This next document which I offer is the Foertsch Document No. 38. This is Exhibit No. 35 and is an affidavit by Franz von Harling and this is concerned again with the problems of band warfare and the relation to the Higher SS and Police Leader, and also with the activity of the defendant for the benefit of the population in the Southeast. The affidavit starts as follows under "1":
"1.) I have known General FOERTSCH fairly well since 31/5/1943, the date of my transfer to the Southeast High Command. As Chief of the General. Staff he was my immediate superior with whom I came in contact almost daily both officially and unofficially."
And then under "2":
"2.) I do not entertain the slightest doubt but that from his inmost convictions General FOERTSCH repudiated everything that was deliberately calculated to injure the population of the occupied territory - in my experience any intentions of extermination, decimation and enslavement were just as alien to him as any feeling of hatred."
And then I skip the next sentence and continue:
"The following details might serve as proof of his attitude toward the population:
"a) On his own initiative General FOERTSCH did everything to remove from office the then Higher SS and Police Leader for Serbia, Gruppenfuehrer MEISSNER. Meissner himself was of the point of view that "the Jugoslavs are to blame that the beginning of the war against Russia had to be postponed and that the objectives set for the attack could not be reached." The consequence he drew from this was: "The Serbs must all be exterminated." (expressed to me in more or less these very words!) Meissner, behind whom stood Reichsfuehrer HIMMLER as a constant source of difficulty to the military command, made it a point to carry out the task assigned to him in Serbia in accordance with this attitude.
"b) General FOERTSCH made very thorough efforts to procure grain for the suffering population of Montenegro. In particular, the fact that after the collapse of Italy the food which had hitherto been delivered from there was lacking very soon led to a food situation which could only be brought back to normal through surpluses from Berbia which at that time had supplies available.
Foertsch devoted himself to this problem with special zeal by procuring truck teams, invoking the OKW, conferring with the Plenipotentiary General for Economics in Serbia, and the like.
"c) Throughout a considerable period of time General FOERTSCH, in cooperation with the Special Commissioner of the Foreign Office for the Southeast, Minister NEUBACHER, made every attempt to increase the very low efficiency of the Athens-Beigrade railroad in order to make larger shipments of food to Greece. General FOERTSCH thought and acted in a similar way with regard to Swedish supplies to the ports of Greece and its islands. I well recall one situation when I called the attention of my then Chief of the General Staff to reports which indicated the misuse of Swedish ships by the British secret service. Despite the definite injury which this represented for us at the time General FOERTSCH adopted the viewpoint that it was more important to improve the supplying of the Greek people than to with advantages for the German forces by a restriction of neutral shipping.
"d) When I ordered the cultural arrangements offered by the German propaganda units to be stopped for four weeks as a result of several cases of sabotage in which it had been proved that the population of Salonika was implicated, General FOERTSCH suggested that this ban be lifted soon.
"e) At the end of the year 1943-44 General FOERTSCH recommended a cessation of hostilities with the national Serbian resistance group (Chetniks), while knowingly accepting the dangers which this might possibly entail for the German forces. It cannot be pointed out often enough, and in the final analysis is only fully clear to one who knows the especially confused conditions in the Balkans, what a risk was assumed along with this change of policy.
Up to the end of the fighting in Croatia experience taught us that the Chetniks had by no means given up their original hostility to the German occupying power; for in spite of extensive supplies provided by us (among other things, medical materials were delivered by car in the resistance areas of the Chetniks which were afflicted with disease) attacks occurred again and again on individual bases and on small parties of German units.
"f) General FOERTSCH was in definite agreement with Tito on the prisoner-exchange station erected directly south of Agram and which was not approved by the OKW. By tacit agreement German soldiers were regularly "purchased" here in exchange for captured Tito partisans. The blessing which this arrangement represented is obvious; the number of human lives which were saved from more or less certain death after the establishment of this central exchange was high on both sides.
"g) General FOERTSCH devoted his special attention to combatting malaria. I have a vivid recollection of his numerous conversations with the Army Group physician on the occasion of the Monday chief conferences, in which he called for the elimination of the malarial focal points on the Albanian coast and at the mouth of the Narenta.
