AAs far as I can remember, there was before this definite order, the stipulation contained therein had reached us more frequently from the OKW, probably over the telephone because I know that the question "f hanging frequently been discussed and that Fieldmarshal List opposed this manner of passing sentence, particularly.
Q Was this OKW order observed strictly in the later period of time?
AAs I remember it was not, just because of the wording.
Q General, in September 1941, you said you were on leave?
A Yes.
Q When you returned from your leave, did you discuss with Fieldmarshal List the fact how during your absence he was kept informed about current affairs?
A Whether I discussed it with him--yes, yes, I did discuss it with him or rather he talked with me about it because I know that when I returned I found out that there had been trouble, trouble that is with the Ia, and with the Quartermaster General, and I know also that it was my impression or that Fieldmarshal told me straight out that during that period of time he felt that he had not received sufficient support and insufficient information that that had been his feeling at least.
Q Was Fieldmarshal List, when you returned from your leave, a changed man in his attitude towards civilian population?
A No.
Q Now meanwhile, orders had been issued by Fieldmarshal List dated the 5th September, contained in Document Book II on page 21 and in the English version on page 27 of the English Document Book. This is Exhibit 42 which I would like to submit to you.
General, when did you read that document for the first time, as far as you can remember?
A Probably after I returned from leave. I cannot give you the date.
Q What is this document about?
A May I just read through it quickly? As I see it, these are directives for the suppression of the Serbian resistance movement. That is to say, essentially for the fighting.
Q Any do you call them directives?
A Because under 2, it gives the details as to how to fight, and there is, first of all, the sentence here: "account is to be taken of the following point of view". Otherwise, it would say there perhaps "I order this or that in this connection" or "This is ordered in this connection" or some such phrase.
Q General, the differences between orders and directives you have described to us on direct examination.
A Quite.
Q Now about this order, one more question. What was the actual significance of these directives contained in Exhibit 42? The actual significance. What was the effect these directives had in as far as you remember?
AAs I see it, these directives didn't have much effect in actual fact because, apart from basic facts as to how to conduct the fighting, which are being brought back to my memory here, any well trained commanding officer would know all about them. This has been over-shadowed later on by the OKW order which came later on, that is the OKW Order of 16 September.
Q What exhibit is the OKW order of 16 September?
A I am afraid I can't give you the number, Doctor, but it is the well known order about reprisal ratios-one to 50 or one to 100.
Q Let us now turn to the order of 10 October by General Boehme. This is Exhibit 88 contained on page 27 of the German Document Book II and on page 33 of the English Document Book. General, can you remember to have reported orally this order to Fieldmarshal List?
A I am afraid I cannot remember that today.
Q Would you please look at the distribution list?
A The order has reached the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for his information.
Q How long does an order which was sent to the Armed Forces commander Southeast for his information--how long would it take to reach the Armed Forces Commander Southeast from the Commanding General Serbia?
A That depends entirely on how it is being passed on. This is an order in writing. It cannot have been passed on by teletype letter or by wireless but simply by courier. It might have come by rail or by air or boat. At that time, courier communications by air, I believe, had been discontinued altogether because of weather conditions, that is to say, at least, the regular courier connectionsevery second day-and also particularly because aircraft had been taken away and were used in the East. I am inclined to assume that this came normally by rail or courier.
Q And how long do you think, roughly, it took if by that normal method by rail, the courier brought mail from the Commanding General of Serbia to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A That is hard to say-but to figure it out, it was signed the 10th of October. It left Boehme's office, by the 11th. No daily courier connection existed. Therefore, if a courier left on the 11th, it left on the 11th, but if there was no courier perhaps it only left on the 13th or 14th.
Q And how long would the trip take under the conditions at the time from Belgrade to Athens?
AAt the least, two days and a half. At the very least, if all was well on the railroad, which was not usually the case. I know cases when people on leave or on official trips from Belgrade to Athens took a whole week.
Q General, did you and Fieldmarshal List discuss the extermination plan as alleged by the prosecution?
