Q Beginning with No. 1:
"1) I recollect the following significant orders and declarations of Hitler as well as of Field-Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jode regarding the conduct of the Commands in the South East; Hitler ordered, about the beginning of 1942, that the prosecution of members of the Croatian Ustascha should he discontinued which had been started by General Bader in agreement with the Commander South-East because of excesses in the fighting against the insurgents. On the contrary, he tried to present the way of action of the Ustascha as an example to the German leadership, which he called "too soft".
For the same reasons Hitler repeatedly declared that the German Generals in the South-East should take Tito as an example, in order to get the necessary toughness.
Keitel did not submit a memorandum by Colonel General Loehr to Hitler, because it was apt to appear as an evasion of the draconic measures intended by Hitler. Jodl rejected, following a command and by order of Hitler, at the beginning of 1942, plans, submitted to him by General Kuntze for the further dealings with the insurgent movement in the South-East, as "too mild".
"2) From my first informatory journey in the Southeast I recollect the following facts:
In Spring 1942 I got Jodl, after persistent requests, to let me travel to the South-East in order to gather first-hand impressions of the situation. Foertsch, receiving me at the Belgrade air-port, had, for that purpose, prepared a drive from Belgrade to Serajevo. Accompanied by General von Glaise, we covered that distance in a day.
We drove in automobiles which were escorted by armoured cars. Likewise, at each stop military security measures were taken. A German unit we met on our way, marched under cover of security detachments. There were no incidents. In north-western Serbia we passed several villages which had been destroyed in the course and as a result of the fighting but were still partly inhabited.
My observations in this region as well as on other occasions that the population did not show any hostility, were answered by Foertsch and Glaise by stating
a) that the German soldiers still enjoyed the respect of most of the Serbs,
b) that behind each seemingly peaceable inhabitant an insurgent may be disguised, appearing today as a peasant, but to-morrow again as a franc-tireur.
In many places we also met indigenous forces in uniform who had placed themselves in the service of the German occupational power. Next day we observed for a time an action against bands in the Sarajevo area. On this occasion the immeasurable difficulties which the German commands encountered in the South-East became clearly evident.
The enemy never disclosed his whereabouts, but kept his positions stubbornly, broken into the smallest groups, hidden in woods and caves, and emerging treacherously again behind the troops who had combed out the area. The German troops at that time were deficient in the necessary equipment to follow the enemy up in that inaccessible territory of mountains and forests. The Croatian Domobrans, on the other hand, could hardly have been used in view of their equipment and age, but also because of their lack of military discipline. Nor was it possible to rely on the Italians.
Some captured partisans I saw made a completely savage impression and did not show in the least the character, let alone the insignia of a regular unit or militia.
A discussion with General Bader, who, like Foertsch and Glaise, faced the unusual military task with the greatest earnestness had mainly the purpose of gaining the assistance of the OKW against acts of subordination and excesses on the part of the Croatian Ustascha through my intervention.
My main efforts after my return from this journey were directed both to this aim and to a reinforcement of the German troops and an improvement in their equipment.
The next document, which I offer is document No. 33 on page 39, which I offer as Exhibit No. 31. It is an affidavit by Theodor Jestrabek and it concerns the efforts made by General Foertsch to protect the population and the economic measures thereby to improve their situation. It also deals with his attitude toward the Jewish question in the East.
I read as follows:
"In June 1941 in Athens, the Head-Quarters of the AOK 12, I made, on the occasion of an official report, the acquaintance of the former General Foertsch, who, a short while before, had been appointed Chief of the General Staff of that unit.
I had been serving for some time on that staff as a Captain d.R.z.V. and was entrusted with the tasks of a Supply Officer. In the same capacity I later served under Foertsch at Salonica in the staffs of the Army Group E and finally at Belgrade in that of the Army Group F, until the transfer of General Foertsch in Spring 1944. Apart from my tasks as a Supply Officer I had to perform extensive welfare work which embraced all the members of the staff including the foreign auxiliary workers employed with the staff such as Italians, Greeks, Serbs, Croats.
