Once in the summer of 1941 I was invited for supper to FOERTSCH's quarters near Athens together with a professor who gave lectures in Greece and whose name I can't remember any longer. In the course of this evening FOERTSCH spoke for several hours about his sympathy for Greece and expressed his disappointment over the poor condition of the country. I remember very well that he demanded two great aid measures for Greece, namely reforestation and artificial irrigation. FOERTSCH has frequently helped me in procuring additional food for the Greeks working in the printing shops, he made it possible for the Propaganda Company 690 that a large plot near the railroad station was tilled in order to improve the workers food supply with the vegetables grown on this land.
Excesses against the civilian population were most severely punished by the staff and the units which were assigned to the staff. Outright draconic punishments were inflicted but it rarely occurred that a cause was given for this.
The next document which I offer is Foertsch Document No. 45. No. 43 and 44 I leave out. They don't contain anything essentially now, and No. 43 also isn't quite in accordance with the certification regulations. I offer Document 45 as Exhibit No. 40. This is an affidavit, - it is on page 101, - an affidavit by Dietrich Heinceke who was in the Department Ic on the staff of Army Group E, as a special missions staff officer, and later on in 1943 in Army Group F. He states here the following, starting under Figure 2, and I submit this affidavit as evidence for the fact of Foertsch's opposition to the OKW, and also with regard to General Foertsch's attitude towards the population in contrast to the assertion made by the prosecution that Foertsch participated in an extermination plan for the population.
2.) General FOERTSCH soon impressed me as a man with an unusually well balanced mind which found expression in his extraordinary clear, generous and humorous personality; his calm manner, free of any pose and desire to create an impression, together with his groat knowledge and ability, gave every meeting with him a level far above the normal standard.
As a soldier General FOERTSCH was the most outstanding personality that I came to know during my period of military service. He showed great strength of character towards his superior, in particular toward the OKW. As I later ascertained from my own service with this office he was not at all popular there on account of his negative attitude toward the "gentlemen of the green table". On the other hand, he was highly esteemed and well liked among all the officers and enlisted men on his staff because of his calm, objective manner and his concern for their welfare.
I continue with Figure 3, page 102, at the bottom.
3.) The guiding motive of General FOERTSCH during his activity in the Balkans resulted from the military necessity of creating the most extensive pacification as possible in the interior in order to guarantee the most effective defense against an invasion from without. Any attitude toward the native population which was influenced by hatred or resentment was completely alien to him, as well as the idea of an extermination policy.
His attitude was clearly expressed in a memorandum on the situation in the Southeast which was prepared according to his instructions for the OKW and which the then Commander in Chief for the Southeast, Colonel General LOEHR, wanted to submit to HITLER in the spring of 1943.
The contents of this memorandum were essentially as follows:
The partisan organization in Serbia, which began around autumn 1941, was given an extraordinary impetus by the systematic extermination policy of the Ustascha units against the pravoslav population in Croatia. Through fear of persecution by the ustascha in particular, then later also through dissatisfaction which the corrupt system of the "State Leader", Dr. Ante PAVALIC, larger and larger portions of the population of Croatia" took to the woods". These refugees first made their appearance as insurgent bands which, without any identification as military units and fighting from ambush with hidden weapon, carried out attacks on the population and the native and occupation troops, partly in order to obtain supplies and partly with the intention of eliminating the Ustascha system. It was not until later, around the winter of 1942/43, that they were gathered into real units, partly Chetnik, partly Tito units. To an increasing extent they tried to give themselves the appearance of regular troops by wearing insignia and partial uniforms, but nevertheless they in no way adhered to the prevailing usages of war. Thus it constantly happened that prisoners were murdered and native villages were burned down together with their populations.
The growing partisan organization, which extended even into Serbia and Montenegro, led to constantly increasing unrest in the country and to a gradual paralysis of the economy and the transportation system.
