they were called quite generally. We know them sufficiently. General von Geitner said that despite their unfortunate history the Serbs were the outstanding nation of the Balkans on the basis of their mental qualifications and courage and their traditions. What I said was "Generally looking at the corruption, this system of denouncing and the brutalities towards the minorities, certainly you cannot really have a high opinion of these people." But General von Geitner said I should not generalize on the basis of certain aspects. The simple ordinary people and a number among the intelligensia, whose hears we were to win for us, those elements could be called decent, honest and straightforward and nearly idealistic.
Q Witness, did you know that in the Balkans, and particularly in Serbia, reprisal measures were taken, collective punishment and things like that; did you know that?
A Yes, indeed.
Q Were you yourself involved in any such measures?
A No, I never had any part in these things.
Q You did not. I see. Do you know whether Herr von Geitner took any part in these things?
A Herr von Geitner had no part in these things. In his staff, that is to say the staff of the Military Commander in Serbia, the Commanding General was the one who had to deal with the problem as the highest Judicial authority, the then experts connected with these things 1st Lt. Dr. Bode, I knew personally, and he had to report orally to the commanding general, and it was his duty to circumvent the the Chief of Staff, that is to say he had to report to the Commanding General directly cause the Chief of Staff was not connected in any way with the reprisal measures, this task was entirely up to the highest judicial authority.
I can remember that 1st. Lt. Bode told me on one occasion that the Commanding General claimed that it was he alone who would work on these problems.
Q So you know that from your conversations with the 1st Lieutenant who, if I have understood you correctly, was the export the referent, for these matters, is that correct?
A Yes, quite.
Q Do you know that from your conversations with Herr von Geitner as well?
A I recollect that on one occasion I went to see Col. von Geitner, as he was at the time, in his office, and that 1st Lieutenant Bode came in and submitted a number of orders for signature, and that he had another folder under his arm. Col. von Geitner asked him "what have you got there?" "Those, he said," are reprisal measures, Colonel, and I am about to see the Commanding General about that." And that was about as far as the matter went.
Q Did you in any event, witness, ever talk to the Commanding General about the problem, I mean the problem who was in the Staff of the Commanding General of Serbia, who was competent to work and decide on these measures?
A No, I didn't talk with the Commanding General about these things.
Q Did you discuss this question with Herr von Geitner at any time, the question I mean whether or not he was competent for any measures of retaliation?
A No, I did not talk to General von Geitner about the competency in the whole problem of retaliation.
Q Do you know whether it was a general opinion in the Staff that reprisal measures were up to the executive power, do you know that?
A Yes, it was always the task of the Commanding General to work alone on the problem of retaliation.
Q Witness, there are orders in existence which apart from the signature of the Commanding General, show the signature and initials of the defendant von Geitner, by that I mean merely his "G", which he used as his initial; these initials are contained also on orders concerning retaliation signed by the Commanding General, how do you explain that?
A Of course I didn't see the staff sufficiently often to be in a position to say 100 per cent what the reasons were for these initials, but I do know that all orders which were dealt with through the ordinary channels and office routine that all these things went through General von Geitner's office. It may well be that General von Geitner's initials were there, but I don't know enough about the details, as to whether he is alleged to have done this and certainly had to do it, or whether he did not have to do it.
Q As far as retaliation measures were concerned and as far as Herr von Geitner's personal attitude towards this problem is concerned, did you ever talk to him about that on more than one occasion?
A On one occasion I, the Col. von Geitner and the Commanding General discussed the retaliation problem in great detail, when on one day I had intercepted a radio message from Mikajlovic, to all, that means, to all wireless stations, where he said, "Sabotage acts and attacks on German troops and signal communications, are to be reduced to a minimum because otherwise the Serbian population will be subject to reprisal measures." General von Geitner then said "at least we have achieved one success. Maybe this will stop these people and this takes a load off my mine, and I hope that at last we can discontinue the retaliation measures. "The commanding General said something more or less in the same sense, that by this deciphered message I had relieved him of a nightmare.
Q When did you intercept that particular radio message?
A In the autumn of 1942.
Q The autumn of 1942, I see. Did Herr von Geitner also tell you why he was against retaliation measures, what the reason for this was?
