I read from the second paragraph:
"Already at the conference mentioned above Ic conferences as well as especially on all occasions later on did it become clearly and obviously evident, that General Foertsch was definitely opposed to any hatred of the foreign population. Just in this conference mentioned he said himself, that only incorruptible justice, benevolence and care for the population could maintain peace in the Land.
"Embassador Altenburg's petition for additional supplies of wheat and potatoes to Greece met with the warmest support from General Foertsch. The same.applies to the efforts of the International Red Cross to support and feed the Greek population. For the representatives of the International Red Cross, as far as I remember from the Swiss delegate, a Mr. Bluemel, their work was cased substantially by giving them sufficient freedom of action and substantial amounts of gasoline. It was also General Foertsch's intention to accomplish the saving of the harvest in Croatia for the population there. For this purpose German troops were made available wherever possible.
But his magnanimous care for the population expressed itself also in other fields; special mention should here be made of the energetic and for the South-Eastern area exemplary fight against malaria, not only to the advantage of the army but on a much larger scale of the local population. At the South-Eastern Exhibition in the army museum in Vienna this sector, a speciality of General Foertsch, was given very large space with much instructive material. Furthermore should be mentioned the big-hearted way in which he made hospitals again available for the Greek population, the oil he made available for the production of soap for Greece and the liberal employment of German Army-Physicians for the Greek population independent of those in German army service, Petitions of the Greek population for the release of buildings for cultural purpose were granted whenever possible if they came to the attention of General Foertsch. One of the examples for this is the release of the so-called German Academy at Saloniki, which was exceptional well attended by the local population very desirous of knowledge, having been closed for a time on account of shortage of space but without the General's knowledge.
All these measures for the benefit of the local population were not only explained by General Foertsch with the fact that the result of an opposing attitude, as far instance with the Italians in the area of the 11th Italian Army, would act to the detriment of the occupation forces, but most of all also by pointing to the natural human kindness of the decent soldier.
"The Southern area in Greece was with the exception of only a few localities, occupied by the 11th Italian Army. It "distinguished itself" not only by the usually bad treatment of the population which was unnecessary but by levying contributions most of all on individual villages and plundering and extorting without any cause. This population driven away from house and farm formed the nucleus of the partisan-bands of national or communist stamp in Greece which made their first appearance in 43.
"In Croatia partisan activity found its origin in the usually brutal encroachments and extortions effected by the Ustascha especially on the orthodox Slavs and the antogonisms between the orthodox Slavs and the Moslem population. Only in Serbia were the partisans at the beginning of a more national origin, called up by General Draza Mihailovic.
Irregular troops were at the beginning involved in every one of those cases. The partisans were no regular uniforms and no markings at all. Their weapons were carried concealed. Proof for this statement is shown by numerous photographs made by reporters of the Propaganda Companies. It has to be pointed out here furthermore, that the different partisan units did in no way adhere to the Hague Convention in their manner of warfare. Especially Communist partisan units in Greece and the Tito-units in Croatia but also National-units in Serbia tried to outdo each other in atrocities not only in their attacks on German Army units but also towards their own population.
In Serbia/Croatia one could sometimes speak of a fight of all against all. The conquest of villages by German troops so far held by partisans was generally welcomed by the local population for they knew that then peace and order prevailed. But the population quailed thinking of the terror instituted by their own countrymen in case the German troops moved away.
"Traffic installations of more important Industrial plants, mines etc. were safeguarded by German troops as far as possible. On account of the inferiority in number of the troops which could be placed at individual points, surprise attacks occurred time and again where German soldiers were slaughtered, and maimed in the most bestial manner by partisans.