In the above mentioned memorandum General FOERTSCH called for the following steps in particular in order to bring about the immediate pacification of Croatia and the adjoining countries:
a) Replacement of Pavolic by the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Dr. Macek, who enjoyed a high reputation among the people and was a capable politician and democrat.
b) Reorganization and disbanding of the Ustascha units, in order to prevent further extermination measures.
c) Recall of the German ambassador in Zagreb, SA Obergruppenfuehrer KASCHE, who was playing a pernicious role through his distorted reports to the Foreign Office.
d) Reinforcement of the German troops in order to make it possible to carry out a real pacification of the occupation area.
e) Immediate measures for the revival of economy and transportation.
I remember very well that General FOERTSCH did not call for the creation of a "graveyard tranquility" by the use of draconic methods, but rather for a real pacification of the Balkans adapted to the political possibilities of this area.
The memorandum remained without any success.
I further recall that after about the summer of 1943 General FOERTSCH advocated the recognition of the bands as regular troops for reasons of expediency, against the opinion of the OKW although he never admitted that they had a right to such recognition.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I should like to read just a few lines from the top of page 102 of this affidavit, in other words, the third line on page 102 of the English Document Book.
He wanted his soldiers to be decent in the old traditional sense and not fanatically possessed by the idea that the end justifies any means. His unusually versatile interests, which ranged far outside the purely military field were evidenced by the fact that he always selected the library of the house as his workroom. Indicative of his attitude towards the peoples of the occupied countries was the fact that on his official journeys along with military matters he always had a glance for the culture and national characteristics of the country; furthermore, that he was generous in giving the members of his staff an opportunity to become acquainted through direct contact with the country concerned. In keeping with this versatility he had a way of thinking that was completely realistic and free from prejudice.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: That is the end of the submission of Document Book II for the defense of Hermann Foertsch, and I now start with Document Book III. I will start on page five of this document book with Document No. 47 which I submit as Foertsch Exhibit No. 41. Document 46, which precedes this book, I will not offer because it is mainly a repetition of documents and testimonies which have already been submitted. This Document No. 47, Exhibit No. 41, is an affidavit by Major General Heribert von Larisch, from which I will only read one paragraph which is concerned with the methods of band warfare in Croatia. It starts at the very beginning:
In November 1942, I received an order by the Chief of Staff of the Amy group F, then Brig. General Hermann FOERTSCH, to proceed to Croatia with the staff of the Fortress Brigade 1, in order to reorganize the Croatian units employed there for the purpose of safeguarding the railway lino Zagreb-Belgrade and in order to unify the supervision and the security of these and other railway lines on Croatian soil.
The battle of the partisans against German railways was being fought with the utmost bitterness already in the winter of 1942/43. There hardly passed a day when the tracks were not destroyed at several places, when the trains were not derailed and plundered, and the stations set on fire. It was difficult to take precautions against any such partisan operations as the attackers could scarcely be recognized as enemies since they appeared in civilian clothes as well as in German or Croatian uniforms, - the little red Sovietstar was only recognizable from a close distance, - and because they had forced the civilian population, through steadily increasing terror, to take their part.
Q And I would ask you a question about this, witness; in which office was Major General von Larisch at that time?
A It was a so-called Railway Security Staff, on the BelgradeZagreb Railway.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: The next document which I offer is Foertsch Document 48, and which I submit as Exhibit 42. This is an affidavit by Stephen Buelowius, and concerns itself with the way in which the band warfare was carried out and how nevertheless General Foertsch tried with peaceful means to create peace and order in the country. I read the beginning:
"I have known General of the Infantry Hermann FOERTSCH since the spring of 1943. At that time I was transferred to the Army group E as a Fortress Engineer Commander. General of the Infantry FOERTSCH was the Chief of the General staff there. For my special tasks, i.e. supervising the constructing of field works and coastal reinforcements, I was responsible to, and subordinated to, the Chief of the General Staff in the same manner as were the remainder of the officers of the Army group staff with regard to their tasks.