A Collective punishment sometimes involves innocent people, and that I think was the main argument of Herr von Geitner, and the whole problem of retaliation was always a highly delicate matter which everyone wanted to avoid.
Q Did you, witness, from your conversations with Herr von Geitner or other officers on the staff, learn anything as to whether Herr von Geitner made efforts on one occasion to discontinue such retaliation measures altogether and substitute them by court proceedings; what could you tell us about that?
A I do not know that retaliation measures were to be substituted by Court proceedings, but I do know, *. however, and this must have happened roughly in 1942 or 1943, that General von Geitner initiated Court proceedings, or rather wanted to institute Court proceedings on the basis of intercepted wireless messages.
Q Against whom?
A He wanted to pin down the actual instigators or promoters, the leading men in Serbia, he wanted to put them before a court, because from the information gained from wireless information, their guilt had been clearly established, and in that connection the really guilty would have been hit. However, these proceedings did never take place, because I was very much opposed to it as the intelligence service of Serbia and Croatia which worked so perfectly would have noticed in a very short time that we intercepted Mihajlovic's wireless communications to about 100 per cent. and at that time deciphered it almost to 100 per cent, and thereupon automatically more codes and/or codes impossible to decipher would have been introduced. This would have made my whole work highly questionable, and the reason for this was the following measure; Mihajlovic then was busy enlarging his units which plans did then only exist on paper, whereas this was not the preparation for the rising of the people in the event of German Military collapse, and he had decided that the order for the uprising was to be passed around by wireless, and it was for that reason why I said "Colonel, in my opinion the knowledge which we might obtain about a possible rising of the people is far more important than to put a few individuals before a court." In this I was supported by the signal officer with the Military Commander, and by my highest superior agency with the OKW, and also by the 1-C of the Army Group, and it was for that reason that the problem was not carried out.
Q But what was the aim which Col. von Geitner had in mind with this suggestion?
A Colonel von Geitner told me at the time if we could prevent it, we could get hold of the actual culprit.
Q And what was it he wanted to prevent on the other hand?
A I could not tell you that in detail, but it is my conviction that he wanted to save the little men with the bands and protect them against these harsh measures.
Q Witness, let us proceed about something else now. In this trial we have seen a document which is a report. This is a report, witness, by the O.K.H. General Staff of the Army, department of foreign army east, of 9 February, 1943. It was submitted as Document NOKW-1806, exhibit 539. I repeat, 1806, exhibit 539 and it is contained in volume 24 of the Prosecution on page 118 of the German edition. This is a report by the O.K.H. about the Mihajlovic movement. It is a very detailed report. I showed you the report yesterday, witness, do you remember what it said in it?
A Yes, I do indeed.
Q What can you tell the Court about the manner in which this report by the German Staff of the Army was drawn up?
A This report is something which was stolen more or less by the O.K.H. from a report compiled by me in July-August of 1942. I should say that at about that time Mihajlovic was just building up his movement and he prepared the rising in the event of a military collapse of Germany. He established his corps and brigades for that purpose and he had put area commanders in charge of the corps and he gave orders to the area commanders, as I said before, to wait for the order to rise up which was to come through the wireless. This was purely desk work and this whole organization of 52 brigades with seven or eight corps or even more was purely on paper. The whole scheme was based on the most impossible conditions and was as it were a far distant aim. Unfortunately the docu ments does not contain the maps which it should to show the mania of General Mihajlovic.
Q Witness, you say in other words that this report by the O.K.H. of 9 February 1943 has been stolen 80% to 90% from a work done by you; is that correct?
A Yes, indeed.
Q On what information did you base your work at the time?
