-M-BX-11-2-Maloy (Int. Schaeffer) under Paragraph 3, "Treatment of the Insurgents."
I wonder if that could be passed to the Court interpreters?
THE PRESIDENT: You will kindly call attention to the particular natters in question, and they will then be submitted to the interpreters.
THE INTERPRETER: This concerns the first sentence on page 3 in the English text. It starts in the English text, "Above all they ere to be treated", but the correct translation would be "To begin with they are to be treated as prisoners according to the Hague regulation of land warfare." "To begin with", "in the initial stage" but not "above all".
THE PRESIDENT: Is that translation - as now made - agreeable to both parties?
DR. RAUSCHENBACE: Yes.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: It is all right with the prosecution, Your Honor.
Q Witness, now let's turn to Exhibit 198, contained on page 11 of the German text and page 14 of the English Document Book. This is a report from the German Commander Southeast to the German General in Zagreb, and it concerns one shooting, and 34 arrested; did you know the document prior to this time?
A Probably, yes.
Q And the next Exhibit, 199, which we find on page 14 of the German and page 17 of the English Document Book. This is a teletype to the OKW, and on the last page it has your signature. What does this document concern, is it an order?
A No, it is a report. That is, it is an extensive message concerning a certain period and the situation in tha.t period in the area of the Southeast, and is directed to the OKW.
Q On the last, but one page of this document, we have a note under Roman numeral III, Capital B, 1612 shot to death in combat, 3 reprisal measures. This situation report was concluded on April 22, 1942, according to the heading?
A Yes.
Q This unusual ration between the ones shot in combat, 1612 men, and only 3 reprisal measures, is that by any chance typical of the subsequent time?
A In any case if three reprisal measures are mentioned here it does not mean that three reprisal measures were carried out. It means that three people were killed in retaliation. This is very few, but I have already said previously, in a subsequent period, reprisal measures decreased considerably because after all the insurrection which we had feared did not take place.
Q Now, we will have a look at Exhibit 200, contained on Page 12 of both the German and English Document Book, and also have a look at Exhibit 208, which you find on page 41 of the German text and page 48 of the English text. Let us look at those two documents together, and read the following: Exhibit 200 contains two 10-day reports, and Exhibits 208 contains a Situation Report. In these two reports we find statements concerning men detained in a concentration camp. In Exhibit 200 we read that 5,000 Jews were in the concentration camp. On the 30 April only 2474, and in the report of 1 July 1942 in Exhibit 208, first page, there are no more Jews mentioned at all. That is rather striking, and I want to know from you now whether it struck you particularly at the time when you made those reports that the Jews decreased in numbers in the concentration camps, and finally none were reported at all. What happened to them?
A If one compares these reports here in a document book as you do now, then of course one is struck by this fact. However, if during the activities of the staff affairs one reads a report of July 1942, one is not in a position to compare offhand this report with another report of April 20, and besides the situation was this, the question whether the Jews had been brought some place else from these concentra tion camps.
Yesterday I discussed this in connection with Saloniki. That fact was regarded by us as a matter to be dealt with by the Higher SS and Police Leader, who had received his clear orders I assume from his own channels. A man like Himmler would have never had the idea to issue orders through us, or inform our authorities, regarding the treatment of Jews. These natters were always handled on the outside and I am convinced today that they were kept secret from us deliberately.
Q Were the Higher SS and Police Leaders subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander or Commander in Chief of the Southeast?
A No, the Higher SS and Police Leader was subordinate in his own person to the Commanding General in Serbia, but people who know the situation of that time realize that that was merely on paper. If Himmler ordered something through police channels, he paid no attention to the Commander in Chief Southeast or to the Commanding General for Serbia, and if he would only suspect that we wanted to interfere in any of his spheres, let's say in the sphere of the Waffen-SS - I am thinking about formations of the Waffen--SS, then we would be stopped before we could as much as open our mouth.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(Thereupon the noon recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you proceed with further direct examination of the witness the Tribunal desires to make this statement for the record:
It has been called to the attention of the Tribunal that pursuant to the order of the Tribunal under date of August 14, 1947, the Prosecution has provided a large number of photostat copies of orders, reports and excerpts from the diaries of the military units commanded by or subordinate to these defendants or some of them. It has been further called to our attention that included among these documents there are approximately one hundred which have been forwarded with the distinct understanding and order that they are not to be made available as evidence. We have been informed that said documents pertain to and contain important information concerning the situation in the Balkan area here involved and the actions and conduct of these defendants, or some of them, with reference thereto. With this information in our possession, it is the feeling of the Tribunal that a fair and impartial conduct of the trial requires the immediate determination of the availability of these documents for the use of both the prosecution and defense.
That is the extent of this statement and you may proceed with your examination.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness before lunch I asked you questions concerning Exhibit 200, and Exhibit 208 in Document Book 8 and we had reference in these two documents to the fact that in between those two reports Jews in concentration camps which before then amounted to 4005, no longer wore there at all, and you had given the explanation why it was not possible for you to notice this fact. One further question about that. What part of those 10-days reports were the most interesting ones to you when they reached you?
A Of course those parts which were concerned with technical and operational matters, less the administrative problems.
Q You have also testified that the treatment of Jews in concentration camps was part of the duties of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A Yes.
Q Was that the reason why you did not read those parts of the daily report with the same attention with which you read the technical parts?
A That is so.
Q A final question about those documents; in those documents reference is made both to hostages and persons taken as a retaliation measure; what is the difference between those two terms?
A It is a difference between their origin. Persons taken in retaliation came from a battle area. Hostages were taken from villages.
Q Now, about Exhibit 203 on page 24 of the German , on page 27 of the English Document Book; again these are reports, teletype letters addressed to the OKW operational staff, etc. Did you know those reports at the time?
A The report of 7 May, or of 8 May which was concluded on 7 May, I probably did not know, because at that time I was in Bosnia. The report of 23 May, concluded 26 May, I probably knew.
Q Exhibit 205 on page 37 of the English Book is a Situation Report addressed also to the OKW in a teletype letter; did you know that one?
A The first Situation Report sent on 10 June has been signed by me -- the second situation report I did not know when it was sent off because I was with the OKW on an official trip.
Q In both these reports reference is made that arrests were made and that it was intended to deport people to Northern Norway; who ordered that deportation?
AAs I said before I cannot tell you what agency was responsible. It must have been a Reich Agency.
14 0ct.-A-BK-13-3-Maloy (Int. Kurtz)
Q It couldn't have been the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A No, not the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q How was the deportation order received?
A We were in full agreement, because thereby human lives could be preserved.
Q Then the next Exhibit 206, did you know those reports?
A I only knew in all probability the daily reports from that document which are addressed to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. The letter to the German Ambassador in Saloniki I did not know.
Q What about Exhibit 209 on page 45 of the English book?
A That again is a situation report addressed to the OKW initialed by me.
Q Does this situation report contain orders of any sort?
A No, it is a report about the situation. It is a report, but not an order.
We find the sentence there in Paragraph I "Women and children, in order to prevent epidemics or unrest, have been sent to camps in different areas." What was the meaning of this measure taken with women and children?
A This was entirely a welfare measure to prevent epidemics, and was to prevent any further streams of refugees being set in motion. These camps were looked after by German doctors.
Q Then it says, "Cattle will be seized in a means for further pacification and distributed among the peaceful population."
A This was cattle which had been herded together by the insurgents which they probably had blackmailed the population into giving them, and which then in some form or another was to be handed over to the peaceful population.
Q Finally under Roman Numeral II there is a list of total losses, both on the German, Croatian and the insurgent sides, losses in battle and shootings. Was it your idea to have a list of total losses in this form?
A No, this was done because of an OKW order. The Armed Forces Commander Southeast then asked that these summary reports should be discontinued, which was approved because, as I said earlier today, these reports could only too easily mislead.
Q Under Roman Number II at the end, it says: "Therefore, a total of 45,261 shot or killed in battle or as retaliation in Croatia and Serbia." Could you estimate what part the shootings for retaliation played in this list and how many were killed in battle?
