"His aversion against the national-socialist system was also expressed by the fact that he had an investigation made into the activities of the so-called "Einsatz Staff Rosenberg" in the Balkans demanded the ousting of this party organization from his command area on the ground of reduction of personnel.
"The rejection by General FOERTSCH of the dictatorial form of government is shown by the fact that in his endeavour to restore settled conditions on the entire Balkans he aimed at ousting the dictator of Croatia appointed by Hitler, the so-called Poglavnik Dr. Ante PAVELICH and his Ustatashi-gang by military means of power, and at replacing them by a government supported by the confidence of wide circles of the population and possibly headed by the noted peasant leader Dr. MATCHEK. The realization of this plan which had been worked out in all details was frustrated by Hitler's rebuff.
2. Attitude towards the Churches.
General FOERTSCH's relations with the Protestant and Catholic army chaplains on the Staff were extraordinarly amiable, not only officially but also privately, in consequence of which the activities of the Wehrmacht chaplains were greatly encouraged and developed throughout the Balkan command area. Though hard pressed by the ever increasing difficulties of the position in the Balkans, General FOERTSCH assisted the work of the Wehrmacht chaplains to the largest possible extent and so made a substantial contribution to the thwarting of the anti-church policy of National-Socialism.
In this connection it is worth mentioning that he ordered the deprecatory remarks in letters of members of the Wehrmacht against antichurch actions of NSDAP agencies, found by the postal censors office, to be passed on to the Wehrmacht operations staff with the request to put an immediate stop to the coercive measures taken against the churches.
PRESIDENT: We will interrupt at this time and take our afternoon recess.
(Following recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q I shall continue reading from document Foertsch 49, which is exhibit No. 43 on page 14 of the affidavit by Otto Fichtner. Roughly in the middle of page 14 in this connection in paragraph 3, "Attitude as professional officer" It says in the second part of this paragraph:
"From my memory of many recorded ideas and plans of General Foertsch I wish to emphasize his well intentioned interest in securing the nutrition of the population in the occupied territory. In particular, he endeavored during the winter of 1941 and 42 to obtain substantial food supplies for Greece from Bulgaria, Turkey and Germany, and encouraged the relief work of the International Red Cross to the largest possible extent.
"In order to improve the health conditions of the country he made a special effort to secure the importation of German medial supplies and lay down a scheme for an effective anti-malaria campaign in the whole country."
And then I shall skip paragraph 4 and continue with paragraph 5:
"Anti-Partisan Combat in the South East:
After the end of the Balkan campaign in spring 1941 there was peace in Serbia and Greece. The occupation troops there were for the most part regional defense troops and units comprising higher age groups. These soldiers were glad in the - apparent - certainty that the war was over for them. The relations with the civilian population were satisfactory.
Then all of a sudden, in the summer of 1941, simultaneously with numerous acts of sabotage, a prepared revolt broke out, led by the Serbian General MIHAILOVITCH which caught the German troops unawares and caused considerable losses. Our German military training had been conducted exclusively with an eye to fighting regular, militarily trained and led enemy troops with whose uniforms, badges and other insignia we were thoroughly familiar.
The Balkan insurgents, however, used quite unsoldierlike, treacherous, cowardly and cruel methods of combat with which the German soldier, drilled in conventional methods of combat and unable to readapt himself to guerilla warcare, could not cope for the time being, the less so as these insurgents were not uniformed, but wore civilian suits and could not be seized unless caught in the act of using a weapon. In the initial stages they succeeded for the most part to disappear in the villages and towns in the disguise of harmless peasants, craftsmen, village priests, teachers etc.
As an example of the combat methods of the insurgents I would mention a combat experience of the guards company South East (a crack troop) which for a rather long time was attached to the Army Group for guarding the Staff building.