In order to be able to carry out that welfare work, an agricultural enterprise was formed at Foertsch's suggestion with the purpose of producing the additional foodstuffs required for the supply of kitchens, canteens on special occasions without tapping the resources of the country, that means, with our own means, for example, by way of cultivation of waste land, creation of vegetable gardens, raising of cattle, etc. In the execution of this welfare and economical tasks I was direct under the Chief of Staff.
"Foertsch always used his influence for a just treatment of the population of the South-East. It was contrary to his whole nature and to his outspoken humanity to apply unjustly harsh measures. Foertsch saw in a contented population the best guarantee for the security of the occupation force.
"Even in the staff itself the measures ordered showed his attitude towards the population. When, in autumn 1941, an order by Goering banned the participation of civilian employees, even of those who were employed directly in soldiers' kitchens, canteens, officers' club etc., in the supply for the troops, Foertsch ordered, in direct opposition to the Goering order, that the indigenous civilian employees might continue to take part in the supply for the troops.
"In addition, at all commands in the occupied territory messes were established for the civilian employees and the food supplies were taken from Army stocks. But he did not only look after the civilians employed with the German agencies, but he also endeavored to help the rest of the population of the occupied territory, to the best of his ability. As an evidence I should like to point out, that the feeding of the population, the deliveries from the Red Cross, were to a large extent helped and furthered by Foertsch in particular in Greece.
"Furthermore, I remember repeated orders issued by Foertsch purporting the protection of public and private property. Any removal if installations was strictly prohibited or made dependent on previous explicit permission.
"When, in autumn 1943, the Army Group Foertsch took over the Municipal Estate Rewa at Belgrade, the socalled- fore-court with vegetable fields of about 60 hectars was left to the Municipality of Belgrade so as not to endanger the supply of vegetables for the municipal employees."
I shall skip the next paragraph and read the last one.
"Significant for his attitude to the Jewish question is the following fact: I was in close contact with the population in the exercise of my duties as a Supply Officer under Foertsch in the Southeast area. He knew and approved that I was dealing with many Jewish firms and suppliers, particularly at Salonica."
The next document is Document No. 34 which I offer as Exhibit No. 32, an affidavit by Christoph von L'Estocq. I shall only read a brief extract. He also speaks about Foertsch's attitude towards the civilian population in the Balkans and the collective measures of reprisal. It starts:
"The former General Hermann Foertsch has been known to me since the summer of 1942 when I was transferred to the staff of the former Army High Command 12 at Salonika. Until 31 January 1943 I have served under Foertsch as 1st Adjutant on the staff of the AOK 12, respectively later Army Group E."
I shall skip the next ten sentences and I shall come, on page 42, to:
"Above all, Foertsch believed in justice which he applied to everyone whether German or foreigner, whether young or old, soldier or civilian, High Commander or groom, once he had acquired for himself an exact picture of the man and his problems.
"Terror, arbitrary rule, ill treatment, pillage, enslavement, not to mention extermination, did not exist in his vocabulary. His thinking and striving never were directed towards such things and I claim that Foertsch was the last person who would ever have recommended to his commander measures of the above mentioned kind against the population that had come to know him personally. Thus, Foertsch also looked upon collective measures, such as the taking of hostages as ordered by the OKW and other reprisals very critically, however as being sometimes unavoidable. At any rate, I have never heard any utterance from his mouth that could have been understood as an approval of such measures."
The next document is Foertsch Document No. 36. I shall not read from 35. Foertsch No. 36 which I beg to offer is Exhibit No. 33 is on page 49. It is an affidavit by Hans Erxleben. He was as becomes clear from the introduction, a Colonel and Army Signal Corps Leader with the Staff of the Army High Command in Salonika. Foertsch was his immediate superior. I shall read only the part which begins on the bottom of page 49.
"His conferences were particularly witty and humorous, party sharply ironical, especially, as to measures and directives of the OKW and other higher up agencies. Every participant at those conferences could immediately feel FOERTSCH's inner opposition to the whole system.