A. I am afraid I cannot tell you that now. I would have to estimate these figures once again, which I have not down so far. You can see for instance from this report that under "Killed in Battle," that there were listed 4,963 and next people shot in retaliation 346. That is an extremely small part of the whole figure.
Q. I shall come back now to the measures to prevent epidemics in the case of women and children. That makes me ask you the rather general question; what was done in the medical field for the population of the occupied countries in the Southeast and what action was taken by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. In this field a great deal was done. On one hand in the question of fighting malaria and then in the problem of general welfare, particularly in the country, where there were very few doctors and health service consisted almost only of German military doctors then. Then just as much was done in the field of fighting epidemics, such as the isolation of certain danger areas. Then there was the whole problem of hospitals, the looking after mothers and babies and a great many things were done with regard to that. Reports and lists were drawn up covering these things at the time by Army Medical Officers and letters of thanks were also received from high ranking civilian personalities.
Q. Now about exhibit 211, which is on page 61 of the English document book. This is an activity report of department 1-A of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast of 26 February 1942. It mentions in the entry of 1 February: "In a teletype to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast dated 1 February 1942 the Chief of the OKW points out that the situation in Serbia according to reports of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the result of the penal expeditions do not as yet justify hopes that insurrections on a large scale will not start again in Spring. Up to now we have been unable to break the backbone of the insurgents by Draconic measures......"
"The Chief of the O.K.W. again points out explicity that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast will have to get along with the use of his remaining forces during the coming year also and that it is his duty to apply these methods which will guarantee success."
The same agency, namely the O.K.W., sent out another teletype letter of 7 February, which is contained in Exhibit 529 on page 103 of the English document book in volume 24, on page 67 of the German. Will you please have a look at this, it is a teletype letter of 7 February.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it please?
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. It is in document book 24, exhibit 529, it is on page 103 of the English document book, and it reads:
"The following teletype has been received from the Chief of the O.K.W.; The reports from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast on the situation in Serbia and the result of the punitive expedition do not yet justify hopes that uprisings on a major scale will not commence again in Spring. The bloody losses incurred by the Insurgents and also the numbers of those liquidated are small. The number of prisoners is much too large. Individual prisoners were even able to escape from captivity."
Both teletype letters are concerned with the same question, the measures taken so far to fight the insurgents are criticized strongly and the Armed Forces Commander Southeast is severely admonished to take stronger measures. I would like to ask you this question witness; how was this admonishment received at the time by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. The teletype letter annoyed my commanding officer a lot.
Q. Did you think that the criticism made by the O.K.W., namely that enough insurgents had not been shot and there were too many prisoners, was justified?
A. The entire teletype letter in its reproaches is typical for the fact that the Armed Forces Commander Southeast in the eyes of the 0.K.W. was too mild and too soft.
Q. Now why were these critical teletypes of the O.K.W. not made use of to try again to convince the O.K.W. that the insurgents must be treated in a different way?
A. Well, that had been done repeatedly oh earlier occasions and the chief of the O.K.W, knew extremely well what the answer would be and he knew how to prevent it, because the whole of the last sentence of this teletype letter is nothing but the rejection of our attitude even before we stated it. It says there:
"I again most emphatically point out that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast must manage in the coming year too with the forces remaining to him and that it is his duty to employ those measures which will guarantee success."
That was a rejection of the idea: We need new troops and then no troops would be sent to us a whole year and then there is the reproach contained therein that if the Southeast is not pacified soon it would be our fault.
Q. Witness, let us make a distinction between two things, you said and gave us repeated reasons that the 0.K.W. was not right in its attitude, but if the O.K.W. said that not enough insurgents had been shot or liquidated and that there were too many prisoners and if you would simply think of figures, was the O.K.W. not right there?
A. No.
Q. What I mean here is not relative figures namely that not enough had been shot for the purposes for which the shootings had been meant. I mean whether the absolute figures of the shootings had decreased to such an extent that the O.K.W. was dissatisfied for that reason alone?
A. Yes, that is true of course. In actual figures few people had been shot, or fewer I should say and that was the annoyance.
Q. And too many people had been taken prisoners?
A. Yes, or otherwise they would carefully reproach us for the fact that we had taken too many prisoners.
Q. Now the fact that these teletype letters followed each other so quickly....
A. Excuse me, it is the same one.
Q. The first comes from the O.K.W., the other one of the 7th is simply a copy of that same teletype letter which came as criticism from the O.K.W.
A. These things, if I may say so, are our monthly bread.
Q. They occured frequently you mean?
A. Yes, very frequently.
Q. And how do you explain this uneasiness on the part of the O.K.W. that they admonished you so frequently by mail?
A. In my opinion, it was Hitler's lack of patience and lack of understanding for the situation in our area.
Q. Witness, yesterday you gave brief information about how the Generals stood between you and the O.K.W., now in connection with this teletype letter, I would like to ask you did the officers of the O.K.W. frequently come to the Southeast to inform themselves?
A. No, unhappily they did not.
Q. What do you mean unhappily?
A. Because their understanding of the situation in the area might have been improved. I know that Keitel visited us only once, I think during the end of 1943 when he went to King Boris' funeral and stopped in Belgrade. Field Marshall Von Weiss' request to listen to him, he turned down. Jodl, after the Greek army's surrender, in my time, never visited the Balkans at all.
Q. You also described to me what proposals were taken by the Armed Forces Southeast time and time again to the O.K.W. in order to pacify the country in a peaceful manner. Were there apart from political measures any economic measures in your mind and if so what measures?
A. Yes, we had the idea at all times that what the areas produced in food should be extracted at a low rate only so that there should be a better distribution in the entire area, let us say from Banate to Greece, the harvesting was to be given aid.
Of course the food situation altogether was a very important one.
Q. Now how were all these suggestions by the Armed Forces Comman* der Southeast received by the O.K.W.
A. Political suggestions as a rule were turned down, others were considered, but very little was actually achieved.
Q. Were there no other means taken to have the opinions of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast carried out by the O.K.W.?
A. Yes, we tried other means as well. We sent officers from my area and staff to the O.K.W. so that understanding might be promoted and in some cases officers were transferred there. Among others one of my best young officers in the I-C I handed over, but there were relatively feeble attempts.
Q. And they were not successful, I take it?
A. Not really successful anyway.
Q. Did the attitude taken by the O.K.W. change when you left the Balkans?
A. I am not able to say that exactly because I was not there, but as far as I know neither the attitude nor conditions changes particularly.
Q. Now, as for this teletype letter of 7 February, which is part of document 529 in volume 24, it was reported to the Plenipotentiary General in Serbia and he was asked to make propositions?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the same document there is a letter by the Commanding General of 13 February 1942?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that the reply by the Commanding General?
A. To the request to hand in propositions, this is the reply, yes. It was an answer which had been agreed on, that is how this letter must be understood if one realizes that previously the two agencies had discussed these things because after all the teletype letter of the O.K W. was an extremely harsh reproach also for Serbia.
Q. And that is why the reply from the Plenipotentiary General in Serbia,volume 392, I am referring to page 3 of the document 529, was so strongly worded so that the O.K.W. could form the opinion that very strong measures had been taken?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, in exhibit 211, from which we started our discussion you find on 10th page of that document, which is on page 92 of the original, a note for what is known as the discussion among the chief. Reference is made there to the fact that prisoners had been taken 1,590 of whom are being sent to Germany, 2,074 to Norway, then there's a full stop and then is says 3,000 women and children; were those 3,000 women and children also sent to Norway or what was some with them?
A. No, there 3,000 women and children were those mentioned in the other document.
Q. You mean exhibit 209?
A. Yes. There it says women and children are to be sent to camps, to prevent epidemics and unrest in other areas.
Q. Do you mean on page 1 of exhibit 209?
A. Yes. During this period of time there was an action in progress in connection with what was known as the Kozara action, the action in the Kozara mountains, and this was discussed at the beginning of the meeting. In Exhibit 209, the text shows: "Good progress in the attack against the groups of insurgents encircled in the area Kozara-Planian." This quotation from the meeting of the chiefs simply amounts to a note which must not be misunderstood.
Q. What is this meeting of chiefs you have mentioned?
A. That was on of the routine meetings held on Mondays by my staff.
Q. Then in this book I want to only ask you question about exhibit 213 on page 97 of the English bock and the following to exhibit, 214 and 215. Did you know at that time the reports which were addressed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. Yes, probably I knew then. As for the report of 6 January 1942 which is exhibit 214, it is debatable whether I know it in these days I was in Sofia.
Q. Witness, I shall now come to some questions concerning documents in document book 24. If the Tribunal please, I am now going over to document book 24 as that document book is connected in time with Book 8. Here again I shall ask the witness about the documents with which he has been charged by the prosecution and which he did not know at the time.
According to your list these are exhibits 526, 531, 532, 535, 537, 538, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 555.
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. I would like to ask you to look at exhibit 527, which is on page 1 in both the English and German books. These again are the usual teletype letters addressed to the operational department of the Army General Staff; did you know those reports at the time?
A. I think probably I did, with the exception of the time when I was not present.
Q. What about exhibit 528, which is one page 103 of the English document book?
A. That letter I also probably knew.
Q. Then exhibit 530 on page 111 of the English document book. These are notes taken about the conference held by the Commander in Chief in Abazzia with the Italians?
A. I was not present at those conferences, but afterwards of course I was informed what the conversations were about.
Q. Exhibit 533 on page 131 of the English document book?
A. I think probably I knew that one.
Q. Does that also apply to 534, the following one?
A. To that again, yes.
A. Now, I want to talk about exhibit 539, on page 162 of the English document book contains an opinion about the Mihajlovic movement and it is dated 9 February 1943; who drew up this document?
Q Who drew up this document?
A This was a list made by the OKW.
Q Do you know on what evidence and information they based this document?
AAs far as I can recall, this was put together on the basis of the monitoring of broadcasts of the broadcasting station of Mihajlovic which seems to explain that this whole compilation did not tally with the actual facts. In his broadcasts addressed to all sorts of agencies Mihajlovic time and again exaggerated facts for obvious reasons, in order to obtain support by the Allies. In his internal wireless communications also, as far as his subalterns were concerned, he described his own situation much more rosily than it actually was. This report I remember particularly well because when it reached the staff it caused a certain amount of comment as it did not tally with the facts at all.
Q How was it that OKW or OKH compiled this report on the basis of evidence which they did not receive from you, and the Army Commander Southeast? After all, you would have been the expert more than anybody else.
A That is what we asked ourselves at the time. I don't know whether the expert in charge ran the risk that he might lose his job and he wanted to show that he was valuable or that there were other reasons I simply don't know.
Q That is how the movement of the insurgents under Mihajlovic seems a very large one in this report?
A Yes, very exaggeratedly so. Had Mihajlovic been so strong as appears in this report, we wouldn't have been able to remain in Serbia for any length of time.
Q I must confess that if I read this report without prejudice it appears to me that Mihajlovic's movement was really a large and modern army and that, you say, is an exaggeration.
A I would say a complete exaggeration and entirely wrong. That he wanted people to believe that this was so and that in his wireless messages and systems he wanted to build up that impression, of course, goes without saying but that OKH, so to speak, fell for Mihajlovic is quite clear also.
Q Witness, in connection with Exhibit 536, which is on page 158 of the English document book, the prosecution have submitted photographs. Have you seen those photographs?
A Yes, I have got them in front of me.
Q In the text which goes with it, it says that a number of soldiers in the uniform of the Jugoslavian Army of Liberation was being shown. What, from your own knowledge of uniforms, can you say about that?
A It seems to me that this is an extremely interesting picture. The man who is wearing a great coat on one side of the picture is wearing a German great coat. The man standing opposite -- there seems to be something wrong with the negative -- is wearing an Italian coat. The one who is sitting down also wears an Italian uniform which can be seen quite clearly from the cut, and it seems to me that another of the ones sitting down is wearing a Serbian coat. In that much it might be true to say that this was the uniform of the Jugoslav Army of Liberation.
Q Could one call that proper uniform in the sense of a beligerant army?
A Not according to the opinions held at the time and the one I told today.
Q I shall now go over to the documents contained in document book IX of the prosecution. I shall again give you the exhibit numbers first which, according to your lists, concerns the document which you saw here in the trial.
These are exhibits 217, 218, 222, 224, 226, 230, 239 and 241.
A Yes, that is so.
Q First, a question quite generally about that period of time with which we are concerned in this document book. When was General Loehr appointed Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
AAt the beginning of August of 1942.
Q Did you know why he was appointed?
A Not officially but I believe I was justified in assuming that changes of personnel within the Luftwaffe were decisive when Loehr was transferred from his old position because Richthofen was to replace Loehr.
Q What was Loehr's position before then?
A He was chief of an air fleet in the Last, Commander in Chief of an air fleet and General Loehr, because of his origin -- he came from the Austrian Army -- was particularly suitable to serve in the Southeast area. He also was an expert in almost all languages spoken in the Southeast and a special peculiarity of his was that he was the only German officer who was a member of the Greek Orthodox Church. His mother was Russian.
Q Did this appointment of General Loehr mean that anything changed in your own work?
AAs far as my official position was concerned nothing changed. As far as my wishes to be used somewhere else, there were changes, because my wish to be used somewhere else was not fulfilled.
Q Why did you want to serve somewhere else?
A I had several reasons. For one thing, I wanted to command a unit as soon as possible and leave the general staff because a general staff officer did not amount to anything in this war.
He was a defeatist, a sceptic or, as we called each other, an intellectual self-analyst. Then I would have liked to leave my position as a chief and would have liked to have been in charge of a unit and, finally, I had enough of these very disturbing conditions in the Southeast, guerilla warfare and so forth, and would have preferred to fight at a more decent and normal front.
Q Did you ask officially to be transferred?
A I did not make an official application in writing because that you could only do for extremely grave personal reasons but with the consent of my Commander in Chief I on several occasions asked the Operational Staff of the OKW orally and I also talked to the personnel expert in the General Staff, Colonel von Ziehberg.
Q Now, when Loehr took over were there important changes in the situation?
A No, that wouldn't have been possible even because conditions in the Southeast area did not depend on the character of the Commander in Chief. They had their own logic both from the outside and inside.
Q What were the factors which influenced the situation in the Southeast at that time?
AAt that time the effect of the events in Africa showed themselves very clearly. Then the war in Russia had reached a turning point toward the end of 1942 or beginning of 1943 -Stalingrad, you know -- and those two events were of great impor tance for the coming period of time in that area.
Q Did that have any influence on your own work?
A Very much so because from then onwards the danger of invasion in this area became more and more acute and I, of course, had to work on that problem more than on anything else.
Q How did this express itself?
A We had to study special problems concerning the best possible places for a landing from the point of view of the enemy. We had to make reconaissance flights and in order to form an impression of the coasts and the places where the enemy could land. Supply questions became increasingly important, the laying-in of stocks and ammunition and food; fortifications had to be extended. Coastal artillery had to be established along the coast itself which was an important problem and in this connection the combating of guerillas played a big part.
Q Was there a new basis established for the combating of guerillas at that time?
A I wouldn't say on a new basis but the manner in which they were combatted militarily assumed more and more the character of large-scale operations for larger areas.
Q What was the effect which these extended tasks had on your own work?
A I had yet more to do and, therefore, one learned less about details.
Q Witness, in order to give a clear picture of the extent of your work, how great was the area of the Commander Southeast?
A I would like to mention here that it was around that period of tine that we drew up what we called a comparative map which was submitted to Hitler. On that map the Southeast area and the area in and around Germany were drawn in in various shades on top of each other. I remember the following matter in this connection. The whole of the Southeastern area from Zagreb to Rhodes was as large as what was known as Greater Germany at that time. The distance from Zagreb to Rhodos, as the crow flies, corresponded to the same distance as from the Rhine to almost the foremost front line in Russia. The length of the coast itself which we had to defend measured by three hundred thousand nap was three tines as long as the whole of the Eastern front iron Leningrad to Odessa, The Pelopones, where one division and a number of battalions were stationed, corresponds roughly to the size of Belgium.