General FOERTSCH was constantly in touch with the director of the Swedish Red Cross - I recall this only from occasional conversations at which I was present.
"3.) Partisan fighting.
"I myself was not present during the first phase of the development of the partisan organization, but nevertheless I know about it from studies made on the spot. I am thoroughly informed about its later development, that is, from 31/5/1943, through my regular and direct cooperation in this problem. I should like to state the following about this:
"In its original beginnings the formation of bands in the southeast area is not to be attributed to the behavior of the German troops, but was the result of ideological differences between the different countries and within their own peoples which had already been in existence long before this time.
The war of the partisans was directed not only against the German occupation force, but also at least against those parts of their own people who had different political and ideological beliefs. The formation of bands received encouragement through the deliberate policy of the Italian occupation force of playing off one part against the other, and was widely strengthened by the Allies through the infiltration of agents, providing food and weapons, radio propaganda, etc. Every effort at settlement and pacification by the German authorities at headquarters necessarily ran up against the greatest difficulties from the very start due to aggravating factors of this kind.
I have personally seen only a few members of the Chetnik bands and this was in the autumn of 1944. These were subordinate officers of Draza Mihailovic who were in uniform and wore the long hair of the Chetniks. However, from all the reports and pictures I can remember there was no question of a standard uniform for all Chetniks. Above all, this holds true during the first period of their appearance.
I myself have not seen any members of the Tito bands; however, I remember numerous snapshots which fell into our hands as booty, and above all documentary photographs taken by the Croatian state government. It was clearly evident from these documents that there could be no question of any standard uniform.
The manner of fighting employed by the bands was not in accordance with the customs of warfare. Attacks from ambush, mine-laying on streets and railroad tracks far behind the front, the brutal slaughtering of prisoners - often even by Partisan women (invasion of the Tito bands into Southern Serbia at the end of 1944!) were just as common as all kinds of terrorist methods against their own countrymen. From my own recollection I shall point out the following violations of laws of warfare:
a) Murder of a German Luftwaffe officer after he had been shot down (he wore the Oak Leaf decoration) by Tito partisans in Croatia.
b) Mutilation of captured German soldiers (cutting off the sex organs, ears, noses) by Tito partisan women in Southwestern Serbia.
c) Raid on a civilian prison in North-eastern Croatia and murder of all the inmates (Serbs) by Croat Tito-partisans.
d) Burning down of whole villages in Croatia by Tito-partisans.
e) Continuous nightly blowing up of railway lines in Croatia (Tito-partisans) and in Greece (Elas-partisans).
f) Raids by the Cetniks on German camps and separate vehicles.
g) Massacre of inhabitants of Moslem ideology in Sarajewe in Greater Germany and in Montenegro.
h) Raids on separate vehicles of the German Wehrmacht in Croatia and killing of the soldiers thereby taken prisoner by shooting in the neck.
i) Artillery bombardment of the Government Building in Tirana by Albanian Communist partisans without previous engagements.
k) Raid by Albanian partisans on a civilian vehicle column of the German Consulate in Tirana with losses in dead and wounded including women.
l) Robber raids by the Cetniks on employees of the Serbian State Bank in Belgrade.
m) Ambushing and murdering of individual German soldiers in Skutari.
Concerning the effect of anti-partisans combat on the general situation in the South-east it may be said that this general situation was almost exclusively conditioned by the anti-partisan combat. Every effort to pacify the area met - regardless of the ways and means of approach - inevitably with the crassest and most passionately fought out ideological opposition.
That the Serbian resistance movement, with the increasing strength of the Tito-bands, fought these as enemy No. 1 and not perhaps the German occupiers, serves actually as evidence for this and at the same time exonerates the higher German command.
The ideological antagonisms were the decisive element in the breaking up of the bands which was carried out with all Balkan brutality.