"If in the South-Eastern area reprisals on persons or villages were carried out, then it was only if they seemed to be inevitable in some individual cases on account of the illegal actions by the partisans in every way contrary to the Hague Convention brutally carried out against their own troops and the population guarded by them. At the Monday conferences attended by the Chiefs as well as also at other official and unofficial conferences General Foertsch always openly and without reserve voiced his criticism of measures considered wrong by him, even of those of the Army high Command, without consideration of possible reactions on his person, preventing many a mischief. I state hereby most emphatically that this attitude of his was not considered as a sometimes voiced remark of ill humor or bloating, but as his fundamental point of view for the voicing of which one needs quite a lot of courage."
The next document is Foertsch Document No. 41, which I offer as Exhibit No. 38. This is an affidavit by Werner Pfafferott. Here I will read those parts from the affidavit which concern the origin of the insurgent movement in Serbia and the Croatian insurrection. The witness Pfafferott was, as can be seen from Paragraph "c" on Page 82 of the document, amongst other things, was in May, 1941 to the summer of 1942 Ic, General Foertsch's Ic, and later on, from the fall of 1942 to the spring of 1944, he was Chief of Staff with the XVth Mountain Army Command in Croatia.
I read from Page 34, Figure 3, "Serbian Insurrection (Mihailovic)."
"This insurrection started to get serious in September 1941. (Personally I had just gone on furlough) It had not been expected to become so serious as far as I know. One had been prepared for guarding the railroad against small acts of sabotage with the insufficient military forces available. The blowing-up of railroads and bridges on a large scale which started the insurrection by Cetniks was carried out without regard to the local population. Civilian trains for instance were blown up or fired on just as well as military transports. The Cetniks were Serbian peasant dress just as generally worn, only on their black sheepskin hats the insurgents were the cap badge of their active military service. These were only recognizable at a distance of 4 - 5 meters. These insignias were also often worn by local Serbian subjects and not objected to. Therefore there was no possibility at all for the German soldier of telling the difference between partisans and hostile peasants for uniform peasant dress was worn by all Serbian peasants."
Q Witness I would like to ask yon a question about this. It seems as if the witness missed a misprint here; at tho end it should probably say: "to tell the difference between partisans and peaceful peasants." What can you say about this from your experience at that time in that area?
A I think this assumption of yours is quite correct; because to say that they were "hostile" here has no sense at all. The fact was, unfortunately, that the individual could not distinguish between the peaceful peasant and the church-goer or the partisan, or the other way around.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honor, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in German language, the word "peaceful" and "hostile" are more or loss spelt the same. It is easy to mix them up, and that is how this printing mistake probably arose. Now I continue.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, is there a possibility of an error in translation or -
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: No, if it were only that then it could have been altered in the document book. It actually is like that in the original typewritten document. I continue.
The insurgents only fought from ambush. By night they had tho trains run on mines firing then on the stopped trains intensively with numerous machine guns (even on purely civilian trains) vanishing then into their villages. As harmless peasants they even ran to give assistance after they had hidden their weapons. At places hard to overlook they attacked motorized convoys killing everyone even the wounded. In the vicinity of Belgrade a signal-unit was so attacked in the Fall of the year 1941. After long and intensive firing the partisans came out of hiding, killed the wounded, robbed the dead bodies and mutilated them (For instance by cutting off their genital-organs).
Those statements originate, among others, from tho Court testimony of one who was wounded and overlooked by the partisans while hidden in tho dense undergrowth.
The population participated, possibly in part under coercion, in the fight, but basically by passing on information and helped by hiding and feeding the insurgents and such like. In the vicinity of Belgrade a high officer was shot in this way while passing through a village by car. Before and while this well prepared and large-scale attack was in progress tho population feigned their normal daily routine aiding tho assassins later on to mix among the harmless peasants coming to give assistance. Details a's to time, place and names are impossible due to confiscation of all papers. FOERTSCH preserved his well-known tranquility in all times of danger. All available reserves were immediately sent to Serbia.