If the fulfillment of my duties did not necessitate my presence in the field, I went and listened to Gen. FOERTSCH's lectures nearly every day. On principle, I was always present at his weekly lectures. Besides, I spent a lot of time with him socially."
And then on page 2 of the original, the second half:
"In general, I can state with conviction in respect to these partisan operations that the only pertinent way in which they can be described is in terms of "assassination" and "chase of human beings". As, during the day the partisans were walking about in the simple garb of a peasant or a shepherd and were seemingly pursuing their work, they were so to speak merely waiting for their prey. Whenever the opportunity offered itself for a new victirm, these apparently harmless people would seize their arms hidden in the corn, grass or behind bushes and shoot their victims from closest range.
"These bandits who were not in uniform and did not wear any badges, were assisted in their murderous activities by women and children. Thus for instance the road leading from Tripolis to the south towards the coast, near Kalamata or Sparta on the Poloponnesos, was made impassable for any supplies. The road built into the steep rock wall was under effective partisan fire and was in an area which was difficult to survey and which was speaking from a military point of view impassable, mountainous country. It was useless even to send the supplies by convoy as the escorts themselves, whether in the front or in the rear, were doomed as well. In all cases, these disturbances were caused by people who were not in uniform and were no badges, they were all natives and mainly mountain people. We are therefore dealing here with completely irregular incidents, i.e. the people who gave battle were unauthorized to carry arms, they carried them hidden and acted contrary to provisions of international law. The many shepherds of the large flock of sheep acted as agents and spies for these bandits in Greece, and their occupation was very useful indeed for such services, as flock of sheep would roam about the country. The supplies for the coastal garrisons of the Peleponnesos was affected via water or air routes, because of the partisans and the impassibility of the mountain roads. Endeavors were made to make up for the deficiency of suitable transport space by the generous constructing of concrete ships for coastal shipping purposes. The building of 2$0 - 600 of freighters made from concrete, reinforced by steel was effected in Athens/Piraeus in a shipyard, newly constructed and enlarged for this purpose. These workshops and others connected with the shipyard and distributed all over the city employed Greek labor of all sorts by the thousand. This instigation for, and the motivating spirit behind, these emergency measures calculated to meet the requirements, is entirely Gen. FOERTSCH's. He intended, apart from improving the transport space situation, to give the local population work, economic security and to raise their standard of living. At the same time and with the same aims in mind, namely the pacification and amelioration of the economic standards of the population, other industrial enterprises were called into being.
Among others there were concrete factories in Piraceus and Volos, saw mills, Bauxit mines east of Saloniki, coal mines on the south coast of the island of Crete, south of Kania; innumerable Greeks by being employed in a regular fashion thus earned their livelihood.
"General FOERTSCH gave further undeniable proof of his solicitude for the Greek population by furthering the anti-Malaria campaign. It was he who caused the construction of large drainage canals, and the improvement of the low-lying marshy country around Salonika which favored the breeding of the Malaria-carrying insects and for which purpose dredgers were used which I, as a fortress engineer, could not get hold of for the building of effective trenches in spite of incessant endeavors. Gen. FOERTSCH told me that for the time being, the battle against the Malaria breeding grounds was of greater importance.
"With respect to the stabilization of currency in Greece for the purpose of maintaining a sufficiently high standard of nutrition for the population and for marketing purposes, the cooperation between Gen. FOERTSCH and the present German Plenipotentiary for Economy, the Ambassador NEUBACHER, may be cited as evidence for his solicitude for the population and the maintenance of economic and industrial standards of the country. Gen. FOERTSCH always regretted the fact that the pay in drachmas (foreign currency) was so extremely low but stated convincingly that it was necessary in order to stabilize the currency, and as a safeguard for the Greek market. Assured food supplies for the Greek population were his primary considerations, even if the pay of the German soldier was only worth thus the equivalent of a few lemons or eggs. The Greek people's well being was what he wanted, this was a genuine wish on his part, I have no doubts whatsoever on that point."
