14 0ct-M-TB-8-3-Stone (Int.Schaeffer)
Q Can you give an explanation for the fact that in this document political commissars are mentioned explicitly under Figure 1, second paragraph, "Band leaders, political Commissars, and couriers are to be interrogated and briefed previously, and whenever possible in the presence of SD." Why was this special indication of political Commissars contained in this order?
A The band leaders and political Commissars, to the extent in which they existed, and couriers were, generally speaking, the most intelligent people, and it was only natural that interrogations were extended to those people.
Q And that happened to them after the interrogations?
A They ware treated exactly in the same way as every other band member.
Q The political Commissars then were not treated in any different manner-- that is, not in a more stringent manner than other members of the band?
A No, on the contrary this is a completely wrong picture. The socalled Commissar Order/ never applied to the Southeast, and it never reached the Southeast. And if there is some talk here frequently of political Commissars, - I might say they were included in the band. They are no more than members of a band. Consequently, they were treated in exactly the same manner in every respect as members of a band.
Q Why was the SD called in here?
A I cannot answer that with certainty, but I would assume that the SDwas called to attend such interrogations because SD people were men with police training and, therefore, they were more versed in interrogations and could carry them out better than maybe a lieutenant of the Infantry whose profession had nothing to do with interrogations. After all interrogations are a very special sphere with a very special technique.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Are you thinking about the tortures which are said to have been sometimes connected with such interrogations on the part of the SD?
A. No. Such tortures or methods of that kind of the SD I only heard after the war in connection with trials, etc.
Q. The next exhibit is a communication from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast; this is Exhibit 189. It is contained on page 88 of the English Document Book and 78 of the German Document Book. The prosecution connects this document with you. What is the significance of this communication which has as its subject designation Cetniki?
A. This is merely a language designation.
Q. How do you mean that?
A. I had already stated that conditions in the large area of the insurgentswas many-fold and varied and if, for instance, one talked about Cetniks, one person could interpret this expression as the loyal government people of Kosta Pecanac or the Lotic followers and somebody else could interpret them as the Mihajlovic Cetnik and of course, in order to prevent must understandings, this language question had to be cleared up and that is why this directive came out.
Q. Exhibit 192 contained or page 99 of the English text and page 90 of the German text, is again daily reports to the Commander of the Wehrmacht Southeast and they have no signature. Did you know these reports?
A. If they came in in the same form as they are available here, then I probably did know them but whether they were sent out in this form I very much doubt because I cannot see any initial of any kind in them.
Q. Now let's turn to the last exhibit in this document book. That is 193.
A. I probably knew this ten-day report.
Q. Well, we will then turn to Document Book VIII and here again I shall name those exhibits of which you did not have any knowledge, according to the surrey which we saw recently, at least no knowledge before these trials here started. Those are Exhibits 194, 197, 201, 202, 204, 207, 210, 212.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. First of all, let's turn to Exhibit 195, contained on cage 2 both of the English and the German text. This is a teletype to the operational staff of the OKW and it contains the usual reports concerning soldiers shot in combat and shot in retaliation. Did you know it at the time?
A. At the time when it was sent out, I was on an official trip with the Commander-in-Chief South. Whether I saw it after my return I cannot now say.
Q. Now the next document, Exhibit 196, contained on page 4 both of the German and English text, contains directives of the operational staff of Combat Group Bader concerning the operations in Bosnia. In these directives at the heading there is some reference to the Italian Second Army. What does that mean in this connection?
A. The so-called Combat Group General Bader is a provisionally crested commend and it was subordinate for these operations in Bosnia to the Italian Second Army.
Q. Did those regulations comply with the regulations of the command of the Italian Second Army? The treatment of the insurgents is mentioned too.
A. Yes, because otherwise it wouldn't say here "previous correspondence, Italian Army II, No. so and so."
Q. It strikes me here that in this document under III and 3, that is on page 4 of the German and the the English text, we find a difference between Communist and Cetnik insurgents.
Why was that done? Were by any chance the Cetniks regarded as regular belligerents by the Italians?