In addition FOERTSCH attempted, on orders from his Supreme Commander, to obtain reinforcements from the OKW. As hE had frequently donE before, he pointed to the fact that his own forces were completely unfit with respect to numbers, age, organization and equipment, he pointed to the danger which an initial success of the revolt would mean for the neighboring countries. The OKW promised help at a later date (help actually arrived, but it was too late, occasionally in the form of completely exhausted divisions from the Eastern front which had to be reshipped to the East before their fighting power had been restored.) For the immediate period tho OKW responded with the collective orders. All counter representations, even those which FOERTSCH advanced later, received no attention from tho OKW.
And then Fig. IV. Croation revolt. Contrary to Serbia, the revolt in Croatia could be recognized in advance. At first it resulted in inhuman attempts of the Catholic Croats, the orthodox Serbs and the Moslems to exterminate each other. The German Wehrmacht was not affected in the beginning. The Wehrmacht restricted its activities to the protection of several objects of transportation and industry. When the Italians provided more and more arms to the Serbs to fight against the Croatian Ustascha, and Mihailovic withdrew the so armed Chetniks into Serbia, the Wehrmacht went into action on a larger scale for the first time in the spring of 1942.
It did not come to any fighting because the Chetniks withdrew before the German Wehrmacht without giving battle. It was to be realized however, that from now on Chetniks as well as Tito partisans were also increasingly menacing the German Wehrmacht or the objects protected by it. Very soon (summer 1942) an increasing activity of bands started. This can be best designated as a war of all against all. According to the character of the people this war was conducted with a cruelty which is inconceivable to the Central European. Women and children were not spared. As early as 1941 -- that is at a time when the German soldier could visit any corner of Croatia without being in danger or molested -- the Serbian command submitted a photographic collection to the recruiting command South-East of atrocities committed in Croatia. Among other things it concerned women and children who had been thrown into the Drina river, and unbelievable mutilations of men, women and children, wounded persons and prisoners were killed by all concerned. Uniforms and insignias could bo seen only in individual cases. (Chetniks). Beginning 1944 the Tito partisans came out with British uniforms. I myself have not seen any units in formation, wearing uniforms. Gradually one learned by their national costumes to distinguish the Chetnik from the followers of Tito. Even this was not certain. There was no possibility to distinguish a partisan from a peaceful peasant.
Then I skip the next three sentences and continue: Civilians and officials who gave quarters to the Wehrmacht, or who sympathized with German soldiers at all, were shot as soon as the latter had moved out. It happened frequently that the mayor of a town asked the German troops to move on to the next village. Otherwise he would be shot. If the troops remained there after all, he, and sometimes even the entire male population, temporarily fled to the woods -- just in order to have an alibi to Tito. Such a mass shooting of loyal citizens by Tito followers was reported from Tuzla in the fall of 1943.
Then I continue to the next document.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, if you don't mind, I would like to read just one brief paragraph which is on page 83 of the English. The affiant is speaking about Defendant Foertsch's attitude, in the third paragraph on page 83:
His attitude towards the question of authority seems to me of groat consequence. Despite his statements as to his own weakness in relation to increasing enemy power his petition for an increase in personnel or material was rejected time and again. Embittered, FOERTSCH informed me of this conversations and said: Now tho greatest Commander in Chief of all times has faced us with a situation in which our forces could never be sufficient aside from Africa and the Eastern-front. And now senseless orders on paper are supposed to compensate for power. A strong man may use force. We could never do so. We always had to suffer for it. 1914/1988 should be a lesson to us.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honor, I welcome this fact very much, that the prosecutor read this paragraph, because from this it can be soon in what despicable and scornful terms General Foertsch had then described the greatest commander-in-chief of all time, and there is no better sign of how much he was opposed to Hitler.
The next document I submit is Foertsch No. 42 and this is Exhibit No. 39. It is on page 89 of the document book. This is an affidavit of a Dr. Alfred Detig. Dr. Alfred Detig was a war correspondent. He was also welfare officer and liaison officer of a propaganda company and has made various statements about the attitude of General Foertsch which can testify Foertsch's attitude towards the press, especially towards the propaganda of the Third Reich, and also his attitude towards the civilian population. I read the paragraph on page 90; it begins at the top.