For the Croat partisan it was the fulfillment of a duty imposed by national honours if he killed a Serbian Cetnik on the open street or vice versa. Moreover it was never necessary that such a Croat here should belong to the Bolshevist resistance movement. There are enough cases in which members of the Ustascha, that is of a national organization, shot down in broad daylight and without any scruples in the open market (South-West-Zagreb) or on the railway station of a large town (Agram) 100 and more Serbian volunteers who had even fought together with other Ustascha - units against the Tito-partisans. Such things have nothing to do with the German military command. They originated and developed in the country itself exclusively. They are the outcome of unrestrained passion born of blood and ideological antagonism. The Catholic Croat certainly hates the orthodox Serb and the Mussulman lies between these fires often enough burned by both sides.
It would have been possible perhaps to settle much in the differences by clever political leadership which took into consideration the actual conditions in the area. That however was denied for the Foreign Office distributed more than once to the German ambassadors such instructions as inevitably led to strengthening of the already existent antagonisms. The German ambassador in Belgrade, Minister Neubacher had, for example, to support the Serbs and to meet their demands in so far as ever it was possible. The ambassador in Zagreb, on the other hand, Minister Kasche had been instructed to further the Ustacha-Kures thereby furthering Croat chavinism in pure culture. That however means that to add to the burdens of the German troops therefore to their disadvantage the political and ideological antagonisms already prevalent on a large scale were considerably stirred up. When Minister Neubachar was appointed Spacial Plenipotentiary for the Foreign Office for the Southeast each of us in the High Command Southeast took it for granted that he had been accredited for Belgrade as wall as for Zagreb for in this way it might have been possible to attempt, with certain prospect of success, to bridge the political animosities.
Unfortunately his sphere of jurisdiction extended only to Serbia."
And than I offer the next document, which is Foertsch Document No. 39, as Exhibit No. 36. The previous one was Exhibit No. 35. Now document 39 is Exhibit No. 36, on Page 69. This is an affidavit by Dr. Gerhard Oskar Merram, and it is evidence for the fact that the Defendant General Foertsch, in his own staff, always urged criticism of and opposition to the National Socialist system. A part of it is also concerned with the method of warfare of the bands. I start "From the middle of June."
"From the middle of June 1941 up to January 1945, I was a special missions officer in the staff of the 12th Army, the army group E and F respectively, that is in the department of the Ic. First, I was entrusted with the job of keeping situation maps. From about the and of summer 1943 I had to draw up the 10-day reports of the Ic to the OKH. I reported nearly daily on this information to the former General FOERTSCH after it had been approved by the Ic. I took part in the regular Monday-"Chief conferences" from fall 1943 approximately. Unofficially, I was sometimes a guest of the former General FOERTSCH.
11. The former General FOERTSCH and department Ic of his Staff.
The former General FOERTSCH sympathized in particular with the department Ic which was outside the general frame-work of the Staff. The mental attitude of the department Ic was unambiguously anti-national socialist. This is proved only by the fact that national socialists were expelled from the department within the shortest time. Thus, I remember the case of an officer with the golden party badge who was transferred to the section. Within a few days, ha had left the Section Ic and the staff, with the assistance and by order of the former General FOERTSCH.
The mass-nights of the section Ic which the former General FOERTSCH was found of attending, often culminated in impersonations of HITLER, GOEBBELS and others which would have induced a National Socialist to take the severest measures. The younger officers among us did not restrain ourselves, because we were sure of the good-will and of the political attitude of the "Chief".
End then I turn over to Page 71. This is under "IV Band Warfare" (b) "distinguishing marks of the partisans" on Page 71, at the bottom of the page:
"b) distinguishing marks of the partisans:
At the beginning, the partisan units included only civilians, who carried concealed weapons. In the course of the fight between national and Communist partisans which became more and more violent, their members began to wear certain badges, mostly on their caps. But these were not recognizable at a distance. A regular uniform was quite out of the question, even at the end of 1944. The members of the partisan-units wore either civil clothes or uniforms or parts of uniforms respectively of widely varied nations.
c) Method of fighting of the partisans.