The next exhibit is Document 49, which I offer as Exhibit 43, and it is found on page 12 of the Document Book. This is an affidavit by Otto Fichtner. Fichtner is not an officer of the Staff, but a member of the Department 1-C, a clerk, and he talks about the clerical work he had to do for General Foertsch there.
The testimony of this witness is especially characteristic with reference to General Foertsch's attitude to the NSDAP, and to the church, and finally his whole attitude towards the people throughout the occupied country. Then the witness describes a few typical incidents from the Partisan war, showing the brutality of the band members. I read from the beginning:
"I have known Lt. General (Infantry) Hermann FOERTSCH since the end of September 1941, when he was Chief of Staff of the High Command of the 12th Army, later to become Army Group E and Army Group F. At the same time I was clerk in section Ia, in which assignment I also had to do the clerical work for General FOERTSCH (taking dictation, typing, temporarily keeping the secret books and handling incoming and outgoing mail).
"As I have been working under General FOERTSCH continuously till April 1944 - altogether 2 l/2 years - in this assignment, I have a thorough insight into his activities and am in a position to give the following opinion on this man on the strength of this knowledge.
1. Attitude towards the Party:
I never noticed any relations between him and National-Socialist leaders. They would certainly have come under my knowledge, since I was also taking dictation from General FOERTSCH for an extensive private correspondence.
Very soon I had the impression that he had no connections whatever with National-Socialism. As time went on, this impression was intensified by the fact that he ignored avowed party papers which were submitted to him along with the incoming mail and, contrary to the usage, left them uninitialled, in other words returned them unread.
General FOERTSCH did not use the Hitler salute. My military salute on entering the office he returned in his ever amiable way with a "Guten Morgen" or "Guten Tag". As I should of course expect from him, he never took exception to my way of saluting without headgear just by standing to attention, which was somewhat out of keeping with regulations.
"His aversion against the national-socialist system was also expressed by the fact that he had an investigation made into the activities of the so-called "Einsatz Staff Rosenberg" in the Balkans demanded the ousting of this party organization from his command area on the ground of reduction of personnel.
"The rejection by General FOERTSCH of the dictatorial form of government is shown by the fact that in his endeavour to restore settled conditions on the entire Balkans he aimed at ousting the dictator of Croatia appointed by Hitler, the so-called Poglavnik Dr. Ante PAVELICH and his Ustatashi-gang by military means of power, and at replacing them by a government supported by the confidence of wide circles of the population and possibly headed by the noted peasant leader Dr. MATCHEK. The realization of this plan which had been worked out in all details was frustrated by Hitler's rebuff.
2. Attitude towards the Churches.
General FOERTSCH's relations with the Protestant and Catholic army chaplains on the Staff were extraordinarly amiable, not only officially but also privately, in consequence of which the activities of the Wehrmacht chaplains were greatly encouraged and developed throughout the Balkan command area. Though hard pressed by the ever increasing difficulties of the position in the Balkans, General FOERTSCH assisted the work of the Wehrmacht chaplains to the largest possible extent and so made a substantial contribution to the thwarting of the anti-church policy of National-Socialism.
In this connection it is worth mentioning that he ordered the deprecatory remarks in letters of members of the Wehrmacht against antichurch actions of NSDAP agencies, found by the postal censors office, to be passed on to the Wehrmacht operations staff with the request to put an immediate stop to the coercive measures taken against the churches.
PRESIDENT: We will interrupt at this time and take our afternoon recess.
(Following recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q I shall continue reading from document Foertsch 49, which is exhibit No. 43 on page 14 of the affidavit by Otto Fichtner. Roughly in the middle of page 14 in this connection in paragraph 3, "Attitude as professional officer" It says in the second part of this paragraph:
"From my memory of many recorded ideas and plans of General Foertsch I wish to emphasize his well intentioned interest in securing the nutrition of the population in the occupied territory. In particular, he endeavored during the winter of 1941 and 42 to obtain substantial food supplies for Greece from Bulgaria, Turkey and Germany, and encouraged the relief work of the International Red Cross to the largest possible extent.
