Q. Exhibit 172 on page 36 of the German and page 42 of the English document book is headed, "Enemy Losses of 1 September 1942 until 15 January 1942 based on the daily or ten day reports." Is that a report or what are we concerned with in the case of this document?
A. It is a sort of note for an oral report, probably notes to be used for a memorandum later on because I believe that the note up on top, "Copy Query," should probably mean, "Memorandum Query."
Q. And the next Exhibit 173, did you know that one? It is a daily report addressed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A. That document does not bear any signature nor does it show whether it was dispatched. I do not know, therefore, whether it is note a draft which was later on changed or something like this, I am unable to say anything about this document.
Q. The next exhibit is 174, a teletype addressed to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia and at the bottom there is your initial "F". Among other things, it reads under paragraph "2",: "Treatment of prisoners in the course of action must be done on a more severe basis." Why was this teletype letter sent out?
A. The reason why it was sent out was an extremely strongly worded, not to say offensively worded, teletype letter by the Chief of the OKW of 1 February which is contained verbatim in Volume 24. In that teletype the Armed Forces Commander Southeast was told in a rather rude manner that he had done wrong things, etc.
Q. By the OKW, you mean?
A. Yes, by Keitel, Chief of the OKW.
Q. And what did the OKW demand in this teletype letter?
A. Much more severe measures: if I may interpolate here, this was the period of time, Spring 1942, as I see it now in my memory, of extremely strong pressure being applied from above.
Q. What was the attitude taken by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. No change. He continued to defend himself and resist.
Q. And how did you attempt to resist?
A. Time and again we attempted to fight this overall tendency of this triumvirate up on top, I guess I would like to call it. At that time General Kuntze, the Commander in Chief, went there personally in order to explain his deviating ideas and on that occasion he was completely turned down with his ideas and he returned.
Q. Whom did you mean when you said "the triumvirate?"
A. Hitler, Keitel and Jodl.
Q. Now, let us turn to Exhibit 176 which is on page 51 of the English page 67 of the German Document Book. Again these are daily reports to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast dated 14 February 1942 to 15 January. Did you know the reports at the time?
A. These reports again bear no signature. You cannot see whether they were dispatched and I cannot say anything about it. I don't know whether they were sent out in this form at all or arrived in this form.
Q. What about the 10 days report in Exhibit 177? Did you know that one?
A. The ten days report of 10 February I probably did not see because after 9 February I went away for about a week. I can not give you the exact time the 10 days report of 20 February I probably did know.
Q. In the 10 days report of 10 February reference is made to a parachute jump of an English major and two former Jugoslavian N.C.O's. It is said the parachutists were captured. Now, would not the so called Commando order referred to in this trial before have caused these British parachutists to be not taken prisoner but killed on the spot?
A. Well, the Commando order was issued only in October 1942 and also, even after that period of time, it did not apply to band warfare in the Southeast but perhaps we can talk about that later on.
Q. Yes, later documents will lead us back to this. This document also contains a relatively large number of shootings as retaliation. Retaliation measures the figure is 3,484. Do you still remember this somewhat large figure?
A. No, but unless I am very much mistaken, this matter is camouflaged report because it is rather strange. that in a daily report of 10 February it says retaliation ordered; ten days later it says in "carrying out." That was a manner of expression which left everything open and which was chosen quite deliberately in some cases in order to hide or disguise or even to mislead.
Q. Did you in later reports which are contained in the prosecution's document books find any indication for the fact that these measures of retaliation were actually carried out?
A. No, I did not find any evidence to that effect.
Q. What was the purpose of these - in your opinion - deliberately falsified reports?
A. I don't want to say that they were deliberate falsifications although to disguise these things would shake the "sacred" truthfulness of a report. That is to say, pretenses were made in order to calm Hitler down.
Q. Were such kind of reports made frequently?
A. Yes.
Q. Were the enemy losses sometimes exaggerated?
A. Yes, that was also done, for one thing for the same reason and also, because one has to realize that every troop always wants to have the enemy high losses because it satisfies their own desire of glory. It shows their own activities more clearly. I believe that applies to all troops, to all types of fighting and, after all, you can only estimate losses suffered by the enemy and, if later on it says in some reports counted enemy dead -- that was sheer nonsense, as I realized only too well at the time. You could only estimate but if you were compelled in regular reports to indicate how many dead were counted, how many dead here estimated, well, then the troops counted and made estimate and you could not check up on it, but who knows the truth knows that in situations of this sort anybody prefers a higher figure to a lower figure.
