Q From 1934 to 1936 you had close official contact with Field Marshal List?
A Yes.
Q Did you at that time ascertain anything regarding the views of Field Marshal List towards National Socialism and towards the National Socialist Party?
A The Roehm episode had just occurred when I arrived with Field Marshal List, and the view of Field Marshal List and of his entourage had become very severe against this whole movement, and that, of course, had its effects and lasted during all the years I stayed there.
Q Was his attitude negative at that time?
A Yes, severely negative.
Q At which occasions could you ascertain that?
A I ascertained that chiefly through discussions with his chief of staff, who at that time was Col. Olbricht, who often talked to us and who had a very intimate relationship with his commander-in-chief.
Q What was the attitude of Col. Olbricht towards National Socialism?
A His attitude was extremely critical.
Q Did Field Marshal List know that?
A Yes, he knew that.
Q What happened to Col. Olbricht?
A Col. Olbricht was shot to death or executed in connection with the attack on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944.
Q At that time did Field Marshal List have any connections with the SA or the SS?
A No connections which ever became known to me.
Q Did you know with whom he had social contacts at that time, the Dresden period?
A Mainly in our circles and also, of course, in the close circles of the former Saxonian army.
Q Could you at that time ascertain what Field Marshal List's attitude was to the Jewish question?
A Yes, I can answer that by recounting an episode which took place at that time. The wife of Field Marshal List had bought things in Jewish shops, and at that time a slogan had been given out by the Party that one should not buy in Jewish shops, otherwise one would be a marked man, and now Mrs. List was to be accused in the newspapers because she shopped in Jewish shops. Olbricht got to know of that and then he tried everything in order to prevent this, and when we got to know of it, of course we discussed this point very extensively.
Q And what attitude did you ascertain of Field Marshal List generally?
A In the Jewish question?
Q Yes, in the Jewish question.
A Yes. As far as I could ascertain, he rejected these accusations as severely as possible, and the manner in which Jewish businessmen and traders were persecuted was criticized and rejected by him most decisively.
Q What was Field Marshal List's attitude towards the church?
A Field Marshal List -- I can testify to this myself -- was a keen church goer and he always took part in church services, and I experienced that myself.
Q What was his attitude towards the church parade of the Wehrmacht?
A The chaplains he invited at every possible occasion to military festivities, etc., and a place of prominence was given to the Catholic as well as the Protestant chaplains in every way.
Q At that time did the government have the tendency to restrict the chaplains' activities in the Wehrmacht as far as possible?
A The tendency was present, of course, at that time, but whether there restricted services had already been ordered, I can't say now.
Q When did you leave your position as I-A in Dresden?
A In the last year, which has been mentioned here, I became commander of a battalion in Jena.
Q And for how long were you a battalion commander?
A I was that for eighteen months.
Q When did your next official contact take place with Field Marshal List?
A My next official contact with Field Marshal List took place at the end of 1940.
Q What kind of official contact was this?
A I was in a military hospital for three months, and in the meantime I received an order that after I had recovered, I was to become chief of staff of AOK-12, whose commander-in chief was Field Marshal List, and during the last days of the year 1941 in the military hospital near Vienna, Field Marshal List once visited me and that was when I saw him again after an interval of many years.
Q Did you later become chief of staff?
A Yes, I did become chief of staff later on.
Q From when to when were you chief of staff of the 12th Army?
A I was chief of staff with the 12th Army from the beginning of 1942 until May, 1942. I am sorry; I have made a mistake. I was chief with Field Marshal List in his capacity, as Commander-in-Chief of AOK12 from January, 1941, to May, 1941.
Q Where at that time was the staff of the AOK-12 transferred when you took over the position of Chief of Staff?
A To Roumania.
Q Where in Roumania?
A It stayed in Roumania for a month.
Q Where did you then go?
A Then the whole army was advanced to the Bulgarian area.
Q What was the intention at that time? We can be quite brief here because we have dealt with this quite frequently here.
A The task of the army was to take up positions in Bulgaria in order to advance towards Greece and invade Greece and occupy Northern Greece.
Q What was the attitude of the Bulgarian officers at that time and the Bulgarian Government?
A Those people knew of these intentions and this plan. They supported it.
Q Did this circle have any misgivings?
A They had misgivings regarding the threat which could arise because of the situation in Yugoslavia if the army marched towards Greece in a southerly direction.
Q In the situation which you described before, did the situation change with regard to the intended campaign in Greece?
A The situation changed completely because of the change of government in Yugoslavia, and now instead of a friendly or at least a safe nation on the right flank, we had an enemy.
Q What was Field Marshal List's attitude in this situation? Did he welcome it or was his attitude negative?
A No. That was the worst thing which could happen to the army, that now in the right flank we had a very strong threat and the forces for Greece would have to be weakened considerably.
Q Were the plans changed on account of that?
A The plans had to be changed within a very few days.
Q Now from the military point of view what was thought of the invasion of Greece?
A I am afraid I have not understood this question.
Q Was it looked upon as a military necessity to attack Yugoslavia as well?
A If one had decided upon a campaign in Greece, it was indispensable that in order to protect the very long right flank of this German army, something had to happen. It would have been suicide if that had not happened.
Q We certainly don't want to have to deal with the details of these campaigns. In what manner did Greece capitulate? Can you tell that quite briefly?
A The bulk of the Greek forces capitulated because we succeeded in advancing very quickly towards Salonika and to cut off these forces.
Q Who capitulated? Who capitulated after Salonika was taken?
AAfter the capture of Salonika the so-called Thracian Forces capitulated which were standing in Northern Greece.
Q Who conducted these negotiations for this capitulation?
A These capitulation negotiations -- as far as I remember they were conducted by the commander of the Panzer Division which had penetrated to Salonika. That was General Keil.
Q With whom did he conclude the capitulation of this army?
A Either he or his commanding general conducted the capitulation negotiations with the Greek leader of that time. I don't remember his name.
Q How many armies did the Greeks have at that time?
A They had the Thracian Army and a further large army which confronted the Italians in Western Greece.
Q What was the name of that army?
A I don't know the number of that army. This army was called Zarakoglu, after the name of its commander.
Q What was the manner of capitulation of this army?
AAfter the army had been encircled by the penetration of the German armies into Southern Greece, the Commander in Chief of that army sent an offer of capitulation to the 12th Army.
Q What happened after that offer.
A The offer resulted in that delegates were asked to the air field of Larissa which was situated fairly centrally.
Q Did that happen?
A Yes.
Q When did that happen and when was the capitulation concluded?
A Field Marshal List concluded the capitulation on tbs air field with the delegate of the Zarakoglu Government. I myself flew to the headquarters of the Greeks, and received from him the signature under the capitulation and with that act it was concluded.
Q Now was this capitulation final?
A No.
Q What was changed and what was added?
A This capitulation was only concluded between the German 12th Army and between the Greeks at their express desire, but not with the Italians and the consequence of that was that Mussolini objected and Hitler on the following day ordered that this capitulation should be changed so that the Italians should also be taken into account, and in order to carry this out he sent General Jodl and an Italian delegation also to Larissa. There we started new negotiations and on the subsequent day the second final capitulation was concluded in the German headquarters near Salonika with certain changes as compared with the previous capitulation.
Q Did you see the Commander in Chief of the Greek Epirus Army again?
A Yes, in Salonika.
Q On what occasion?
A When the capitulation was concluded which took place in our headquarters Field Marshal List invited the Greek Commander in Chief and his retinue to a meal and I took part in that.
Q Did the Greek Commander in Chief get any further advantages and facilities?
A The greek officer retained all their weapons and the knowledge that they had been fighting as brave men and when the Commander in Chief expressed the wish to Field Marshal List that he would like to remain one day and one night in Salonika because he had to discuss something with friends this request was approved.
Q Did the Italians, too, dissolve parts of the Greek army?
A The Italians had tried that but it was prevented by the Germans at the request of the Greeks by drawing a line of demarkation so that practically the whole process of disarmament was carried out by the German 12th Army.
Q You said that this happened at the request of the Greeks?
A Yes.
Q Who had fulfilled this desire of the Greeks?
A Field Marshal List.
Q Now, only a few questions regarding Greece. What was the destruction there?
A We found destruction only on the big roads, on the great roads which were used by advancing armies and the destructions concerned only bridges.
Q These destructions were carried out by whom?
A These destructions were probably carried out by the British units during their withdrawal.
Q At that time, after the fighting had stopped, what was life in Greece and in Athens like?
A I only remained in Athens for a few days. At that time life presented a very quiet and I might almost say a normal impression. The shops were open. The restaurants were open. Destructions on a big scale I did not see.
Q What was the attitude of Field Marshal List to the Greek population?
A I believe that Field Marshal List very much regretted that he had to take part in this campaign at all because he had nothing against the Greeks at all and we certainly didn't have anything against them either and for that reason he endeavored at every occasion to help the Greeks who, after all, had suffered this misfortune. I can only talk of the time during which I was there.
Q What was the cause of this attitude of Field Marshal List or, rather, what was the expression of Field Marshal List's attitude towards Greece?
A E.g. he took special measures to prevent unrest and plunder in Athens. For instance, the Harbor of Pireus was blocked off because it had suffered heavily through air attacks. He saw afterwards that the liquidation of the Zarakoglu army took place quietly and in an orderly manner and he ordered the German 73rd Division to look after the supply, the transportation and the sanitary measures for this beaten army.
Q Were there any outward signs in Athens which testified to Field Marshal List's attitude towards Greece?
A He allowed the Greek government in Athens to hoist the Greek flag next to the German flag on the government buildings in order to give a proof of his regard for the Greeks. He intended to do the same about the flags which had been hoisted on the Akropolis for the same reason. That was a friendly gesture.
Q One more question regarding Greece: what role was played at that time by the Jewish question in Greece?
AAs far as I know, the Jewish question did not constitute any problem at that time at all.
Q Were there any restrictive measures in this field by the army?
AAt the time I am talking about no measures at all were taken.
Q How long did you remain Chief of Staff of the 12th Army?
A Until the middle of May.
Q Were you transferred then?
A I had a short leave and then I was transferred to the Eastern front.
Q What was your position there?
A I again became Chief of Staff of an army group.
Q When did you return? Rather, when did you again establish official contact with Field Marshal List?
A When the new army group List was established and which was used in the south of the Eastern front, I was transferred there as Chief of Staff of that army group.
Q And who was Commander in Chief of that army group?
A The commander in chief of that new army group was to be Field Marshal List.
Q From what date? From what time docs your collaboration with Field Marshal List date?
A From July. In July the Field Marshal arrived there.
Q You meant July 1942?
A July 1942, yes.
Q What, now, was the task of this army group which was led by Field Marshal List?
A This new army group had the task to pierce the Russian Southern front and had to advance against the lower Volga River and then had to turn round and march towards the Caucasus.
Q. Was this task carried out?
A. The order was carried out up to the foot of the hills of the Kaukasus.
Q. How many Armies belonged to that Army Group at that time?
A. Four Armies.
Q. To whom was the rear Army area subordinate?
A. The rear Army area was subordinate to the Army Commander of the Army concerned.
Q. Was the Army Group, for instance, informed about individual incidents' which took place in such a rear area?
A. No. Certainly it was mot informed regarding individual incidents.
Q. Did the Army Group led by Field Marshal List receive the Commissar Order?
A. I believe quite certainly that the Army Group did not receive the Commissar Order.
Q. Why are you certain of that?
A. Because the Army Group was only established in the middle of 1942.
Q. What role did the Commissar Order play, as far as the Army Group was concerned?
A. At that time in the middle of 1942, as far as my recollection goes, the Commissar Order did not play any role at all. I can't even remember that this matter was discussed with Field Marshal List.
Q. In the cases in which the Commissar Order was carried out were such cases reported to the Army Group?
A. No, such reports are unknown to me.
Q, How were the orders of the Army Group carried out in the fall of 1942?
A. In the fall of 1942 the Army Group stopped at the ridge of the Kaukasus. That is, activities ceased.
Q. Now, what kind of situation developed from that for the Army Group?
A. Parts of the Army Group--mountain units -- had already got across the ridges of the Kaukasus. And now the question arose what was to happen. Field Marshal List, who had special experience in mountain warfare from former times, thought it was impossible that these troops could remain beyond the ridge because winter was imminent, and there was no certainty of supply for the troops. Because of that, after discussing this matter with the Army Commanders, he flew to Headquarters and suggested to Hitler to withdraw the Front to the ridges because there the troops would have better living conditions.
Q. Now, what was Hitler's attitude to that.
A. Hitler absolutely rejected this proposal.
Q. Well, what else happened in this matter?
A. Field Marshal List then advanced again and he reconnoitered and discussed the possibilities on the spot and prospects of the winter campaign. The result was again that it would be impossible. Because of that -- and I hoard that myself -- he asked General Halder and Hitler's Adjutant, General Schmundt to receive him again in Headquarters.
Q. Just another question: Who was General Halder, whom you just mentioned?
A. General Halder was the Chief of Staff of the German Army.
Q. And how did this matter develop?
A. These requests were rejected and the reason given was that the decision had already been made. Thereupon, Field Marshal List urgently asked General Jodl to visit him. Jodl was also an old mountain expert. All possibilities were discussed again with Jodl. Ho agreed with Field Marshal Lists views and promised that he would achieve the withdrawal of this order.
Q. How did this matter end?
A. The answer which was given stood and thereupon I believe on the following day or on the second day after that, Field Marshal Keitel arrived at our Headquarters by airplane, and he had a discussion with Field Marshal List, tete a tete, which lasted a couple of hours, and when Keitel left, Field Marshal List, told me that he had resigned from his office as Commander in Chief and had told Keitel this, and Field Marshal List then returned to Germany on the next day.
Q. What was your impression of Field Marshal List after he had resigned his office?
A. Field Marshal List gave a very quiet, calm and collected impression. He had prepared himself for this situation, and he was quite collected.
Q. What did he say shortly before he left?
A. He said to me -- I mean roughly speaking -- when I said goodbye to him on the air field: "I'm content with what I could do so far, and I hope that the few years which God will grant me, I may be able to live out in peace." Well, that's just paraphrasing it -at least that's the sense of it.
Q. Did you have the impression as if the differences of opinion which he had with Hitler had had a very great effect on him?
A. No.
Q. Did you then again see Field Marshal List in the later years of the war?
A. Yes, passing through Vienna, I visited him for about two hours.
Q. After the end of the war?
A. After the end of the war I saw the Field Marshal again in American captivity at Hersfeld Prison.
Q. And did you often talk with him then?
A. Yes.
Q. On these occasions was there any talk whether he expected a trial?
A. No, we never discussed that.
Q. What was his attitude in this matter?
A. I think that he never believed that he had to expect to be put on trial, at least he didn't express such a view to me, and ho was very much surprised and shocked when he heard over the wireless that Greece had asked for Field Marshal List as a war criminal.
Q. At that time between Field Marshal List and yourself were there any incidents discussed by you, which had taken place in the Serbian area?
A. No.
Q. Now, when were you together with Field Marshal List for the last time?
A. After Hersfeld we were transferred to Allendorf, which was a similar camp. In January of this year we were brought to Nurnberg, and we were told that we would remain here about ten days.
Q. Did Field Marshal List express any worries on his trip to Nurnberg?
A. No.
Q. What did he assume?
A. He assumed that ho would be called as a military witness in some case.
Q. Did he not, at that time, count on the possibility of a trial against himself?
A. No, that is not known to me.
Q. Now. I have one last question. You have been together for many years with Field Marshal List, and for that reason I want to ask you what opinion you had arrived at of the personality of Field Marshal Lit?
A. I have known Field Marshal List for several years. I know him as a soldier who valued his profession above anything else. I know him as a Commander in Chief and as a superior officer, who demanded a lot from his troops, but who took groat and exceptional interest in his troops.
And he took severe measures where there was anything wrong. And I also know Field Marshal List as a human being, whose character and personality and whose Christian attitude always demanded the highest regard from all of us who worked together with him. For that reason I cannot believe and I think it's out of the question that he could have done anything which, according to Ms view, was not militarily speaking, necessary.. I cannot say more.
Q. I thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
( The Court adjourned until 0930 Thursday, 9 October 1947 )
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal is the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et all, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 9 October 1947, 0930, Justice Burke presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom?
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom except von Weichs who is still in the hospital.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Fenstermacher, you may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: OK your Honor.
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants Lanz and von Geitner): I would like to ask the witness a few questions. First of all, in order to clarify the actual documents of the prosecution with regard to the fact that the activity of the partisans was justified because the German invasion of Greece was something illegal, for this reason I want to ask the witness the following questions.
HANS von GREIFFENBERG - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. SAUTER:Q. fitness, did it become known to you from your official duties in the Balkans as Chief of Staff of an Army Group that at the beginning of the year 1941 and in the year 1940 Hitler wanted to keep the Balkans out of the war under all circumstances?
Is that known to you?
A. This became known to me during imprisonment from conversations I had with other people and during talks in which the Balkans problem was often discussed.
Q. Did it now become know to you when you were in Balkans and as Chief of the General Staff you had a very accurate insight into strategic plans.
A. I knew the task which the army had?
Q. Yes.
A. This order said that the 12th Army would have to invade Greece, first of all, in order to prevent British forces penetrating northward from Greece and secondly, in order to prevent the Italians who were fighting the Greeks in Albania being beaten, because the position of the Italians was pretty bad.
Q. Now, regarding the Italians, General, did you learn in your position at that time that the Italians in October 1940 had carried out the attack on Greece against Hitler's will?
A. I did not learn that at that time. I was not in office at that time. I was in a military hospital for many months.
Q. But you learned officially, that the Italians got into difficulties in their fight against Greece.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you confirm that these difficulties in which the Italians found themselves was a reason for Hitler to change his strategic plans regarding the Balkans in the spring of 1941 in order to maintain the front of the Italians?
A. This was expressly stated as the reason for the order of the OKW to which I had access.
Q. Yesterday you told us that in the winter 1940-41 the army, under the command of Field Marshal List was stationed first in Rumania and then in Bulgaria.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you at that time learn, and when, that Hitler ordered all preparations to made for military intervention in Greece?
A. Yes, as I already stated, that was in our maching orders.
Q. When?
A. I saw this order for the fist time when I reported it to the new Commander in Chief; that is, just before the New Year's Eve 19401941.
Q. In order to recall the date again, witness, I would like you to toll us when did the attack took place against Greece and against Serbia, just the month.
A. The attack against Greece took place on the 6th of May.
Q. 1941?
A. 1941.
Q. From your activity in the Balkans at that time did you learn just a moment, General, you made a mistake.
A. On the 6th of April the attack took place -- on the 6th of April.
Q. We correct our statement to the effect that the attack on Greece took place on the 6th of April 1941 and not on the 6th of May.
Now I will continue with another question which I want to put to you now. Did you learn through your official activities at that time as Chief of Staff of the Army Group List that before the 6th of April, English troops had been landed on Crete and on the Greek mainland, and can you perhaps give us the exact date of that landing?
A. Through the directives and reports which we have received from the Department of Foreign Armies in the OKH, we could see that British troops were on Crete and in Greece. Our 12th Army itself had no information of is own regarding this, because it could not fly across the borders.
Q. Could you tell us at about what date the landing of the British forces took place on Crete and who on the Greek mainland?
A. No, I cannot give you the date. But during the preparatory time when I was in the army, according to the documents of the OKH, the British were on Crete and in the Balkans.
Q. The German attack against Yugoslavia and against Greece started on the 6th of April?
A. Against Yugoslavia somewhat later.
Q. Around about the 6th of April?
A. About 48 hours later.
Q. Is it correct, if I understand you testimony in this, that in that moment when the German attack started against Greece and Yugoslavia, British troops were already on Crete and on the Greek mainland?
A. That I know on the strength of the documents which we received from our superior headquarters.
Q. Did you get any hints on the basis of your official duties whether this landing of British forces on Crete and on the Greek mainland took place with the consent of the Greek government or against the will of the Greek government?
A. I cannot base my knowledge on official information. I merely assume.
Q. What do you assume?
A. I assume that the Greek government consented to the landing of foreign troops on this territory.
Court, V - Case VII
Q. In ether words, in orders or messages which came to your knowledge at that time and, therefore, to the knowledge of Field Marshal List, was it expressed from the German side or from any other side that Greece had given up its neutrality by this act, and that it had taken up its position with the enemies, and that, therefore, the attack of the German troops against Greece had been provoked? Have you understood this question?
A. I understood the question.
Q. Has this view been expressed at the time and have you had this view?
A. We heard this view. As I have already stated we heard this again and again at OKU, we repeatedly heard this view.
Q. Witness, I have a few further questions regarding another problem, Yesterday, you told us that, I believe, on the 9th of April 1941 the Thracian army capitulated in Greece and somewhat later, on the 21st of April, I believe, the Epirns army capitulated; and you further told us that this capitulation was a double event, so to speak. First of all it capitulated to the Germans and the next day it capitulated to the Germans and Italians. Is that correct?
A. It is correct that the second capitulation was a double event.
Q. Now, I would be interested to know whether this actually concluded the fighting in Greece. Witness, I emphasis the word, "actually". I am not at the moment interested in the legal position. I want to know from you during the next days and during the next weeks whether fighting took in fact took place -- that is to say, whether in fact, the Greek Army was still belligerent towards the Germans or not.
A. After these two negotiations for capitulation fighting took place in Southern Greece and in the Peloponnesos, but not in Thrace and not in the Epirus. This fighting was conducted originally by the British and the Australian. If Greek units took part in these last mentioned operations I do not now know. A Greek army in the sense of a proper army no longer existed.