This company was withdrawn from Staff duty in the second half of 1943 and ordered to Southern Albania for antiguerilla combat. An advance scouting party, after having conscientiously done its reconnaissance work, according to the existing service regulations, reported that a certain village the name of which I forgot was free from the enemy, whereupon the company entered the village and put in a rest, that is to say the men, except the sentries, put away their arms. Then all of a sudden fire was opened on the company by civilians from all the houses and from many roofs; most of the company made for cover outside the village to carry out a systematic counter-attack. The heavy machine gun group covered the retreat with its arms. After recapture of the village, the men of the company found their comrades in a horribly mutilated condition. The bandits had cut off their tongues, ears and, partly, their hands, put out the eyes of most of the victims, and all that according to the statements of the medical officer must have been done to them while they lay wounded, viz. while they were still alive.
The members of this company to which I myself had been temporarily attached doing duty in the heavy machine gun group, gave me a detailed report of the incident of which I gave the above summary, to inform me about the death of my comrades.
These reports of atrocities of the worst kind by the insurgents kept reaching the Army Group.
Much harder hit by the guerilla war than the German troops was the Creek and Serbian civilian population. The result of the ever increasing blastings of tracks and bridges was that real food transports could not be carried out at all or only partly. This again and again endangered and at last overthrew the carefully laid plans for an effective tackling of the food crisis, particularly in Greece.
6. Execution of orders of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, O.K.H. Wehrmacht - Operational Staff.
As far as I know, the order was issued by the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht Operational Staff to all Army Groups to kill at once all enemy personnel taking part in so-called "Kommando" actions. I know that this order was not carried out in Army Croup E which later became Army Group F. For instance at the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944 a relative of the then British Prime Minister Churchill, presumably Randloph CHURCHILL, was taken prisoner with his whole force during a Kommando action on the coast of Dalmatia, without any harm having been done to these men. It did not leak out until later that it was a relative of the head of the British government who had taken part in Kommando action.
The next document is Foertsch document No. 51. I shall not offer document No. 50. Document No. 51 is on pace 21 and I offer it as exhibit Foertsch 44. It is an affidavit by Hans Juergen Freiherr von Weber, which refers to the many protests made by Foertsch against O.K.W. orders, and I want to read this part from it, it is right at the beginning:
I have known Infantry General Hermann FOERTSCH since Christmas 1943, when the General appointed me as his personal Aide-de-Camp-, two months after I, a lieutenant in the reserve, had been assigned to the staff of the Supreme Command of Army Group F (Commander in Chief "South-East"). My functions in this office can be compared to those of a private secretary in civilian life. Thus I acquired a rather far-reaching knowledge of the life and work of my superior, and although my information was far from complete and did not cover all official matters and all cases, my information depended on the extent to which I was able no take part in the numerous discussions, to listen-in to long-distance-calls, or to be informed by the General in personal conversations, I nevertheless believe that I am entitled, yes even obliged, to pass a more embracing judgment on the person of my former superior.
Although, for reason of my Jewish descent I could never be an adherent of National Socialist or military Ideas, and although I repudiate such ideas to-day more than ever. I have never had any cause to revise my opinion and my judgment of the personality of General FOERTSCH for whom I have always felt a feeling of deep reverence -- apart from the fact that the General, fully aware of my then rather precarious situation due to my Jewish descent, proved himself to my protector."
I want to ask you this about that, witness, to what extent was Herr von Weber of Jewish descent and how was it possible for him to be an officer nevertheless?
A von Weber's grandmother had been Jewish and he was I believe for half a year a member of the party, I believe in 1933. He had to leave the party because of his Jewish ancestory. Through the efforts of somebody else, he became an officer because he was the great grandson of Karl Maria von Weber, the music composer who had composed the music of Freischuetz and Oberon. If he had been slighted in any way, then this wouldn't have suited Goebbels, "because the music of Freischuetz and Oberon was more popular than many points of the party program.
Always just, full of human understanding and of exemplary philosophy of life, General FOERTSCH was never the type of the single-minded professional soldier or Prussian policeman, but an officer of particularly high intellectual level, guided by high eithic principles and animated more by cosmopolitan spirit than by feelings which were hostile to other peoples.