Q. The next document is 179, on page 46 of the German and 59 of the English document book. Once again it is not signed. They are daily reports. Did you see that report before this trial?
A. I can only answer the same thing which I have answered before. It cannot be seen whether they were sent out in this form and, therefore, I am quite unable to tell you anything concrete about this.
Q. Then there is Exhibit 181 on page 50 of the German and 65 of the English document book. It is an order by the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia signed by General Bader, General infantry order valid heretofore that captured revising the insurgents must not be shot to death unconditionally but may be sent to concentration camp in Sabac later Semlin and insofar as insurgents are ready to surrender unconditionally they may be informed that they will not suffer the death penalty as heretofore. Did you know that document?
A. I don't think I knew the document but I was familiar with the contents.
Q. What was the reason to have a new regulation?
A. The general reason was that it probably came from a nonmilitary agency but we all welcomed this new regulation at that time because one could save lives and it would help to appease the country also, we hoped.
Q Exhibit 183 in the German Document Book on page 52 and on page 69 of the English book, a daily report to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, the extraction: "502 were transported to Semlin from Mitrovica." Did you know that document?
A There again I can only point out that there is no signature. No sender is mentioned. I don't know whether it was sent out in this form or whether it ever arrived.
Q Now, about Exhibit 184, directives for the treatment of insurgents in Croatia, it contains among other things the order by the Aimed Forces Commander Southeast of 19 March 1942. What was the reason to issue new directives concerning the treatment of partisans?
A I wouldn't call them new directives because it was really more compilations of lists which had been ordered previously but the external reason why this was done came from two directions: pressure coming from the OKW, which I have attempted to describe before and which in these days became particularly obvious when Kuntze's ideas were turned down and also at that time in the Spring of 1942 reports kept coming in from all sides that a large insurrection in Serbia was to be expected.
I can very clearly remember the tension under which we lived in those weeks. The date mentioned was always the 15th of March and the whole system of intercepting the communications of the bands, and other methods showed that the second part of March would be a very dangerous period of time and then at the back of this for every one who went through this was the picture of the previous autumn and that was something which must not happen again.
Q On page 10 of this document there is an initial printed concerning a draft and it looks as though it might be your initial. May I give you the original document and perhaps you can tell me whether this is your initial.
A Yes, that's my initial but I see here that this note is different from what it says in. the document book. In the document book it says on page 8 "directives smaller," and in the original it says on page i "clear up directives."
Something was not clear, in other words.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, on a question of translation I suggest that the original document be handed to the interpreters.
THE PRESIDENT: It might be referred to the -- I suggest that it be referred to the interpreters for any necessary correction if counsel cares to do so.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Do the interpreters need the copy?
A It is not a mistake in the translation. It is simply that the handwritten note has been wrongly read.
THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreters refer to the page and give any other identifying designation that sort of may be helpful to the Tribunal?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I would suggest that the translator read the whole page which I have dust given to them. It is only a small note.
THE INTERPRETER: Is that convenient to the Tribunal, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if you can, will you tell us first as to the point to which you are referring?
THE INTERPRETER: Well, I haven't found that passage in the English document book, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you may read it as you find it.
THE INTERPRETER: Thank you, Sir.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: It should be on page 10 of the English version of the original document.
THE INTERPRETER: What it says on this note is -- there are a number of initials -- for instance, "OB, ZULL7, KTB" -- and then it says immediately after, "Return -- Hand over for signature" and then there are two initials "BB," another one "A," and on page 8 it says, "Please clear up' directives,'" and "directives" is in quotations.
Q Witness, on page 6 of these directives: "As to the treatment of insurgents in. Croatia and in Serbia, a ratio of retaliation of 1 to 100 or 1 to 50 is mentioned." Was that expressly an order?
A No, it says expressly the / "may" be taken and "for example."
