Q. Did I understand you correctly, witness? You told us during the next few days and perhaps weeks after the capitulation of the two Greek armies actions took place and in fact, took place in the Peloponnesos and in Southern Greece?
A. In Southern Greece and around, around Athens.
Q. According to your view and according to your knowledge, these were mainly fighting on the part of the British and Australian troops which had been landed there and Greek troops may have been attached to these foreign troops. How long did these withdrawal actions of the English and Canadian troops in Southern Greece and Peloponnesos last?
A. It is almost impossible to give you the exact date.
Q. Approximate date.
A. I think until the end of the month.
Q. Until the end of April?
A. On the 27th of April we were already in Athens and at that time-- that is, at the end of the month -- the Greeks -- that is, the enemy -- must have left Southern Greece. There were concluding actions on the Peloponnesos which lasted until the following month. As I have already stated, I cannot give you the exact date. But I am not talking of Crete.
Q. No, not of Crete. You are talking of the Greek mainland. Is it correct that this fighting on the Peloponnesos lasted until the troops under the British and Canadian troops which had been landed there left the Peloponnesos by the sea route, because that will be correct and I should like you to express it that the British groups left the Peloponnesos by sea.
A. Yes, they left the Peloponnesos by sea after withdrawal skirmishes.
Q. Now, witness, during the time which followed partisans appeared in Greece. Did these partisan groups appear in the first weeks after the capitulation of the Greek Army or between the capitulations of the Greek armies and the appearance of larger partisan units was there a long period of time?
A. After the capitulation and after the taking of Athens I left the Balkans. During that time there were no partisans at all.
Q. When did you leave?
A. I left at about the 15th of May. It may have been the 16th.
Q. That is to say, witness, after the first capitulation you remained approximately five weeks?
A. Yes.
Q. And after the second capitulation you remained for three weeks in Greece and you said during that time no partisan units appeared.
A. During that time, at least, I had no knowledge of the appearance of the fighting activities.
Q. From your activities on the Balkans and also from reports which you saw at that time or later, did you gain the impression that these partisan units at the time of the capitulations -- that is, in April 1941 -- had already been established or did you, on the contrary, gain the impression that there partisan units were only established sometime later and were used in fighting? What is your personal impression?
A. My personal impression is this, on the basis of my experience and of my stay in Greece, that immediately after the capitulation and in the first weeks of which am still informed there were no partisan units of any size or any cohesion.
Q. Witness, I want to come back to the capitulation regarding one point. You know probably that in any such capitulation the victor gets certain guarantees in order that the capitulation provisions are kept - in other words, guarantees for the fact that we would have a capitulation today and not a continuance of the fighting tomorrow. Did the responsible German agencies who concluded these capitulations create any guarantees in the capitulation instrument in order to prevent that the capitulation could be broken and that legally the fight could be continued illegally.
A. In the discussions about the capitulation of the Epirus Army, as far as I can recall, it says on one paragraph, I believe, that General Zolakoglau and his staff and his whole organization
Q. All Greeks?
A. Took over the duty to see to it that tho ordered dissolution and the withdrawal of the troops which had capitulated was carried out in a proper manner. That is to say, were led back to their homes after they had boon discharged. Secondly tho German Army Headquarters sent a German division in tho area of the dissolving army - as far as I can remember, it was the 73rd division - and this division had the task, first of all, to see to it that the dissolution of the army which was in a pitiable state took place in an orderly manner, and, secondly, it took over the guard duties in this sense and, thirdly, it helped the Greeks by supplying them with food and transportation and medical help. I can remember those things.
Q. Can you tell us, General, just roughly approximately the strength of the capitulating Greek armies, the Thracian army and the Epirus army?
A. I am afraid I can't answer this question because after these many years I cannot remember these figures but it could be easily established.
Q. You were talking of one German division which was placed in that area. I assume that tho Greek armies had comised quite a number of divisions.
