DR. SAUTER: I anticipated this objection so to speak by asking the witness what is known to him from his own observations and impressions. I assume that the witness, who was chief of staff with the troops, can assume certain facts from discussions with Geitner and from discussions with his commander and that thus he would be informed about certain facts. If he is not informed, then he can say so.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: There is not objection to the interrogation of the witness on this subject, the effective question is much too involved to get a definite answer. I sustain the objection.
DR. SAUTER: May I ask if the objection is sustained?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Yes, I have suggested that you ask him shorter questions so he can give more direct answers.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, did the commanders of General von Geitner make any remarks to you concerning the question whether Herr von Geitner attempted to create a position of power for himself or did they on the other hand make remarks that he was a particularly quiet and correct chief of staff in his relationship with his commander?
A. The relation between the commander and his chief Geitner I am in a position to judge precisely on the basis of observations I made during two years. Geitner is completely correct. I might almost say he is more than correct and he always remained within the limitations of his position.
Q Witness, I would now like to touch upon another question: are you informed and can you tell us anything concerning the strength of the German occupation troops in Serbia?
A I have made a compilation for myself which gives the strength from the 1st of October 1942, then for the time of the 1st of October 1943, one year later, and then for the time from the 1st of January 1944.
Q Can you tell us now how strong the German occupation forces were and whether their size and quality changed, whether it increased or decreased?
A Concerning the strength of the units in Serbia, I am not in a position to give you any concrete statements but I know that our forces in Serbia did not increase but, that generally speaking, they decreased.
Q What you just said, does that apply merely to the numerical strength of the German occupation troops or does it also apply to their quality? In other words, the troops committed in Serbia, did they deteriate in the course of time with regard to their fighting value?
A They did not deteriate but the total situation in the Southeast forced us again and again to effect changes in the total area. We had to create troop concentrations in all those districts where the enemy situation demanded it. That, of course, lead to temporary weaknesses in other districts through replacement of regiments who were more suitable for combat by worse amounts. Seen on a large scale, Serbia frequently suffered under this scheme because as of the date with which your question is concerned the situation was more dangerous in other parts-- in Croatia, it was more dangerous for instance, than it was in Serbia. Therefore, generally speaking, if I understand your question correctly, I can affirm it.
Q Now, onelast question, witness. Is it your opinion that the increase of surprise attacks and sabotage acts was effected as of April 1943 and that it could be traced back to the decrease of German and Bulgarian occupation troops in Serbia?
A that was the unavoidable consequence.
Q This consequence decrease of the occupation troops and of their quality, - was that pointed out by Geitner at the occasion of various discussions and did he apply for a change in this condition?
A That was done all the time.
Q All the Time.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, I have no further questions to put to the witness, I thank you.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW (Counsel for defendant Felmy):
Q General, just one short question: General Felmy as of June 1941 up until August 1942 was Commander for Southern Greece; my question was the Commander of the fortress Crete subordinate to the Commander for Southern Greece and if he was to what extent?
A The Commander of Crete was subordinate until the summer of 1943, I believe, to the Commander for Southern Greece, but the subordination was rather a loose one and I might call it a formal one. In tactical respects, he was completely independent as Commander of Crete. Concerning administrative matters he had his own agencies. He exercised executive power himself. Therefore, the Commander for Southern Greece for all practical purposes had no influence on Crete, and did not exercise it. Only in one sphere was the contact rather close and that was in the question of supply. In that respect Crete, too was completely dependent on the area of Southern Greece. I know that at the time we created an organizational solution with coped with the situation as described by me. We created a Supply Staff Southern Greece, which was lead by the Chief of Staff of General Felmy. I believe immediately after Loehr arrived this whole situation resulted in the Commander of Crete being then subordinated immediately to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Concerning the supply to Crete, Southern Greece remained responsible.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I think you. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Is there any further questions on the part of the defense? If not, you may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Foertsch, I get the impression from your direct testimony that, quoting Shakespeare, the fault was not so much with the generals in the Southeast as it was with OKW in Berlin, am I correct?
A The fight with the OKW took up a lot of time.
Q I get the impression also that you and Field Marshal List, General Kuntze and Field Marshal Weichs were almost like marionettes dangling at the end of strings pulled by the evil tyrants in Berlin, Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. Is that correct?
A The expression, "marionettes", is not correct.
Q But you were powerless to do anything about these orders which you received from Berlin, weren't you? You could protest but that was all?
A One could protest and in individual cases one could mitigate a number of things in individual cases.
Q But if you were discovered softening the orders of OKW there would he evid consequences for you, wouldn't there?
A That could have occurred, yes.
Q And Hitler had a lot of spys in the Southeast watching your every action all the time; he had the SS; Goering was there with his 4-year-plan; Himmler's agents were around all over; they would have discovered every attempt by you to circumvent OKW orders, wouldn't they?
A They wouldn't have discovered everything, no.
Q Do you suppose Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, if they were living today would have a different opinion as to where the blame and responsibility for the disaster of the German troops in the Southeast lay? Do you suppose they would agree with your conclusions?
A I beg your pardon. May I make a request? Would you just put one question at a time so I can answer it? Just now two questions were put to mo and owing to the translation I find it difficult to concentrate on those questions and memorize them. Could you possibly repeat the last question, please, the first question, please?
Q. I asked whether you believed that Hitler, Keitel, and Lidl-if they were living today--would indorse your conclusions as to where the blame and the responsibility lie for the disaster which the German troops suffered in the Southeast from 1941 to 1944.
A. I'm afraid I didn't understand it. Before the siren sounded I believe the question was put differently than it is being put now.
Q. Well, suppose you answer the one I just put now.
A. That's just the one which I didn't understand, the one which was just put to me. The previous one was a little clearer, and I would be grateful if you would repeat again.
Q. I'd like to know whether you believe that Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, all of whom are now dead as you know, would agree with you that the blame and the responsibility for the disaster of the German troops in the Southeast was theirs and theirs alone, and not that of the generals in the Southeast from 1941 to 1944.
A. That is a hypothetical question, and I don't believe, since I am under oath, that I can answer it. All I can testify to is what the facts were at the time, but I don't think I can testify to what would be the case if Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl were alive today. But I believe I have clearly expressed the contrasting opinions between my Commander-in-Chief and the three persons you mentioned, who are not alive today.
Q. You've cast a lot of blame, General Foertsch, upon Thurner, upon Himmler, upon Goering, upon Ribbentrop's Foreign Office. They interfered with you in the Southeast, and made your task very difficult. Where are those men today--Thurner, Himmler, Goering, and Ribbenthorp?
A. I do not know where Thurner is; Himmler committed suicide; Goering was killed--not through me; Ribbentrop was killed too.
Q. General Foertsch, I get the impression that OKW was issuing a lot of senseless orders from Berlin to you in the Southeast. They were far removed from your problems and didn't understand them, but you had to carry them out because you had the responsibility of an inferior to obey the orders of a superior command.
Is that correct?
A. First, of all I must correct something. I did not carry any responsibility for events in the Southeast. It was my Commander-inChief who did so. The commander-in-Chief was bound to the orders which Hitler issued, or to orders which came from the Chief of the OKW on Hitler's behalf.
Q. These orders were senseless for the most part weren't they?
A. They weren't all senseless, no. I don't think "senseless" is the correct expression in any case. There were some orders which we did not understand from our own inward attitude, and we opposed them. Whether an order is senseless or not is a question which has to be considered from two sides.
Q. Didn't you say that the orders which came down from the OKW represented a misunderstanding of your problems in the Southeast?
A. The orders could not have expressed such a misunderstanding. I have always regretted that the understanding for the problems of the Southeast, in the Reich, and especially with the decisive authorities, was not adequate and, therefore, the effect which this insufficient understanding had did not correspond with the situation.
Q. I understood you to say that the orders of OKW made your problems worse. They aggravated the situation.
A. Hot all orders.
Q. Well, lot's get specific. Suppose we take the Keitel communication of the 16th of September 1942. Did that make matters worse or were you glad to receive that order?
A. First of all, I will answer the second part of the question. We were not glad to receive the order.
Q. Why not?
A. I have repeatedly explained that in direct-examination. The situation was always made worse through the attitude of the population and through the behavior of the bands.
Q. And then the population, and not the OKW, is to blame for the dire situation you faced for three years in the Southeast?
A. Primarily it's the fault of the population; that is quite obvious, because that was the primary basis.
Q. And the orders which OKW sent down were of no help?
A. Help for what?
Q. They didn't help you in your pacification measures; you opposed these orders, General Foertsch?
A. When the order of the 16th of September arrived I was not present and I cannot describe the immediate situation and the atmosphere at that time.
Q. What I want to know, General Foertsch, is why you protested against these many orders that come down from Berlin. What were your reasons?
A. I cannot answer that question generally. The orders were of a varied nature. And they were also received differently by the Supreme Commander of the area. There were some orders to which we did not object, and then there were some orders to which we did object. And then there were orders again to which we objected for a large variety of reasons.
Q. General Foertsch, you must know by now that we are only concerned with certain basic orders which came down from Berlin. We're concerned with the 16th of September 1941 order, concerned with the order of about 3rd or 4th of February 1942, and other orders of a similar nature. I believe you have testified that you were displeased at the receipt of those orders. And you have not yet told me specifically why those orders displeased you.
A. It's correct that we were displeased with the orders.
Q. And can you tell me why?
A. I can only do that in regard to every individual case. Things can be only understood and seen in relation to the situation and the period.
I cannot answer such a question generally.
Q. Dell, suppose we take the period of Field Marshal List, first, and specifically the order of the 16th of September 1941. Why were you opposed to that order which fixed a quota of from 50 to 100 to 1 for each German soldier who was killed?
A. I personally would have preferred that that order had not come in at all, for considerations of principles which I have already mentioned here. Those considerations were that insurrections and unrest in the country could be better counteracted by Military measures and the commitment of military units.
Q. You felt then that that order was not a military necessity?
A. That's not what I mean by this.
Q. Well now, General Foertsch,/.....
A. I can only repeat what I have basically stated. Reprisal measures, and that is what we are concerned with in the order of the 16th of September 1941, was a consequence of the behavior of the population. That is a reaction to an (illegal) action.
Q. General Foertsch, I can't understand why you would be opposed to an order which you deemed to be necessary to carry out your tasks.
A. One cannot express it that way. It's not all that simple. I have said that in my opinion reprisals were not desired but unavoidable.
Q. You would have preferred to have more troops than to have orders in that way?
A. Yes, without any doubt.
Q. Do you believe that the basic orders which you received from OKW, and I mean by that the orders with which we are concerned in this trial, were all necessary for you to carry out your military pacification tasks?
A. The orders I cannot judge altogether hero. One has to consider every order individually in relation to the period when it was issued, in relation to the person who issued the order, and in relation to the total situation when the order was issued.
Q. General Foertsch, we have seen excerpts from many of your letters which you have written to your wife, covering the whole period of time from 1941 to 1944, and in almost each letter you complain about the stupidity in Berlin. Do you mean by Berlin's stupidity the orders which they sent down to you?
A. They were not only orders. There were a number of telephone conversations, for instance, which I had. I heard a lot. But it was the total attitude of the persons mentioned and it was the inadequate-at least in my opinion--understanding for our situation.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We'll recess until 1:30.
(The Court recessed.)
AFTERNOON SESSION The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, October 17, 1947.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
HERMANN FOERTSCH - Resumed CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Foertsch, prior to the luncheon recess I had asked you whether you considered the orders of OKW to be necessary from a military standpoint for the carrying out of your tasks in the Southeast, and you asked me, as I recall, to be specific about the OKW orders. I would like to ask you now whether you considered the Keitel Order of 16th September 1941 to have been necessary from a military standpoint?
A. Hitler, by whose order this decree was issued, certainly considered that it was necessary from a military point of view.
Q. Did you in the Southeast, consider that you needed an order of that kind in order to carry out you tasks?
A. I can only give you my personal opinion in this respect.
Q. Can you not also give me the opinion of your Commander-in-Chief at that time---Field Marshal List?
A. No. After all, I did not discuss that question with him. When I returned the order had already been issued.
Q. Didn't you ask List what his opinions were about that order? It was, after all, a very basic one.
A. It is probable that the Field Marshal discussed the matter with me. I cannot recall having had such a discussion, however, with him.
Q. Well, what is your personal opinion then as to the military necessity for the Keitel Order?
A. My personal opinion of that time I can't give you precisely any more today.
Q. You don't remember whether you felt that that order was necessary in order to accomplish the pacification of the Southeast at that time?
A. I recall what my over-all opinion, at that time, of retaliation measures was, and as far as I can recall it from that time I have testified about it already in my direct examination.
Q. Can you tell me again what your opinion was regarding the military necessity for that order?
A. No, I did not speak about the military necessity of this order, but I expressed my opinion with regard to the question of the necessity for retaliation measures. If I can recall correctly, I expressed myself to the effect that in view of the behavior of the population of the occupied territories I considered retaliation measures to be very unpleasant, but that they were inevitable.
Q. Did you consider that order of the 16th of September 1941 to have been necessary from a military standpoint, General Foertsch.
A. From a military point of view it was necessary insofar as reprisals became military necessities.
Q. You would say, then, that that order was necessary from a military standpoint?
A. According to my personal judgment which, however, at that time was not of any importance, the formulation of this order --in this form-was not according to my taste.
Q. Which part of the order did you mean was not according to your taste?
A. In order to answer to this specific question I would have to read over this order once more. However, under oath I cannot precisely tell you any more today just what my opinion was about the subject at the time. After all I can only remember this whole thing very vaguely.
Q. Did the hostage quota meet with your approval--the quota that was mentioned in that order?
A. I also gave my opinion about that in my direct-examination.
Q. Can you do so again?
A. In essence, yes. I stated that the fixing of hostage ratios for certain areas and at certain times--please, I would like to correct myself completely. I stated that the fixing of retaliation ratios can be made with regard to certain areas and at certain periods, and in most areas it can be used as a warning to the population and be most effective for that purpose.
Q. There was no limitation either of area or if time in that order, was there, General Foertsch?
A. As far as I can recall, no time limitations were given in that order.
Q. And to that extent you disagreed and were displeased with the order?
A. No. If you are trying to find a contradiction here with regard to my opinion as expressed then, of course I do not agree with that.
Q. You approved did you, General Foertsch, of the hostage quotas' being fixed in that order except for the fact that you had misgivings about its non-limitation regarding time?
A. Well, I have already said that the fixing of certain ratios I considered above all as a possibly effective warning to the population. And I considered that appropriate. It could be appropriate at certain occasions.
Q. But there were no limitations either of time or area in that order, General Foertsch. And I would like to know whether you approved of that order or not.
A. No, after all, such a limitation could not be made by the OKW. It was stated here, if I can remember correctly, that order was to be applied generally. I don't know whether this is correct, but I believe it stated there that that order was to be applied generally. And the general application of that order in itself is a refutation of a certain fixing of a time limit.
Q. And that's what you disapproved of in the order, the fact that it was to be applied generally and was not limited?
A. In the general form you can't say that anybody could object to it. Of course, I could not object to this order.
Q. I'm not asking whether you could object, General Foertsch. I'm trying now simply to find out what your own ideas were, what you yourself thought and felt about this order.
A. I have testified about that already. I have testified about it in my direct examination. And I have just repeated it. I have stated my opinion to the reprisal measures and the fixing of certain ratios.
Q. When that order was passed on by Field Marshal List to the subordinate units did he specify that the order was to be limited to time and area the way you would have preferred to have had the order read originally?
A. From the Prosecution document which contains this document I assume that no additions of that kind were made and no time limitations were imposed. However, I don't know whether any supplements were made to that order. In any case I don't know anything about it.
Q. Did you state your misgivings about the order regarding its non-limitations to time and area to Field Marshal List when you returned to Southeast Headquarters at the 16th or 17th of September?
A. I don't know that any more.
Q. Did you inquire of Field Marshal List as to whether the order in the form in which it was passed on might not lead to excesses?
A. I don't know that any more either.
Q. Is that order of OKW, this one of the 16th of September 1941, an order to which you delivered no protest, General Foertsch?
AAgainst which I personally did not lodge any protest? Have I understood you correctly?
Q Yes, I would like to know whether you ever protested against this order to OKW through official channels?
A That was not within my field of work. I was not entitled to do that. I, on my own initiative, could not raise any objections of that sort.
Q But you protested to Buttlar, Brandenfels, Warlimont and others in OKW regarding other OKW orders. You told Warlimont that these orders were senseless and stupid. Weren't you able to tell Warlimont and Buttlar that this order was also senseless?
A On my repeated visits at the OKW, I have said to Warlimont, to Buttlar and I think also Jodl, clearly that in my opinion the most secure and best means in order to combat the uprising and in order to maintain public peace would be to station as many troops as possible in these areas and that with reprisal measures we could not have best means to serve that purpose.
Q You felt then that the way to secure pacification in the Southeast was as one of the affidavits introduced on your behalf states, by military operations rather than by reprisal measures?
A By all means, military operations were preferable.
Q And was it because you didn't have enough troops to carry out military operations that you took the least preferable way, the way of reprisal measures?
A No, in my direct examination I have also expressed my opinion on that subject. Do you want me to repeat it? Well, I shall repeat it once more in detail. My fundamental thought was at all times that I should have as many troops as possible at my disposal in order to enable me to crack down on the sources of unrest and in order to eliminate them, and in order to stifle any new attempts at uprisings, and by having as many troops as possible in these areas so that the population would be pacified and so that I would take the incentive away from the population to engage in any illegal actions that occur at all times.
However, in this connection, I also stated that even with the strongest occupation by military units, reprisal measures are inevitable in my opinion as long as the population, in spite of strong occupation forces, keeps carrying out illegal actions of these sorts. I tried to support my opinion by pointing out the order which had been proclaimed in Berlin which stated that in cases of that sort, besides the perpetrators of the deeds, fifty nazis would have to die and also by referring to the agreement between General Eisenhower and Badoglio. That was Article 44 in this agreement and I understood that particular paragraph in that agreement in the same sense.
Q We will go into those points a little later, General Foertsch. We don't want to get ahead of ourselves. The answer of Keitel to your request for more troops was to say that "We are tied up in Russia. We can't give you any more troops. You will have to pacify the Southeast area by draconic measures." That was Keitel's answer to you, wasn't it?
A Keitel's answer to me was not given in that form but in the main it was the attempt to convince me that the entire unrest in the Sougheast was solely caused by communist propaganda and instigation. He also tried to convince me that therefore military measures alone would not suffice but that also police measures and other measures were necessary. Then quite in general he pointed out the fact to me that as he expressed himself: "All orders have been issued already" and he added "You will find everything ready when you come back to your station."
Q General Foertsch, no troops at least not enough troops ever came to you from OKW and you therefore had to take the other way--the less preferable way of reprisal measures to pacify the Southeast. I take it then that you believe-
A No, that is not correct, in my opinion. The problem is not so simple at all. The troops were quite sufficient in order to occupy a peaceful country.
Q Well, it was not a peaceful country, General Foertsch, and you got, in fact, no troops and you therefore had to take another way.
A Yes, at the time we received the 342nd Division and later on we also had the 113th Division. However, it was pointed out to us that we would lose these troops again in a few weeks to another assignment. However, from this, we never drew the conclusion at any time during the time of my assignment in the Southeast that as a result of inadequate troop strength we should take especially severe measures in the question of reprisals. We always regretted that the population forced us to take reprisal measures.
Q Did you ever ask to have the Keitel order of 16 September repealed or withdrawn?
A That did not happen as far as I can recall and there were some good reason's for it.
Q Did you ever wish yourself either that the order had never been issued or that it would be withdrawn?
A I would have liked that very much indeed.
Q Would you have preferred to have it withdrawn because it was no longer necessary from a military standpoint?
A I would have like it but if this order had become superfluous if the population had not given us any further cause to apply such orders.
Q Did the situation ever become such that that order was not militarily necessary?
A In the various areas at various times the situation varied. Consequently, in the individual areas at various times different action was taken.
Q Would you say, generally speaking, that the order was necessary at all times in the Southeast or, generally speaking, that it was not necessary from a military standpoint at all times?
A Could you please repeat the question once more? I don't think I understood the question in its entirety.
(The interpreter repeated the question)
A The order was necessary at all times in view of the basic principle of reprisals which was involved.
Q Well then -
A However, it was not necessary at all times in view of the ratio which was expressed in this order and that is how we acted -- in accordance with that order.
Q You objected to the quota provisions in the order then? You didn't object to the fact that you were ordered to take reprisal measures but you simply objected to the fact that there was a fixed quota?
A I never suggested to my commanders-in-chief that on their own initiative they should set certain quotas because I considered it appropriate to take into account the conditions at various times in the various areas and as I have just stated that again depended on the attitude of the population. That completed the circle.
Q General Foertsch, if there had not been a hostage quota, then an individual commander might have executed 200 hostages to one, might he not?
A In theory he could have done that, but in practice he never would have done a thing of that sort.
Q I am in somewhat of a dilemma, General Foertsch. If you believe that the Keitel Order was necessary from a military standpoint, then I can't understand why you protested against it.
A That is no contradiction at all. I have repeatedly pointed out and now I am going to repeat it for the third time. Against the fundamental principle of reprisal measures, I personally --and my personal opinion did not have any importance at the time--I never objected to that personally. I only made objections as far as I was concerned against setting of quotas which weren't flexible at all for the entire area and for the entire time, and according to this principle which apparently was also maintained by my Commanders-in-Chief because they were the decisive persons here action was taken.
Q You agreed, General Foertsch, did you, with OKW that reprisal measures of some kind were necessary?
A Yes.
Q And then you carried out reprisal measures in the Southeast not because they were ordered by your superiors but rather because you felt that you had to in order to pacify your area? We have here not a question of your obeying orders because they were orders from above but rather because you also agreed that such measures were necessary.
A I beg your pardon. Don't think this is criticism but perhaps it is possible that I am -- it is impossible for me to understand so much at one time. If you ask me one question after the other, in sequence, then I will be able to understand them.
Q I am sorry, General Foertsch, I will try to do better. If you agreed with OKW that reprisal measures were necessary, then I take it you carried out such reprisal measures not because they were orders from above but rather because you and your Commander-inChief agreed yourselves that such measures were necessary.
A In order to give you an answer to this, I must state the following. None of my Commanders-in-Chief was ever in such a situation because when we took over the area of Serbia, reprisal measures had already become necessary at that particular time and, unfortunately, in the course of time, this necessity always arose, Whether my Commander-in-Chief on his own initiative would have on his own initiative taken that step if the situation had been different, that I don't know of course.
Q General Foertsch, did you and your Commander-in-Chief carry out these orders? Withdrawn. Did you and your Commander-inChief carry out reprisal measures in the Southeast because you were ordered to do so from above or did you carry them out because you had to from a military necessity standpoint in order to pacify your area?
A We carried out this order because we received this order from a higher level and we had been ordered to do that because this had become necessary and inevitable as a result of the behavior of the population. One thing here does not exclude the other.
Q Well then, you would have taken measures because they were necessary whether or not you had received orders from above to do so.
A I could talk about this subject but under oath and on the witness stand I cannot answer a question of that sort.
Q Would you have taken the reprisal measures that were, in fact, taken even though you had not received any orders from OKW?
A I don't know that. This situation did not exist.
Q General Foertsch, you were faced with a very serious situation in the Southeast from the standpoint of the security of your troops and installations.