Q You mean the passage where it says: "If you do not succeed in"-it is on page 5 at the bottom. The document starts on page 58 of the German and as it starts in the English book on page 20 it should be on page 76. I shall read this passage.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please. In making reference to these various documents and portions of them, it would be helpful to me personally -- and I am certain it would be to the other members of the Tribunal-if you each time refer to the English document page and if other counsel in their later examinations, keep that in mind it will be appreciated.
Q It is on page 76 of the English Document Book. It says: "If it is not possible to get hold of the people who have participated in any way in this insurrection or to seize them, reprisal measures of a general kind may be deemed advisable -- for instance, the shooting to death of all male inhabitants from the nearest villages according to a definite ratio (for instance, one German dead -- one hundred Serbians, and one German wounded -- 50 Serbians)". What do you conclude from the way it is put as far as my question is concerned for this order committed you to take these ratios in every case when retaliations had to be applied?
AAs I have said before, you cannot say this order committed us because this expression may be the possibility. The possibility is left open, in other words, and also because of the interpolation, "for instance."
Q That, in other words, was not a directive which had to be followed irrespective of individual conditions and various incidents. You did not have to have the ratio 1 to 100 or 1 to 50?
A No, we were not committed by this because the whole thing is only a directive and it is not committed in detail because it says "may be" and "for instance."
Q Was the ratio of retaliation which was then applicable in Serbia increased after that?
A No, it was not increased.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is in recess until eleven-fifteen.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness, before the recess we had started to discuss Exhibit 184, contained in Document Book VII. We had talked about directives concerning the treatments of insurgents in Serbia and Croatia in connection with the order of the 19th of March 1942. After this order of the 19th of March had been issued were reprisal measures actually carried out in increasing or in decreasing numbers? I put my question this way: Were reprisal measures always carried out where they were suitable?
A During the course of that time reprisal measures had actually decreased, and besides I have to point out here that even at an earlier period not all surprise attacks and all sabotage acts and all illegal actions had been actually countered by reprisal measures. That is a completely wrong idea. Essentially those acts had been retaliated against which could be designated as severe cases.
Q Just one last question concerning this document: You have already stated that this note contained on Page 10 of that document, Page 76 of the English Document Book, clears up directives which have been made by you. Now, in the original document we have a handwritten draft of the directives, and if I am correct, the Prosecution, when submitting that document, asserted that this handwritten draft was initialed by you. I will submit the original document to you again, and I put this question: What initials do you find at the end of this directive? What name would it represent?
A It I remember correctly, it was even asserted that this handwritten draft was made in my handwriting; however, it is the handwriting of Captain Leeb, who was a member of the staff at that time.
Q And how do you recognize it?
A I recognize the handwriting quite clearly, and besides at the end of the handwritten draft I see his "L," which I find again in other parts of the document and which I remember very clearly.
Q Now, let us turn to Exhibit 186. We find it on Page 68 of the German and Page 79 of the English Document Book. This is a priority teletype. Did you see this document at the time?
A Probably, but not in this abbreviated form.
Q Now, to the next exhibit, Exhibit 187. This is a teletype from tho Armed Forces Commander Southeast to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. It reads as follows: "The Wehrmacht Commander Southeast agrees that certain captured insurgents are to be transferred to work in Norway. Insurgents captured in combat action are, on principle, to be hanged or shot to death." Under that teletype we find the note, "Foertsch" in the Document Book. Is that your initials? I'll show the original to you.
A Yes, that is my handwriting.
Q Does that mean that you issued that order?
A No. As I have already said, it is merely a sign for my Commander in Chief, who also initialed this teletype, to show him tha.t the contents comply with the decision which ha.d been made and that the formulation is in order regarding its form.
Q Was this order again based on a directive by the OKW?
A I cannot say that with absolute certainty, but in any case the employment oi labor in Norway is not an invention of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, but instead it came from an authority outside of our jurisdiction. However, we welcomed this suggestion because, as I have said, we realized that we could thus save human lives.
Q Witness, now have a look at Exhibit 188. It is on Page 72 of the German and Page 86 of the English Document Book. This is an order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia regarding the treatment ot captured insurgents, dated the 25th of March 1942. Was this order known to you at the time?
A No, that document was not known to me.
14 0ct-M-TB-8-3-Stone (Int.Schaeffer)
Q Can you give an explanation for the fact that in this document political commissars are mentioned explicitly under Figure 1, second paragraph, "Band leaders, political Commissars, and couriers are to be interrogated and briefed previously, and whenever possible in the presence of SD." Why was this special indication of political Commissars contained in this order?
A The band leaders and political Commissars, to the extent in which they existed, and couriers were, generally speaking, the most intelligent people, and it was only natural that interrogations were extended to those people.
Q And that happened to them after the interrogations?
A They ware treated exactly in the same way as every other band member.
Q The political Commissars then were not treated in any different manner-- that is, not in a more stringent manner than other members of the band?
A No, on the contrary this is a completely wrong picture. The socalled Commissar Order/ never applied to the Southeast, and it never reached the Southeast. And if there is some talk here frequently of political Commissars, - I might say they were included in the band. They are no more than members of a band. Consequently, they were treated in exactly the same manner in every respect as members of a band.
Q Why was the SD called in here?
A I cannot answer that with certainty, but I would assume that the SDwas called to attend such interrogations because SD people were men with police training and, therefore, they were more versed in interrogations and could carry them out better than maybe a lieutenant of the Infantry whose profession had nothing to do with interrogations. After all interrogations are a very special sphere with a very special technique.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Are you thinking about the tortures which are said to have been sometimes connected with such interrogations on the part of the SD?
A. No. Such tortures or methods of that kind of the SD I only heard after the war in connection with trials, etc.
Q. The next exhibit is a communication from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast; this is Exhibit 189. It is contained on page 88 of the English Document Book and 78 of the German Document Book. The prosecution connects this document with you. What is the significance of this communication which has as its subject designation Cetniki?
A. This is merely a language designation.
Q. How do you mean that?
A. I had already stated that conditions in the large area of the insurgentswas many-fold and varied and if, for instance, one talked about Cetniks, one person could interpret this expression as the loyal government people of Kosta Pecanac or the Lotic followers and somebody else could interpret them as the Mihajlovic Cetnik and of course, in order to prevent must understandings, this language question had to be cleared up and that is why this directive came out.
Q. Exhibit 192 contained or page 99 of the English text and page 90 of the German text, is again daily reports to the Commander of the Wehrmacht Southeast and they have no signature. Did you know these reports?
A. If they came in in the same form as they are available here, then I probably did know them but whether they were sent out in this form I very much doubt because I cannot see any initial of any kind in them.
Q. Now let's turn to the last exhibit in this document book. That is 193.
A. I probably knew this ten-day report.
Q. Well, we will then turn to Document Book VIII and here again I shall name those exhibits of which you did not have any knowledge, according to the surrey which we saw recently, at least no knowledge before these trials here started. Those are Exhibits 194, 197, 201, 202, 204, 207, 210, 212.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. First of all, let's turn to Exhibit 195, contained on cage 2 both of the English and the German text. This is a teletype to the operational staff of the OKW and it contains the usual reports concerning soldiers shot in combat and shot in retaliation. Did you know it at the time?
A. At the time when it was sent out, I was on an official trip with the Commander-in-Chief South. Whether I saw it after my return I cannot now say.
Q. Now the next document, Exhibit 196, contained on page 4 both of the German and English text, contains directives of the operational staff of Combat Group Bader concerning the operations in Bosnia. In these directives at the heading there is some reference to the Italian Second Army. What does that mean in this connection?
A. The so-called Combat Group General Bader is a provisionally crested commend and it was subordinate for these operations in Bosnia to the Italian Second Army.
Q. Did those regulations comply with the regulations of the command of the Italian Second Army? The treatment of the insurgents is mentioned too.
A. Yes, because otherwise it wouldn't say here "previous correspondence, Italian Army II, No. so and so."
Q. It strikes me here that in this document under III and 3, that is on page 4 of the German and the the English text, we find a difference between Communist and Cetnik insurgents.
Why was that done? Were by any chance the Cetniks regarded as regular belligerents by the Italians?
A. No, those were merely consideration of expediency. These Cetniks too were illegal.
Q. Why then was this Italian influence emphasized?
A. There were, as far as I remember, special reasons for this. The Italians had a rather strange policy in Croatia. On the one hand, they were the occupation force in the largest part of the area. Nominally, they had picked a king for the throne but on tne other hand the Italian military authorities in Croatia pursued a policy which I at the time could not understand. According to my attitude and feelings at that time, the purpose at the time was that these Italian military authorities at the time did not want the Croatian state as an independent state. They wanted to prove that this Croatian state was not capable of independent life, because they wanted to have a different form of state, maybe a protectorate or something of that kind. I wouldn't know. Only thus it can be explained and was understood by us at the time that in sharp contradition to our tendencies they played out this ethnik differences against each other.
They took the part of the Serbian Cetniks who were for the Slavs, in order to be able to take action against the Catholic Slavs. They played out Croats against Moslems and the other way around and the background idea at the time was - at least one Italian general made that quite clear - to spare their own Italian blood and instead rather to incite those people against each other. This was a policy which the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the Commander-in-Chief Southeast regarded as completely wrong and which he never pursued in his own area of command. I do know and I do remember clearly that Jodl at one time suggested to employ Croat regiments in Serbia and even in Greece.
But we rejected that and we succeeded, thank God, in this rejection because that would have only emphasized the unrest in this area. Nobody was more interested in a peaceful state in those areas than the German Military authorities.
Q. Witness, this morning you have mentioned the Italian policy of occupation in Croatia and also the participation of the German armed forces in the occupation in Croatia. To what period of time does that apply?
A. The period of time which I mentioned before and which I am mentioning now is essentially the year 1942. That is, the first part of that year.
Q. Now let's turn to Exhibit 198. On page 11 of the German.
JUDGE CARTER: Before you leave that exhibit, I wonder if I might ask one question here. General, in Section III-a of this report, on the top of page five of the English, it says "Cetniks who do not resist the allied troops are not to be treated as insurgents. Above all, they are to be treated as prisoners according to the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare."
I don't know whether you explained that or not but how do you account for General Bader's statement to that effect?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: I have already said that this regulation was an Italian order for reasons of expediency, and may I point out that in the German text which in this case is decisive because we deal with a German order, it reads: "They are, to begin with, to be treated as prisoners according to the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare."
These Cetniks which were made use of by the Italians or were intended to be made use of by the Italians, one wanted to treat as well as possible in order to draw them out of the Croatian area and in order to thus avoid any more emphasis on the ethnik differences.
The designation Cetniks must only be applied to Serbia and Montenegro, not to Croatia. The more Cetniks were withdrawn from the Croatian area, it would give better prerequisites for a pacification of that area. The intention was to build a golden bridge for these Cetniks, if I may put it that way.
JUDGE CARTER: Well, the reason was then not that they had met the four fundamental requirements of a belligerent but because they were cooperating with the Italians or with the Germans. Is that the reason?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: The reason for this regulation was not of a legal nature. It was not a recognition of legality. It was merely a regulation based on reasons of expediency and suitability merely for this one operation. It was intended to prevent any more aggravation of the Cetnik differences.
JUDGE CARTER: In other words, the Italians or the Germans, or whichever one of the two it may have been, were playing these particular Cetniks off against other insurgents in that particular territory, is that correct?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: The Italians had such tendencies. At least, according to our observations at that time. German authorities at a later date had occasionally also worked together with such Cetniks but in a different sense, I.E. they used them as scouts, as pathfinders, and to help solve the very difficult questions of territorial nature. In the whole area, Cetnik differences were never intended to be made use of by the Commander-in-Chief Southeast.
JUDGE CARTER: Well General, didn't the Germans and the Italians or both take advantage of these conflicts in that particular territory and in various times extend favors to certain groups because of services that they had rendered to them? Isn't that a fact?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: No, not in that sense, but in this connection I would like to point out that in individual documents we find certain statements which might support such an opinion. There is, for instance, a pamphlet of a division concerning conditions in Montenegro. There the very difficult conditions in Montenegro are discussed and there is some talk about the white and the green ones. One must not forget that I believe the green ones of the white ones, I am not sure which -- were those people who supported the Montenegran government, in the same way as, for instance, in Serbia, the Cetniks of Kosta Pecanac supported the Nedic government, and practically, they were later on included to a large extent in a so-called Serbian state guard.
They were made a kind of auxiliary police which was officially sanctioned. Certainly, the German military leadership was pleased with every individual and gladly accepted his support who supported the German tendencies for pacification and thus the work of the Nedic government, to mention Serbia here.
However, this was never done with the idea of playing off one Cetnik difference against another, and I would like to point to something which have just said. Where there were such ideas on the part of the OKW, for instance, to bring Croatian regiments into Serbia or into Greece or the other way around, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast always objected and always attempted to avoid such a mixup of the problems at stake and such an aggravation of the situation. It was unavoidable that large parts of Serbia were at the time occupied by Bulgarian units and this seems to contradict which I have said. That was a decision on which the Armed Forces Commander Southeast could take no influence and which was reached for more extensive political considerations. But that again was always recognized as a necessary evil.
JUDGE CARTER: Just one more question. Isn't it a fact that the Germans were supported by the Croatians and the Croatian-Ustasha? Isn't it a fact that Mihajlovic and his Cetniks at times cooperated with the German Army and fought the partisans and the Communists at times? Didn't those things all occur and didn't the German army take advantage of it?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: Yes, indeed. With regard to the Ustasha we have to consider that it was a militia. Really, one should always say Ustasha Militia because the Ustasha as such was merely a party. The relation is about this way: The Ustasha was in Crotia what the National Socialist Party was in Germany, and the Ustasha Militia were about roughly the same as the Waffen SS in Germany. It is a military unit created on a party basis which is completely legal and a state institution.
The question of loyalty to the government of that state has to be excluded. The Mihajlovic Cetniks did only at a very late date find the way to the Germans and then not completely. As long as I was in the Southeast, there was no clear stand on the part of Mihajlovic of his people, and it was never quite clear how Mihajlovic and his sub leaders were really orientated, but here again the following must not be forgotten. In the first place, Mihajlovic had for a long time found certain support from the allies, and then came the time when this support was discontinued and Tito arrived on the scene and so Mihajlovic lost ground.
Mihajlovic, however, had not only fought the German occupation power but from the very beginning he fought against the ideological opponent whom he saw in militant communism. Mihajlovic fight was on on one hand the fight of a nationalist against the occupying forces and on the other hand, independent of that, the fight of a Royalist and a Conservative against the enormous revolutionary Communist-Bolshevist danger. That was the picture which we faced at the time and that is the picture as I see it today.
JUDGE CARTER: Didn't you -- you don't think the Germans contributed to the confusion down there by lighting up these inherent conflicts and keeping them at each other's throats during this period? Is that your opinion?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: No, Your Honor. It was never the intention of the German leader nor the intention of the OKW and I am convinced not the intention of Hitler either to emphasize these differences and to increase the confusion, because, what really was the intention and the wash of the Commander-in-Chief Southeast? It was his first task to fulfill the strategic operational task in the area. That is, to keep the Southeast area within the framework of the general war events.
At the time we repeatedly regarded this old center of trouble of Europe with great anxiety - also the historic entrance, that is the area Saloniki, and so on - and during the time of my tenure down there there was no greater tension than there was during those months when we knew that the allies were about to start tearing open the German front from the Balkan area. At the time we had reliable informations regarding these plans, and we stationed troops, that is amongst others the 1st Panzer Division, in the Peloponnesus which , however, were insufficient. We knew that if the Allies had attached there in all seriousness it would have meant an extremely difficult struggle for us. We not only had to defend ourselves in case of an inversion against the attack from the outside, but also against the formation of the enormous insurgent movement in the Southeast. I believe that everyone who could put themselves into the situation of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast at the time, will have to admit that there could be nobody in the whole wide world who was more interested in the peace and quiet in the interior of the Southeast area, and acted accordingly, then we at that time. If I may say this it is a personal attack of the prosecution that at the time we wanted to exterminate, terrorize and wanted to incite the population against itself, and that we caused unrest. This assertion apart from the insult which I saw in it, concerned me personally so deeply, because it is a complete misunderstanding of our endeavor at the time when we fought against a misunderstanding from above; we fought against dangers from the outside and we fought against meanness on the other side. Nobody could pray more for reason amongst those people than the person who was responsible for that area, my Commander in Chief who was represented by four people.
JUDGE CARTER: I have nothing further.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, there appears to have been a translation error at the top of page 5 of the English, page 4 of the German, l4 0ct.