As far as General FOERTSCH was permitted to follow his own convictions and was not bound by orders from above, his views and his opinions in all problems of the occupied territories time and again were testimonies for his extraordinarily great conscientiousness, his feeling of responsibility, his generosity and humane reason. With complete disregard of his own person and position General FOERTSCH on no occasion was afraid to criticize supreme orders if, in his opinion, measures were at issue for which a soldier could not assume responsibility. The rejection of such orders was frequently discussed without any reserve and the reason for it was precisely established by the General in a smaller and, sometimes, also in a larger circle of the staff. The widelyknown orders, for instance, to put English prisoners of war into chains as a reprisal moved not only us, but above all General FOERTSCH to the utmost indignation. Likewise, I very clearly recall a conversation between General FOERTSCH and myself after a longer conference with Ambassador NEUBACHER, the political Plenipotentiary of the Balkan, on which occasion the General expressed his satisfaction about the fact that NEUBACHER fortunately was completely in accord with the General on the question of collective measures to be taken against the population.
The next document is Foertsch No. 52, which I offer as exhibit No. 34, this is also.....
THE PRESIDENT: Number 45.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. No. 45, I beg your pardon, 44 was the last and this is exhibit 45. It is on page 25 of the document book. It is an affidavit by the same Herr von Weber.
I shall read the part of it which deals with what is known as the Conference of Chiefs, paragraph 1. "The statements made by Foertsch in the Chiefs' conferences were, as far as I know, and I think I remember rightly, not fixed beforehand. Foertsch spoke extempory from brief notes.
Senior Army archivist Wisshaupt did not submit the minutes of the meeting of Chiefs for checking up. I, as a special staff officer should have known this. I do not know that Foertsch had the activity reports (war diaries) of the section submitted to him. I do not remember this in any case. Apart from this, however, in view of the many overflowing tasks I hardly had time to examine such compilations which were sent for the files. Consequently, it is possible that the notes on the conferences of chiefs contain mistakes. Especially a man like Wisshaupt who, like any other people was mentally inferior to Foertsch and certainly was not always able to follow Foertsch's reports 100%, a man of this kind can be expected to make mistakes occasionally when writing down certain events."
In this case of this affidavit, I should like to point out that when, on the witness stand, the defendant saw reports and communications about conferences of chiefs, he pointed out that they are not always very correct.
The next document is document Foertsch 53 on page 38 of the document book, which will be exhibit 46. It is an affidavit by Wolfgang Keilig. I shall read that part which deals with the conditions in the Southeast and how the O.K.W. dealt with the chiefs and some of the commanders in chief Southeast and what the attitude of General Foertsch in the area was and how he attempted to carry out his intentions.
I shall start with the beginning:
"I have known the former General Foertsch since the beginning of December, 1943, when I was transferred as a major and Id compile" on the staff of Amy Group F to Belgrade..."
Then I shall continue on page 29 at the top:
"In my opinion the work and the good intentions of General FOERTSCH for the Southeast were strongly hampered, and frustrated in the respective situations by the following factors against which FOERTSCH was powerless.
1. The multiplicity of the forces at work in the territory of the Southeast.
The Army Group itself was tactically under the OKW, whereas the training, supply, and equipment problems in general were under the OKH. In addition to the Supreme Command of Army Group F there were also the following powers in the Southeast; the Military Government, Generals with full powers, the diplomatic representations and numerous special offices of the Party, in particular, those of the SS, which were not subordinate to the Army Group, but were simply instructed to cooperate, All these offices had special channels and special orders, and the often carried out on the spur of the moment what they pleased to do, whenever the Army Group did not approve of their plans. On the basis of this fact there was a duplication or counter-effort in the work, which led to a great deal of unrest.
2. The fact that the Southeast was a secondary theater of war and was correspondingly treated as a side issue with respect to personnel and equipment. Whenever reserves were needed in other centers of attach, good disciplined units were withdrawn, approved deliveries of supplies would be stopped, and the attempt was made more and more to replace the withdrawn units with national SS-units of the Southeast, the formation of which FOERTSCH would gladly have avoided.