A. Certainly.
Q. So that one German Army was comparatively poor protection against Greek resistance and that is tho reason why I asked you for the approximate strength of the Greek army at tho moment of this capitulation.
A. Yes, this Greek Epirus army which capitulated certainly comprised quite a number of divisions. I don't know how many-
certainly much stronger than tho German but, first of all, it was hemmed in at the front by the Italians and, secondly -- I was there myself it was in such a pitiable state of complete dissolution that a unified action by this division, or parts of this division, was quite impossible after it had once laid down its arms.
Q. Witness, you mentioned yesterday that the Greek officers wore not even disarmed. Is that correct?
A. I know definitely that the capitulation instrument contained the provision that the Greek officers, in view of the brave behavior of tho troops, could retain their swords.
Q. Does the capitulation instrument or the negotiations say anything about the fact that the Greek officers would have to give their word of honor to the Italians that they would naturally not take part in any further fighting? Is this known to you?
A. I cannot today say that this is contained in the capitulation instrument, but I assume it to be certain because this is a very usual custom in the fixing of such conditions.
Q. You have told us the Greek Armies capitulated and then they were just transported to their homes without any security measures, How do you explain to yourself, Witness, the fact that the Germans took no protective measures at all? That is, that German delegates did not at least take the officers and make them prisoners of war? How do you explain the fact that they were, after all, set free? You also took part in these activities.
A. The explanation is this: The order which the Army had, that is to drive the British out of Greece and to prevent the Italian catastrophe--that order had been fulfilled. It was not the intention of this order, as far as we could understand it from our point of view, to beat or annihilate the Greek Army.
Q. If one had not assumed, on the strength of the behavior of the Greek delegates, that, of course, any future resistance was out of the question, that any future fighting action, of course, would have to cease, do you believe that the German delegates would have agreed to it without any guarantee for the adherence to the capitulation conditions? Was it your opinion that, since you were present at these negotiations, that the delegates would have asked for extensive guarantees if on the German side one had reckoned with the possibility, or if the Greek delegates had hinted that the light against the German Armies would be continued?
Is that correct? That is to say, it would have been continued by partisans at a later date. What is your opinion?
A. There can be no doubt about this question at all. If we had assumed or if there had been an danger that the Greek military resistance would revise against us, then one would, of course, had to have taken quite different protective measures. That's my opinion.
Q. One would have had to tame them or one would have taken them?
A. One would have taken them.
Q. And during the next weeks, after the capitulation, while you were in Greece it was quiet in the areas of those two capitulated armies?
A. No report reached the area of any further incidents.
Q. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there further questions by defense counsel?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General von Greiffenberg, you have been exploring with Dr. Sauter something of a background of the attack on Greece and Yugoslavia in April of 1941. I would just like to explore that with you very briefly now.
Did you ever hear anything about conferences between Foreign Minister of Italy Ciano and Foreign Minister of Germany Ribbentrop in August 1939, at which it was stated that the best thing to happen was for neutrals to be liquidated one after the other? This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral.
Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind. Did you ever hear anything to that effect?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I object to this questioning, this incident, that is the discussion between Ciano and Ribbentrop was never subject of the examination, and for this reason he cannot be questioned on it.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The witness is a man of more than ordinaly intelligence, and I feel certain that he will be able to take care of himself in an emergency. And the objection will be overruled.
-----BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Did you ever hear anything about that conference, General von Greiffenberg?
A. No, I have not heard anything of such a conference or of any expressions of opinions on such a conference.
Q. You never heard that Yugoslavia regarded (Withdrawn).
You never heard that Italy was supposed to guard Yugoslavia while Germany went on to other deeds?
A. No, these political considerations and these discussions I don't know anything about. I had heard nothing of them.
Q. Do you recall when Italy invaded Albania?
A. Yes, I remember this fact from the reports in the press.
Q. Do you remember the date?
A. No, I cannot give it to you now.
Q. Do you remember when Italy invaded Greece?
A. That date too I cannot fix exactly, but I know the fact on the strength of the plans we had.
Q. Could it have been in October of 1940?
A. Mr. Prosecutor, it is possible that it may have been at that time. As I have already stated, I was in a military hospital for more than three months, and I don't exactly remember are those incidents between the fall of 1940 and January 1941.
Q. You recall I believe, General von Greiffenberg, however, that Italy's invasion of Greece was not making much headway and that Hitler was quite worried about that fact?
A. You moan to say the first days of fighting?
Q. I moan the whole Italian campaign against Greece was going very badly.
A. Yes, it took a very bad course. The campaign made very bad progress and Hitler was certainly displeased that no progress at all was made.
Q. and I believe you must know that the British were trying to come to the aid of Greece in their war against Italy?
A. Yes.
Q. And then in December of 1940 Hitler issued directives for the campaign against Greece. He sent Field Marshal List of the XIIth Army to Romania and then told List to quietly move into Bulgaria and poise for an attack on Greece. Do you remember that?
A. Yes, that was what the order said. That's the meaning oi the order which the XIIth Army received from the OHW,--gathering in Romania and then penetrating to Bulgaria, and then to prepare for advance into Greece.
A. And you were Chief of Staff of the XIIth Army at that time wore you not?
A. Yes, I was Chief of Staff of the XIIth Army from the first of January.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I regret that I have to interrupt. I have the impression that the witness cannot hear very well because otherwise I cannot explain to myself why the witness constantly presses the earphones against his ears. (TO THE WITNESS): Do you hear well?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm hearing very well.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. So that even though the attack upon Greece did not occur until April, 1941, plans for the invasion of Greece were already in operation as early as December, 1940, Is that true, General?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And then while you and the XIIth Army were waiting in Bulgaria to attack Greece in order to protect your flank in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was invited to join the Tri-Partite Pact. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I recall that.
Q. And sometime in March Yugoslavia did join the Tri-Partite Pact?
A. Yes.
Q. And as soon as the ministers of Yugoslavia returned from Berlin to Belgrade there was a coup d'etat and the government was overthrown, Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Do you recall who was the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia at the time the Yugoslavian Government joined the Tri-Partite Pact?
A. I have not understood the first part of this sentence. Would you kindly repeat it?
Q. Was Prince Paul Regent of Yugoslavia at the time Yugoslavia joined the Tri-Partite Pact?
A. Yes, as far as I know, Prince Paul was the Regent of Yugoslavia.
Q. And towards the end of March Prince Paul's Government was overthrown, and King rotor the 2nd was permitted to rule in his own right. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, we got this information.
Q. Do you remember whether the new government of King Peter offered loyalty declarations to Germany at that time?
A. A declaration of loyalty by this now government? I haven't heard anything about this. This is quite new to me.
Q. Did you never hear that hitler said that he was determined without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit? Did you over hear that?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. Did you over hear that Hitler said he would deal with unmerciful harshness against Yugoslavia?
A. No, we didn't hear that, at least I didn't hear this expression.
Q. I take it, General von Greiffenberg, that you consider the war against Greece and Yugoslavia a war justified by military necessity on Germany's part.
A. Yes, on the strength of the political situation and on the strength of the orders we had boon given I thought it was a military necessity to invade Greece.
Q. I wonder perhaps if you are familiar with the International Military Tribunal's opinion regarding the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia?
A. No, I don't know anything about that...
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. How long were you Chief of Staff of the XIIth Army?
A. I was Chief of Staff of the XIIth Army until the middle of May.
Q. You've stated that Greece capitulated sometime towards the end of April, 1941. Do you recall who signed the capitulation on the part of Greece?
A. The capitulation of the Epirus Army was signed by the Commander in Chief, General Zolakoglou, or something like that. That was the name.
Q. Do you know, General, that General Zolakoglou became Quisling Premier of the Greek Government during the German occupation of Greece?
A. Yes. I remember that General Zolakoglou, during the last days of my presence there, took over the government.
Q. I wonder if you ever heard the General Zolakoglou died while awaiting charges for being a traitor to his people? Have you ever heard that by any chance?
A. No, that's the first I hear of it.
Q. Do you happen to know what happened to King George and the Government of Greece and what they did prior to the capitulation by General Zolakoglou?
A. Yes, as far as I know, the Greek Government fled. I don't know where it fled to Crete or to Africa. I don't know. At least when we came to Athens the Greek Government was no longer on the Greem mainland.
Q. King George and his Government had fled to Crete and then to Egypt, and finally to London, didn't they. General?
A. It probably would have been like that. I assume this to be correct.
Q. And King Peter and his government of Yugoslavia fled to London end set up a Yugoslavian Government in Exile did they not?
A. Yes.
Q. General, isn't it true that one of the most important reasons motivating the German release of the Greek soldiers was the fact that you didn't want to feed these soldiers?
A. I don't believe that this was the cause, because practically during the first period at least the soldiers of the Epirus Army had to be fed by us, because, I believe I already said, the state of the soldiers of this Epirus Army was so bad that they could not have stayed the course by their own means for any length of time.
Q. General, Germany simply guessed wrong by releasing all the Greek prisoners after the capitulation did they not? You never anticipated that Greek resistance would flare up in the future. That was a bad military guess on your part?
A. As far as I know from the orders of the OKH there was no necessity to retain these prisoners because we say no danger for the future and for that reason we had no cause to keep these soldiers.
Q. That turned out to be rather a bad guess?
THE ENGLISH GERMAN INTERPRETER: There was a wrong translation on my part. (CORRECTING HIMSELF BY REPEATING).
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
A. Yes, I believe that under the conditions obtaining at that time and with the German superiority this guess must be understandable. I don't know whether one should call this guess wrong at that time.
Q. General, did you know whether the Greek soldiers were pleged not to take up arms again following the capitulation?
A. I cannot recall that paragraph in the capitulation instrument. I don't know whether it was really put like that, but I assume that such a paragraph was contained in it, but I don't know, at least regarding the officers.
Q. General, the procedure in a matter of that kind is to ask each individual soldier to pledge himself in writing not to take up arms against the victor. Isn't it?
A. No, that is practically impossible. I believe that is out of the question.
Q. You don't believe that provision that each individual soldier must sign an individual pledge in writing is contained in the Hague Rules of Land Warfare?
A. I don't know whether that is the case.
Q. General, you stated that on the basis of your long acquaintance with Field Marshal List you know him to have opposed the Party, to have opposed the Party's attitude regarding the Jews, and to have been a steady and consistent church goer. Would you say that Field Marshal List was considered politically unreliable by Hitler?
A. I cannot say that. I have no proof for that.
Q. Do you know whether Field Marshal List's attitude towards the Party and the Party's actions against the Jews was well known prior to 1939?
A. That it was known to Hitler, do you mean that? I haven't understood.
Q. I mean whether Hitler knew it, whether Keitel knew it, whether lots of the German officers surrounding List knew it.
A. Whether Hitler knew it I cannot say that because I had too little contace. But I believe I said yesterday that one who was especially opposed to Hitler and his measures was the then Chief of Staff, Col. Oloricht, and that this man was known as such to his superior officers.
At least that is what I assume.
Q. Did you believe that if Field Marshal List was an out-spoken critic of the Party and that if his criticism of the Party was well known, that he ever would have been appointed Field Marshal by Hitler in 1940?
A. That Field Marshal List was a sharp critic of the Party, there's no doubt about that. I know that from a large number of conversations of former years. That he was made a Field Marshal I believe has its only reason in his military service of that time during the war; otherwise I cannot explain.
Q. But Hitler was very anxious to gain control of the Army, General. In 1938 he replaced Fritsch because he couldn't trust him, and he put in Brauchitsch as Commander in Chief of the Army, and I believe at the same time he got rid of von Blomberg because he couldn't trust him, and he was very find of promoting officers upon whom he could rely politically. He promoted Rommel, Reichenau, and Schoerner.
A. Yes, that is right without any doubt.
Q. And Hitler was very anxious to indoctrinate the Army with National Socialism, and have the officers indoctrinate their men with Party principles, was he not?
A. Yes.
Q. And in 1940 he promoted the then Generaloberst List to become Field Marshal, did he not?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. General, you said that Field Marshal List and 1 suppose you yourself and other members of the XIIth Army had misgivings about the invasion of Greece. Did you ever consider that to be an unjust war on Germany's part?
A. We all regretted very much that we had to attack Greece and the Break people, and we all -- I can testify to chat -- we all took part very unwilling in this campaign because we all had nothing against the Greeks or the Greek Army.
We had nothing against them whatsoever.
Q. What were the political reasons which moved Hitler to conduct this campaign?
A. That I cannot say from my viewpoint at this time nor from my viewpoint today. I cannot say. I only know the military reasons of which we wore informed.
Q. General, did you ever feel that the order to invade Greece and Yugoslavia was an illegal order and that by virtue of Paragraph 47 of the German Military Code you had a duty to disobey illegal orders?
A. This impression of the advance into Greece being illegal we didn't have, at least we at the front didn't have it, because the reasons which we had been given by superior headquarters were sufficient that we had to assume that it was absolutely necessary and that the Greeks, by letting the British enter their country, had no longer kept the neutrality which was to be expected. That was our view.
Q. You agree, do you not, General, that a German officer has a duty to disobey illegal orders according to paragraph 47?
A. Yes.
Q. General, you have said that Fieldmarshal List liked the Greeks so much that he permitted them to fly their flag on the national palace beside the German flag?
A. Yes, that is what I said. That was to be a gesture.
Q. When you were in Athens, you no doubt walked up to the Akropolis and saw the Parthenon?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever see the Greek flag flying beside the German flag atop the Parthenon?
A. I believe at my time the Greek flag was not hoisted there. I don't believe it but I cannot say with certainty, I know that Fieldmarshal List had the intention to carry this out but I don't know whether it happened during my time.
Q. Could it have been possible that during your time only the Nazi flag was flying there?
A. I believe there was a flag there certainly, but it certainly was the Reich war flag. We didn't have any other flag. The troops didn't have any other flags.
Q. General von Greiffenberg, you have said that through your knowledge of Fieldmarshal List you didn't believe he would ever do anything that was not warranted by military necessity?
A. Yes, I said that. That is right.
Q. Do you consider the execution of hostages at ratios from one to fifty and one to one hundred, and the burning down of villages in reprisal, measures of military necessity?
A. I cannot answer this question because I don't know the situation in which these measures were taken and subsequently I can't give any judgment whether this was really military necessity. I don't know it.
Q. You are not familiar with the problems which Fieldmarshal List fused in the Southeast? You can't very well say then that he always acted according to dictates of military necessity, can you?
A. No, I only want to express the fact that I can only imagine with difficulty that the Fieldmarshal who, I and our soldiers so highly regarded, that he would do something which was not dictated by military necessity, and which was not indispensable, I believe I said it in this way and I want to express it like this.
Q. General von Greiffenberg, were you ever of the opinion that the execution of hostages simply made matters worse, that they increased the resistance of the occupied peoples?
A. I have no practical experience regarding the question of hostages. I was always stationed where there was no question of taking hostages, and I cannot give you any judgment on the practical result of the taking of hostages. It is quite clear, as far as I know, that an execution or shotting of hostages always carries the danges of counter-measures and of increasing counter-measures. I lack however, practical experience in these matters.
Q. General, do you recall being interrogated here in Nurnberg on the 15th of January, 1947?
A. Yes.
Q. You weren't under indictment at that time, were you?
A. No.
Q. And you gave your testimony voluntarily and without threat of coercion?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall at that time being asked about certain directives which had been issued in connection with the waging of partisan warfare?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, before this interrogation is made a subject of this examination here, I would like to say for a copy of it. First of all, I want to look through it before it is being discussed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: We have no objection to that, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The copy which we are handing to your Honor is simply for your information. We are not intending to offer them as an exhibit.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, from the statement of the prosecutor, I gather that he is submitting copies of this statement for the information of the Court. He cannot do this. The prosecution can only submit material for the information of the Court with my consent. I would like to ask the prosecutor that we can first examine.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: My first words were misspoken, your Honor. I simply intended for you to have copies while we were going over the question and answers, for no other purposes of explanation.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I believe the explanation obviates the necessity of inquiring as to the rather irregular fashion but if your thought is to interrogate the witness as to statements previously made by him and which arc in contradiction of statements that he had given on the stand, you may proceed; but further than that, I think the statement is inadmissible. First, it obviously wasn't made in the presence of any of these defendants and except as it bears on his credibility would be inadmissible.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: May I proceed without waiting for Dr. Laternser to finish examining the interrogations, your Honor?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, first of all I ask that the prosecutor is asked to withdraw the record of the interrogation. If he wants to examine the witness, if he wants to examine the witness about my incidents in his interrogation---
(Stopped by interpreter)
I object first of all that this record is being used here, and I ask that the prosecutor is asked to withdraw his copies which have been distributed. Would the Court please decide about this question?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Court cannot be seriously influenced by immaterial matter that may have been handed by the prosecutor but the point that we are interested in at the present time is a question of his examining the witness upon interrogations previously made on the 15th of January. Have you any objection to that procedure?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I can only judge this after the question have been asked, because I cannot object to the examination. I can only object to question which I consider inadmissible.
CROSS EXAMINATION - (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General von Greiffenberg, do you recall being asked on the 15th of January, 1947, several questions regarding the issuance of directives of OKW regarding the combatting of bands?
A. Yes, and I was interrogated on that.
Q. Now, do you recall being asked this question and giving this answer on that occasion?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, the prosecutor now starts an examination about a. point which was not subject of the direct examination. Now it is the intention of the prosecution to make this witness into a prosecution witness, I emphatically object to this kind of examination. Now I ask since the prosecutor intends to read from a document which I don't know, that this examination is declared to be inadmissible. He can only use documents if they have been submitted 24 hours in advance to the defense.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, I would like to ask the prosecution that it submit to me and to the other defense counsel copies of this examination, The witness is now to be examined about a subject which is of importance to the defendant Lanz and von Geitner. I my-self want to know it. I also want to know what this document contains and for that reason I must insist that I get a German copy of this document.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: For the time being, you may proceed.
CROSS EXAMINATION - (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General von Greiffenberg, were you asked this question on the 15th of January, 1947, and did you give this answer at that time? This is question 17 for the interpreters' information.
"However that may be, it is established that this directive for the combatting of bands in our opinion contains paragraphs which go far beyond that which is permissible, according to principles of International Law or humanity. Within this scope, there is a series of directives and orders which have fallen into hour hands in the course of the last years of the Balkan theater of operations and which are streaming in now as before. There is a series of directives which, just to pick out an example, are built on the principle that to an attack on one member of the German Wehrmacht fifty, seventy-five and sometimes even one hundred Serbians or Croatians are to be executed. I see that these matters arc not unknown to you. May I learn from you how you, as a member of the general staff, chief of several army groups and with your broad military experience and disposed to those matters?
"A. I head the some in the case of von Mackensen whereby a rather large number of retaliation prisoners were executed, when the perpetrators themselves could not be determined. Ever today I am still of the opinion that nothing is helped by these measures on the contrary in the case of fanatic opponents--and that is what most of the Slavic peoples are who posses a very strong feeling for their country--the matter is simply goaded on. Consequently, I cannot imagine that anything could be gained through measures of this kind whereby for one murdered man, fifty other men who have nothing to do with the deed are executed. It on represents a possibility of momentary intimidation which in the last analysis must needs lead to a more stubborn resistance. I do not only regard it as cruelty but also as absolutely false and ineffective f or the purpose of maintaining peace in the country."