"All his endeavours were directed towards securing the safety of the troop and of the communications to the rear. Inhuman, criminal actions or inclinations to exterminate whole groups of people were entirely foreign to his whole character. Intentional actions of that kind cannot even be discussed. The extermination of the Jews was not favored by him or promoted. When I related to him, at the occasion of a oral report, that Jews had been driven together around Saloniki, which I had witnessed I could but notice his disagreement with this senseless measure. Since this herding together was not carried out by military forces, but by the Gestapo and (S.D.) he could not interfere.
"He tried particularly to improve living conditions of the Greek civilian population, as far as it was in his power. He always particularly supported the endeavours of the Reich plenipotentiary in Athens to stabilize Greek currency.
Also he took a vigorous interest in the food situation of the civilian population."
The next document will be Foertsch Document No. 37 which I offer as Exhibit No. 34, an affidavit by Dr. Emil Hans Haller and it tries to prove at least that General Foertsch, unlike the assertion of the prosecution concerning extermination tendencies, did everything to make the situation of the population bearable. There follows as well the nature and character of bandit warfare and the manner in which members of the bands attacked German troops.
It begins on page 52 of the document book. We can see from this that he as an orderly officer of the 1st Adjutant belonged to Army Group E and F or the staff of the AOK and he also deputized for the Staff Officer of the Chief of the General Staff. As far as the general contents are concerned, I shall read a sentence on page 52-A -- or perhaps it is still on page 52 in the English version, the last sentence probably:
"I know that General Foertsch complained again and again that the men "higher up" were insufficiently acquainted with conditions in the Balkans and therefore very frequently adopted opinions that were completely at variance with realities."
On the next page, skipping one sentence, I shall read:
"I am convinced that Foertsch did everything in his power whenever this was left to his personal decision, to make the situation created by the occupation and the guerilla warfare as bearable as possible for the suffering population. So far as I remember, FOERTSCH especially concerned himself with the stabilization of the depreciating Greek currency and with exhausting every possibility in order to keep the occupation costs as low as possible as primary conditions for the economic recovery of the country.
"In this connection I do not wish to omit that the partisan fighting in the Southeast, in the opinion of all those engaged in it, cannot be given the character of normal military actions. By this I understand such actions as could be judged according to international military law. The reason for this lies in the circumstance that in general the bands themselves did not bother about these agreements, even if on occasion and in certain localities they attached importance to being treated as regular military formations.
"In the Balkans a boy is likely to be born, so to speak, with his rifle in his hand; the struggle of all against all -- an armed struggle -- has been a characteristic of this focus of unrest at the "edge of Europe" for generations.
The customary standards of the civilized world cannot, accordingly, be applied directly to the Balkans. I myself constantly had the impression that the conditions prevailing in Germany at the time of the Thirty Years War had been perpetuated there in the Balkans. The partisan war was more or less a struggle -whether waged under nationalist or other political slogans (socialist, communist) -- of those who had nothing more to lose against those from whom they hoped, by plundering or destroying them, to get something for their momentary needs or even for later on. The peasant of today is the plunderer of tomorrow who has lost everything himself through plundering. One can speak of uniformed and militarily organized units only by way of exception and then only with the greatest qualifications. How little the laws of warfare were observed by the bands I can show from one example which I recall particularly well because it concerns my own brother who was captured by the partisans on the Peloponnesus in 1943. The Italians captured with him at the same time who did not agree to join the band were shot off hand. A few days after his capture my brother himself was released when the band was surrounded by German forces after he had escaped shooting several times only due to the circumstance that the well-intentioned elements outnumbered the radicals who advocated the immediate shooting of all prisoners."
THE PRESIDENT: We will interrupt here at this time, Dr. Kauschenbach, and take our noon recess.
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours.
16 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
HERMANN FOETSCH - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued
DUR. RAUSCHENBACH: Before the recess I stopped at Foertsch Document No. 37 which I offered as Exhibit No. 34. This it on page 54 of the document book. I continue where I left off, where we were speaking about how the brother of the witness was captured by the bands. I continue in roughly the middle of the page.
"My brother described this band to me as being led by a major of of the former Greek army who had with him a former gymnasium professor from Athens as his commissar. A large part of the men had no uniforms and taken together resembled a motley band of robbers which in addition outright adventurers and political muddleheads, also included a number of former peasants who in the course of the perpetual plundering had lost all their property and had now "taken to the woods" themselves. This impression has been constantly confirmed for me in a large number of conversations with well-informed officers. I can also remember very well that these bands were the terror of the entire country, that is the peace-loving and hard-working part of the native population, who sought protection against them from the German Wehrmacht.
"Accordingly, the partisan war was primarily waged not against but rather for the country. It was not the occupation or the exploitation of the country by the country by the occupying power which kept the people from work and prevented the recovery of the economy but rather the bands roaming and plundering through the country as partisans who in time brought about chaotic conditions in spite of all our efforts, because of the weakness of the occupation units, and at first made normal life difficult and then to a large extent impossible.
From a military point of view the "war" in the Balkans was a perpetual war of attrition with a sly and crafty, as well as cruel enemy."
And then I skip the next sentence and continue on page 55:
"I am firmly convinced, and gained this impression from many remarks of the Chief, that he never regarded the war against the partisans as an end in itself, more or less like an extermination campaign, but rather as a military and economic necessity."
I skip the next five sentences and continue as follows:
"From his own philosophy of life FOERTSCH repudiated the way of life and tendencies of National Socialism. It was not at all in his line. Towards officers of the SS, as well as toward the SS in general, he shoed a reserve modified only by convention or by official necessity, which might wound their feelings and which perhaps in some cases was even intended to do so.
"He was deeply interested in the free expression of opinion in "his" soldiers' newspaper, the "Watch in the Southeast", just as he was always concerned with raising the intellectual and cultural level on his staff".
And then on page 56 another paragraph:
"Next to dishonesty it was chiefly stupidity which was repugnant to FOETSCH, even if he did not think too severely of this, either. Characteristic here is a resigned remark - as in general at the end of our acquaintance FOERTSCH was dominated by a mood of strong resignation - of the military author: "If ever in my life I should write a book, I would call it 'The Arse-holes of the Wehrmacht'. I have had enough material for this for a long time. The first 10 pages are intended for the OKW."
This next document which I offer is the Foertsch Document No. 38. This is Exhibit No. 35 and is an affidavit by Franz von Harling and this is concerned again with the problems of band warfare and the relation to the Higher SS and Police Leader, and also with the activity of the defendant for the benefit of the population in the Southeast. The affidavit starts as follows under "1":
"1.) I have known General FOERTSCH fairly well since 31/5/1943, the date of my transfer to the Southeast High Command. As Chief of the General. Staff he was my immediate superior with whom I came in contact almost daily both officially and unofficially."
And then under "2":
"2.) I do not entertain the slightest doubt but that from his inmost convictions General FOERTSCH repudiated everything that was deliberately calculated to injure the population of the occupied territory - in my experience any intentions of extermination, decimation and enslavement were just as alien to him as any feeling of hatred."
And then I skip the next sentence and continue:
"The following details might serve as proof of his attitude toward the population:
"a) On his own initiative General FOERTSCH did everything to remove from office the then Higher SS and Police Leader for Serbia, Gruppenfuehrer MEISSNER. Meissner himself was of the point of view that "the Jugoslavs are to blame that the beginning of the war against Russia had to be postponed and that the objectives set for the attack could not be reached." The consequence he drew from this was: "The Serbs must all be exterminated." (expressed to me in more or less these very words!) Meissner, behind whom stood Reichsfuehrer HIMMLER as a constant source of difficulty to the military command, made it a point to carry out the task assigned to him in Serbia in accordance with this attitude.
"b) General FOERTSCH made very thorough efforts to procure grain for the suffering population of Montenegro. In particular, the fact that after the collapse of Italy the food which had hitherto been delivered from there was lacking very soon led to a food situation which could only be brought back to normal through surpluses from Berbia which at that time had supplies available.
Foertsch devoted himself to this problem with special zeal by procuring truck teams, invoking the OKW, conferring with the Plenipotentiary General for Economics in Serbia, and the like.