At the beginning, the partisans fought as civilians, I remember many reports on shootings at German soldiers from an ambush. These sudden attacks were mostly carried out in this way that the members of the partisan-units, also woman, who were working in the fields, let the German soldiers pass and shot at them, as soon as they turned their backs, with weapons which they had hidden previously. First of all, the partisans committed acts of sabotage of every kind, in particular against the communication lines (mines, disconnecting of rails, blockings) as well as attacks from an ambush on individual German soldiers and weak units. Atrocities were always the order of the day, that is between national and Communist partisans, especially between Serbs and Croats, as well as on both of the partisan-units and towards the members of the German Occupation-Forces.
I remember many reports and photos of incredibly mutilated bodies.
Only as late as in 1944, TITO tried to fight with larger units in Croatia, besides the cruel guerrilla warfare. But the atrocities, even of the larger partisan units, did not stop.
Then as next document I offer....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, I would like to read into the record one paragraph which appears on Page 71, under "IV, The Fights against Partisans." It starts, "I can declare the following as far as the fights against partisans are concerned."
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: "s) the origin of the fights against the partisans: Partisans activity in the Balkans is the historic form of opposition. There were partisans before the German occupation, and there are partisans today. After the beginning of the German occupation, the partisans appeared first in Serbia. Besides the beginning of the German occupation, the partisans appeared first in Serbia. Besides the Communist partisans, there were the national Serbian partisans of Draza Mihailovic. The cause of the formation of partisans was not German measures, but simple the opposition of radical forces. Only later on there were Communist partisans in Croatia under Tito. Here, the cause for the formation of partisans -- in my opinion -- was not only the historic tradition but also the German support of the USTASCHA- Government, which was rejected by large parts of the Croatian people. The contrast between Serbs and Croats was the reason for the Serbian-national and the CroatianCommunist partisans fighting each other 'with increasing intensity. Simultaneously, each group fought against the German Occupation Forces."
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Now, I offer Document Foertsch No. 40 as Exhibit No. 37, on Page 76 of the Document Book. This concerns, firstly, the welfare measures which General Foertsch took for the population, and secondly this deals with the question of whether the partisan bands were regular troops and whether they had standard uniforms and insignia, and how they were to be recognized. I will read the following part of this affidavit. This is an affidavit by Wilhelm Hammer, from whom another affidavit has already been presented in another connection. At that time Hammer was Ic with the Commander in Southern Greece, and in the autumn 1942 he was transferred as deputy Ic to the staff of General Foertsch.
I read from the second paragraph:
"Already at the conference mentioned above Ic conferences as well as especially on all occasions later on did it become clearly and obviously evident, that General Foertsch was definitely opposed to any hatred of the foreign population. Just in this conference mentioned he said himself, that only incorruptible justice, benevolence and care for the population could maintain peace in the Land.
"Embassador Altenburg's petition for additional supplies of wheat and potatoes to Greece met with the warmest support from General Foertsch. The same.applies to the efforts of the International Red Cross to support and feed the Greek population. For the representatives of the International Red Cross, as far as I remember from the Swiss delegate, a Mr. Bluemel, their work was cased substantially by giving them sufficient freedom of action and substantial amounts of gasoline. It was also General Foertsch's intention to accomplish the saving of the harvest in Croatia for the population there. For this purpose German troops were made available wherever possible.
But his magnanimous care for the population expressed itself also in other fields; special mention should here be made of the energetic and for the South-Eastern area exemplary fight against malaria, not only to the advantage of the army but on a much larger scale of the local population. At the South-Eastern Exhibition in the army museum in Vienna this sector, a speciality of General Foertsch, was given very large space with much instructive material. Furthermore should be mentioned the big-hearted way in which he made hospitals again available for the Greek population, the oil he made available for the production of soap for Greece and the liberal employment of German Army-Physicians for the Greek population independent of those in German army service, Petitions of the Greek population for the release of buildings for cultural purpose were granted whenever possible if they came to the attention of General Foertsch. One of the examples for this is the release of the so-called German Academy at Saloniki, which was exceptional well attended by the local population very desirous of knowledge, having been closed for a time on account of shortage of space but without the General's knowledge.