A That is quite impossible because that plan did not exist.
Q General, what were relations between Fieldmarshal List and Keitel, the Chief of OKW?
A One might describe them as extremely bad. I remember, for instance, discussions, frequent discussions where Fieldmarshal List would make derogatory remarks so that is not quite right because after all they were of the same rank-but at any rate he was indignant and he took a negative attitude.
Q What was Field Marshal List's attitude towards the party, the National Socialist Party?
A When I was Chief of Staff the problem did not play a part t all, because any contact with the party down there did not exist, but as far as Field Marshal List's fundamental attitude is concerned I know that he was anything but a friend or advocate of the Party, on the contrary.
Q What were Field Marshal List's relations to Hitler?
A I did not see any personal relations at any time, between Field Marshal List and Hitler, but it was known that Field Marshal List regarded Hitler as military amateur, and politically as to say the least a somewhat doubtful politician and a dictator.
Q Now, I have two questions, General, which I put to you on behalf of Field Marshal von Weichs, concerning the various and changeable tasks of the Supreme Commander Southeast, you have made a number of statements; there is only one question about that point. Were the tasks of the Commander in Chief Southeast changed when Field Marshal von Weichs was appointed Commander in Chief Southeast?
A Yes, I have touched on that also. With the new organization which started by the end of August 1943 when Field Marshal von Weichs was to take over the command, the separation was initiated, and the Commander in Chief Southeast was relieved of executive power and territorial authority.
Q Would it be possible to say that from then onwards the Commander in Chief Southeast was the Supreme strategic officer of the Balkans?
A Well, that was the whole point of this organizational measure, yes.
Q What was Field Marshal von Weichs' attitude towards reprisal measures?
A Speaking quite generally it was entirely calm, collected, and sensible. I think his attitude was the same which I have described as my own point of view, that it was not desirable but inevitable.
Q General, yon mentioned conversations and conferences about reprisal measures; were you present when Neubacher and Field Marshal von Weichs discussed the problem?
A I was present at the more important conversations in this respect.
Q Did the two agree?
A I may add it is not a conversation between Neubacher and Weichs; it was a discussion between Neubacher, Felber and other people concerned. It was held in a large circle.
Q During these conferences was there an agreement on the reprisal question?
A Yes, with one exception, which was Meissner, the SS and Police Leader in Belgrade.
Q What was the attitude taken by von Weichs at the conference; tell us that briefly?
A Well, he expressed it in the order.
Q What order do you mean?
A The order of December 22, 1943 about measures concerned with retaliation.
Q In what manner was the Commander in Chief informed about measures while you were in office?
A Do you mean the von Weichs period?
Q Yes.
A Oral reports about individual decisions or special areas were made as needed, either by me or by the experts working on the problems in my presence or perhaps in my absence, but any decisions reached by tie Commander in Chief I immediately learned. The daily reporting about daily events was done while I was there during the evenings, after the daily reports from the subordinate offices had come in, compiled into our own daily reports and put into our own words. We always had a large map of the whole area in front of us, and daily all the events of the day had been put down on a transparent page, so that on the basis of this map and of the transparent sheets the areas, either beginning from the South or the North - depending on their importance - were reported on daily.
Q Two final questions about the problem of Italy; General, did the Commander in Chief Southeast at the time, that is Field Marshal von Weichs, order that General Roncallia, should be shot?
A I talked about that on direct examination, and I said that I do not remember any order, and that now, knowing the documents, it seems to me highly unlikely that any such order was issued, because the notes about the alleged order and the report that it was intended, date from the same day and have the same wording, and therefore, they must have pursed each other. From a technical point of view, I think this unlikely.
Q In order to finish with that point, would you know if Field Marshal von Weichs had ordered the shooting?
A Well, this is a question concerned with my memory, and after four years I cannot guarantee anything there, but at the time, of course, I would have had to know it.
Q And that surely would have been such an unusually striking occurrence, as far as you were concerned, that you would remember it today?