"In order to improve the health conditions of the country he made a special effort to secure the importation of German medial supplies and lay down a scheme for an effective anti-malaria campaign in the whole country."
And then I shall skip paragraph 4 and continue with paragraph 5:
"Anti-Partisan Combat in the South East:
After the end of the Balkan campaign in spring 1941 there was peace in Serbia and Greece. The occupation troops there were for the most part regional defense troops and units comprising higher age groups. These soldiers were glad in the - apparent - certainty that the war was over for them. The relations with the civilian population were satisfactory.
Then all of a sudden, in the summer of 1941, simultaneously with numerous acts of sabotage, a prepared revolt broke out, led by the Serbian General MIHAILOVITCH which caught the German troops unawares and caused considerable losses. Our German military training had been conducted exclusively with an eye to fighting regular, militarily trained and led enemy troops with whose uniforms, badges and other insignia we were thoroughly familiar.
The Balkan insurgents, however, used quite unsoldierlike, treacherous, cowardly and cruel methods of combat with which the German soldier, drilled in conventional methods of combat and unable to readapt himself to guerilla warcare, could not cope for the time being, the less so as these insurgents were not uniformed, but wore civilian suits and could not be seized unless caught in the act of using a weapon. In the initial stages they succeeded for the most part to disappear in the villages and towns in the disguise of harmless peasants, craftsmen, village priests, teachers etc.
As an example of the combat methods of the insurgents I would mention a combat experience of the guards company South East (a crack troop) which for a rather long time was attached to the Army Group for guarding the Staff building.
This company was withdrawn from Staff duty in the second half of 1943 and ordered to Southern Albania for antiguerilla combat. An advance scouting party, after having conscientiously done its reconnaissance work, according to the existing service regulations, reported that a certain village the name of which I forgot was free from the enemy, whereupon the company entered the village and put in a rest, that is to say the men, except the sentries, put away their arms. Then all of a sudden fire was opened on the company by civilians from all the houses and from many roofs; most of the company made for cover outside the village to carry out a systematic counter-attack. The heavy machine gun group covered the retreat with its arms. After recapture of the village, the men of the company found their comrades in a horribly mutilated condition. The bandits had cut off their tongues, ears and, partly, their hands, put out the eyes of most of the victims, and all that according to the statements of the medical officer must have been done to them while they lay wounded, viz. while they were still alive.
The members of this company to which I myself had been temporarily attached doing duty in the heavy machine gun group, gave me a detailed report of the incident of which I gave the above summary, to inform me about the death of my comrades.
These reports of atrocities of the worst kind by the insurgents kept reaching the Army Group.
Much harder hit by the guerilla war than the German troops was the Creek and Serbian civilian population. The result of the ever increasing blastings of tracks and bridges was that real food transports could not be carried out at all or only partly. This again and again endangered and at last overthrew the carefully laid plans for an effective tackling of the food crisis, particularly in Greece.
6. Execution of orders of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, O.K.H. Wehrmacht - Operational Staff.
As far as I know, the order was issued by the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht Operational Staff to all Army Groups to kill at once all enemy personnel taking part in so-called "Kommando" actions. I know that this order was not carried out in Army Croup E which later became Army Group F. For instance at the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944 a relative of the then British Prime Minister Churchill, presumably Randloph CHURCHILL, was taken prisoner with his whole force during a Kommando action on the coast of Dalmatia, without any harm having been done to these men. It did not leak out until later that it was a relative of the head of the British government who had taken part in Kommando action.