All these measures for the benefit of the local population were not only explained by General Foertsch with the fact that the result of an opposing attitude, as far instance with the Italians in the area of the 11th Italian Army, would act to the detriment of the occupation forces, but most of all also by pointing to the natural human kindness of the decent soldier.
"The Southern area in Greece was with the exception of only a few localities, occupied by the 11th Italian Army. It "distinguished itself" not only by the usually bad treatment of the population which was unnecessary but by levying contributions most of all on individual villages and plundering and extorting without any cause. This population driven away from house and farm formed the nucleus of the partisan-bands of national or communist stamp in Greece which made their first appearance in 43.
"In Croatia partisan activity found its origin in the usually brutal encroachments and extortions effected by the Ustascha especially on the orthodox Slavs and the antogonisms between the orthodox Slavs and the Moslem population. Only in Serbia were the partisans at the beginning of a more national origin, called up by General Draza Mihailovic.
Irregular troops were at the beginning involved in every one of those cases. The partisans were no regular uniforms and no markings at all. Their weapons were carried concealed. Proof for this statement is shown by numerous photographs made by reporters of the Propaganda Companies. It has to be pointed out here furthermore, that the different partisan units did in no way adhere to the Hague Convention in their manner of warfare. Especially Communist partisan units in Greece and the Tito-units in Croatia but also National-units in Serbia tried to outdo each other in atrocities not only in their attacks on German Army units but also towards their own population.
In Serbia/Croatia one could sometimes speak of a fight of all against all. The conquest of villages by German troops so far held by partisans was generally welcomed by the local population for they knew that then peace and order prevailed. But the population quailed thinking of the terror instituted by their own countrymen in case the German troops moved away.
"Traffic installations of more important Industrial plants, mines etc. were safeguarded by German troops as far as possible. On account of the inferiority in number of the troops which could be placed at individual points, surprise attacks occurred time and again where German soldiers were slaughtered, and maimed in the most bestial manner by partisans.
"If in the South-Eastern area reprisals on persons or villages were carried out, then it was only if they seemed to be inevitable in some individual cases on account of the illegal actions by the partisans in every way contrary to the Hague Convention brutally carried out against their own troops and the population guarded by them. At the Monday conferences attended by the Chiefs as well as also at other official and unofficial conferences General Foertsch always openly and without reserve voiced his criticism of measures considered wrong by him, even of those of the Army high Command, without consideration of possible reactions on his person, preventing many a mischief. I state hereby most emphatically that this attitude of his was not considered as a sometimes voiced remark of ill humor or bloating, but as his fundamental point of view for the voicing of which one needs quite a lot of courage."
The next document is Foertsch Document No. 41, which I offer as Exhibit No. 38. This is an affidavit by Werner Pfafferott. Here I will read those parts from the affidavit which concern the origin of the insurgent movement in Serbia and the Croatian insurrection. The witness Pfafferott was, as can be seen from Paragraph "c" on Page 82 of the document, amongst other things, was in May, 1941 to the summer of 1942 Ic, General Foertsch's Ic, and later on, from the fall of 1942 to the spring of 1944, he was Chief of Staff with the XVth Mountain Army Command in Croatia.
I read from Page 34, Figure 3, "Serbian Insurrection (Mihailovic)."
"This insurrection started to get serious in September 1941. (Personally I had just gone on furlough) It had not been expected to become so serious as far as I know. One had been prepared for guarding the railroad against small acts of sabotage with the insufficient military forces available. The blowing-up of railroads and bridges on a large scale which started the insurrection by Cetniks was carried out without regard to the local population. Civilian trains for instance were blown up or fired on just as well as military transports. The Cetniks were Serbian peasant dress just as generally worn, only on their black sheepskin hats the insurgents were the cap badge of their active military service. These were only recognizable at a distance of 4 - 5 meters. These insignias were also often worn by local Serbian subjects and not objected to. Therefore there was no possibility at all for the German soldier of telling the difference between partisans and hostile peasants for uniform peasant dress was worn by all Serbian peasants."
Q Witness I would like to ask yon a question about this. It seems as if the witness missed a misprint here; at tho end it should probably say: "to tell the difference between partisans and peaceful peasants." What can you say about this from your experience at that time in that area?
A I think this assumption of yours is quite correct; because to say that they were "hostile" here has no sense at all. The fact was, unfortunately, that the individual could not distinguish between the peaceful peasant and the church-goer or the partisan, or the other way around.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honor, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in German language, the word "peaceful" and "hostile" are more or loss spelt the same. It is easy to mix them up, and that is how this printing mistake probably arose. Now I continue.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, is there a possibility of an error in translation or -
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: No, if it were only that then it could have been altered in the document book. It actually is like that in the original typewritten document. I continue.
The insurgents only fought from ambush. By night they had tho trains run on mines firing then on the stopped trains intensively with numerous machine guns (even on purely civilian trains) vanishing then into their villages. As harmless peasants they even ran to give assistance after they had hidden their weapons. At places hard to overlook they attacked motorized convoys killing everyone even the wounded. In the vicinity of Belgrade a signal-unit was so attacked in the Fall of the year 1941. After long and intensive firing the partisans came out of hiding, killed the wounded, robbed the dead bodies and mutilated them (For instance by cutting off their genital-organs).
Those statements originate, among others, from tho Court testimony of one who was wounded and overlooked by the partisans while hidden in tho dense undergrowth.
The population participated, possibly in part under coercion, in the fight, but basically by passing on information and helped by hiding and feeding the insurgents and such like. In the vicinity of Belgrade a high officer was shot in this way while passing through a village by car. Before and while this well prepared and large-scale attack was in progress tho population feigned their normal daily routine aiding tho assassins later on to mix among the harmless peasants coming to give assistance. Details a's to time, place and names are impossible due to confiscation of all papers. FOERTSCH preserved his well-known tranquility in all times of danger. All available reserves were immediately sent to Serbia.
In addition FOERTSCH attempted, on orders from his Supreme Commander, to obtain reinforcements from the OKW. As hE had frequently donE before, he pointed to the fact that his own forces were completely unfit with respect to numbers, age, organization and equipment, he pointed to the danger which an initial success of the revolt would mean for the neighboring countries. The OKW promised help at a later date (help actually arrived, but it was too late, occasionally in the form of completely exhausted divisions from the Eastern front which had to be reshipped to the East before their fighting power had been restored.) For the immediate period tho OKW responded with the collective orders. All counter representations, even those which FOERTSCH advanced later, received no attention from tho OKW.
And then Fig. IV. Croation revolt. Contrary to Serbia, the revolt in Croatia could be recognized in advance. At first it resulted in inhuman attempts of the Catholic Croats, the orthodox Serbs and the Moslems to exterminate each other. The German Wehrmacht was not affected in the beginning. The Wehrmacht restricted its activities to the protection of several objects of transportation and industry. When the Italians provided more and more arms to the Serbs to fight against the Croatian Ustascha, and Mihailovic withdrew the so armed Chetniks into Serbia, the Wehrmacht went into action on a larger scale for the first time in the spring of 1942.
It did not come to any fighting because the Chetniks withdrew before the German Wehrmacht without giving battle. It was to be realized however, that from now on Chetniks as well as Tito partisans were also increasingly menacing the German Wehrmacht or the objects protected by it. Very soon (summer 1942) an increasing activity of bands started. This can be best designated as a war of all against all. According to the character of the people this war was conducted with a cruelty which is inconceivable to the Central European. Women and children were not spared. As early as 1941 -- that is at a time when the German soldier could visit any corner of Croatia without being in danger or molested -- the Serbian command submitted a photographic collection to the recruiting command South-East of atrocities committed in Croatia. Among other things it concerned women and children who had been thrown into the Drina river, and unbelievable mutilations of men, women and children, wounded persons and prisoners were killed by all concerned. Uniforms and insignias could bo seen only in individual cases. (Chetniks). Beginning 1944 the Tito partisans came out with British uniforms. I myself have not seen any units in formation, wearing uniforms. Gradually one learned by their national costumes to distinguish the Chetnik from the followers of Tito. Even this was not certain. There was no possibility to distinguish a partisan from a peaceful peasant.