A That would be assumed, but I cannot commit myself to anything here.
Q General, my final question about this problem; do you know of cases where Field Marshal von Weichs aggravated the treatment of the Italians?
A I can remember no such action.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
JUDGE CARTER: Are there any further questions for the defense?
DR. MENZEL (Menzel for Kuntze):
Q Witness, surely you still remember the order by the OKW of February, 1, 1942?
A You mean the teletype letter with that reproach - yes, quite, quite.
Q Can you remember whether General Kunze approved the contents of this teletype letter when, at the beginning of February it reached you?
A No, General Kuntze boiled with fury, if I may put it that way.
Q Do you mean that -
A Yes, I mean the teletype letter of February 1. I didn't quite understand your question. You say "approved", - do you mean whether he was in agreement? No, on the contrary.
Q Did he express his indignation in an unequivical manner?
A Certainly he did.
Q Do you know whether he did that only to you or whether he did so also towards the OKW?
A This teletype letter was one of the reasons for the intention which General Kurtze had, to go up and see the OKW in order to acquaint them with his attitude. If I remember the period of time correctly he was held up by the whole problem of the conference with the Italians in Abazzia, but it certainly was the originally intended course.
Q So when Kuntze went to see the OKW what was the success he had?
A No success at all. I may remind you of the extract from the letter in which it says that at that period of time.
Q You report therein about the way General Kuntze was impressed by his lack of success, could you repeat that briefly for us; whether he was depressed, for instance, when he came back or what impression he gave?
A Of course I cannot describe that in detail. Normally, one simply cursed until one had cursed enough, but that doesn't help, and one simply had to swallow hard and toe the line and use the next opportunity to do something else.
Q Very well, my next question, did you know how Hitler and the Chief of the OKW thought of General Kuntze and his work in the Southeast?
A Not directly, because at that time I talked neither with Hitler or Keitel, but only with Warlimont, who probably by his daily reports was informed of the attitude of the people you mention, and I can again remind you of the extract of one letter written the day after the talk with Warlimont in Bosnia, where I expressed my opinion that Kuntze was not popular, and that his release might be expected for the near future. I further remember that Warlimont dropped hints of this sort, otherwise I would not have written this in a letter.
Q Can you perhaps remember that in this connection General Kuntze was regarded as being too weak in the Southeast, or don't you remember that any more?
A Details of the conversation with Warlimont I do not remember, of course, but the visit of Warlimont, as I have expressed in the letter, was a matter of checking up on us. He had been sent down in order to see why these offices in the Southeast could not deal with this mess, as I have put it, at the time. The tendency was without a doubt the one which you assume.
DR. MENZE: That is all. Thank you very much.
DR. FRITSCH: (Fritsch for Rendulic):
Q General, only three brief questions. To the 2nd Armored Division, there belonged a Division of Cossacks, is that correct?
A Yes, as of autumn of 1943.
Q Did the 2nd Armored Division apply for a transfer of this Division of Cossacks?
A I don't understand, a transfer into the area or away from the area? Away from the area, you mean?
Q Yes.
A Yes, just as we did, and probably they were even more interested in it because the 2nd Army had to solve all these things with Glaese, which the Cossacks had done wrong.
Q Another question. General, you are an experienced man in personnel problems; if an offer for two years held the rank of Brigadier General, that is to say, as Brigadier General, he has to wait two years until he is appointed Major General, is that a long time to wait or not?
A Well, I must ask two counter questions in this connection; First, in what position was the General, was he commanding a division, in command at the front or at home?
Q He was at the front.
A Let me specify my question, General -
AAnd then it depends when it was, what period of time, what years.
Q Let me specify my question, Colonel General Rendulic, during the war, was a Brigadier General for two years before he was promoted to Major General. He was at the front, and before that time was serving in Russia.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to the question. The defendant was not present where all of these problems were handled, and I don't think he is in a position to comment upon it.
DR. FRITSCH: I am afraid I didn't quite catch what the prosecution said.
(Remark repeated by interpreters.)
JUDGE CARTER: He may answer the question.
Q Please answer the question now, General.
A You see two years was a long period of time under the conditions which you have just described.
Q You yourself were an officer serving at the front, General; may I ask you for how long a period of time you were Brigadier General?
A For one year.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you very much.
DR. TIPP: (Tipp for von Leyser):
Q General, may I ask you when you met General von Leyser first?
A I met him when he came to the Southeast, and was appointed Commanding General of the 15th Mountain Corps or in any case of the corps. It must have been in October 1943.
Q Do you remember whether Field Marshal von Weichs was present or absent at the time?
A Do you mean when von Leyser arrived?
Q Yes.
A If you can help me with a few dates there.
Q It was by the end of October 1943.
AAt the end of October Field Marshal von Weichs went on a reconnaissance flight for several days.
Q You mean that Field Marshal von Weichs was not present at the time?
A Well, that is entirely possible.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to counsel leading the witness on these questions.
DR. TIPP: It is not a leading question, if the Tribunal, please. It was only to clarify the answer given by the witness.
A I don't know what you are getting at, but at that time I and General von Leyser had a talk when he reported to the Commander in Chief, I know that he talked to him for sometime and that he and I had lunch together, and I also seem to remember that von Weichs was not present, because we drank a nice bottle of wins together.
Q Now, that is exactly what I wanted to hear from you, witness. Can you tell us briefly how you introduced von Leyser into his new sphere of tasks, in order to specify my question; how did you describe to him the tasks he would have to contend with?
A I can't give you details, and all I can do is give you a description of the tasks which the Corps had to settle at the time. The main problems at the time were the anxieties confronting us with a possible invasion in the area where the corps was settled, because in Italy, the allied occupation kept creeping up higher and higher, and that constituted a constantly growing threat to our northern area. I am quite sure that at that time I described that part of the picture as a decisive one. I probably said the main task of the group was to prepare themselves to fight an invasion, but surely we also discussed the guerilla situation in large lines.
Q Do you recall what you told von Leyser about the guerilla fighting and also how to combat the guerillas at the time?
A I am afraid I didn't say anything about that. I did probably -
DR. TIP: My attention has just been called to the fact that the interpreter must have misheard me when I talked about the over-all band situation, and he translated the guerilla situation in Russia.
Q You couldn't tell us, witness, could you, whether you gave details about the guerilla situation to General von Leyser?
A Well, probably I told him that because of the main task of defending the coast, the combating of guerillas was particularly important.
Q Another point, witness, on direct examination you talked about labor allocation and transfer of the civilian population to Germany. Let me ask you a particular question about that concerning the 15th Corps; was the 15th Corps connected with labor allocation of civilian population and transfer of civilian population to Germany?
A No, these were territorial tasks in the Croatian area, and they were to be dealt with by the Croatian Government, and as far as the German assistance want, it was given by General von Glaese, who was Plenipotentiary General.
Q The 1st Cossack division has already been mentioned, let me ask you, who commanded that division?
A When I was there General Pannwitz.
Q Can you tell me briefly about General von Pannwitz?
AAbout the sort of man he was?
Q Briefly about the way he reported.
A I saw General von Pannwitz twice, once when he reported -perhaps three times. He always came to our headquarters in Belgrade. I can not give you a really well-founded judgment about him. No doubt he was an efficient soldier. I believe you remember that at the time he already had the Oak leaves, but he was showing off a little. He was a bit boastful, but I wish to emphasize that this is an opinion I am giving with mental reservation, because I did not really know him.
Q To clarify one point, General von Pannwitz was a German officer?
A Yes, he was a German general.
DR. TIPP: I have no further questions.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess for 15 minutes.
(Thereupon a recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Are there any further questions for the defense?
BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for the defendant von Geitner):
Q. Witness, in one of the previous sessions here a document, concerning the activities cf the defendant Geitner was submitted. That is document NOKW 704 and is contained in document bock 7 of the prosecution on page 10. The document concerns itself with the qualifications of General von Geitner. To begin with let me read to you the recommendation which von Geitner received on 1 March 1943 from his Commander General Bader. And then I shall read the recommendation which you gave him on the same day. On 1 March 1943 General Bader, who at that time was Commander in Servia, writes the following concerning General von Geitner:
"Especial valuable individual, straightforward, open, energetic, intelligent and comprehensive knowledge. National Socialist and General Staff officer of the old school, familar with the present principles through private study and practice. Great conscientious working force, with practical sense. Physically tough, possesses endurance. Adapted for commander." Then we have a few abbreviations, there is a F - s g - a, then we have, "A soldierly bearing. Above average. Adapted also for Chief of Staff of a regular corps." So much for what General Bader has to say for him and I beg the tribunal to pay particular attention to the last sentence of it.
The chief of Army Group E, General Foertsch, writes the following:
"Completely in agreement. Excellent Chief of Staff. Indispensable at the present time for Serbia."
This, witness, is the judgment about General von Geitner, which you yourself wrote on 1 March 1943. Now the following interests me in this connection; If the defendant von Geitner was at the time regarded as qualified as a chief of a regular corps and if he had become chief of a regular corps, would his official position have been improved?
A. That cannot be answered with just "yes" or "no". He personally would have had an easier time and it all depends on where such a corps would have been committed. More important and more responsibility concerning the total events was his work in Serbia.
Q. The assignment as chief of a regular corps; would that have been regarded by the Wehrmacht as a kind of promotion?
A. In view of the fact that von Geitner had been retired permanently, yes.
Q. Do you know whether General Von Geitner at the time endeavored to reach such an assignment; what I mean is did he desire to get away from Serbia and instead become chief of staff of a regular corps?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. And how did you know that?
A. I believe I remember that we discussed these things.
Q. You and Herr von Geitner?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I am interested in the following; why did you object to this reason of General von Geitner and instead wrote indispensable for Serbia, at the present time. Can you tell us for what reasons and in what capacity he was indispensable for Serbia at the time?
A. Indispensable of course is exaggerated, because of course, everyone can be replaced.
Q. Yes.
A. But, if I may refer back to your previous question. Anybody could be chief of staff in a regular corps, however. In the complex and difficult situation in Serbia it was much harder to find such a reasonable and keen man in every way and such a considerate person as von Geitner as a chief of staff. He was especially suitable as chief in this situation and I want to partly explain . . . . . .
Q. A little slower, maybe you want to repeat your last sentence.
A. What I want to express is that just in that situation, I believe you said the spring of 1943?
Q. It was on 1 March 1943.
A. At that time I did not think it desirable to effect a change in the position of the Chief of Staff. That was doubtlessly also an egotittic reason of mine. I did not by ant means desire to spoil any other assignment for him.
Q. Witness, in some connection the term "a man who believed in stringent measures" was mentioned here. I think through your previous answer you have already explained your attitude concerning this word, but still I would like to ask you to tell us briefly whether von Geitner, because of his activities in Serbia, can in any way be regarded as such an individual and what experiences there did you have with him in your capacity as his superior?
A. He was not a man who wanted to use force. He was just the contrary.
Q. On the basis of your own observations and discussions with Herr von Geitner and also through your personal insight in his official capacity and an his tendencies did you gain the impression that von Geitner took up the interests of the Serbian population to a special strong degree?
A. I am convinced of this to the fullest extent and I know that he was regarded by the OKW as a particular friend of the Serbs.
Q. Witness, you have told us something about the structure and the organization of your staff, I would now be interested to know the following; is it correct that the staff of the commander for Serbia was on the whole organized on the same principles as yours?
A. The command staff at the head of which von Geitner was, yes. It was organized in the same way, but the organization was different inasmuch as in Serbia there was next to the command staff an administrative staff which had its own chief and von Geitner had nothing to do with this, except the necessary contact between the two staffs.
In this respect the two staffs were differently organized because in my staff we had no such thing as an administrative staff.
Q. Geitner was therefore only in charge of the command staff?
A. Geitner was only incharge of the command staff.
Q. Is it correct that this command staff was responsible for the training, leading, supplying and orientation of the troops; it had nothing to do with the administrative matters which were under the administrative staff?
A. That is correct.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: In putting the questions, I think Dr. Sauter can ask what the duties of the command staff and what the duties of the administrative staff were, but he should not lead the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is possibly somewhat leading, but we will permit the answer.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, you have already told us what the defendant von Geitner had nothing to do with the so-called administrative staff; it is known to you on the basis of your own experiences in Serbia that besides the operational staff of Geitner's and besides the administrative staff, which you have just mentioned, there were other organizations at the office of the military commander for Serbia, which however were quite outside the sphere of influence for Geitner.
A.Yes.
Q. And which were they?
A. They were the plenipotentiary for economy; Neuhausen, then there was the higher SS police leader Meissner.
Q. And then another plenipotentiary was supposed to have been down there, who also had nothing to do with the chief of staff Geitner?
A. Do you mean in the staff of the commander?
Q. For foreign affairs?
A. There was a German ambassador, but he existed next to the Commander and he was by no means subordinate to the commander, therefore, one can in no way say that he was subordinate to the chief of the command staff.
Q. Witness, how did the defendant von Geitner deal with this manifold organization? When discussing it with you did he consider this organization a good solution or did he complain about it, did he complain about lack of organization, etc.; do you know anything about that?
A. He frequently and justifiably complained about bad organization but this bad organization was no fault of his and no fault of his commander nor any fault of the commander in chief Southeast. I know that applications were made repeatedly in order to clarify these involved conditions but I think it was the principle of the time not to clarify certains things deliberately.
Q. From your own experience do you happen to know, witness, what was the attitude of the defendant von Geitner particularly toward the Higher SS and Police Leader Meissner in Serbia whom you have mentioned previously?
A. He thought badly of him. Geitner made use of every opportunity. to achieve a change in this position.
Q. And what did Geitner say concerning the activities and competency of this Higher SS and Police leader; what were his complaints?
A. The decisive factor was that the Higher SS and Police leader received his factual directives immediately from Himmler and did not receive his directives via the military commander. As far as I can judge now I am sure he did not always inform the commander either of what his directives were, therefore this was a parallel channel.
Q. You mean there were several channels existing next to one another other than the CiC's channel, that of the higher SS leader existed next to it and the higher SS leader got his directives from Himmler; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, do you remember that because of these repeated complaints of Geitner, General Loehr, by reason of oral report of Geitner, decided to bring up this matter in the Fuehrer headquarters and to demand a change in the conditions as they prevailed.
Supposedly that was after an oral report of Geitner's concerning these questions toward the end of August 1942?
A. Yes, I remember that very well indeed.
Q. Did General Loehr make any personal representations to Hitler in the Fuehrer headquarters regarding these matters as far as you know?
A. I know that around that time General Loehr was present in Hitler's headquarters and I know that he reported a number of questions and among them the question of the organization of Serbia.
Q. Is it known to you whether General Loehr succeeded and did General Loehr tell you what a strange answer he received from Hitler?
A. He had no success at all of course because nothing was changed and the answer which was given particularly concerning the conditions in Serbia and which was probably given by Hitler himself was essentially, "They should try and get on."
Q. Hitler is supposed to have said literally, "Just tell them they should try and get on?"
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, on the occasion of your direct examination you described to us the relation between the commander and his chief of staff. From your own observation did you gain the impression that Herr von Geitner, during his activities as chief of staff in Serbia remained within his authority correct; what I mean is did he report all masters of importance to the commander which was proper -- did he apply for his consent or did you on the other hand gain the reverse impression that Geitner exceeded his authority in order to gain power for himself.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I don't see how General Foertsch would know what happened between Geitner as chief of staff and General Bader, I believe he is incompetent to answer the question