The next document is Foertsch document No. 51. I shall not offer document No. 50. Document No. 51 is on pace 21 and I offer it as exhibit Foertsch 44. It is an affidavit by Hans Juergen Freiherr von Weber, which refers to the many protests made by Foertsch against O.K.W. orders, and I want to read this part from it, it is right at the beginning:
I have known Infantry General Hermann FOERTSCH since Christmas 1943, when the General appointed me as his personal Aide-de-Camp-, two months after I, a lieutenant in the reserve, had been assigned to the staff of the Supreme Command of Army Group F (Commander in Chief "South-East"). My functions in this office can be compared to those of a private secretary in civilian life. Thus I acquired a rather far-reaching knowledge of the life and work of my superior, and although my information was far from complete and did not cover all official matters and all cases, my information depended on the extent to which I was able no take part in the numerous discussions, to listen-in to long-distance-calls, or to be informed by the General in personal conversations, I nevertheless believe that I am entitled, yes even obliged, to pass a more embracing judgment on the person of my former superior.
Although, for reason of my Jewish descent I could never be an adherent of National Socialist or military Ideas, and although I repudiate such ideas to-day more than ever. I have never had any cause to revise my opinion and my judgment of the personality of General FOERTSCH for whom I have always felt a feeling of deep reverence -- apart from the fact that the General, fully aware of my then rather precarious situation due to my Jewish descent, proved himself to my protector."
I want to ask you this about that, witness, to what extent was Herr von Weber of Jewish descent and how was it possible for him to be an officer nevertheless?
A von Weber's grandmother had been Jewish and he was I believe for half a year a member of the party, I believe in 1933. He had to leave the party because of his Jewish ancestory. Through the efforts of somebody else, he became an officer because he was the great grandson of Karl Maria von Weber, the music composer who had composed the music of Freischuetz and Oberon. If he had been slighted in any way, then this wouldn't have suited Goebbels, "because the music of Freischuetz and Oberon was more popular than many points of the party program.
Always just, full of human understanding and of exemplary philosophy of life, General FOERTSCH was never the type of the single-minded professional soldier or Prussian policeman, but an officer of particularly high intellectual level, guided by high eithic principles and animated more by cosmopolitan spirit than by feelings which were hostile to other peoples.
As far as General FOERTSCH was permitted to follow his own convictions and was not bound by orders from above, his views and his opinions in all problems of the occupied territories time and again were testimonies for his extraordinarily great conscientiousness, his feeling of responsibility, his generosity and humane reason. With complete disregard of his own person and position General FOERTSCH on no occasion was afraid to criticize supreme orders if, in his opinion, measures were at issue for which a soldier could not assume responsibility. The rejection of such orders was frequently discussed without any reserve and the reason for it was precisely established by the General in a smaller and, sometimes, also in a larger circle of the staff. The widelyknown orders, for instance, to put English prisoners of war into chains as a reprisal moved not only us, but above all General FOERTSCH to the utmost indignation. Likewise, I very clearly recall a conversation between General FOERTSCH and myself after a longer conference with Ambassador NEUBACHER, the political Plenipotentiary of the Balkan, on which occasion the General expressed his satisfaction about the fact that NEUBACHER fortunately was completely in accord with the General on the question of collective measures to be taken against the population.
The next document is Foertsch No. 52, which I offer as exhibit No. 34, this is also.....
THE PRESIDENT: Number 45.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. No. 45, I beg your pardon, 44 was the last and this is exhibit 45. It is on page 25 of the document book. It is an affidavit by the same Herr von Weber.
I shall read the part of it which deals with what is known as the Conference of Chiefs, paragraph 1. "The statements made by Foertsch in the Chiefs' conferences were, as far as I know, and I think I remember rightly, not fixed beforehand. Foertsch spoke extempory from brief notes.
Senior Army archivist Wisshaupt did not submit the minutes of the meeting of Chiefs for checking up. I, as a special staff officer should have known this. I do not know that Foertsch had the activity reports (war diaries) of the section submitted to him. I do not remember this in any case. Apart from this, however, in view of the many overflowing tasks I hardly had time to examine such compilations which were sent for the files. Consequently, it is possible that the notes on the conferences of chiefs contain mistakes. Especially a man like Wisshaupt who, like any other people was mentally inferior to Foertsch and certainly was not always able to follow Foertsch's reports 100%, a man of this kind can be expected to make mistakes occasionally when writing down certain events."