A. No, those were merely consideration of expediency. These Cetniks too were illegal.
Q. Why then was this Italian influence emphasized?
A. There were, as far as I remember, special reasons for this. The Italians had a rather strange policy in Croatia. On the one hand, they were the occupation force in the largest part of the area. Nominally, they had picked a king for the throne but on tne other hand the Italian military authorities in Croatia pursued a policy which I at the time could not understand. According to my attitude and feelings at that time, the purpose at the time was that these Italian military authorities at the time did not want the Croatian state as an independent state. They wanted to prove that this Croatian state was not capable of independent life, because they wanted to have a different form of state, maybe a protectorate or something of that kind. I wouldn't know. Only thus it can be explained and was understood by us at the time that in sharp contradition to our tendencies they played out this ethnik differences against each other.
They took the part of the Serbian Cetniks who were for the Slavs, in order to be able to take action against the Catholic Slavs. They played out Croats against Moslems and the other way around and the background idea at the time was - at least one Italian general made that quite clear - to spare their own Italian blood and instead rather to incite those people against each other. This was a policy which the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the Commander-in-Chief Southeast regarded as completely wrong and which he never pursued in his own area of command. I do know and I do remember clearly that Jodl at one time suggested to employ Croat regiments in Serbia and even in Greece.
But we rejected that and we succeeded, thank God, in this rejection because that would have only emphasized the unrest in this area. Nobody was more interested in a peaceful state in those areas than the German Military authorities.
Q. Witness, this morning you have mentioned the Italian policy of occupation in Croatia and also the participation of the German armed forces in the occupation in Croatia. To what period of time does that apply?
A. The period of time which I mentioned before and which I am mentioning now is essentially the year 1942. That is, the first part of that year.
Q. Now let's turn to Exhibit 198. On page 11 of the German.
JUDGE CARTER: Before you leave that exhibit, I wonder if I might ask one question here. General, in Section III-a of this report, on the top of page five of the English, it says "Cetniks who do not resist the allied troops are not to be treated as insurgents. Above all, they are to be treated as prisoners according to the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare."
I don't know whether you explained that or not but how do you account for General Bader's statement to that effect?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: I have already said that this regulation was an Italian order for reasons of expediency, and may I point out that in the German text which in this case is decisive because we deal with a German order, it reads: "They are, to begin with, to be treated as prisoners according to the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare."
These Cetniks which were made use of by the Italians or were intended to be made use of by the Italians, one wanted to treat as well as possible in order to draw them out of the Croatian area and in order to thus avoid any more emphasis on the ethnik differences.
The designation Cetniks must only be applied to Serbia and Montenegro, not to Croatia. The more Cetniks were withdrawn from the Croatian area, it would give better prerequisites for a pacification of that area. The intention was to build a golden bridge for these Cetniks, if I may put it that way.
JUDGE CARTER: Well, the reason was then not that they had met the four fundamental requirements of a belligerent but because they were cooperating with the Italians or with the Germans. Is that the reason?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: The reason for this regulation was not of a legal nature. It was not a recognition of legality. It was merely a regulation based on reasons of expediency and suitability merely for this one operation. It was intended to prevent any more aggravation of the Cetnik differences.
JUDGE CARTER: In other words, the Italians or the Germans, or whichever one of the two it may have been, were playing these particular Cetniks off against other insurgents in that particular territory, is that correct?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: The Italians had such tendencies. At least, according to our observations at that time. German authorities at a later date had occasionally also worked together with such Cetniks but in a different sense, I.E. they used them as scouts, as pathfinders, and to help solve the very difficult questions of territorial nature. In the whole area, Cetnik differences were never intended to be made use of by the Commander-in-Chief Southeast.
JUDGE CARTER: Well General, didn't the Germans and the Italians or both take advantage of these conflicts in that particular territory and in various times extend favors to certain groups because of services that they had rendered to them? Isn't that a fact?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: No, not in that sense, but in this connection I would like to point out that in individual documents we find certain statements which might support such an opinion. There is, for instance, a pamphlet of a division concerning conditions in Montenegro. There the very difficult conditions in Montenegro are discussed and there is some talk about the white and the green ones. One must not forget that I believe the green ones of the white ones, I am not sure which -- were those people who supported the Montenegran government, in the same way as, for instance, in Serbia, the Cetniks of Kosta Pecanac supported the Nedic government, and practically, they were later on included to a large extent in a so-called Serbian state guard.
