Q Please answer the question now, General.
A You see two years was a long period of time under the conditions which you have just described.
Q You yourself were an officer serving at the front, General; may I ask you for how long a period of time you were Brigadier General?
A For one year.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you very much.
DR. TIPP: (Tipp for von Leyser):
Q General, may I ask you when you met General von Leyser first?
A I met him when he came to the Southeast, and was appointed Commanding General of the 15th Mountain Corps or in any case of the corps. It must have been in October 1943.
Q Do you remember whether Field Marshal von Weichs was present or absent at the time?
A Do you mean when von Leyser arrived?
Q Yes.
A If you can help me with a few dates there.
Q It was by the end of October 1943.
AAt the end of October Field Marshal von Weichs went on a reconnaissance flight for several days.
Q You mean that Field Marshal von Weichs was not present at the time?
A Well, that is entirely possible.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to counsel leading the witness on these questions.
DR. TIPP: It is not a leading question, if the Tribunal, please. It was only to clarify the answer given by the witness.
A I don't know what you are getting at, but at that time I and General von Leyser had a talk when he reported to the Commander in Chief, I know that he talked to him for sometime and that he and I had lunch together, and I also seem to remember that von Weichs was not present, because we drank a nice bottle of wins together.
Q Now, that is exactly what I wanted to hear from you, witness. Can you tell us briefly how you introduced von Leyser into his new sphere of tasks, in order to specify my question; how did you describe to him the tasks he would have to contend with?
A I can't give you details, and all I can do is give you a description of the tasks which the Corps had to settle at the time. The main problems at the time were the anxieties confronting us with a possible invasion in the area where the corps was settled, because in Italy, the allied occupation kept creeping up higher and higher, and that constituted a constantly growing threat to our northern area. I am quite sure that at that time I described that part of the picture as a decisive one. I probably said the main task of the group was to prepare themselves to fight an invasion, but surely we also discussed the guerilla situation in large lines.
Q Do you recall what you told von Leyser about the guerilla fighting and also how to combat the guerillas at the time?
A I am afraid I didn't say anything about that. I did probably -
DR. TIP: My attention has just been called to the fact that the interpreter must have misheard me when I talked about the over-all band situation, and he translated the guerilla situation in Russia.
Q You couldn't tell us, witness, could you, whether you gave details about the guerilla situation to General von Leyser?
A Well, probably I told him that because of the main task of defending the coast, the combating of guerillas was particularly important.
Q Another point, witness, on direct examination you talked about labor allocation and transfer of the civilian population to Germany. Let me ask you a particular question about that concerning the 15th Corps; was the 15th Corps connected with labor allocation of civilian population and transfer of civilian population to Germany?
A No, these were territorial tasks in the Croatian area, and they were to be dealt with by the Croatian Government, and as far as the German assistance want, it was given by General von Glaese, who was Plenipotentiary General.
Q The 1st Cossack division has already been mentioned, let me ask you, who commanded that division?
A When I was there General Pannwitz.
Q Can you tell me briefly about General von Pannwitz?
AAbout the sort of man he was?
Q Briefly about the way he reported.
A I saw General von Pannwitz twice, once when he reported -perhaps three times. He always came to our headquarters in Belgrade. I can not give you a really well-founded judgment about him. No doubt he was an efficient soldier. I believe you remember that at the time he already had the Oak leaves, but he was showing off a little. He was a bit boastful, but I wish to emphasize that this is an opinion I am giving with mental reservation, because I did not really know him.
Q To clarify one point, General von Pannwitz was a German officer?
A Yes, he was a German general.
DR. TIPP: I have no further questions.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess for 15 minutes.
(Thereupon a recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Are there any further questions for the defense?
BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for the defendant von Geitner):
Q. Witness, in one of the previous sessions here a document, concerning the activities cf the defendant Geitner was submitted. That is document NOKW 704 and is contained in document bock 7 of the prosecution on page 10. The document concerns itself with the qualifications of General von Geitner. To begin with let me read to you the recommendation which von Geitner received on 1 March 1943 from his Commander General Bader. And then I shall read the recommendation which you gave him on the same day. On 1 March 1943 General Bader, who at that time was Commander in Servia, writes the following concerning General von Geitner:
"Especial valuable individual, straightforward, open, energetic, intelligent and comprehensive knowledge. National Socialist and General Staff officer of the old school, familar with the present principles through private study and practice. Great conscientious working force, with practical sense. Physically tough, possesses endurance. Adapted for commander." Then we have a few abbreviations, there is a F - s g - a, then we have, "A soldierly bearing. Above average. Adapted also for Chief of Staff of a regular corps." So much for what General Bader has to say for him and I beg the tribunal to pay particular attention to the last sentence of it.
The chief of Army Group E, General Foertsch, writes the following:
"Completely in agreement. Excellent Chief of Staff. Indispensable at the present time for Serbia."
This, witness, is the judgment about General von Geitner, which you yourself wrote on 1 March 1943. Now the following interests me in this connection; If the defendant von Geitner was at the time regarded as qualified as a chief of a regular corps and if he had become chief of a regular corps, would his official position have been improved?
A. That cannot be answered with just "yes" or "no". He personally would have had an easier time and it all depends on where such a corps would have been committed. More important and more responsibility concerning the total events was his work in Serbia.
Q. The assignment as chief of a regular corps; would that have been regarded by the Wehrmacht as a kind of promotion?
A. In view of the fact that von Geitner had been retired permanently, yes.
Q. Do you know whether General Von Geitner at the time endeavored to reach such an assignment; what I mean is did he desire to get away from Serbia and instead become chief of staff of a regular corps?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. And how did you know that?
A. I believe I remember that we discussed these things.
Q. You and Herr von Geitner?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I am interested in the following; why did you object to this reason of General von Geitner and instead wrote indispensable for Serbia, at the present time. Can you tell us for what reasons and in what capacity he was indispensable for Serbia at the time?
A. Indispensable of course is exaggerated, because of course, everyone can be replaced.
Q. Yes.
A. But, if I may refer back to your previous question. Anybody could be chief of staff in a regular corps, however. In the complex and difficult situation in Serbia it was much harder to find such a reasonable and keen man in every way and such a considerate person as von Geitner as a chief of staff. He was especially suitable as chief in this situation and I want to partly explain . . . . . .
Q. A little slower, maybe you want to repeat your last sentence.
A. What I want to express is that just in that situation, I believe you said the spring of 1943?
Q. It was on 1 March 1943.
A. At that time I did not think it desirable to effect a change in the position of the Chief of Staff. That was doubtlessly also an egotittic reason of mine. I did not by ant means desire to spoil any other assignment for him.
Q. Witness, in some connection the term "a man who believed in stringent measures" was mentioned here. I think through your previous answer you have already explained your attitude concerning this word, but still I would like to ask you to tell us briefly whether von Geitner, because of his activities in Serbia, can in any way be regarded as such an individual and what experiences there did you have with him in your capacity as his superior?
A. He was not a man who wanted to use force. He was just the contrary.
Q. On the basis of your own observations and discussions with Herr von Geitner and also through your personal insight in his official capacity and an his tendencies did you gain the impression that von Geitner took up the interests of the Serbian population to a special strong degree?
A. I am convinced of this to the fullest extent and I know that he was regarded by the OKW as a particular friend of the Serbs.
Q. Witness, you have told us something about the structure and the organization of your staff, I would now be interested to know the following; is it correct that the staff of the commander for Serbia was on the whole organized on the same principles as yours?
A. The command staff at the head of which von Geitner was, yes. It was organized in the same way, but the organization was different inasmuch as in Serbia there was next to the command staff an administrative staff which had its own chief and von Geitner had nothing to do with this, except the necessary contact between the two staffs.
In this respect the two staffs were differently organized because in my staff we had no such thing as an administrative staff.
Q. Geitner was therefore only in charge of the command staff?
A. Geitner was only incharge of the command staff.
Q. Is it correct that this command staff was responsible for the training, leading, supplying and orientation of the troops; it had nothing to do with the administrative matters which were under the administrative staff?
A. That is correct.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: In putting the questions, I think Dr. Sauter can ask what the duties of the command staff and what the duties of the administrative staff were, but he should not lead the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is possibly somewhat leading, but we will permit the answer.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, you have already told us what the defendant von Geitner had nothing to do with the so-called administrative staff; it is known to you on the basis of your own experiences in Serbia that besides the operational staff of Geitner's and besides the administrative staff, which you have just mentioned, there were other organizations at the office of the military commander for Serbia, which however were quite outside the sphere of influence for Geitner.
A.Yes.
Q. And which were they?
A. They were the plenipotentiary for economy; Neuhausen, then there was the higher SS police leader Meissner.
Q. And then another plenipotentiary was supposed to have been down there, who also had nothing to do with the chief of staff Geitner?
A. Do you mean in the staff of the commander?
Q. For foreign affairs?
A. There was a German ambassador, but he existed next to the Commander and he was by no means subordinate to the commander, therefore, one can in no way say that he was subordinate to the chief of the command staff.
Q. Witness, how did the defendant von Geitner deal with this manifold organization? When discussing it with you did he consider this organization a good solution or did he complain about it, did he complain about lack of organization, etc.; do you know anything about that?
A. He frequently and justifiably complained about bad organization but this bad organization was no fault of his and no fault of his commander nor any fault of the commander in chief Southeast. I know that applications were made repeatedly in order to clarify these involved conditions but I think it was the principle of the time not to clarify certains things deliberately.
Q. From your own experience do you happen to know, witness, what was the attitude of the defendant von Geitner particularly toward the Higher SS and Police Leader Meissner in Serbia whom you have mentioned previously?
A. He thought badly of him. Geitner made use of every opportunity. to achieve a change in this position.
Q. And what did Geitner say concerning the activities and competency of this Higher SS and Police leader; what were his complaints?
A. The decisive factor was that the Higher SS and Police leader received his factual directives immediately from Himmler and did not receive his directives via the military commander. As far as I can judge now I am sure he did not always inform the commander either of what his directives were, therefore this was a parallel channel.
Q. You mean there were several channels existing next to one another other than the CiC's channel, that of the higher SS leader existed next to it and the higher SS leader got his directives from Himmler; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, do you remember that because of these repeated complaints of Geitner, General Loehr, by reason of oral report of Geitner, decided to bring up this matter in the Fuehrer headquarters and to demand a change in the conditions as they prevailed.
Supposedly that was after an oral report of Geitner's concerning these questions toward the end of August 1942?
A. Yes, I remember that very well indeed.
Q. Did General Loehr make any personal representations to Hitler in the Fuehrer headquarters regarding these matters as far as you know?
A. I know that around that time General Loehr was present in Hitler's headquarters and I know that he reported a number of questions and among them the question of the organization of Serbia.
Q. Is it known to you whether General Loehr succeeded and did General Loehr tell you what a strange answer he received from Hitler?
A. He had no success at all of course because nothing was changed and the answer which was given particularly concerning the conditions in Serbia and which was probably given by Hitler himself was essentially, "They should try and get on."
Q. Hitler is supposed to have said literally, "Just tell them they should try and get on?"
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, on the occasion of your direct examination you described to us the relation between the commander and his chief of staff. From your own observation did you gain the impression that Herr von Geitner, during his activities as chief of staff in Serbia remained within his authority correct; what I mean is did he report all masters of importance to the commander which was proper -- did he apply for his consent or did you on the other hand gain the reverse impression that Geitner exceeded his authority in order to gain power for himself.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I don't see how General Foertsch would know what happened between Geitner as chief of staff and General Bader, I believe he is incompetent to answer the question
DR. SAUTER: I anticipated this objection so to speak by asking the witness what is known to him from his own observations and impressions. I assume that the witness, who was chief of staff with the troops, can assume certain facts from discussions with Geitner and from discussions with his commander and that thus he would be informed about certain facts. If he is not informed, then he can say so.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: There is not objection to the interrogation of the witness on this subject, the effective question is much too involved to get a definite answer. I sustain the objection.
DR. SAUTER: May I ask if the objection is sustained?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Yes, I have suggested that you ask him shorter questions so he can give more direct answers.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, did the commanders of General von Geitner make any remarks to you concerning the question whether Herr von Geitner attempted to create a position of power for himself or did they on the other hand make remarks that he was a particularly quiet and correct chief of staff in his relationship with his commander?
A. The relation between the commander and his chief Geitner I am in a position to judge precisely on the basis of observations I made during two years. Geitner is completely correct. I might almost say he is more than correct and he always remained within the limitations of his position.
Q Witness, I would now like to touch upon another question: are you informed and can you tell us anything concerning the strength of the German occupation troops in Serbia?
A I have made a compilation for myself which gives the strength from the 1st of October 1942, then for the time of the 1st of October 1943, one year later, and then for the time from the 1st of January 1944.
Q Can you tell us now how strong the German occupation forces were and whether their size and quality changed, whether it increased or decreased?
A Concerning the strength of the units in Serbia, I am not in a position to give you any concrete statements but I know that our forces in Serbia did not increase but, that generally speaking, they decreased.
Q What you just said, does that apply merely to the numerical strength of the German occupation troops or does it also apply to their quality? In other words, the troops committed in Serbia, did they deteriate in the course of time with regard to their fighting value?
A They did not deteriate but the total situation in the Southeast forced us again and again to effect changes in the total area. We had to create troop concentrations in all those districts where the enemy situation demanded it. That, of course, lead to temporary weaknesses in other districts through replacement of regiments who were more suitable for combat by worse amounts. Seen on a large scale, Serbia frequently suffered under this scheme because as of the date with which your question is concerned the situation was more dangerous in other parts-- in Croatia, it was more dangerous for instance, than it was in Serbia. Therefore, generally speaking, if I understand your question correctly, I can affirm it.
Q Now, onelast question, witness. Is it your opinion that the increase of surprise attacks and sabotage acts was effected as of April 1943 and that it could be traced back to the decrease of German and Bulgarian occupation troops in Serbia?
A that was the unavoidable consequence.
Q This consequence decrease of the occupation troops and of their quality, - was that pointed out by Geitner at the occasion of various discussions and did he apply for a change in this condition?
A That was done all the time.
Q All the Time.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, I have no further questions to put to the witness, I thank you.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW (Counsel for defendant Felmy):
Q General, just one short question: General Felmy as of June 1941 up until August 1942 was Commander for Southern Greece; my question was the Commander of the fortress Crete subordinate to the Commander for Southern Greece and if he was to what extent?
A The Commander of Crete was subordinate until the summer of 1943, I believe, to the Commander for Southern Greece, but the subordination was rather a loose one and I might call it a formal one. In tactical respects, he was completely independent as Commander of Crete. Concerning administrative matters he had his own agencies. He exercised executive power himself. Therefore, the Commander for Southern Greece for all practical purposes had no influence on Crete, and did not exercise it. Only in one sphere was the contact rather close and that was in the question of supply. In that respect Crete, too was completely dependent on the area of Southern Greece. I know that at the time we created an organizational solution with coped with the situation as described by me. We created a Supply Staff Southern Greece, which was lead by the Chief of Staff of General Felmy. I believe immediately after Loehr arrived this whole situation resulted in the Commander of Crete being then subordinated immediately to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Concerning the supply to Crete, Southern Greece remained responsible.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I think you. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Is there any further questions on the part of the defense? If not, you may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Foertsch, I get the impression from your direct testimony that, quoting Shakespeare, the fault was not so much with the generals in the Southeast as it was with OKW in Berlin, am I correct?
A The fight with the OKW took up a lot of time.
Q I get the impression also that you and Field Marshal List, General Kuntze and Field Marshal Weichs were almost like marionettes dangling at the end of strings pulled by the evil tyrants in Berlin, Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. Is that correct?
A The expression, "marionettes", is not correct.
Q But you were powerless to do anything about these orders which you received from Berlin, weren't you? You could protest but that was all?
A One could protest and in individual cases one could mitigate a number of things in individual cases.
Q But if you were discovered softening the orders of OKW there would he evid consequences for you, wouldn't there?
A That could have occurred, yes.
Q And Hitler had a lot of spys in the Southeast watching your every action all the time; he had the SS; Goering was there with his 4-year-plan; Himmler's agents were around all over; they would have discovered every attempt by you to circumvent OKW orders, wouldn't they?
A They wouldn't have discovered everything, no.
Q Do you suppose Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, if they were living today would have a different opinion as to where the blame and responsibility for the disaster of the German troops in the Southeast lay? Do you suppose they would agree with your conclusions?
A I beg your pardon. May I make a request? Would you just put one question at a time so I can answer it? Just now two questions were put to mo and owing to the translation I find it difficult to concentrate on those questions and memorize them. Could you possibly repeat the last question, please, the first question, please?
Q. I asked whether you believed that Hitler, Keitel, and Lidl-if they were living today--would indorse your conclusions as to where the blame and the responsibility lie for the disaster which the German troops suffered in the Southeast from 1941 to 1944.
A. I'm afraid I didn't understand it. Before the siren sounded I believe the question was put differently than it is being put now.
Q. Well, suppose you answer the one I just put now.
A. That's just the one which I didn't understand, the one which was just put to me. The previous one was a little clearer, and I would be grateful if you would repeat again.
Q. I'd like to know whether you believe that Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, all of whom are now dead as you know, would agree with you that the blame and the responsibility for the disaster of the German troops in the Southeast was theirs and theirs alone, and not that of the generals in the Southeast from 1941 to 1944.
A. That is a hypothetical question, and I don't believe, since I am under oath, that I can answer it. All I can testify to is what the facts were at the time, but I don't think I can testify to what would be the case if Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl were alive today. But I believe I have clearly expressed the contrasting opinions between my Commander-in-Chief and the three persons you mentioned, who are not alive today.
Q. You've cast a lot of blame, General Foertsch, upon Thurner, upon Himmler, upon Goering, upon Ribbentrop's Foreign Office. They interfered with you in the Southeast, and made your task very difficult. Where are those men today--Thurner, Himmler, Goering, and Ribbenthorp?
A. I do not know where Thurner is; Himmler committed suicide; Goering was killed--not through me; Ribbentrop was killed too.
Q. General Foertsch, I get the impression that OKW was issuing a lot of senseless orders from Berlin to you in the Southeast. They were far removed from your problems and didn't understand them, but you had to carry them out because you had the responsibility of an inferior to obey the orders of a superior command.
Is that correct?
A. First, of all I must correct something. I did not carry any responsibility for events in the Southeast. It was my Commander-inChief who did so. The commander-in-Chief was bound to the orders which Hitler issued, or to orders which came from the Chief of the OKW on Hitler's behalf.
Q. These orders were senseless for the most part weren't they?
A. They weren't all senseless, no. I don't think "senseless" is the correct expression in any case. There were some orders which we did not understand from our own inward attitude, and we opposed them. Whether an order is senseless or not is a question which has to be considered from two sides.
Q. Didn't you say that the orders which came down from the OKW represented a misunderstanding of your problems in the Southeast?
A. The orders could not have expressed such a misunderstanding. I have always regretted that the understanding for the problems of the Southeast, in the Reich, and especially with the decisive authorities, was not adequate and, therefore, the effect which this insufficient understanding had did not correspond with the situation.
Q. I understood you to say that the orders of OKW made your problems worse. They aggravated the situation.
A. Hot all orders.
Q. Well, lot's get specific. Suppose we take the Keitel communication of the 16th of September 1942. Did that make matters worse or were you glad to receive that order?
A. First of all, I will answer the second part of the question. We were not glad to receive the order.
Q. Why not?
A. I have repeatedly explained that in direct-examination. The situation was always made worse through the attitude of the population and through the behavior of the bands.
Q. And then the population, and not the OKW, is to blame for the dire situation you faced for three years in the Southeast?
A. Primarily it's the fault of the population; that is quite obvious, because that was the primary basis.
Q. And the orders which OKW sent down were of no help?
A. Help for what?
Q. They didn't help you in your pacification measures; you opposed these orders, General Foertsch?
A. When the order of the 16th of September arrived I was not present and I cannot describe the immediate situation and the atmosphere at that time.
Q. What I want to know, General Foertsch, is why you protested against these many orders that come down from Berlin. What were your reasons?
A. I cannot answer that question generally. The orders were of a varied nature. And they were also received differently by the Supreme Commander of the area. There were some orders to which we did not object, and then there were some orders to which we did object. And then there were orders again to which we objected for a large variety of reasons.
Q. General Foertsch, you must know by now that we are only concerned with certain basic orders which came down from Berlin. We're concerned with the 16th of September 1941 order, concerned with the order of about 3rd or 4th of February 1942, and other orders of a similar nature. I believe you have testified that you were displeased at the receipt of those orders. And you have not yet told me specifically why those orders displeased you.
A. It's correct that we were displeased with the orders.
Q. And can you tell me why?
A. I can only do that in regard to every individual case. Things can be only understood and seen in relation to the situation and the period.
I cannot answer such a question generally.
Q. Dell, suppose we take the period of Field Marshal List, first, and specifically the order of the 16th of September 1941. Why were you opposed to that order which fixed a quota of from 50 to 100 to 1 for each German soldier who was killed?
A. I personally would have preferred that that order had not come in at all, for considerations of principles which I have already mentioned here. Those considerations were that insurrections and unrest in the country could be better counteracted by Military measures and the commitment of military units.
Q. You felt then that that order was not a military necessity?
A. That's not what I mean by this.
Q. Well now, General Foertsch,/.....
A. I can only repeat what I have basically stated. Reprisal measures, and that is what we are concerned with in the order of the 16th of September 1941, was a consequence of the behavior of the population. That is a reaction to an (illegal) action.
Q. General Foertsch, I can't understand why you would be opposed to an order which you deemed to be necessary to carry out your tasks.
A. One cannot express it that way. It's not all that simple. I have said that in my opinion reprisals were not desired but unavoidable.
Q. You would have preferred to have more troops than to have orders in that way?
A. Yes, without any doubt.
Q. Do you believe that the basic orders which you received from OKW, and I mean by that the orders with which we are concerned in this trial, were all necessary for you to carry out your military pacification tasks?
A. The orders I cannot judge altogether hero. One has to consider every order individually in relation to the period when it was issued, in relation to the person who issued the order, and in relation to the total situation when the order was issued.
Q. General Foertsch, we have seen excerpts from many of your letters which you have written to your wife, covering the whole period of time from 1941 to 1944, and in almost each letter you complain about the stupidity in Berlin. Do you mean by Berlin's stupidity the orders which they sent down to you?
A. They were not only orders. There were a number of telephone conversations, for instance, which I had. I heard a lot. But it was the total attitude of the persons mentioned and it was the inadequate-at least in my opinion--understanding for our situation.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We'll recess until 1:30.
(The Court recessed.)