In this case of this affidavit, I should like to point out that when, on the witness stand, the defendant saw reports and communications about conferences of chiefs, he pointed out that they are not always very correct.
The next document is document Foertsch 53 on page 38 of the document book, which will be exhibit 46. It is an affidavit by Wolfgang Keilig. I shall read that part which deals with the conditions in the Southeast and how the O.K.W. dealt with the chiefs and some of the commanders in chief Southeast and what the attitude of General Foertsch in the area was and how he attempted to carry out his intentions.
I shall start with the beginning:
"I have known the former General Foertsch since the beginning of December, 1943, when I was transferred as a major and Id compile" on the staff of Amy Group F to Belgrade..."
Then I shall continue on page 29 at the top:
"In my opinion the work and the good intentions of General FOERTSCH for the Southeast were strongly hampered, and frustrated in the respective situations by the following factors against which FOERTSCH was powerless.
1. The multiplicity of the forces at work in the territory of the Southeast.
The Army Group itself was tactically under the OKW, whereas the training, supply, and equipment problems in general were under the OKH. In addition to the Supreme Command of Army Group F there were also the following powers in the Southeast; the Military Government, Generals with full powers, the diplomatic representations and numerous special offices of the Party, in particular, those of the SS, which were not subordinate to the Army Group, but were simply instructed to cooperate, All these offices had special channels and special orders, and the often carried out on the spur of the moment what they pleased to do, whenever the Army Group did not approve of their plans. On the basis of this fact there was a duplication or counter-effort in the work, which led to a great deal of unrest.
2. The fact that the Southeast was a secondary theater of war and was correspondingly treated as a side issue with respect to personnel and equipment. Whenever reserves were needed in other centers of attach, good disciplined units were withdrawn, approved deliveries of supplies would be stopped, and the attempt was made more and more to replace the withdrawn units with national SS-units of the Southeast, the formation of which FOERTSCH would gladly have avoided.
The absence of experts on the Southeast in the OKW and of political leadership, which led to the result that the measures proposed by the Army Group or the objections raised by it against orders which it regarded as unfeasible, again and again met lack of understanding and rejection. This was aggravated furthermore by the fact that in spite of the constant pressure on the part of the Army Group, the OKW did not consider it necessary to send to the Army Group, at least from time to time, responsible officers of higher rank, who were working on problems of the Southeast, and who were equipped with full powers, to personally confer about, and to orient themselves on the special conditions of the Southeast.
Thus, as far as I know, from 1941 to the beginning of 1944, only General WARLIMONT and General von BUTTLAR have been in the Southeast personally, the former 3 or 4 times and the latter once, on behalf of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and Operational Staff of the Wehrmacht (OKW/WFSt), whereas lower-ranking general staff officers, who came solely as "mail-carrier", were customarily sent.
FOERTSCH has often complained to me and to other associates about this gross lack of understanding. Another incident, which is also indicative of this condition, is, for example, the fact that Field Marshal KEITEL categorically refused the urgent plea of Field Marshal WEICHS and of General FOERTSCH to grant them an interview so that they might present problems of the Southeast, and received no one. This was in 1943, on the occasion of the state funeral of King BORIS of Bulgaria when KEITEL traveled to Sofia, and his private coach was side-tracked at the Belgrade station for several hours. Yet KEITEL was the man who was the highest authority for the 0137-theaters of war, and who presented the intended measures and proposals to Hitler. Thus ho was obliged above all others to personally gain a picture for himself of the conditions of the areas under his command.
According to common opinion General FOERTSCH was a good student of the conditions of the Southeast, and I gained the clear impression during the time when I belonged to his staff, that he used his influence for a genuine pacification of the Southeast, with the most liberal preservation of the governmental independence and of the rights of the individual Governments of the Southeast."
I shall continue on page 32 at the top: