Q What is an activity report?
AAn activity report is actually the same thing as a war diary. It is in the form of a file. We have a brief compilation of the events, orders, important reports of the department concerned, for whom the report is drawn up.
Q. Who drew up these activity reports?
A. That was the task of a special officer in every case. The activity report of the operational department here was in my opinion made by the man who kept the war diary and the archives.
Q. And who was that?
A. The archives clerk, his name was Wisshaupt.
Q. Were you shown these reports?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I did not have time to read such compilations, moreover every department made its own reports, the operational department for instance, the I-C department, the quartermaster department, etc.
Q. And who signed this activity report we have here now?
A. This was signed by Lt. Col. Macher, who was the I-A at the time he signed for his department.
Q. Would it be possible that there were mistakes contained in such reports?
A. Certainly.
Q. You mentioned just now the name of Wisshaupt, who was in charge of the archives and who kept the war diaries. The prosecution has offered as exhibit 584 outside the document books a large book, which is called "Combatting the Insurgent Movement in the Southeastern Area," the first part from June 1941 to August 1942 edited by Oberheeresardiivrat Ernst. Wisshaupt on behalf of the chief of the General Staff. Could this document also be called an activity report?
A. No, it is a draft for a description which was to form a basis for the official war history later on. It was my idea that one should write these things down as soon as possible after the event without any actual and final formulation, in order to prevent a history being written later on which would depend entirely on how the war would come out, and would therefore be one-sided.
Had everything gone well Hitler would have done everything, and if things had not gone well, then the things we did would have been distorted. In the ordinary manner, this is what I thought to do under the circumstances of the time.
Q. Did you read this compilation at the time?
A. Extracts yes, whether I have read this particular part I do not know, I am inclined to think I did not, because when I read it now I found a number of definite mistakes.
Q. Do you have this report before you?
A. No, but I remember it more or less.
Q. Can you give us a few examples for these mistakes, I mean those which you would have corrected at the time had you read the report?
A. Yes, one example for a formal question is that my rank has been quoted wrong. At the time I was still a colonel and I was promoted to a General's rank. Also there is the description which runs as it the 342nd Infantry Division would have been sent to Serbia. On the basis of my oral report to Keitel. The fact is that this order came out a very short period of time prior to my report to Keitel.
Q. Would you say that the whole report might be contested therefore?
A. No, not at all, on the contrary it should be understood as a draft. It must not be regarded as the final version and it is an over-all picture which shows the events quite correctly as I remember it, but there are mistakes among the details.
Q. Were attempts made to have more of these historical descriptions?
A. No, unless you include the order given to Dr. Ibbeken at the time and to which he referred here on the witness stand.
Q. Did this order have the same purpose?
A. Yes, it had really the sane purpose, but was more extensive and from a higher perspective and there was also the idea which Ibbeken mentioned, to have a sort of manual for officers who were serving in the Southeast.
Q. Why did you take Ibbeken of all people for this?
A. The idea to have a report of this type originated perhaps with me, but I believe my successor Winter exactly the sane share in it. Ibbeken I met on the occasion of a lecture which he gave to officers in the Southeast to which I listened and which impressed me particularly. As he said himself here on the witness stand, he had just been sacked for political reasons and you could kill two birds with one stone on this occasion, you could give a chance to a man who was in disgrace and at the same time perhaps create something valuable.
Q. At that time were you familiar with the basic orders of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General for Serbia for the winter of 20 December 1941? This is exhibit 161 on page 78 of the German and page 96 of the document book 6.
A. Whether or not I read these orders verbatim at the time I do not know, but I was familiar with the contents.
Q. Under paragraph 3, we have "Security and Conduct of Battle." In the fifth paragraph it mentions the so-called directives for the combatting of partisans of 25 October 1941; did you know those directives to combat partisans?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Did you find the directives in the documents submitted by the Prosecution?
A. No, they are not contained therein.
Q. Can you from your memory tell us something about the essential contents of those directives?
A. I believe I remember that the first main part of the directives is concerned with the combatting of bands and the tactical procedure of combat. It was a sort of training manual for the fighting troops. In the second part I seem also to remember something was said about reprisal measures, etc.
Q. What was said about the latter with respect to details you do not remember?
A. No, I do not remember because that was superseded by another directive.
Q. Were these directives distributed to the troops?
A. Yes, they were issued down to the companies. This fact also becomes clear from one of the documents of the prosecution.
Q. Witness, were you familiar with the last two exhibits in document book 6, 162 and 163? Both are ten day reports by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. They contain the usual reports concerning our losses, losses suffered and by the enemy and the shooting of hostages.
A. I probably knew these reports. I am unable to say so with absolute certainty because I have not seen the original with any initials.
Q. Witness, now let us take up document book 7, At the beginning, I would like you to confirm what documents you did not know at the time in the Southeast, but which nevertheless have been used by the prosecution as incriminating evidence. These are Exhibits 165, 166, 168, 171, 175, 178, 180, 182, 185, 190, and 191; is that correct?
A. Yes, did you also include 167?
Q. No, yes No, 167 I should also include that as part of the list.
A. This as among the documents I did not know at the time and only came across in this trial.
Q. Yes. The first document in document book 7 is exhibit 164 on page 1. It concerns the employment of German Troops against the insurgents in Croatia. This document gives me the opportunity of putting a few questions to you concerning conditions in Croatia. How was it that in Croatia, too, the insurgent movement became so extensive?
A. I believe I have said something about that already. I can give you a brief answer of your questions by pointing to the political decisions, which were reached concerning Croatia and which led to an extenuation of the national and religious contrasts, which also gave the Italians pre-domination in the newly established state of Crotia and which in some cases were to be explained by the system of Government in that country. The dictatorial nature of the Government represented by the Poglavnik and the Ustasha, as the party number one, with their military Chetniks as the combat unit of the Party.
Q. Did the Commander in Chief Southeast have any political influence on the political development in Croatia?
A. No.
Q. Now had the occupation of Croatia been regulated?
A. As has been indicated, what was done there was that on both sides of the Belgrade-Zagreb railway and the territory north of that Railway was occupied by weak German forces, up to what was called the line of demarcation which ran roughly parallel to the Save River and also parallel to the railway following up that line of demarcation that in the far greater part of Croatia, the Italians were in occupation.
Q. And how did the Italians carry out their occupation?
A. They had subdivided their area into three zones, the zone near the coast, a zone which followed the line of demarcation to the German Zone and an area in the middle. In those areas, they as a rule followed the principle to concentrate their forces in a few isolated places and to keep them rather immobile in a sort of central strong points, I would like to call it.
Q. Now, this Italian occupation, was this regarded by the Commander Southeast as an adequate arrangement?
A. Well, we had no influence on this at all because the Italians were entirely independent, but from the point of view of an expert we thought that the manner in which they occupied the country was entirely wrong.
It lacked mobility which was possibly based on a certain amount of fear and gave absolute lea-way to the development of Guerrila warfare, because large areas were practically not constantly occupied.
Q. Witness, in the document a number of groups of bands are being mentioned against whom the German troops in Croatia fought at the beginning of January 1941. This is on page 3 of the copy and it is on page 6 of the original; did you know the organization of the insurgent troops in the fighting area of Croatia?
A. I knew these by and large, yes.
Q. Were these groups under a uniform leadership?
A. No, on the contrary. There were Communistic bands with Serbian tendencies and some with Croatian tendencies, some were Moslems in their tendencies. There were Cetniks, such as the group of the Dangic Cetnicks and there were indenpendant Cetnicks, especially the border area of Bosnia offered itself for a coming and going of bands and that is now the most extraordinary variety of bands with extraordinary varieties of leadership were formed with a number of different aims.
Q. Did they all fight together against the German occupation?
A. Yes and no, the Communistic bands without doubt, as far as the Serbians and Cetniks were concerned, but particularly the Dangic Cetniks fought. Those Croatians who had suppressed their Serbian brothers and mistreated them in some cases in the most are full manner, with the result that these Dangic Cetniks during certain places did not oppose the German occupation, but tried to link with us.
Q. Did they ever contact you?
A. In order to protect their fellow Serbians in the fight against the Croatian suppressors they asked for our support and backing.
Q. Now did the armed forces of the Commander Southeast take up this idea?
A. This was a highly delicate problem, needless to say we made attempts in some cases successfully to have this mutual operation discontinued, but Dangic was in his final demands so extravagant. He demanded for instance that a great part of Croatia should be ceded to Serbia, he demanded we should arm him officially and supply him with ammunition, etc., with the result that we could not comply with these demands because to a large part they were directed against the independent state of Croatia, which was a German allie and whose existance had to be recognized.
Q. Were these bands also regarded and treated as franc-tireurs?
A. Yes, because the same conditions applied as I have described so often before.
Q. As far as Croatia was concerned did the same fighting rules apply as in Serbia?
A. As a matter of principle yes, but it characterized the different type of enemies we faced and the variety of the fighting that for each individual operation special directives and orders had to be issued because conditions were different everytime.
Q. Were these orders to be issued by the armed Commanders Southeast?
A. No, that was not possible because individual conditions could not be judged in that manner in detail. The orders were issued by these commanders who were in charge of carrying out the relevant orders.
Q. And who was that at the time.
A. The head man was the Commanding General in Serbia.
Q. Did the same retaliation measures apply in Croatia?
A. There again special directives were issued in each case because in Croatia the participation of Croatian Government departments was necessary and was always observed. In Croatia there were relatively few occasions when these measures were used.
Q. Who had the executive power in Croatia?
A. The Croatian state in any case not the armed forces Commander Southeast unless in the case of certain areas and certain restricted periods of time when operations were in progress the executive power would be transferred to the most senior officer of the troops operating in that area who then would be given a civilian commissioner of the Croatian government to assist him.
Q. Exhibit 169 on page 27 of the German and page 30 of the document book 7 contains daily reports addressed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. These reports again contain shootings of Communists and measures of reprisal; did you know those daily reports?
A. Yes, I think possibly I knew them, excluding the days of course between the 5th and 8th of January when I was on an official trip to Sofia, but these reports I knew on the manner in which they came in, that is to say complete.
Q. And these reports are incomplete in the document book you mean?
A. Yes, here - as I have shown by certain examples only brief and weak extracts are contained.
Q. Did you know those reports, which are contained in exhibit 170, the report by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the Armed Forces General Southeast, which is on page 36 of the English document book page 32 of the German.
A. I think these reports also I possibly knew.
Q. Exhibit 172 on page 36 of the German and page 42 of the English document book is headed, "Enemy Losses of 1 September 1942 until 15 January 1942 based on the daily or ten day reports." Is that a report or what are we concerned with in the case of this document?
A. It is a sort of note for an oral report, probably notes to be used for a memorandum later on because I believe that the note up on top, "Copy Query," should probably mean, "Memorandum Query."
Q. And the next Exhibit 173, did you know that one? It is a daily report addressed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A. That document does not bear any signature nor does it show whether it was dispatched. I do not know, therefore, whether it is note a draft which was later on changed or something like this, I am unable to say anything about this document.
Q. The next exhibit is 174, a teletype addressed to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia and at the bottom there is your initial "F". Among other things, it reads under paragraph "2",: "Treatment of prisoners in the course of action must be done on a more severe basis." Why was this teletype letter sent out?
A. The reason why it was sent out was an extremely strongly worded, not to say offensively worded, teletype letter by the Chief of the OKW of 1 February which is contained verbatim in Volume 24. In that teletype the Armed Forces Commander Southeast was told in a rather rude manner that he had done wrong things, etc.
Q. By the OKW, you mean?
A. Yes, by Keitel, Chief of the OKW.
Q. And what did the OKW demand in this teletype letter?
A. Much more severe measures: if I may interpolate here, this was the period of time, Spring 1942, as I see it now in my memory, of extremely strong pressure being applied from above.
Q. What was the attitude taken by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. No change. He continued to defend himself and resist.
Q. And how did you attempt to resist?
A. Time and again we attempted to fight this overall tendency of this triumvirate up on top, I guess I would like to call it. At that time General Kuntze, the Commander in Chief, went there personally in order to explain his deviating ideas and on that occasion he was completely turned down with his ideas and he returned.
Q. Whom did you mean when you said "the triumvirate?"
A. Hitler, Keitel and Jodl.
Q. Now, let us turn to Exhibit 176 which is on page 51 of the English page 67 of the German Document Book. Again these are daily reports to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast dated 14 February 1942 to 15 January. Did you know the reports at the time?
A. These reports again bear no signature. You cannot see whether they were dispatched and I cannot say anything about it. I don't know whether they were sent out in this form at all or arrived in this form.
Q. What about the 10 days report in Exhibit 177? Did you know that one?
A. The ten days report of 10 February I probably did not see because after 9 February I went away for about a week. I can not give you the exact time the 10 days report of 20 February I probably did know.
Q. In the 10 days report of 10 February reference is made to a parachute jump of an English major and two former Jugoslavian N.C.O's. It is said the parachutists were captured. Now, would not the so called Commando order referred to in this trial before have caused these British parachutists to be not taken prisoner but killed on the spot?
A. Well, the Commando order was issued only in October 1942 and also, even after that period of time, it did not apply to band warfare in the Southeast but perhaps we can talk about that later on.
Q. Yes, later documents will lead us back to this. This document also contains a relatively large number of shootings as retaliation. Retaliation measures the figure is 3,484. Do you still remember this somewhat large figure?
A. No, but unless I am very much mistaken, this matter is camouflaged report because it is rather strange. that in a daily report of 10 February it says retaliation ordered; ten days later it says in "carrying out." That was a manner of expression which left everything open and which was chosen quite deliberately in some cases in order to hide or disguise or even to mislead.
Q. Did you in later reports which are contained in the prosecution's document books find any indication for the fact that these measures of retaliation were actually carried out?
A. No, I did not find any evidence to that effect.
Q. What was the purpose of these - in your opinion - deliberately falsified reports?
A. I don't want to say that they were deliberate falsifications although to disguise these things would shake the "sacred" truthfulness of a report. That is to say, pretenses were made in order to calm Hitler down.
Q. Were such kind of reports made frequently?
A. Yes.
Q. Were the enemy losses sometimes exaggerated?
A. Yes, that was also done, for one thing for the same reason and also, because one has to realize that every troop always wants to have the enemy high losses because it satisfies their own desire of glory. It shows their own activities more clearly. I believe that applies to all troops, to all types of fighting and, after all, you can only estimate losses suffered by the enemy and, if later on it says in some reports counted enemy dead -- that was sheer nonsense, as I realized only too well at the time. You could only estimate but if you were compelled in regular reports to indicate how many dead were counted, how many dead here estimated, well, then the troops counted and made estimate and you could not check up on it, but who knows the truth knows that in situations of this sort anybody prefers a higher figure to a lower figure.
Q. The next document is 179, on page 46 of the German and 59 of the English document book. Once again it is not signed. They are daily reports. Did you see that report before this trial?
A. I can only answer the same thing which I have answered before. It cannot be seen whether they were sent out in this form and, therefore, I am quite unable to tell you anything concrete about this.
Q. Then there is Exhibit 181 on page 50 of the German and 65 of the English document book. It is an order by the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia signed by General Bader, General infantry order valid heretofore that captured revising the insurgents must not be shot to death unconditionally but may be sent to concentration camp in Sabac later Semlin and insofar as insurgents are ready to surrender unconditionally they may be informed that they will not suffer the death penalty as heretofore. Did you know that document?
A. I don't think I knew the document but I was familiar with the contents.
Q. What was the reason to have a new regulation?
A. The general reason was that it probably came from a nonmilitary agency but we all welcomed this new regulation at that time because one could save lives and it would help to appease the country also, we hoped.
Q Exhibit 183 in the German Document Book on page 52 and on page 69 of the English book, a daily report to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, the extraction: "502 were transported to Semlin from Mitrovica." Did you know that document?
A There again I can only point out that there is no signature. No sender is mentioned. I don't know whether it was sent out in this form or whether it ever arrived.
Q Now, about Exhibit 184, directives for the treatment of insurgents in Croatia, it contains among other things the order by the Aimed Forces Commander Southeast of 19 March 1942. What was the reason to issue new directives concerning the treatment of partisans?
A I wouldn't call them new directives because it was really more compilations of lists which had been ordered previously but the external reason why this was done came from two directions: pressure coming from the OKW, which I have attempted to describe before and which in these days became particularly obvious when Kuntze's ideas were turned down and also at that time in the Spring of 1942 reports kept coming in from all sides that a large insurrection in Serbia was to be expected.
I can very clearly remember the tension under which we lived in those weeks. The date mentioned was always the 15th of March and the whole system of intercepting the communications of the bands, and other methods showed that the second part of March would be a very dangerous period of time and then at the back of this for every one who went through this was the picture of the previous autumn and that was something which must not happen again.
Q On page 10 of this document there is an initial printed concerning a draft and it looks as though it might be your initial. May I give you the original document and perhaps you can tell me whether this is your initial.
A Yes, that's my initial but I see here that this note is different from what it says in. the document book. In the document book it says on page 8 "directives smaller," and in the original it says on page i "clear up directives."
Something was not clear, in other words.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, on a question of translation I suggest that the original document be handed to the interpreters.
THE PRESIDENT: It might be referred to the -- I suggest that it be referred to the interpreters for any necessary correction if counsel cares to do so.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Do the interpreters need the copy?
A It is not a mistake in the translation. It is simply that the handwritten note has been wrongly read.
THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreters refer to the page and give any other identifying designation that sort of may be helpful to the Tribunal?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I would suggest that the translator read the whole page which I have dust given to them. It is only a small note.
THE INTERPRETER: Is that convenient to the Tribunal, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if you can, will you tell us first as to the point to which you are referring?
THE INTERPRETER: Well, I haven't found that passage in the English document book, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you may read it as you find it.
THE INTERPRETER: Thank you, Sir.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: It should be on page 10 of the English version of the original document.
THE INTERPRETER: What it says on this note is -- there are a number of initials -- for instance, "OB, ZULL7, KTB" -- and then it says immediately after, "Return -- Hand over for signature" and then there are two initials "BB," another one "A," and on page 8 it says, "Please clear up' directives,'" and "directives" is in quotations.
Q Witness, on page 6 of these directives: "As to the treatment of insurgents in. Croatia and in Serbia, a ratio of retaliation of 1 to 100 or 1 to 50 is mentioned." Was that expressly an order?
A No, it says expressly the / "may" be taken and "for example."
Q You mean the passage where it says: "If you do not succeed in"-it is on page 5 at the bottom. The document starts on page 58 of the German and as it starts in the English book on page 20 it should be on page 76. I shall read this passage.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please. In making reference to these various documents and portions of them, it would be helpful to me personally -- and I am certain it would be to the other members of the Tribunal-if you each time refer to the English document page and if other counsel in their later examinations, keep that in mind it will be appreciated.
Q It is on page 76 of the English Document Book. It says: "If it is not possible to get hold of the people who have participated in any way in this insurrection or to seize them, reprisal measures of a general kind may be deemed advisable -- for instance, the shooting to death of all male inhabitants from the nearest villages according to a definite ratio (for instance, one German dead -- one hundred Serbians, and one German wounded -- 50 Serbians)". What do you conclude from the way it is put as far as my question is concerned for this order committed you to take these ratios in every case when retaliations had to be applied?
AAs I have said before, you cannot say this order committed us because this expression may be the possibility. The possibility is left open, in other words, and also because of the interpolation, "for instance."
Q That, in other words, was not a directive which had to be followed irrespective of individual conditions and various incidents. You did not have to have the ratio 1 to 100 or 1 to 50?
A No, we were not committed by this because the whole thing is only a directive and it is not committed in detail because it says "may be" and "for instance."
Q Was the ratio of retaliation which was then applicable in Serbia increased after that?
A No, it was not increased.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is in recess until eleven-fifteen.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness, before the recess we had started to discuss Exhibit 184, contained in Document Book VII. We had talked about directives concerning the treatments of insurgents in Serbia and Croatia in connection with the order of the 19th of March 1942. After this order of the 19th of March had been issued were reprisal measures actually carried out in increasing or in decreasing numbers? I put my question this way: Were reprisal measures always carried out where they were suitable?
A During the course of that time reprisal measures had actually decreased, and besides I have to point out here that even at an earlier period not all surprise attacks and all sabotage acts and all illegal actions had been actually countered by reprisal measures. That is a completely wrong idea. Essentially those acts had been retaliated against which could be designated as severe cases.
Q Just one last question concerning this document: You have already stated that this note contained on Page 10 of that document, Page 76 of the English Document Book, clears up directives which have been made by you. Now, in the original document we have a handwritten draft of the directives, and if I am correct, the Prosecution, when submitting that document, asserted that this handwritten draft was initialed by you. I will submit the original document to you again, and I put this question: What initials do you find at the end of this directive? What name would it represent?
A It I remember correctly, it was even asserted that this handwritten draft was made in my handwriting; however, it is the handwriting of Captain Leeb, who was a member of the staff at that time.
Q And how do you recognize it?
A I recognize the handwriting quite clearly, and besides at the end of the handwritten draft I see his "L," which I find again in other parts of the document and which I remember very clearly.
Q Now, let us turn to Exhibit 186. We find it on Page 68 of the German and Page 79 of the English Document Book. This is a priority teletype. Did you see this document at the time?
A Probably, but not in this abbreviated form.
Q Now, to the next exhibit, Exhibit 187. This is a teletype from tho Armed Forces Commander Southeast to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. It reads as follows: "The Wehrmacht Commander Southeast agrees that certain captured insurgents are to be transferred to work in Norway. Insurgents captured in combat action are, on principle, to be hanged or shot to death." Under that teletype we find the note, "Foertsch" in the Document Book. Is that your initials? I'll show the original to you.
A Yes, that is my handwriting.
Q Does that mean that you issued that order?
A No. As I have already said, it is merely a sign for my Commander in Chief, who also initialed this teletype, to show him tha.t the contents comply with the decision which ha.d been made and that the formulation is in order regarding its form.
Q Was this order again based on a directive by the OKW?
A I cannot say that with absolute certainty, but in any case the employment oi labor in Norway is not an invention of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, but instead it came from an authority outside of our jurisdiction. However, we welcomed this suggestion because, as I have said, we realized that we could thus save human lives.
Q Witness, now have a look at Exhibit 188. It is on Page 72 of the German and Page 86 of the English Document Book. This is an order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia regarding the treatment ot captured insurgents, dated the 25th of March 1942. Was this order known to you at the time?
A No, that document was not known to me.