The absence of experts on the Southeast in the OKW and of political leadership, which led to the result that the measures proposed by the Army Group or the objections raised by it against orders which it regarded as unfeasible, again and again met lack of understanding and rejection. This was aggravated furthermore by the fact that in spite of the constant pressure on the part of the Army Group, the OKW did not consider it necessary to send to the Army Group, at least from time to time, responsible officers of higher rank, who were working on problems of the Southeast, and who were equipped with full powers, to personally confer about, and to orient themselves on the special conditions of the Southeast.
Thus, as far as I know, from 1941 to the beginning of 1944, only General WARLIMONT and General von BUTTLAR have been in the Southeast personally, the former 3 or 4 times and the latter once, on behalf of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and Operational Staff of the Wehrmacht (OKW/WFSt), whereas lower-ranking general staff officers, who came solely as "mail-carrier", were customarily sent.
FOERTSCH has often complained to me and to other associates about this gross lack of understanding. Another incident, which is also indicative of this condition, is, for example, the fact that Field Marshal KEITEL categorically refused the urgent plea of Field Marshal WEICHS and of General FOERTSCH to grant them an interview so that they might present problems of the Southeast, and received no one. This was in 1943, on the occasion of the state funeral of King BORIS of Bulgaria when KEITEL traveled to Sofia, and his private coach was side-tracked at the Belgrade station for several hours. Yet KEITEL was the man who was the highest authority for the 0137-theaters of war, and who presented the intended measures and proposals to Hitler. Thus ho was obliged above all others to personally gain a picture for himself of the conditions of the areas under his command.
According to common opinion General FOERTSCH was a good student of the conditions of the Southeast, and I gained the clear impression during the time when I belonged to his staff, that he used his influence for a genuine pacification of the Southeast, with the most liberal preservation of the governmental independence and of the rights of the individual Governments of the Southeast."
I shall continue on page 32 at the top:
"The same inner disapprobation of FOERTSCH applied also to measures of collective punishment, since, according to his interpretation, innocent people would needs be caught also. To be sure, in view of the means of warfare to which the opponent resorted, he could indeed not question the necessity of collective punishment in many cases.
This conception of his with regard to military and political measures in the Southeast FOERTSCH PRESENTED REPEATEDLY AND WITH COMPLETE CANDOR TOWARD SUPERIOR OFFICES WITHOUT REGARD TO HIS PERSONAL POSITION. IN MY OPINION FOERTSCH ALSO REACTED CORRESPONDLY TO THE CONSTANT CONTEMPT FOR HIS PROPOSANS BY REPEATEDLY ASKING FOR A TRANSFER TO THE FRONT. IT HE NEVERTHELESS REMAINED ON HIS POST AS LONG AS HE DID IT WAS AGAINST HIS WISHES AND BECAUSE OF THE REPEATED CHANGES OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF. IT SUITED HIS SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, SINCE HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE REAL CONDITIONS, TO WORK AGAINST INEXPEDIENT MEASURES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND TO PREVENT STILL GREATER DISASTER."
Then I shall road only the last paragraph of this affidavit on page 35:
"The tragedy of General Foertsch was that he was appointed to a post in the Southeast on the basis of his ability. Here he always wanted to do that which was good, but he was tripped up time and again and was ordered, over his warning voice, to put into effect measures which he could often only mitigate, but not wholly obviate, because of the limitations sot on his authority."
The next document will be document No.55, documents 54 and 54-A I shall not offer. Document 55 is on page 43, which I offer as exhibit 47. This is an affidavit by Erwin Braumueller, who was chief of the Economic Staff Southeast and military economic advisor to the Commanderin-Chief Southeast. It is evidence of the measures taken by General Foertsch for the benefit of the civilian population. It reads as follows:
"I got to know the former General of Infantry Foertsch in spring of 1941, when I reported to him for the first time in my capacity as Chief of the Economic Staff Southeast and Advisor in matters of military economy to the C.I.C. Southeast High Command Army Group E, later F in Salonika."