They were made a kind of auxiliary police which was officially sanctioned. Certainly, the German military leadership was pleased with every individual and gladly accepted his support who supported the German tendencies for pacification and thus the work of the Nedic government, to mention Serbia here.
However, this was never done with the idea of playing off one Cetnik difference against another, and I would like to point to something which have just said. Where there were such ideas on the part of the OKW, for instance, to bring Croatian regiments into Serbia or into Greece or the other way around, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast always objected and always attempted to avoid such a mixup of the problems at stake and such an aggravation of the situation. It was unavoidable that large parts of Serbia were at the time occupied by Bulgarian units and this seems to contradict which I have said. That was a decision on which the Armed Forces Commander Southeast could take no influence and which was reached for more extensive political considerations. But that again was always recognized as a necessary evil.
JUDGE CARTER: Just one more question. Isn't it a fact that the Germans were supported by the Croatians and the Croatian-Ustasha? Isn't it a fact that Mihajlovic and his Cetniks at times cooperated with the German Army and fought the partisans and the Communists at times? Didn't those things all occur and didn't the German army take advantage of it?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: Yes, indeed. With regard to the Ustasha we have to consider that it was a militia. Really, one should always say Ustasha Militia because the Ustasha as such was merely a party. The relation is about this way: The Ustasha was in Crotia what the National Socialist Party was in Germany, and the Ustasha Militia were about roughly the same as the Waffen SS in Germany. It is a military unit created on a party basis which is completely legal and a state institution.
The question of loyalty to the government of that state has to be excluded. The Mihajlovic Cetniks did only at a very late date find the way to the Germans and then not completely. As long as I was in the Southeast, there was no clear stand on the part of Mihajlovic of his people, and it was never quite clear how Mihajlovic and his sub leaders were really orientated, but here again the following must not be forgotten. In the first place, Mihajlovic had for a long time found certain support from the allies, and then came the time when this support was discontinued and Tito arrived on the scene and so Mihajlovic lost ground.
Mihajlovic, however, had not only fought the German occupation power but from the very beginning he fought against the ideological opponent whom he saw in militant communism. Mihajlovic fight was on on one hand the fight of a nationalist against the occupying forces and on the other hand, independent of that, the fight of a Royalist and a Conservative against the enormous revolutionary Communist-Bolshevist danger. That was the picture which we faced at the time and that is the picture as I see it today.
JUDGE CARTER: Didn't you -- you don't think the Germans contributed to the confusion down there by lighting up these inherent conflicts and keeping them at each other's throats during this period? Is that your opinion?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: No, Your Honor. It was never the intention of the German leader nor the intention of the OKW and I am convinced not the intention of Hitler either to emphasize these differences and to increase the confusion, because, what really was the intention and the wash of the Commander-in-Chief Southeast? It was his first task to fulfill the strategic operational task in the area. That is, to keep the Southeast area within the framework of the general war events.
At the time we repeatedly regarded this old center of trouble of Europe with great anxiety - also the historic entrance, that is the area Saloniki, and so on - and during the time of my tenure down there there was no greater tension than there was during those months when we knew that the allies were about to start tearing open the German front from the Balkan area. At the time we had reliable informations regarding these plans, and we stationed troops, that is amongst others the 1st Panzer Division, in the Peloponnesus which , however, were insufficient. We knew that if the Allies had attached there in all seriousness it would have meant an extremely difficult struggle for us. We not only had to defend ourselves in case of an inversion against the attack from the outside, but also against the formation of the enormous insurgent movement in the Southeast. I believe that everyone who could put themselves into the situation of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast at the time, will have to admit that there could be nobody in the whole wide world who was more interested in the peace and quiet in the interior of the Southeast area, and acted accordingly, then we at that time. If I may say this it is a personal attack of the prosecution that at the time we wanted to exterminate, terrorize and wanted to incite the population against itself, and that we caused unrest. This assertion apart from the insult which I saw in it, concerned me personally so deeply, because it is a complete misunderstanding of our endeavor at the time when we fought against a misunderstanding from above; we fought against dangers from the outside and we fought against meanness on the other side. Nobody could pray more for reason amongst those people than the person who was responsible for that area, my Commander in Chief who was represented by four people.
JUDGE CARTER: I have nothing further.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, there appears to have been a translation error at the top of page 5 of the English, page 4 of the German, l4 0ct.
-M-BX-11-2-Maloy (Int. Schaeffer) under Paragraph 3, "Treatment of the Insurgents."
I wonder if that could be passed to the Court interpreters?
THE PRESIDENT: You will kindly call attention to the particular natters in question, and they will then be submitted to the interpreters.
THE INTERPRETER: This concerns the first sentence on page 3 in the English text. It starts in the English text, "Above all they ere to be treated", but the correct translation would be "To begin with they are to be treated as prisoners according to the Hague regulation of land warfare." "To begin with", "in the initial stage" but not "above all".
THE PRESIDENT: Is that translation - as now made - agreeable to both parties?
DR. RAUSCHENBACE: Yes.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: It is all right with the prosecution, Your Honor.
Q Witness, now let's turn to Exhibit 198, contained on page 11 of the German text and page 14 of the English Document Book. This is a report from the German Commander Southeast to the German General in Zagreb, and it concerns one shooting, and 34 arrested; did you know the document prior to this time?
A Probably, yes.
Q And the next Exhibit, 199, which we find on page 14 of the German and page 17 of the English Document Book. This is a teletype to the OKW, and on the last page it has your signature. What does this document concern, is it an order?
A No, it is a report. That is, it is an extensive message concerning a certain period and the situation in tha.t period in the area of the Southeast, and is directed to the OKW.
Q On the last, but one page of this document, we have a note under Roman numeral III, Capital B, 1612 shot to death in combat, 3 reprisal measures. This situation report was concluded on April 22, 1942, according to the heading?
A Yes.
Q This unusual ration between the ones shot in combat, 1612 men, and only 3 reprisal measures, is that by any chance typical of the subsequent time?
A In any case if three reprisal measures are mentioned here it does not mean that three reprisal measures were carried out. It means that three people were killed in retaliation. This is very few, but I have already said previously, in a subsequent period, reprisal measures decreased considerably because after all the insurrection which we had feared did not take place.
Q Now, we will have a look at Exhibit 200, contained on Page 12 of both the German and English Document Book, and also have a look at Exhibit 208, which you find on page 41 of the German text and page 48 of the English text. Let us look at those two documents together, and read the following: Exhibit 200 contains two 10-day reports, and Exhibits 208 contains a Situation Report. In these two reports we find statements concerning men detained in a concentration camp. In Exhibit 200 we read that 5,000 Jews were in the concentration camp. On the 30 April only 2474, and in the report of 1 July 1942 in Exhibit 208, first page, there are no more Jews mentioned at all. That is rather striking, and I want to know from you now whether it struck you particularly at the time when you made those reports that the Jews decreased in numbers in the concentration camps, and finally none were reported at all. What happened to them?
A If one compares these reports here in a document book as you do now, then of course one is struck by this fact. However, if during the activities of the staff affairs one reads a report of July 1942, one is not in a position to compare offhand this report with another report of April 20, and besides the situation was this, the question whether the Jews had been brought some place else from these concentra tion camps.
Yesterday I discussed this in connection with Saloniki. That fact was regarded by us as a matter to be dealt with by the Higher SS and Police Leader, who had received his clear orders I assume from his own channels. A man like Himmler would have never had the idea to issue orders through us, or inform our authorities, regarding the treatment of Jews. These natters were always handled on the outside and I am convinced today that they were kept secret from us deliberately.
Q Were the Higher SS and Police Leaders subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander or Commander in Chief of the Southeast?
A No, the Higher SS and Police Leader was subordinate in his own person to the Commanding General in Serbia, but people who know the situation of that time realize that that was merely on paper. If Himmler ordered something through police channels, he paid no attention to the Commander in Chief Southeast or to the Commanding General for Serbia, and if he would only suspect that we wanted to interfere in any of his spheres, let's say in the sphere of the Waffen-SS - I am thinking about formations of the Waffen--SS, then we would be stopped before we could as much as open our mouth.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(Thereupon the noon recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you proceed with further direct examination of the witness the Tribunal desires to make this statement for the record:
It has been called to the attention of the Tribunal that pursuant to the order of the Tribunal under date of August 14, 1947, the Prosecution has provided a large number of photostat copies of orders, reports and excerpts from the diaries of the military units commanded by or subordinate to these defendants or some of them. It has been further called to our attention that included among these documents there are approximately one hundred which have been forwarded with the distinct understanding and order that they are not to be made available as evidence. We have been informed that said documents pertain to and contain important information concerning the situation in the Balkan area here involved and the actions and conduct of these defendants, or some of them, with reference thereto. With this information in our possession, it is the feeling of the Tribunal that a fair and impartial conduct of the trial requires the immediate determination of the availability of these documents for the use of both the prosecution and defense.
That is the extent of this statement and you may proceed with your examination.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness before lunch I asked you questions concerning Exhibit 200, and Exhibit 208 in Document Book 8 and we had reference in these two documents to the fact that in between those two reports Jews in concentration camps which before then amounted to 4005, no longer wore there at all, and you had given the explanation why it was not possible for you to notice this fact. One further question about that. What part of those 10-days reports were the most interesting ones to you when they reached you?
A Of course those parts which were concerned with technical and operational matters, less the administrative problems.
Q You have also testified that the treatment of Jews in concentration camps was part of the duties of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A Yes.
Q Was that the reason why you did not read those parts of the daily report with the same attention with which you read the technical parts?
A That is so.
Q A final question about those documents; in those documents reference is made both to hostages and persons taken as a retaliation measure; what is the difference between those two terms?
A It is a difference between their origin. Persons taken in retaliation came from a battle area. Hostages were taken from villages.
Q Now, about Exhibit 203 on page 24 of the German , on page 27 of the English Document Book; again these are reports, teletype letters addressed to the OKW operational staff, etc. Did you know those reports at the time?
A The report of 7 May, or of 8 May which was concluded on 7 May, I probably did not know, because at that time I was in Bosnia. The report of 23 May, concluded 26 May, I probably knew.
Q Exhibit 205 on page 37 of the English Book is a Situation Report addressed also to the OKW in a teletype letter; did you know that one?
A The first Situation Report sent on 10 June has been signed by me -- the second situation report I did not know when it was sent off because I was with the OKW on an official trip.
Q In both these reports reference is made that arrests were made and that it was intended to deport people to Northern Norway; who ordered that deportation?
AAs I said before I cannot tell you what agency was responsible. It must have been a Reich Agency.
14 0ct.-A-BK-13-3-Maloy (Int. Kurtz)
Q It couldn't have been the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A No, not the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q How was the deportation order received?
A We were in full agreement, because thereby human lives could be preserved.
Q Then the next Exhibit 206, did you know those reports?
A I only knew in all probability the daily reports from that document which are addressed to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. The letter to the German Ambassador in Saloniki I did not know.
Q What about Exhibit 209 on page 45 of the English book?
A That again is a situation report addressed to the OKW initialed by me.
Q Does this situation report contain orders of any sort?
A No, it is a report about the situation. It is a report, but not an order.
We find the sentence there in Paragraph I "Women and children, in order to prevent epidemics or unrest, have been sent to camps in different areas." What was the meaning of this measure taken with women and children?
A This was entirely a welfare measure to prevent epidemics, and was to prevent any further streams of refugees being set in motion. These camps were looked after by German doctors.
Q Then it says, "Cattle will be seized in a means for further pacification and distributed among the peaceful population."
A This was cattle which had been herded together by the insurgents which they probably had blackmailed the population into giving them, and which then in some form or another was to be handed over to the peaceful population.
Q Finally under Roman Numeral II there is a list of total losses, both on the German, Croatian and the insurgent sides, losses in battle and shootings. Was it your idea to have a list of total losses in this form?
A No, this was done because of an OKW order. The Armed Forces Commander Southeast then asked that these summary reports should be discontinued, which was approved because, as I said earlier today, these reports could only too easily mislead.
Q Under Roman Number II at the end, it says: "Therefore, a total of 45,261 shot or killed in battle or as retaliation in Croatia and Serbia." Could you estimate what part the shootings for retaliation played in this list and how many were killed in battle?
A. I am afraid I cannot tell you that now. I would have to estimate these figures once again, which I have not down so far. You can see for instance from this report that under "Killed in Battle," that there were listed 4,963 and next people shot in retaliation 346. That is an extremely small part of the whole figure.
Q. I shall come back now to the measures to prevent epidemics in the case of women and children. That makes me ask you the rather general question; what was done in the medical field for the population of the occupied countries in the Southeast and what action was taken by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. In this field a great deal was done. On one hand in the question of fighting malaria and then in the problem of general welfare, particularly in the country, where there were very few doctors and health service consisted almost only of German military doctors then. Then just as much was done in the field of fighting epidemics, such as the isolation of certain danger areas. Then there was the whole problem of hospitals, the looking after mothers and babies and a great many things were done with regard to that. Reports and lists were drawn up covering these things at the time by Army Medical Officers and letters of thanks were also received from high ranking civilian personalities.
Q. Now about exhibit 211, which is on page 61 of the English document book. This is an activity report of department 1-A of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast of 26 February 1942. It mentions in the entry of 1 February: "In a teletype to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast dated 1 February 1942 the Chief of the OKW points out that the situation in Serbia according to reports of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the result of the penal expeditions do not as yet justify hopes that insurrections on a large scale will not start again in Spring. Up to now we have been unable to break the backbone of the insurgents by Draconic measures......"
"The Chief of the O.K.W. again points out explicity that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast will have to get along with the use of his remaining forces during the coming year also and that it is his duty to apply these methods which will guarantee success."
The same agency, namely the O.K.W., sent out another teletype letter of 7 February, which is contained in Exhibit 529 on page 103 of the English document book in volume 24, on page 67 of the German. Will you please have a look at this, it is a teletype letter of 7 February.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it please?
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. It is in document book 24, exhibit 529, it is on page 103 of the English document book, and it reads:
"The following teletype has been received from the Chief of the O.K.W.; The reports from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast on the situation in Serbia and the result of the punitive expedition do not yet justify hopes that uprisings on a major scale will not commence again in Spring. The bloody losses incurred by the Insurgents and also the numbers of those liquidated are small. The number of prisoners is much too large. Individual prisoners were even able to escape from captivity."
Both teletype letters are concerned with the same question, the measures taken so far to fight the insurgents are criticized strongly and the Armed Forces Commander Southeast is severely admonished to take stronger measures. I would like to ask you this question witness; how was this admonishment received at the time by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. The teletype letter annoyed my commanding officer a lot.
Q. Did you think that the criticism made by the O.K.W., namely that enough insurgents had not been shot and there were too many prisoners, was justified?
A. The entire teletype letter in its reproaches is typical for the fact that the Armed Forces Commander Southeast in the eyes of the 0.K.W. was too mild and too soft.
Q. Now why were these critical teletypes of the O.K.W. not made use of to try again to convince the O.K.W. that the insurgents must be treated in a different way?
A. Well, that had been done repeatedly oh earlier occasions and the chief of the O.K.W, knew extremely well what the answer would be and he knew how to prevent it, because the whole of the last sentence of this teletype letter is nothing but the rejection of our attitude even before we stated it. It says there:
"I again most emphatically point out that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast must manage in the coming year too with the forces remaining to him and that it is his duty to employ those measures which will guarantee success."
That was a rejection of the idea: We need new troops and then no troops would be sent to us a whole year and then there is the reproach contained therein that if the Southeast is not pacified soon it would be our fault.
Q. Witness, let us make a distinction between two things, you said and gave us repeated reasons that the 0.K.W. was not right in its attitude, but if the O.K.W. said that not enough insurgents had been shot or liquidated and that there were too many prisoners and if you would simply think of figures, was the O.K.W. not right there?
A. No.
Q. What I mean here is not relative figures namely that not enough had been shot for the purposes for which the shootings had been meant. I mean whether the absolute figures of the shootings had decreased to such an extent that the O.K.W. was dissatisfied for that reason alone?
A. Yes, that is true of course. In actual figures few people had been shot, or fewer I should say and that was the annoyance.
Q. And too many people had been taken prisoners?
A. Yes, or otherwise they would carefully reproach us for the fact that we had taken too many prisoners.