Then I skip the next three sentences and continue: Civilians and officials who gave quarters to the Wehrmacht, or who sympathized with German soldiers at all, were shot as soon as the latter had moved out. It happened frequently that the mayor of a town asked the German troops to move on to the next village. Otherwise he would be shot. If the troops remained there after all, he, and sometimes even the entire male population, temporarily fled to the woods -- just in order to have an alibi to Tito. Such a mass shooting of loyal citizens by Tito followers was reported from Tuzla in the fall of 1943.
Then I continue to the next document.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, if you don't mind, I would like to read just one brief paragraph which is on page 83 of the English. The affiant is speaking about Defendant Foertsch's attitude, in the third paragraph on page 83:
His attitude towards the question of authority seems to me of groat consequence. Despite his statements as to his own weakness in relation to increasing enemy power his petition for an increase in personnel or material was rejected time and again. Embittered, FOERTSCH informed me of this conversations and said: Now tho greatest Commander in Chief of all times has faced us with a situation in which our forces could never be sufficient aside from Africa and the Eastern-front. And now senseless orders on paper are supposed to compensate for power. A strong man may use force. We could never do so. We always had to suffer for it. 1914/1988 should be a lesson to us.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honor, I welcome this fact very much, that the prosecutor read this paragraph, because from this it can be soon in what despicable and scornful terms General Foertsch had then described the greatest commander-in-chief of all time, and there is no better sign of how much he was opposed to Hitler.
The next document I submit is Foertsch No. 42 and this is Exhibit No. 39. It is on page 89 of the document book. This is an affidavit of a Dr. Alfred Detig. Dr. Alfred Detig was a war correspondent. He was also welfare officer and liaison officer of a propaganda company and has made various statements about the attitude of General Foertsch which can testify Foertsch's attitude towards the press, especially towards the propaganda of the Third Reich, and also his attitude towards the civilian population. I read the paragraph on page 90; it begins at the top.
I received the current orders through the IC, however, in cases of importance at that time and later in Arsakli near Saloniki, I was frequently called to FOERTSCH, that is I was called alone if pressing, sometimes even dangerous subjects were in question. In conversations I had mentioned that in May 1936 the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung had to dismiss me without previous notice and compensation for having reported in a manner detrimental to the interests and the reputation of the party, after I had spent seven weeks in Gestapo custody in Munich, after proceedings were started against me for malicious acts against the state and I was forbidden to exercise my profession and several bans for establishment of residence were pronounced. These events resulted in the fact that FOERTSCH gave me an unusual confidence in political questions and conducted himself with unusual frankness before me, although, properly speaking, my official rank, compared to that of FOERTSCH, was a rather modest and subordinate one. At that time, I was Lieutenant and later on captain of the Reserve.
FOERTSCH, when I met him for the first time, tole me that he hated the word Propaganda and that in his innermost he was opposed to the designation of our company, since it was misleading. FOERTSCH exerted a strong influence on the Propaganda company which was assigned to his staff and to the editing of the front newspapers, and he knew how to counteract with the greatest success against the obligations of the propaganda team towards the Propaganda Ministry and the Department OKW/W Pr. FOERTSCH affected those agencies like a red rag to a bull. By persons in authority he was as greatly hated as feared. One called him the "most difficult general" in the German Wehrmacht as seen from the point of view of the Propaganda Ministry.
And then I continue on page 91, second paragraph:
I remember the following detail in particular: Around the end of 1941 BRAUCHITSCH was dismissed and Hitler took over as Supreme Commander of the army. FOERTSCH was very excited when he received the news and for days ho prevented the publishing of these official reports in the army newspaper.
I myself at that time was under the certain impression that FOERTSCH was expecting a counter action against this significant measure and therefore ordered the news to be withheld. I feared that he would be arrested and dismissed since it was indeed flatly appalling that a decision with which the whole world was occupied and of which every Creek boot-black knew for a long time, was to be concealed by the own army newspaper.
Then on page 92, second paragraph: