Q. Was this task carried out?
A. The order was carried out up to the foot of the hills of the Kaukasus.
Q. How many Armies belonged to that Army Group at that time?
A. Four Armies.
Q. To whom was the rear Army area subordinate?
A. The rear Army area was subordinate to the Army Commander of the Army concerned.
Q. Was the Army Group, for instance, informed about individual incidents' which took place in such a rear area?
A. No. Certainly it was mot informed regarding individual incidents.
Q. Did the Army Group led by Field Marshal List receive the Commissar Order?
A. I believe quite certainly that the Army Group did not receive the Commissar Order.
Q. Why are you certain of that?
A. Because the Army Group was only established in the middle of 1942.
Q. What role did the Commissar Order play, as far as the Army Group was concerned?
A. At that time in the middle of 1942, as far as my recollection goes, the Commissar Order did not play any role at all. I can't even remember that this matter was discussed with Field Marshal List.
Q. In the cases in which the Commissar Order was carried out were such cases reported to the Army Group?
A. No, such reports are unknown to me.
Q, How were the orders of the Army Group carried out in the fall of 1942?
A. In the fall of 1942 the Army Group stopped at the ridge of the Kaukasus. That is, activities ceased.
Q. Now, what kind of situation developed from that for the Army Group?
A. Parts of the Army Group--mountain units -- had already got across the ridges of the Kaukasus. And now the question arose what was to happen. Field Marshal List, who had special experience in mountain warfare from former times, thought it was impossible that these troops could remain beyond the ridge because winter was imminent, and there was no certainty of supply for the troops. Because of that, after discussing this matter with the Army Commanders, he flew to Headquarters and suggested to Hitler to withdraw the Front to the ridges because there the troops would have better living conditions.
Q. Now, what was Hitler's attitude to that.
A. Hitler absolutely rejected this proposal.
Q. Well, what else happened in this matter?
A. Field Marshal List then advanced again and he reconnoitered and discussed the possibilities on the spot and prospects of the winter campaign. The result was again that it would be impossible. Because of that -- and I hoard that myself -- he asked General Halder and Hitler's Adjutant, General Schmundt to receive him again in Headquarters.
Q. Just another question: Who was General Halder, whom you just mentioned?
A. General Halder was the Chief of Staff of the German Army.
Q. And how did this matter develop?
A. These requests were rejected and the reason given was that the decision had already been made. Thereupon, Field Marshal List urgently asked General Jodl to visit him. Jodl was also an old mountain expert. All possibilities were discussed again with Jodl. Ho agreed with Field Marshal Lists views and promised that he would achieve the withdrawal of this order.
Q. How did this matter end?
A. The answer which was given stood and thereupon I believe on the following day or on the second day after that, Field Marshal Keitel arrived at our Headquarters by airplane, and he had a discussion with Field Marshal List, tete a tete, which lasted a couple of hours, and when Keitel left, Field Marshal List, told me that he had resigned from his office as Commander in Chief and had told Keitel this, and Field Marshal List then returned to Germany on the next day.
Q. What was your impression of Field Marshal List after he had resigned his office?
A. Field Marshal List gave a very quiet, calm and collected impression. He had prepared himself for this situation, and he was quite collected.
Q. What did he say shortly before he left?
A. He said to me -- I mean roughly speaking -- when I said goodbye to him on the air field: "I'm content with what I could do so far, and I hope that the few years which God will grant me, I may be able to live out in peace." Well, that's just paraphrasing it -at least that's the sense of it.
Q. Did you have the impression as if the differences of opinion which he had with Hitler had had a very great effect on him?
A. No.
Q. Did you then again see Field Marshal List in the later years of the war?
A. Yes, passing through Vienna, I visited him for about two hours.
Q. After the end of the war?
A. After the end of the war I saw the Field Marshal again in American captivity at Hersfeld Prison.
Q. And did you often talk with him then?
A. Yes.
Q. On these occasions was there any talk whether he expected a trial?
A. No, we never discussed that.
Q. What was his attitude in this matter?
A. I think that he never believed that he had to expect to be put on trial, at least he didn't express such a view to me, and ho was very much surprised and shocked when he heard over the wireless that Greece had asked for Field Marshal List as a war criminal.
Q. At that time between Field Marshal List and yourself were there any incidents discussed by you, which had taken place in the Serbian area?
A. No.
Q. Now, when were you together with Field Marshal List for the last time?
A. After Hersfeld we were transferred to Allendorf, which was a similar camp. In January of this year we were brought to Nurnberg, and we were told that we would remain here about ten days.
Q. Did Field Marshal List express any worries on his trip to Nurnberg?
A. No.
Q. What did he assume?
A. He assumed that ho would be called as a military witness in some case.
Q. Did he not, at that time, count on the possibility of a trial against himself?
A. No, that is not known to me.
Q. Now. I have one last question. You have been together for many years with Field Marshal List, and for that reason I want to ask you what opinion you had arrived at of the personality of Field Marshal Lit?
A. I have known Field Marshal List for several years. I know him as a soldier who valued his profession above anything else. I know him as a Commander in Chief and as a superior officer, who demanded a lot from his troops, but who took groat and exceptional interest in his troops.
And he took severe measures where there was anything wrong. And I also know Field Marshal List as a human being, whose character and personality and whose Christian attitude always demanded the highest regard from all of us who worked together with him. For that reason I cannot believe and I think it's out of the question that he could have done anything which, according to Ms view, was not militarily speaking, necessary.. I cannot say more.
Q. I thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
( The Court adjourned until 0930 Thursday, 9 October 1947 )
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal is the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et all, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 9 October 1947, 0930, Justice Burke presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom?
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom except von Weichs who is still in the hospital.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Fenstermacher, you may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: OK your Honor.
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants Lanz and von Geitner): I would like to ask the witness a few questions. First of all, in order to clarify the actual documents of the prosecution with regard to the fact that the activity of the partisans was justified because the German invasion of Greece was something illegal, for this reason I want to ask the witness the following questions.
HANS von GREIFFENBERG - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. SAUTER:Q. fitness, did it become known to you from your official duties in the Balkans as Chief of Staff of an Army Group that at the beginning of the year 1941 and in the year 1940 Hitler wanted to keep the Balkans out of the war under all circumstances?
Is that known to you?
A. This became known to me during imprisonment from conversations I had with other people and during talks in which the Balkans problem was often discussed.
Q. Did it now become know to you when you were in Balkans and as Chief of the General Staff you had a very accurate insight into strategic plans.
A. I knew the task which the army had?
Q. Yes.
A. This order said that the 12th Army would have to invade Greece, first of all, in order to prevent British forces penetrating northward from Greece and secondly, in order to prevent the Italians who were fighting the Greeks in Albania being beaten, because the position of the Italians was pretty bad.
Q. Now, regarding the Italians, General, did you learn in your position at that time that the Italians in October 1940 had carried out the attack on Greece against Hitler's will?
A. I did not learn that at that time. I was not in office at that time. I was in a military hospital for many months.
Q. But you learned officially, that the Italians got into difficulties in their fight against Greece.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you confirm that these difficulties in which the Italians found themselves was a reason for Hitler to change his strategic plans regarding the Balkans in the spring of 1941 in order to maintain the front of the Italians?
A. This was expressly stated as the reason for the order of the OKW to which I had access.
Q. Yesterday you told us that in the winter 1940-41 the army, under the command of Field Marshal List was stationed first in Rumania and then in Bulgaria.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you at that time learn, and when, that Hitler ordered all preparations to made for military intervention in Greece?
A. Yes, as I already stated, that was in our maching orders.
Q. When?
A. I saw this order for the fist time when I reported it to the new Commander in Chief; that is, just before the New Year's Eve 19401941.
Q. In order to recall the date again, witness, I would like you to toll us when did the attack took place against Greece and against Serbia, just the month.
A. The attack against Greece took place on the 6th of May.
Q. 1941?
A. 1941.
Q. From your activity in the Balkans at that time did you learn just a moment, General, you made a mistake.
A. On the 6th of April the attack took place -- on the 6th of April.
Q. We correct our statement to the effect that the attack on Greece took place on the 6th of April 1941 and not on the 6th of May.
Now I will continue with another question which I want to put to you now. Did you learn through your official activities at that time as Chief of Staff of the Army Group List that before the 6th of April, English troops had been landed on Crete and on the Greek mainland, and can you perhaps give us the exact date of that landing?
A. Through the directives and reports which we have received from the Department of Foreign Armies in the OKH, we could see that British troops were on Crete and in Greece. Our 12th Army itself had no information of is own regarding this, because it could not fly across the borders.
Q. Could you tell us at about what date the landing of the British forces took place on Crete and who on the Greek mainland?
A. No, I cannot give you the date. But during the preparatory time when I was in the army, according to the documents of the OKH, the British were on Crete and in the Balkans.
Q. The German attack against Yugoslavia and against Greece started on the 6th of April?
A. Against Yugoslavia somewhat later.
Q. Around about the 6th of April?
A. About 48 hours later.
Q. Is it correct, if I understand you testimony in this, that in that moment when the German attack started against Greece and Yugoslavia, British troops were already on Crete and on the Greek mainland?
A. That I know on the strength of the documents which we received from our superior headquarters.
Q. Did you get any hints on the basis of your official duties whether this landing of British forces on Crete and on the Greek mainland took place with the consent of the Greek government or against the will of the Greek government?
A. I cannot base my knowledge on official information. I merely assume.
Q. What do you assume?
A. I assume that the Greek government consented to the landing of foreign troops on this territory.
Court, V - Case VII
Q. In ether words, in orders or messages which came to your knowledge at that time and, therefore, to the knowledge of Field Marshal List, was it expressed from the German side or from any other side that Greece had given up its neutrality by this act, and that it had taken up its position with the enemies, and that, therefore, the attack of the German troops against Greece had been provoked? Have you understood this question?
A. I understood the question.
Q. Has this view been expressed at the time and have you had this view?
A. We heard this view. As I have already stated we heard this again and again at OKU, we repeatedly heard this view.
Q. Witness, I have a few further questions regarding another problem, Yesterday, you told us that, I believe, on the 9th of April 1941 the Thracian army capitulated in Greece and somewhat later, on the 21st of April, I believe, the Epirns army capitulated; and you further told us that this capitulation was a double event, so to speak. First of all it capitulated to the Germans and the next day it capitulated to the Germans and Italians. Is that correct?
A. It is correct that the second capitulation was a double event.
Q. Now, I would be interested to know whether this actually concluded the fighting in Greece. Witness, I emphasis the word, "actually". I am not at the moment interested in the legal position. I want to know from you during the next days and during the next weeks whether fighting took in fact took place -- that is to say, whether in fact, the Greek Army was still belligerent towards the Germans or not.
A. After these two negotiations for capitulation fighting took place in Southern Greece and in the Peloponnesos, but not in Thrace and not in the Epirus. This fighting was conducted originally by the British and the Australian. If Greek units took part in these last mentioned operations I do not now know. A Greek army in the sense of a proper army no longer existed.
Q. Did I understand you correctly, witness? You told us during the next few days and perhaps weeks after the capitulation of the two Greek armies actions took place and in fact, took place in the Peloponnesos and in Southern Greece?
A. In Southern Greece and around, around Athens.
Q. According to your view and according to your knowledge, these were mainly fighting on the part of the British and Australian troops which had been landed there and Greek troops may have been attached to these foreign troops. How long did these withdrawal actions of the English and Canadian troops in Southern Greece and Peloponnesos last?
A. It is almost impossible to give you the exact date.
Q. Approximate date.
A. I think until the end of the month.
Q. Until the end of April?
A. On the 27th of April we were already in Athens and at that time-- that is, at the end of the month -- the Greeks -- that is, the enemy -- must have left Southern Greece. There were concluding actions on the Peloponnesos which lasted until the following month. As I have already stated, I cannot give you the exact date. But I am not talking of Crete.
Q. No, not of Crete. You are talking of the Greek mainland. Is it correct that this fighting on the Peloponnesos lasted until the troops under the British and Canadian troops which had been landed there left the Peloponnesos by the sea route, because that will be correct and I should like you to express it that the British groups left the Peloponnesos by sea.
A. Yes, they left the Peloponnesos by sea after withdrawal skirmishes.
Q. Now, witness, during the time which followed partisans appeared in Greece. Did these partisan groups appear in the first weeks after the capitulation of the Greek Army or between the capitulations of the Greek armies and the appearance of larger partisan units was there a long period of time?
A. After the capitulation and after the taking of Athens I left the Balkans. During that time there were no partisans at all.
Q. When did you leave?
A. I left at about the 15th of May. It may have been the 16th.
Q. That is to say, witness, after the first capitulation you remained approximately five weeks?
A. Yes.
Q. And after the second capitulation you remained for three weeks in Greece and you said during that time no partisan units appeared.
A. During that time, at least, I had no knowledge of the appearance of the fighting activities.
Q. From your activities on the Balkans and also from reports which you saw at that time or later, did you gain the impression that these partisan units at the time of the capitulations -- that is, in April 1941 -- had already been established or did you, on the contrary, gain the impression that there partisan units were only established sometime later and were used in fighting? What is your personal impression?
A. My personal impression is this, on the basis of my experience and of my stay in Greece, that immediately after the capitulation and in the first weeks of which am still informed there were no partisan units of any size or any cohesion.
Q. Witness, I want to come back to the capitulation regarding one point. You know probably that in any such capitulation the victor gets certain guarantees in order that the capitulation provisions are kept - in other words, guarantees for the fact that we would have a capitulation today and not a continuance of the fighting tomorrow. Did the responsible German agencies who concluded these capitulations create any guarantees in the capitulation instrument in order to prevent that the capitulation could be broken and that legally the fight could be continued illegally.
A. In the discussions about the capitulation of the Epirus Army, as far as I can recall, it says on one paragraph, I believe, that General Zolakoglau and his staff and his whole organization
Q. All Greeks?
A. Took over the duty to see to it that tho ordered dissolution and the withdrawal of the troops which had capitulated was carried out in a proper manner. That is to say, were led back to their homes after they had boon discharged. Secondly tho German Army Headquarters sent a German division in tho area of the dissolving army - as far as I can remember, it was the 73rd division - and this division had the task, first of all, to see to it that the dissolution of the army which was in a pitiable state took place in an orderly manner, and, secondly, it took over the guard duties in this sense and, thirdly, it helped the Greeks by supplying them with food and transportation and medical help. I can remember those things.
Q. Can you tell us, General, just roughly approximately the strength of the capitulating Greek armies, the Thracian army and the Epirus army?
A. I am afraid I can't answer this question because after these many years I cannot remember these figures but it could be easily established.
Q. You were talking of one German division which was placed in that area. I assume that tho Greek armies had comised quite a number of divisions.
A. Certainly.
Q. So that one German Army was comparatively poor protection against Greek resistance and that is tho reason why I asked you for the approximate strength of the Greek army at tho moment of this capitulation.
A. Yes, this Greek Epirus army which capitulated certainly comprised quite a number of divisions. I don't know how many-
certainly much stronger than tho German but, first of all, it was hemmed in at the front by the Italians and, secondly -- I was there myself it was in such a pitiable state of complete dissolution that a unified action by this division, or parts of this division, was quite impossible after it had once laid down its arms.
Q. Witness, you mentioned yesterday that the Greek officers wore not even disarmed. Is that correct?
A. I know definitely that the capitulation instrument contained the provision that the Greek officers, in view of the brave behavior of tho troops, could retain their swords.
Q. Does the capitulation instrument or the negotiations say anything about the fact that the Greek officers would have to give their word of honor to the Italians that they would naturally not take part in any further fighting? Is this known to you?
A. I cannot today say that this is contained in the capitulation instrument, but I assume it to be certain because this is a very usual custom in the fixing of such conditions.
Q. You have told us the Greek Armies capitulated and then they were just transported to their homes without any security measures, How do you explain to yourself, Witness, the fact that the Germans took no protective measures at all? That is, that German delegates did not at least take the officers and make them prisoners of war? How do you explain the fact that they were, after all, set free? You also took part in these activities.
A. The explanation is this: The order which the Army had, that is to drive the British out of Greece and to prevent the Italian catastrophe--that order had been fulfilled. It was not the intention of this order, as far as we could understand it from our point of view, to beat or annihilate the Greek Army.
Q. If one had not assumed, on the strength of the behavior of the Greek delegates, that, of course, any future resistance was out of the question, that any future fighting action, of course, would have to cease, do you believe that the German delegates would have agreed to it without any guarantee for the adherence to the capitulation conditions? Was it your opinion that, since you were present at these negotiations, that the delegates would have asked for extensive guarantees if on the German side one had reckoned with the possibility, or if the Greek delegates had hinted that the light against the German Armies would be continued?
Is that correct? That is to say, it would have been continued by partisans at a later date. What is your opinion?
A. There can be no doubt about this question at all. If we had assumed or if there had been an danger that the Greek military resistance would revise against us, then one would, of course, had to have taken quite different protective measures. That's my opinion.
Q. One would have had to tame them or one would have taken them?
A. One would have taken them.
Q. And during the next weeks, after the capitulation, while you were in Greece it was quiet in the areas of those two capitulated armies?
A. No report reached the area of any further incidents.
Q. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there further questions by defense counsel?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General von Greiffenberg, you have been exploring with Dr. Sauter something of a background of the attack on Greece and Yugoslavia in April of 1941. I would just like to explore that with you very briefly now.
Did you ever hear anything about conferences between Foreign Minister of Italy Ciano and Foreign Minister of Germany Ribbentrop in August 1939, at which it was stated that the best thing to happen was for neutrals to be liquidated one after the other? This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral.
Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind. Did you ever hear anything to that effect?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I object to this questioning, this incident, that is the discussion between Ciano and Ribbentrop was never subject of the examination, and for this reason he cannot be questioned on it.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The witness is a man of more than ordinaly intelligence, and I feel certain that he will be able to take care of himself in an emergency. And the objection will be overruled.
-----BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Did you ever hear anything about that conference, General von Greiffenberg?
A. No, I have not heard anything of such a conference or of any expressions of opinions on such a conference.
Q. You never heard that Yugoslavia regarded (Withdrawn).
You never heard that Italy was supposed to guard Yugoslavia while Germany went on to other deeds?
A. No, these political considerations and these discussions I don't know anything about. I had heard nothing of them.
Q. Do you recall when Italy invaded Albania?
A. Yes, I remember this fact from the reports in the press.
Q. Do you remember the date?
A. No, I cannot give it to you now.
Q. Do you remember when Italy invaded Greece?
A. That date too I cannot fix exactly, but I know the fact on the strength of the plans we had.
Q. Could it have been in October of 1940?
A. Mr. Prosecutor, it is possible that it may have been at that time. As I have already stated, I was in a military hospital for more than three months, and I don't exactly remember are those incidents between the fall of 1940 and January 1941.
Q. You recall I believe, General von Greiffenberg, however, that Italy's invasion of Greece was not making much headway and that Hitler was quite worried about that fact?
A. You moan to say the first days of fighting?
Q. I moan the whole Italian campaign against Greece was going very badly.
A. Yes, it took a very bad course. The campaign made very bad progress and Hitler was certainly displeased that no progress at all was made.
Q. and I believe you must know that the British were trying to come to the aid of Greece in their war against Italy?
A. Yes.
Q. And then in December of 1940 Hitler issued directives for the campaign against Greece. He sent Field Marshal List of the XIIth Army to Romania and then told List to quietly move into Bulgaria and poise for an attack on Greece. Do you remember that?
A. Yes, that was what the order said. That's the meaning oi the order which the XIIth Army received from the OHW,--gathering in Romania and then penetrating to Bulgaria, and then to prepare for advance into Greece.
A. And you were Chief of Staff of the XIIth Army at that time wore you not?
A. Yes, I was Chief of Staff of the XIIth Army from the first of January.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I regret that I have to interrupt. I have the impression that the witness cannot hear very well because otherwise I cannot explain to myself why the witness constantly presses the earphones against his ears. (TO THE WITNESS): Do you hear well?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm hearing very well.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. So that even though the attack upon Greece did not occur until April, 1941, plans for the invasion of Greece were already in operation as early as December, 1940, Is that true, General?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And then while you and the XIIth Army were waiting in Bulgaria to attack Greece in order to protect your flank in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was invited to join the Tri-Partite Pact. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I recall that.
Q. And sometime in March Yugoslavia did join the Tri-Partite Pact?
A. Yes.
Q. And as soon as the ministers of Yugoslavia returned from Berlin to Belgrade there was a coup d'etat and the government was overthrown, Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Do you recall who was the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia at the time the Yugoslavian Government joined the Tri-Partite Pact?
A. I have not understood the first part of this sentence. Would you kindly repeat it?
Q. Was Prince Paul Regent of Yugoslavia at the time Yugoslavia joined the Tri-Partite Pact?
A. Yes, as far as I know, Prince Paul was the Regent of Yugoslavia.
Q. And towards the end of March Prince Paul's Government was overthrown, and King rotor the 2nd was permitted to rule in his own right. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, we got this information.
Q. Do you remember whether the new government of King Peter offered loyalty declarations to Germany at that time?
A. A declaration of loyalty by this now government? I haven't heard anything about this. This is quite new to me.
Q. Did you never hear that hitler said that he was determined without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit? Did you over hear that?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. Did you over hear that Hitler said he would deal with unmerciful harshness against Yugoslavia?
A. No, we didn't hear that, at least I didn't hear this expression.
Q. I take it, General von Greiffenberg, that you consider the war against Greece and Yugoslavia a war justified by military necessity on Germany's part.
A. Yes, on the strength of the political situation and on the strength of the orders we had boon given I thought it was a military necessity to invade Greece.
Q. I wonder perhaps if you are familiar with the International Military Tribunal's opinion regarding the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia?
A. No, I don't know anything about that...