"My sphere of activity was restricted to purely economic matters in the command area of the Army Group. The German war economics officer in Salonika was my permanent representative with the Army Group up to the time when Headquarters were removed to Belgrade. He regularly attended the Monday conferences with the Chief. As for myself I visited General Foertsch personally only on special occasions to report orally to him; later, in Belgrade, I myself attended the Monday conferences with the Chief. General Foertsch regularly received the monthly economic report, which I had to submit to the Office for War Economy and Armaments in Berlin from which I got my technical directives. "Both I myself and the war economy installations in the South-East area always got most effective support from General Foertsch when it was a question of helping to re-start immobilized or financially weak economic enterprises such as power plants, mines, cement works, etc. for the benefit of the armament of the occupying authorities or also of the country, by furnishing the missing technical equipment as well as coal and raw materials and supplying the workers with food, aiming solely at the steady improvement of the economic conditions in the South East, to secure jobs for the workers and so to bring about the real pacification of the South-East area, such as aimed at by the Army Group.
"In Greece, for instance, the Wehrmacht-Building Material Office was set up by the Army Group for this purpose. It was incorporated in the office of the War Economy Officer at Athens (later War Economy Staff Greece). In closest cooperation with the Greek government, the Wehrmacht Building Materials Office took care of all power plants vital for the capital Athens as well as of all coal pits, ore mines, cement works, brick works, etc. essential for the economy of the country. The monthly reports showed steadily rising production figures, up to 15 17,000 workers and their families were supplied with foodstuff partly from Wehrmacht stocks. Also, in regard to the anti-malaria combat everything possible was done by making available supplies of Atabrin from Wehrmacht stocks in order to improve the state of health of the factory employees.
"Again and again General Foertsch made suggestions aiming at the advancement of the economy, showing particular care for the population. As regards the execution of the tasks assigned to me in the field of war economy, I, for one, could not have wished for a more appreciative superior who above all staked his whole personality to secure all from the higher authority that was required.
"Thus, it was also thanks to his efforts that in the spring of 1944 the mining battalion of the War Economy Sector South-East, composed of about 1500 highly skilled mining exports was employed in the SouthEa.st area for the double purpose of "Increase of production" and "Protection of the Mines and Smelting Works against the ever increasing surprise raids and acts of sabotage by insurgent formations."
"The complete lack of understanding on the part of the Reich authorities and the supreme leadership of the geo-political conditions of the South-East area and the ever increasing above mentioned raids and acts of sabotage as well as the incitation and vexation of the population, and, what was more important, of the personnel of the economic enterprises by the insurgent organizations could not but result in the frustration of ail the well-intentioned economic measures taken or supported by the Army Group for the lasting pacification of the troubled South-East area.
These conditions which were insupportable for the occupation troops, but also for the peaceable population of course led to measures dictated by military necessity.
The next document is Document Foertsch No. 56 which I shall offer as Exhibit 48. This document is offered in rebuttal of Exhibit 539 contained in Document Book VIII of the prosecution and which if I might remind the court of the examination of the defendant on the witness stand, deals with the strength of the Mihajlovic movement.
This document, Exhibit 539 - I must correct myself there; it is in Document Book XXIV, but I dealt with it in connection with the documents in Book VIII; it is contained twice in the books - is a letter by the OKH, department of foreign Armies East which through intelligence received from interception of Mihajlovic radio communications, gives a compilation about the strength of the Mihajlovic movement. Defendant Foertsch has already expressed his comments about that, and this affidavit here by Wilhelm Hammer supports and bears out what he said. It reads as follows:
"With reference to the letter from OKH, General Staff of the Army; Section Foreign Armies. East III No. 100/43, Top Secret, of 9 February 1943, I wish to point out that the comments do not at all square with the conception which section I c (Intelligence) at headquarters of Army Group E has formed of the enemy. It appears that OKH (Foreign Armies) was taken in by the boastful broadcasts of Mihailovitch). D.M. proved himself to be an excellent propagandist who knew excellently how to humbug his listeners, in particular the Allies, into accepting an exaggerated idea of his power.
"This will be confirmed by the then Intelligence Officer, Colonel Behle, moreover, his predecessor, Colonel of the General Staff Pfafferott will be able to confirm it partly from his own experience. "It was obvious from the true picture of the enemy which presented itself all the clearer to section I c of Army Group E as the facts underlying the Mihailovic broadcasts were known, that the so-called sub-commanders were chiefs of guerilla bands, partly at feud among themselves and by no means obeying Mihajlovic instructions and orders, and for the most part acting against his orders.
It is out of the question that there existed a Yugoslavian army of 150,000 men at that time, and that another 457,000 men could be expected in case of a general uprising. The facts as they emerged shortly after the issuance of the OKH letter in connection with the 'operation Schwarz' proved the correctness of the picture which section Ic of the High Command of Army Group E had formed of the enemy.
In this connection it might be mentioned in passing that even at that early stage the Tito movement was a serious competitor of the Mihajlovic movement.
It was, therefore, noted very regretfully at the time when the letter from OKH was received that conditions in the South-east area had once more been grossly misjudged by higher authority."
The next document which I beg to offer is Foertsch Document No. 57 which I offer as Exhibit 49. It is on page 48 of the document book, It is an affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar and it deals with the question of recognizing the Tito troops as a belligerant power. The affidavit reads as follows:
"From 1 January 1942 till 16 November 1944 I was chief of the Operational Section (Army) in the Armed Forces Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. In this capacity I got to know General Foertsch as Chief of Staff of Army Group E, later F, which was stationed in the South-East and directly under the High Command of the Armed Forces, through official correspondence, telephone conversations and also became personally acquainted with him by occasional visits in the Fuehrer's Headquarters.
On the strength of these relations I am in a position to make the following statements:
As regards the question of a recognition of the Tito forces as a. belligerent power, it never came to my knowledge that we had at any time been notified of a recognition by the Allies of the Tito forces as an integral part of the Allied forces fighting in South-Eastern Europe.
"However, the question of a recognition of guerilla movements in the Southeast as regular forces was broached, though unofficially by members of the Staff of the C.i.C. South-East during their presence in the Fuehrer's Headquarters as early as the beginning of 1943, if my memory serves me right, even prior to the operation "WeissI". Whether General Foertsch or a member of his staff reported to me about this matter I cannot say with certainty.
However, in 1943, there would have been no point at all in submitting such a suggestion to Hitler, considering his general attitude to the question of guerilla bands, and also for reasons of international law (combat methods of the bands contrary to international law) as well as for political and propagandist reasons.
"I remember that this question was cautiously advanced by Generaloberst Jodl during a report to Hitler on the intended operation Weiss I, but was brusquely rebuffed by the latter who forebade the use of any military terms in connection with guerilla bands (for instance "guerilla brigades") and ordered these to be replaced by the designations "small bands", "medium bands" and "large bands".
"Although no general change in the official attitude to the guerilla question took place, a certain change did occur in practice in the summer of 1944 which was reflected in the "Instructions for the Anti-Guerilla Combat" which were issued at that time. In these instructions it was ordered, - as far as I remember, - that in future members of guerilla bands, with certain exceptions, were to be treated as prisoners of war. However, Hitler remained firm in his insistence on having the bands designated as such.
This change, if I remember rightly, was essentially conditioned by the rising of the Maquis-movement in Southern France. Despite this fact, even after the publication of the above instructions, the only official motion for recognition of a guerilla movement- namely, the Maquis movement - was not approved by Hitler. Whether the motion was rejected or just left unanswered I cannot say.
The next document which I offer is Foertsch No. 58, which will become Exhibit No. 50 is an affidavit by Hermann Brudermueller. Hermann Brudermueller, as can be seen from the beginning of the affidavit at the end of July 1943, was an expert on the Southeast, was transferred to the Operations Division of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. He met the Defendant Foertsch at the end of August or the beginning of September 1943, in Belgrade. I offer this affidavit in order to prove the attitude taken by the Defendant towards the problems in the Southeast and particularly about the question of recognizing the Tito bands as a regular army. Lest I repeat myself unnecessarily, I shall read only that part of the affidavit which is found on page 52 of the Document Book, under "c". It is on the top of page 52:
"c) I know of Herr Foertsch's ceaseless attempts to have the Titounits recognized as regular troops. They were wrecked by Hitler's stubborn attitude which, for instance, forbade the use of the descriptions "Division Corps" etc. for Tito's forces. It was only permitted to call them "guerilla bands" or "large bands".