I received the current orders through the IC, however, in cases of importance at that time and later in Arsakli near Saloniki, I was frequently called to FOERTSCH, that is I was called alone if pressing, sometimes even dangerous subjects were in question. In conversations I had mentioned that in May 1936 the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung had to dismiss me without previous notice and compensation for having reported in a manner detrimental to the interests and the reputation of the party, after I had spent seven weeks in Gestapo custody in Munich, after proceedings were started against me for malicious acts against the state and I was forbidden to exercise my profession and several bans for establishment of residence were pronounced. These events resulted in the fact that FOERTSCH gave me an unusual confidence in political questions and conducted himself with unusual frankness before me, although, properly speaking, my official rank, compared to that of FOERTSCH, was a rather modest and subordinate one. At that time, I was Lieutenant and later on captain of the Reserve.
FOERTSCH, when I met him for the first time, tole me that he hated the word Propaganda and that in his innermost he was opposed to the designation of our company, since it was misleading. FOERTSCH exerted a strong influence on the Propaganda company which was assigned to his staff and to the editing of the front newspapers, and he knew how to counteract with the greatest success against the obligations of the propaganda team towards the Propaganda Ministry and the Department OKW/W Pr. FOERTSCH affected those agencies like a red rag to a bull. By persons in authority he was as greatly hated as feared. One called him the "most difficult general" in the German Wehrmacht as seen from the point of view of the Propaganda Ministry.
And then I continue on page 91, second paragraph:
I remember the following detail in particular: Around the end of 1941 BRAUCHITSCH was dismissed and Hitler took over as Supreme Commander of the army. FOERTSCH was very excited when he received the news and for days ho prevented the publishing of these official reports in the army newspaper.
I myself at that time was under the certain impression that FOERTSCH was expecting a counter action against this significant measure and therefore ordered the news to be withheld. I feared that he would be arrested and dismissed since it was indeed flatly appalling that a decision with which the whole world was occupied and of which every Creek boot-black knew for a long time, was to be concealed by the own army newspaper.
Then on page 92, second paragraph:
Once in the summer of 1941 I was invited for supper to FOERTSCH's quarters near Athens together with a professor who gave lectures in Greece and whose name I can't remember any longer. In the course of this evening FOERTSCH spoke for several hours about his sympathy for Greece and expressed his disappointment over the poor condition of the country. I remember very well that he demanded two great aid measures for Greece, namely reforestation and artificial irrigation. FOERTSCH has frequently helped me in procuring additional food for the Greeks working in the printing shops, he made it possible for the Propaganda Company 690 that a large plot near the railroad station was tilled in order to improve the workers food supply with the vegetables grown on this land.
Excesses against the civilian population were most severely punished by the staff and the units which were assigned to the staff. Outright draconic punishments were inflicted but it rarely occurred that a cause was given for this.
The next document which I offer is Foertsch Document No. 45. No. 43 and 44 I leave out. They don't contain anything essentially now, and No. 43 also isn't quite in accordance with the certification regulations. I offer Document 45 as Exhibit No. 40. This is an affidavit, - it is on page 101, - an affidavit by Dietrich Heinceke who was in the Department Ic on the staff of Army Group E, as a special missions staff officer, and later on in 1943 in Army Group F. He states here the following, starting under Figure 2, and I submit this affidavit as evidence for the fact of Foertsch's opposition to the OKW, and also with regard to General Foertsch's attitude towards the population in contrast to the assertion made by the prosecution that Foertsch participated in an extermination plan for the population.
2.) General FOERTSCH soon impressed me as a man with an unusually well balanced mind which found expression in his extraordinary clear, generous and humorous personality; his calm manner, free of any pose and desire to create an impression, together with his groat knowledge and ability, gave every meeting with him a level far above the normal standard.
As a soldier General FOERTSCH was the most outstanding personality that I came to know during my period of military service. He showed great strength of character towards his superior, in particular toward the OKW. As I later ascertained from my own service with this office he was not at all popular there on account of his negative attitude toward the "gentlemen of the green table". On the other hand, he was highly esteemed and well liked among all the officers and enlisted men on his staff because of his calm, objective manner and his concern for their welfare.
I continue with Figure 3, page 102, at the bottom.
3.) The guiding motive of General FOERTSCH during his activity in the Balkans resulted from the military necessity of creating the most extensive pacification as possible in the interior in order to guarantee the most effective defense against an invasion from without. Any attitude toward the native population which was influenced by hatred or resentment was completely alien to him, as well as the idea of an extermination policy.
His attitude was clearly expressed in a memorandum on the situation in the Southeast which was prepared according to his instructions for the OKW and which the then Commander in Chief for the Southeast, Colonel General LOEHR, wanted to submit to HITLER in the spring of 1943.
The contents of this memorandum were essentially as follows:
The partisan organization in Serbia, which began around autumn 1941, was given an extraordinary impetus by the systematic extermination policy of the Ustascha units against the pravoslav population in Croatia. Through fear of persecution by the ustascha in particular, then later also through dissatisfaction which the corrupt system of the "State Leader", Dr. Ante PAVALIC, larger and larger portions of the population of Croatia" took to the woods". These refugees first made their appearance as insurgent bands which, without any identification as military units and fighting from ambush with hidden weapon, carried out attacks on the population and the native and occupation troops, partly in order to obtain supplies and partly with the intention of eliminating the Ustascha system. It was not until later, around the winter of 1942/43, that they were gathered into real units, partly Chetnik, partly Tito units. To an increasing extent they tried to give themselves the appearance of regular troops by wearing insignia and partial uniforms, but nevertheless they in no way adhered to the prevailing usages of war. Thus it constantly happened that prisoners were murdered and native villages were burned down together with their populations.
The growing partisan organization, which extended even into Serbia and Montenegro, led to constantly increasing unrest in the country and to a gradual paralysis of the economy and the transportation system.
In the above mentioned memorandum General FOERTSCH called for the following steps in particular in order to bring about the immediate pacification of Croatia and the adjoining countries:
a) Replacement of Pavolic by the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Dr. Macek, who enjoyed a high reputation among the people and was a capable politician and democrat.
b) Reorganization and disbanding of the Ustascha units, in order to prevent further extermination measures.
c) Recall of the German ambassador in Zagreb, SA Obergruppenfuehrer KASCHE, who was playing a pernicious role through his distorted reports to the Foreign Office.
d) Reinforcement of the German troops in order to make it possible to carry out a real pacification of the occupation area.
e) Immediate measures for the revival of economy and transportation.
I remember very well that General FOERTSCH did not call for the creation of a "graveyard tranquility" by the use of draconic methods, but rather for a real pacification of the Balkans adapted to the political possibilities of this area.
The memorandum remained without any success.
I further recall that after about the summer of 1943 General FOERTSCH advocated the recognition of the bands as regular troops for reasons of expediency, against the opinion of the OKW although he never admitted that they had a right to such recognition.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I should like to read just a few lines from the top of page 102 of this affidavit, in other words, the third line on page 102 of the English Document Book.
He wanted his soldiers to be decent in the old traditional sense and not fanatically possessed by the idea that the end justifies any means. His unusually versatile interests, which ranged far outside the purely military field were evidenced by the fact that he always selected the library of the house as his workroom. Indicative of his attitude towards the peoples of the occupied countries was the fact that on his official journeys along with military matters he always had a glance for the culture and national characteristics of the country; furthermore, that he was generous in giving the members of his staff an opportunity to become acquainted through direct contact with the country concerned. In keeping with this versatility he had a way of thinking that was completely realistic and free from prejudice.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: That is the end of the submission of Document Book II for the defense of Hermann Foertsch, and I now start with Document Book III. I will start on page five of this document book with Document No. 47 which I submit as Foertsch Exhibit No. 41. Document 46, which precedes this book, I will not offer because it is mainly a repetition of documents and testimonies which have already been submitted. This Document No. 47, Exhibit No. 41, is an affidavit by Major General Heribert von Larisch, from which I will only read one paragraph which is concerned with the methods of band warfare in Croatia. It starts at the very beginning:
In November 1942, I received an order by the Chief of Staff of the Amy group F, then Brig. General Hermann FOERTSCH, to proceed to Croatia with the staff of the Fortress Brigade 1, in order to reorganize the Croatian units employed there for the purpose of safeguarding the railway lino Zagreb-Belgrade and in order to unify the supervision and the security of these and other railway lines on Croatian soil.