A In June, July and August of 1942 a flock of wireless messages came in, in which the chief of staff of General Mihajlovic, General Ostojic, -- to spell it O-s-t-o-j-i-c developed, as I said, whole organization was on paper. In actual fact the D.B. movement was never built up in the way which was planned so well even from a General staff point of view. The fact was that these things which were down on paper had been born in the imagination of the officers under Mihajlovic and there they remained. I was rapped over the knuckles more than once by a number of agencies about that report because it seemed to be so exaggerated as to the strength of the movement under Mihajlovic. All I could say at the time was that it is my task to evaluate anything intercepted from Mihajlovic sources and if Mihajlovic has a plan of this sort on his mind, it is my task to inform the staffs about it. If O.K.H. should be taken in by this and should fall for these things, it simply will prove that in February of 1943 they finally copied this laboriously and passed it on as a product of their own. This is a situation as the one in the Balkans where within a week bands could almost completely dissolve and the picture change. At that time in 1943 the plan of Mihajlovic had long since been regarded as piece-meal failure by the high agencies in the Balkans. Then on top of this the O.K.H. report came in at a period of time when in other words this highly imaginative aim of Mihajlovic had become out of data for any concrete basis of action in the Balkans.
Q Witness, if I understood you correctly, you want to say this and please pay attention to what I am saying now and tell me if it is correct or not. What the report or the memorandum by the O.K.H. of 9 February 1943 says does not represent the actual strength of the Mihajlovic resistance movement at the time, but merely the plans which Mihajlovic developed in the event of Germany's collapse. Have I understood you correctly?
A Yes, indeed.
Q It is therefore possible to conclude from what the document says whether or not in the Mihajlovic movement at the time one should see a regular army in accordance with international law or would it not be possible in your opinion to conclude that? I ask you that because 80% or 90% of this memorandum is your own work.
A Of course I cannot give an expert opinion about international law, but as a soldier I am in a position to say, or at least as a soldier at the time, I can say that the whole report reflects the wishes and ideas of Mihajlovic, but it does not contain facts. Nor can one speak here of a regular army because after all there was an Armistice with Yugo Slovia and above all these people were not wearing uniforms.
Q Witness, do you know anything about the facts or do you know anything about the tendencies in the resistant movement under Mihajlovic in the autumn of 1942 and in what sense they changed in the spring of 1943; do you, on the basis of your wireless interception have reliable knowledge about that?
A In the autumn of 1942 the Mihajlovic movements started on a downward trend, because the German troops had in some cases been highly successful in their operations against them and these people were short of arms and ammunition, the troops were exhausted and they wanted to go back to their families. Then we intercepted this wireless message, which I mentioned before regarding the problems of retaliation, where Mihajlovic ordered that attacks on German troops, supply units, communication stations, etc.
, were reduced to a minimum because of the retaliation measures. In the spring of 1943 a large number of British liaison officers parachuted into the area. It was their task first of all to train the Cetnik Bands to sabotage acts; second, to find out what they needed in the way of ammunition, arms, clothes and money; third, intelligence service directed against the Wehrmacht; fourth, reports about the military and political ability of the Cetnik bands and fifth to report about the military and political situation in the Balkans.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Now, I think at this time witness we will discontinue until 1:30 o'clock.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1:30 o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, October 21, 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue.
DR. SAUTER: Before the recess you described to the Tribunal that as of April, 1943, the insurrection movement in Serbia had reached a stronger degree. You stopped when you were just about to tell us that British or other Allied fliers had parachuted down in order to support the insurgent movement. Maybe you would like to repeat your last answer so that we may better recall in which context your answer was given.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: It will not be necessary to repeat it. The Tribunal is endowed with the ordinary sense of memory. We recall distinctly what he said, so if you will start with the point where he left off and continue it will save your time and the time of the Tribunal.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, you told us that many fliers, I believe they were British ones, parachuted down in the Balkan area. Now, according to your knowledge of the conditions, can you tell us what happened to the Allied fliers?
A. These Allied, i.e. British liaison officers with Draja Mihajlovic had to carry out their missions down there. Several of those British officers and enlisted men were captured. From the date of their arrival with the Draja Mihajlovic units a stronger sabotage activity on the part of the Draja Mihajlovic bands started. Mihajlovic ordered in his radio messages that sabotage acts should be carried out. But he also ordered that the Communists or Partisans respectively should be proclaimed as the authors of the sabotage acts through posters and proclamations. Mihajlovic gave his reasons at the end of these radio messages and said that this camouflage should be effected in order to make the German Armed Forces take reprisal measures with respect to Communists.
Q. Witness, can you give us several example cases where British fliers, who had parachuted down in order to support the insurgent movements were captured by the German troops; of how many such cases do you know?
A. There were about six officers who were captured, five of them I saw myself. A number of enlisted men and non-commissioned officers were also captured and I saw those too partly. I also talked with them.
Q. What happened to these people, these English fliers?
A. After they had bean interrogated, they were made German Prisoners of War and they were sent to camps in Germany.
Q. Can you give us names of such British fliers?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. Names of some who became Prisoners of War and were sent to German to camps?
A. Before May of 1942, that was the date of arrival in Belgrade, a Captain or Major Laurence was captured. I know that from talks and reports of a number of German officers who had seen Laurence. Laurence was kept in a kind of honorary confinement at the staff of Military Commander. He took his meals in the Casino of the staff of the Military Commander. What he said impressed me deeply, it was: "Four times I have been captured by the Germans and every time I have broken out again. I can guarantee and assure you in a short time I will have disappeared again." This British officer; in spite of this statement of his, was brought to Germany into a prisoner of war camp.
In 1943 in North East Serbia, Captain Hargreaves, I will spell it, H-a-r-g-r-ea-v-e-s, was captured. He was a New Zealander. A Polish officer who was dressed in a British uniform and who had the commission to incite the Polish laborers in Bor to escape and to build up a Polish army in Yugoslavia, was shot during combat action.
Captain Hargreaves came to Belgrade and was transferred to the S.D. for interrogation and after he had been interrogated by field police officers, that is the police of the army, he was sent to Germany to a prisoner of war camp.
Q. Were you present at the interrogation of this British officer?
A. Concerning the expert questions of radio messages and radio transmissions, I myself interrogated Captain Hargreaves.
Q. Do you know of any other officers who were shot down and then transferred to Germany into Prisoner of War camps?
A. You mean fliers who were shot down; I know nothing of that. I do know of two crews of American four engine bombers who did manage to got through. There was some talk about them in a radio message, but nothing was undertaken against them. However, in Southern Serbia in the late summer of 1943 a British Captain and another officer with two or three non-commissioned officers were captured. I did not know those officers through radio interceptions, I only talked to them briefly, but I do know that they came to German and were put into prisoner of war camps.
One further case, is known to me, in late fall of 1943 or it may have been the beginning of 1944, on the occasion of a large scale operation the Tito partisans, a British liaison officer who was also a captain whom I believe was stationed with the second Tito corps was captured. I have also talked with this captain briefly and he told me the following: the corps with which he was stationed had an unwritten law saying that no Fascist prisoners were to be taken. I asked him what he had done against this unwritten law and he said that he objected against it but without success and it had only contributed to his isolation. This officer too was later made a German prisoner of war.
Q. Witness, can you give us an explanation why these officers were sent to prisoner of war camps and why the so-called commando order was not applied concerning these British officers; you know what the commando order is, don't you
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Will you please answer the question then?
A. I know the commando order for one reason, because it was mentioned in an army report and because one day I got to know of it through my own channel, that is through my regiment in Athens.
I have repeatedly inquired whether the Commando order was applicable for these offices. The then Ic, Captain of the Cavalry, Fuerst Wrede -- I spell it, W r e d e -- told me that the Commando Order was not applicable to these officers, although they trained the bands for sabotage acts and put the explosives and other means at their disposal and although they also requested supplies by air. Despite all these facts they were not treated in accordance with the Commando Order.
Q: Was the Commando order valid in the Balkans at all?
A: I don't know that, but from practical experience, I learned that apparently it was not valid.
Q: Witness, from your activity in the Balkans, do you know anything about the fact whether the partisan units of that time were considered military units in the sense of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare? I am especially interested in the fact of whether they wore uniforms, whether their insignia were recognizable from a distance, whether they carried arms openly, whether they were under one responsible leadership and other things like that. What do you know about all these facts from your own experience?
A: I would like to say the following. We have to divide up this question into two categories. There is for one thing the Mihajlovic movement and for another thing the Tito partisans. The Mihajlovic movement was led by former Jugoslav officers. They were very rarely found in uniform. The men and N.C.O's for the most part also wore no uniform. Generally, they walked around in civilian clothes; they did not wear insignia which could be seen from a larger distance. A responsible leadership they had only in part, but their discipline was not good by any means because individual parts of the bands became independent and requisitioned things and these requisitions were not always carried out in a very humane manner.