"c) Throughout a considerable period of time General FOERTSCH, in cooperation with the Special Commissioner of the Foreign Office for the Southeast, Minister NEUBACHER, made every attempt to increase the very low efficiency of the Athens-Beigrade railroad in order to make larger shipments of food to Greece. General FOERTSCH thought and acted in a similar way with regard to Swedish supplies to the ports of Greece and its islands. I well recall one situation when I called the attention of my then Chief of the General Staff to reports which indicated the misuse of Swedish ships by the British secret service. Despite the definite injury which this represented for us at the time General FOERTSCH adopted the viewpoint that it was more important to improve the supplying of the Greek people than to with advantages for the German forces by a restriction of neutral shipping.
"d) When I ordered the cultural arrangements offered by the German propaganda units to be stopped for four weeks as a result of several cases of sabotage in which it had been proved that the population of Salonika was implicated, General FOERTSCH suggested that this ban be lifted soon.
"e) At the end of the year 1943-44 General FOERTSCH recommended a cessation of hostilities with the national Serbian resistance group (Chetniks), while knowingly accepting the dangers which this might possibly entail for the German forces. It cannot be pointed out often enough, and in the final analysis is only fully clear to one who knows the especially confused conditions in the Balkans, what a risk was assumed along with this change of policy.
Up to the end of the fighting in Croatia experience taught us that the Chetniks had by no means given up their original hostility to the German occupying power; for in spite of extensive supplies provided by us (among other things, medical materials were delivered by car in the resistance areas of the Chetniks which were afflicted with disease) attacks occurred again and again on individual bases and on small parties of German units.
"f) General FOERTSCH was in definite agreement with Tito on the prisoner-exchange station erected directly south of Agram and which was not approved by the OKW. By tacit agreement German soldiers were regularly "purchased" here in exchange for captured Tito partisans. The blessing which this arrangement represented is obvious; the number of human lives which were saved from more or less certain death after the establishment of this central exchange was high on both sides.
"g) General FOERTSCH devoted his special attention to combatting malaria. I have a vivid recollection of his numerous conversations with the Army Group physician on the occasion of the Monday chief conferences, in which he called for the elimination of the malarial focal points on the Albanian coast and at the mouth of the Narenta.
General FOERTSCH was constantly in touch with the director of the Swedish Red Cross - I recall this only from occasional conversations at which I was present.
"3.) Partisan fighting.
"I myself was not present during the first phase of the development of the partisan organization, but nevertheless I know about it from studies made on the spot. I am thoroughly informed about its later development, that is, from 31/5/1943, through my regular and direct cooperation in this problem. I should like to state the following about this:
"In its original beginnings the formation of bands in the southeast area is not to be attributed to the behavior of the German troops, but was the result of ideological differences between the different countries and within their own peoples which had already been in existence long before this time.
The war of the partisans was directed not only against the German occupation force, but also at least against those parts of their own people who had different political and ideological beliefs. The formation of bands received encouragement through the deliberate policy of the Italian occupation force of playing off one part against the other, and was widely strengthened by the Allies through the infiltration of agents, providing food and weapons, radio propaganda, etc. Every effort at settlement and pacification by the German authorities at headquarters necessarily ran up against the greatest difficulties from the very start due to aggravating factors of this kind.
I have personally seen only a few members of the Chetnik bands and this was in the autumn of 1944. These were subordinate officers of Draza Mihailovic who were in uniform and wore the long hair of the Chetniks. However, from all the reports and pictures I can remember there was no question of a standard uniform for all Chetniks. Above all, this holds true during the first period of their appearance.
I myself have not seen any members of the Tito bands; however, I remember numerous snapshots which fell into our hands as booty, and above all documentary photographs taken by the Croatian state government. It was clearly evident from these documents that there could be no question of any standard uniform.
The manner of fighting employed by the bands was not in accordance with the customs of warfare. Attacks from ambush, mine-laying on streets and railroad tracks far behind the front, the brutal slaughtering of prisoners - often even by Partisan women (invasion of the Tito bands into Southern Serbia at the end of 1944!) were just as common as all kinds of terrorist methods against their own countrymen. From my own recollection I shall point out the following violations of laws of warfare:
a) Murder of a German Luftwaffe officer after he had been shot down (he wore the Oak Leaf decoration) by Tito partisans in Croatia.
b) Mutilation of captured German soldiers (cutting off the sex organs, ears, noses) by Tito partisan women in Southwestern Serbia.
c) Raid on a civilian prison in North-eastern Croatia and murder of all the inmates (Serbs) by Croat Tito-partisans.
d) Burning down of whole villages in Croatia by Tito-partisans.
e) Continuous nightly blowing up of railway lines in Croatia (Tito-partisans) and in Greece (Elas-partisans).
f) Raids by the Cetniks on German camps and separate vehicles.
g) Massacre of inhabitants of Moslem ideology in Sarajewe in Greater Germany and in Montenegro.
h) Raids on separate vehicles of the German Wehrmacht in Croatia and killing of the soldiers thereby taken prisoner by shooting in the neck.
i) Artillery bombardment of the Government Building in Tirana by Albanian Communist partisans without previous engagements.
k) Raid by Albanian partisans on a civilian vehicle column of the German Consulate in Tirana with losses in dead and wounded including women.
l) Robber raids by the Cetniks on employees of the Serbian State Bank in Belgrade.
m) Ambushing and murdering of individual German soldiers in Skutari.
Concerning the effect of anti-partisans combat on the general situation in the South-east it may be said that this general situation was almost exclusively conditioned by the anti-partisan combat. Every effort to pacify the area met - regardless of the ways and means of approach - inevitably with the crassest and most passionately fought out ideological opposition.
That the Serbian resistance movement, with the increasing strength of the Tito-bands, fought these as enemy No. 1 and not perhaps the German occupiers, serves actually as evidence for this and at the same time exonerates the higher German command.
The ideological antagonisms were the decisive element in the breaking up of the bands which was carried out with all Balkan brutality.
For the Croat partisan it was the fulfillment of a duty imposed by national honours if he killed a Serbian Cetnik on the open street or vice versa. Moreover it was never necessary that such a Croat here should belong to the Bolshevist resistance movement. There are enough cases in which members of the Ustascha, that is of a national organization, shot down in broad daylight and without any scruples in the open market (South-West-Zagreb) or on the railway station of a large town (Agram) 100 and more Serbian volunteers who had even fought together with other Ustascha - units against the Tito-partisans. Such things have nothing to do with the German military command. They originated and developed in the country itself exclusively. They are the outcome of unrestrained passion born of blood and ideological antagonism. The Catholic Croat certainly hates the orthodox Serb and the Mussulman lies between these fires often enough burned by both sides.
It would have been possible perhaps to settle much in the differences by clever political leadership which took into consideration the actual conditions in the area. That however was denied for the Foreign Office distributed more than once to the German ambassadors such instructions as inevitably led to strengthening of the already existent antagonisms. The German ambassador in Belgrade, Minister Neubacher had, for example, to support the Serbs and to meet their demands in so far as ever it was possible. The ambassador in Zagreb, on the other hand, Minister Kasche had been instructed to further the Ustacha-Kures thereby furthering Croat chavinism in pure culture. That however means that to add to the burdens of the German troops therefore to their disadvantage the political and ideological antagonisms already prevalent on a large scale were considerably stirred up. When Minister Neubachar was appointed Spacial Plenipotentiary for the Foreign Office for the Southeast each of us in the High Command Southeast took it for granted that he had been accredited for Belgrade as wall as for Zagreb for in this way it might have been possible to attempt, with certain prospect of success, to bridge the political animosities.
Unfortunately his sphere of jurisdiction extended only to Serbia."
And than I offer the next document, which is Foertsch Document No. 39, as Exhibit No. 36. The previous one was Exhibit No. 35. Now document 39 is Exhibit No. 36, on Page 69. This is an affidavit by Dr. Gerhard Oskar Merram, and it is evidence for the fact that the Defendant General Foertsch, in his own staff, always urged criticism of and opposition to the National Socialist system. A part of it is also concerned with the method of warfare of the bands. I start "From the middle of June."
"From the middle of June 1941 up to January 1945, I was a special missions officer in the staff of the 12th Army, the army group E and F respectively, that is in the department of the Ic. First, I was entrusted with the job of keeping situation maps. From about the and of summer 1943 I had to draw up the 10-day reports of the Ic to the OKH. I reported nearly daily on this information to the former General FOERTSCH after it had been approved by the Ic. I took part in the regular Monday-"Chief conferences" from fall 1943 approximately. Unofficially, I was sometimes a guest of the former General FOERTSCH.
11. The former General FOERTSCH and department Ic of his Staff.
The former General FOERTSCH sympathized in particular with the department Ic which was outside the general frame-work of the Staff. The mental attitude of the department Ic was unambiguously anti-national socialist. This is proved only by the fact that national socialists were expelled from the department within the shortest time. Thus, I remember the case of an officer with the golden party badge who was transferred to the section. Within a few days, ha had left the Section Ic and the staff, with the assistance and by order of the former General FOERTSCH.
The mass-nights of the section Ic which the former General FOERTSCH was found of attending, often culminated in impersonations of HITLER, GOEBBELS and others which would have induced a National Socialist to take the severest measures. The younger officers among us did not restrain ourselves, because we were sure of the good-will and of the political attitude of the "Chief".
End then I turn over to Page 71. This is under "IV Band Warfare" (b) "distinguishing marks of the partisans" on Page 71, at the bottom of the page:
"b) distinguishing marks of the partisans:
At the beginning, the partisan units included only civilians, who carried concealed weapons. In the course of the fight between national and Communist partisans which became more and more violent, their members began to wear certain badges, mostly on their caps. But these were not recognizable at a distance. A regular uniform was quite out of the question, even at the end of 1944. The members of the partisan-units wore either civil clothes or uniforms or parts of uniforms respectively of widely varied nations.
c) Method of fighting of the partisans.
At the beginning, the partisans fought as civilians, I remember many reports on shootings at German soldiers from an ambush. These sudden attacks were mostly carried out in this way that the members of the partisan-units, also woman, who were working in the fields, let the German soldiers pass and shot at them, as soon as they turned their backs, with weapons which they had hidden previously. First of all, the partisans committed acts of sabotage of every kind, in particular against the communication lines (mines, disconnecting of rails, blockings) as well as attacks from an ambush on individual German soldiers and weak units. Atrocities were always the order of the day, that is between national and Communist partisans, especially between Serbs and Croats, as well as on both of the partisan-units and towards the members of the German Occupation-Forces.
I remember many reports and photos of incredibly mutilated bodies.
Only as late as in 1944, TITO tried to fight with larger units in Croatia, besides the cruel guerrilla warfare. But the atrocities, even of the larger partisan units, did not stop.
Then as next document I offer....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, I would like to read into the record one paragraph which appears on Page 71, under "IV, The Fights against Partisans." It starts, "I can declare the following as far as the fights against partisans are concerned."
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: "s) the origin of the fights against the partisans: Partisans activity in the Balkans is the historic form of opposition. There were partisans before the German occupation, and there are partisans today. After the beginning of the German occupation, the partisans appeared first in Serbia. Besides the beginning of the German occupation, the partisans appeared first in Serbia. Besides the Communist partisans, there were the national Serbian partisans of Draza Mihailovic. The cause of the formation of partisans was not German measures, but simple the opposition of radical forces. Only later on there were Communist partisans in Croatia under Tito. Here, the cause for the formation of partisans -- in my opinion -- was not only the historic tradition but also the German support of the USTASCHA- Government, which was rejected by large parts of the Croatian people. The contrast between Serbs and Croats was the reason for the Serbian-national and the CroatianCommunist partisans fighting each other 'with increasing intensity. Simultaneously, each group fought against the German Occupation Forces."
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Now, I offer Document Foertsch No. 40 as Exhibit No. 37, on Page 76 of the Document Book. This concerns, firstly, the welfare measures which General Foertsch took for the population, and secondly this deals with the question of whether the partisan bands were regular troops and whether they had standard uniforms and insignia, and how they were to be recognized. I will read the following part of this affidavit. This is an affidavit by Wilhelm Hammer, from whom another affidavit has already been presented in another connection. At that time Hammer was Ic with the Commander in Southern Greece, and in the autumn 1942 he was transferred as deputy Ic to the staff of General Foertsch.