The battle of the partisans against German railways was being fought with the utmost bitterness already in the winter of 1942/43. There hardly passed a day when the tracks were not destroyed at several places, when the trains were not derailed and plundered, and the stations set on fire. It was difficult to take precautions against any such partisan operations as the attackers could scarcely be recognized as enemies since they appeared in civilian clothes as well as in German or Croatian uniforms, - the little red Sovietstar was only recognizable from a close distance, - and because they had forced the civilian population, through steadily increasing terror, to take their part.
Q And I would ask you a question about this, witness; in which office was Major General von Larisch at that time?
A It was a so-called Railway Security Staff, on the BelgradeZagreb Railway.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: The next document which I offer is Foertsch Document 48, and which I submit as Exhibit 42. This is an affidavit by Stephen Buelowius, and concerns itself with the way in which the band warfare was carried out and how nevertheless General Foertsch tried with peaceful means to create peace and order in the country. I read the beginning:
"I have known General of the Infantry Hermann FOERTSCH since the spring of 1943. At that time I was transferred to the Army group E as a Fortress Engineer Commander. General of the Infantry FOERTSCH was the Chief of the General staff there. For my special tasks, i.e. supervising the constructing of field works and coastal reinforcements, I was responsible to, and subordinated to, the Chief of the General Staff in the same manner as were the remainder of the officers of the Army group staff with regard to their tasks.
If the fulfillment of my duties did not necessitate my presence in the field, I went and listened to Gen. FOERTSCH's lectures nearly every day. On principle, I was always present at his weekly lectures. Besides, I spent a lot of time with him socially."
And then on page 2 of the original, the second half:
"In general, I can state with conviction in respect to these partisan operations that the only pertinent way in which they can be described is in terms of "assassination" and "chase of human beings". As, during the day the partisans were walking about in the simple garb of a peasant or a shepherd and were seemingly pursuing their work, they were so to speak merely waiting for their prey. Whenever the opportunity offered itself for a new victirm, these apparently harmless people would seize their arms hidden in the corn, grass or behind bushes and shoot their victims from closest range.
"These bandits who were not in uniform and did not wear any badges, were assisted in their murderous activities by women and children. Thus for instance the road leading from Tripolis to the south towards the coast, near Kalamata or Sparta on the Poloponnesos, was made impassable for any supplies. The road built into the steep rock wall was under effective partisan fire and was in an area which was difficult to survey and which was speaking from a military point of view impassable, mountainous country. It was useless even to send the supplies by convoy as the escorts themselves, whether in the front or in the rear, were doomed as well. In all cases, these disturbances were caused by people who were not in uniform and were no badges, they were all natives and mainly mountain people. We are therefore dealing here with completely irregular incidents, i.e. the people who gave battle were unauthorized to carry arms, they carried them hidden and acted contrary to provisions of international law. The many shepherds of the large flock of sheep acted as agents and spies for these bandits in Greece, and their occupation was very useful indeed for such services, as flock of sheep would roam about the country. The supplies for the coastal garrisons of the Peleponnesos was affected via water or air routes, because of the partisans and the impassibility of the mountain roads. Endeavors were made to make up for the deficiency of suitable transport space by the generous constructing of concrete ships for coastal shipping purposes. The building of 2$0 - 600 of freighters made from concrete, reinforced by steel was effected in Athens/Piraeus in a shipyard, newly constructed and enlarged for this purpose. These workshops and others connected with the shipyard and distributed all over the city employed Greek labor of all sorts by the thousand. This instigation for, and the motivating spirit behind, these emergency measures calculated to meet the requirements, is entirely Gen. FOERTSCH's. He intended, apart from improving the transport space situation, to give the local population work, economic security and to raise their standard of living. At the same time and with the same aims in mind, namely the pacification and amelioration of the economic standards of the population, other industrial enterprises were called into being.
Among others there were concrete factories in Piraceus and Volos, saw mills, Bauxit mines east of Saloniki, coal mines on the south coast of the island of Crete, south of Kania; innumerable Greeks by being employed in a regular fashion thus earned their livelihood.
"General FOERTSCH gave further undeniable proof of his solicitude for the Greek population by furthering the anti-Malaria campaign. It was he who caused the construction of large drainage canals, and the improvement of the low-lying marshy country around Salonika which favored the breeding of the Malaria-carrying insects and for which purpose dredgers were used which I, as a fortress engineer, could not get hold of for the building of effective trenches in spite of incessant endeavors. Gen. FOERTSCH told me that for the time being, the battle against the Malaria breeding grounds was of greater importance.
"With respect to the stabilization of currency in Greece for the purpose of maintaining a sufficiently high standard of nutrition for the population and for marketing purposes, the cooperation between Gen. FOERTSCH and the present German Plenipotentiary for Economy, the Ambassador NEUBACHER, may be cited as evidence for his solicitude for the population and the maintenance of economic and industrial standards of the country. Gen. FOERTSCH always regretted the fact that the pay in drachmas (foreign currency) was so extremely low but stated convincingly that it was necessary in order to stabilize the currency, and as a safeguard for the Greek market. Assured food supplies for the Greek population were his primary considerations, even if the pay of the German soldier was only worth thus the equivalent of a few lemons or eggs. The Greek people's well being was what he wanted, this was a genuine wish on his part, I have no doubts whatsoever on that point."
The next exhibit is Document 49, which I offer as Exhibit 43, and it is found on page 12 of the Document Book. This is an affidavit by Otto Fichtner. Fichtner is not an officer of the Staff, but a member of the Department 1-C, a clerk, and he talks about the clerical work he had to do for General Foertsch there.
The testimony of this witness is especially characteristic with reference to General Foertsch's attitude to the NSDAP, and to the church, and finally his whole attitude towards the people throughout the occupied country. Then the witness describes a few typical incidents from the Partisan war, showing the brutality of the band members. I read from the beginning:
"I have known Lt. General (Infantry) Hermann FOERTSCH since the end of September 1941, when he was Chief of Staff of the High Command of the 12th Army, later to become Army Group E and Army Group F. At the same time I was clerk in section Ia, in which assignment I also had to do the clerical work for General FOERTSCH (taking dictation, typing, temporarily keeping the secret books and handling incoming and outgoing mail).
"As I have been working under General FOERTSCH continuously till April 1944 - altogether 2 l/2 years - in this assignment, I have a thorough insight into his activities and am in a position to give the following opinion on this man on the strength of this knowledge.
1. Attitude towards the Party:
I never noticed any relations between him and National-Socialist leaders. They would certainly have come under my knowledge, since I was also taking dictation from General FOERTSCH for an extensive private correspondence.
Very soon I had the impression that he had no connections whatever with National-Socialism. As time went on, this impression was intensified by the fact that he ignored avowed party papers which were submitted to him along with the incoming mail and, contrary to the usage, left them uninitialled, in other words returned them unread.
General FOERTSCH did not use the Hitler salute. My military salute on entering the office he returned in his ever amiable way with a "Guten Morgen" or "Guten Tag". As I should of course expect from him, he never took exception to my way of saluting without headgear just by standing to attention, which was somewhat out of keeping with regulations.