"As far as I can judge, Herr Foertsch never made any secret of his opinion of the questions regarding the Southeast area, I know that his subordinates on the staff valued him very highly for this sincerity and I always heard from them that Foertsch expressed his opinion in a firm and manly way, and never allowed himself to be intimidated by anyone (not even by members of the Party.)"
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I would like to read into the record a few lines on pages 51 of the English, found on the first page of this affidavit, about in the middle of the page: "I know Mr. Foertsch's basic attitude on the essential Southeast questions in the first place from the memoranda submitted by the Army Group as well as from telephone conversations between Herr Foertsch and my superiors. I can remember in detail: a) Herr Foertsch held the point of view that a pacification of the Southeast area could only be achieved by military operations against the guerilla bands, and that considerably more combat troops would be necessary for this."
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: The next document will be Foertsch Document No. 59 which I offer as Exhibit No. 51. It is an affidavit by the former medical officer of the 12th Army, Army Group Physician for Army Group E and Army Group F, Dr. Hermann Hofmann, of whom I have already submitted an affidavit in a different connection. The first was an affidavit concerning the contents of the chief's conferences held by the defendant Foertsch. This affidavit, on the other hand, deals with the measures taken by the Army Group, mainly at the suggestion of the defendant Foertsch, to provide the population with medical supplies and to keep the population healthy. Here again we find the exact opposite to a plan of extermination such as has been held by the Prosecution in the case against the defendant Foertsch. I shall begin on page 53, the first page of the document, starting with the last paragraph:
"I know, that neither Field Marshal Freiherr von Foertsch ever expressed any opinion to me, which even in the least violated the laws of Humanity. Neither did I ever hear statements from any other side, which would justify such an assumption. Their thoroughly humane, not to say benevolent, attitude is best characterized by the deep understanding, which they showed for the sphere of my medical activity. After I had oriented myself on my sphere of work, after I took up my office, I explained to the Field Marshal Freiherr von Weichs and to the Chief of the general staff, General Foertsch, on the occasion of my first oral report, the medical and hygienic aid measures which had already been started by my predecessor for the civilian population in the South East area. I received their express approval and unreserved support, within the scope of the military possibilities, for the continuation of those measures.
"Until the end of the war, I had a compilation made for every country of the Balkans of all those measures, which we carried out in the sphere of health service for the civilian population. Of these, the report on Greece in fall and the report on Serbia, Groatia, and Albania in form of surveys are available. The reports were made out by the local leading health officers, then under my authority, or by commissioned hygienists.
Based on these reports the measures effected by the Wehrmacht in the interests of the civilian population, which could be undertaken only with approval and support of the Supreme Commander of the Chief of the General Staff, present, the following picture in brief:"
And then he gives a rather detailed description of the measures which were taken in Greece, and then of those taken in Serbia, and finally in Croatia, to fight epidemics, for the welfare of refugees, the quite generally for the medical welfare of the population. These details are listed as can be seen from the affidavit on the reports drawn up at the time. I shall, therefore, limit myself to reading only a few sentences therefrom, but I would like the Tribunal to pay attention to the document in its entirety. I wish to read from the paragraph 1, "Greece", on page the following sentence which will be found in the German Document Book, and I think also in the English Document Book, especially underlined. In the English Document Book I that it is unfortunately not underlined. I shall, therefore, read it. It reads as follows: "The medical care in the country was secured free of charge by German health officers during the entire period of the occupation." And, skipping one more sentence, "During the occupation of Greece a total of at least million Greek men, women, and children were advised, treated, and operated on free of charge of German army doctors, specialists, and professors.
"Support of the Greek hospital system.
"The position of the Greek civilian hospitals also was critical at the time of the invasion, as a result of the previous Italian campaign and the inadequate supply system for food and first rate medicines. Measures carried out by German offices: Securing the supply from German stocks, free issue of medicines and bandages, installation of auxiliary hospitals, organization of Greek aid centers for mothers and children including constant allocation of vitamin preparations."