Q The people who were German down there were Volksdeutsch, persons who formed a potential 5th Column for the Germans, isn't that true?
AAs far as I know I didn't speak one single word with a Volksdeutsche. I mean Croats and Serbs who belonged to the intelligensia and had an above-average knowledge of the German language.
Q Doctor, Ibbeken, in spite of the fact you were considered politically unreliable you were interested in preparing a manual for the German soldiers of the Southeast, which did you put in that manual, -how big was it? -- what subjects were touched upon?
A My work for the Commander in Chief of the Southeast reached the following state: I studied all the files, I took out notes which seemed important to me, and created copies of files which seemed important to me, and in addition I made a disposition about those points, which during the course of further work seemed to me to be important. The work contained about 100 to 120, no perhaps 200 typewritten pages, which were concerned less with the topical events of 1941 to 1944 and 1945, but rather more about the prior historical conditions of the problems in that area.
Q Was a copy of that manual given to every German soldier in the Balkans?
A It wasn't finished. In addition, the first part of my work was concerned with the military political course of events, and I didn't even get to the actual manual during that time.
Q If I understand you correctly, Dr. Ibbeken, you didn't come to the Southeast until later, January or February 1944, and in a few months, October or September 1944 you left because the German troops were gone, and if I understood you correctly further you say your work was not concerned so much with 1941-1944, but during the period prior to 1941, am I correct?
A No, the period from 1941 to 1944 was fundamentally worked on by me by taking out all the files and copying them as far as they were important, and then in addition I did the historical work in order to get a complete view of events.
Q Well, now, let us see how much you remember about the files. Do you remember seeing anything in the files about the talking and execution of hostages at rather large ratios?
A Not one single memo is known to me, or which I can remember which talked about shooting, figures about shootings.
Q Did you have access to the orders which were sent by Army Group F to the subordinate units in the Southeast, and reports which those subordinate units sent back to higher headquarters?
A Yes.
Q And you saw nothing in them about execution of hostages?
AAbout the actual execution I remember no report, but I do know that the orders went out containing instructions about the shootings of hostages. I didn't especially study this question because it was almost outside my sphere of research.
Q Do you remember any orders which were sent by higher headquarters in the Southeast to lower commands stating that hostages should be executed at the rate of 50 to one, if a German soldier was killed?
A I remember that orders were there in which a number was mentioned larger than the losses of the German troops. Definite figures I don't remember, but there was a ratio number, but it didn't say that for one German soldier shot one other must be shot. I remember there were ratio figures but a definite ratio I don't remember.
Q You don't remember whether a ratio of 100 to one was ordered in case a German soldier was killed?
A In the corridor of the Palace of Justice in a conversation, -- who was it with, -- or was it in the room of the lawyer, when I first came here, I heard about a figure of one to 100, and the fact that such orders are supposed to exist, but I don't remember that in my work on the files and from my work on the files that this figure of one to 100 remained in my memory.
JUDGE CARTER: We will recess until 1:30.
(Thereupon the noon recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
AFTERNOON SESSION The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
RUDOLF IBBEKEN CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Doctor Ibbeken, prior to the luncheon recess we were examining some of your qualifications as an expert on Balkan characteristics. Will you tell us again what files were available to you in the Southeast area?
A. The files of the 12th Army and of the Army Groups E and F.
Q. Were all of the files available to you, the 1-C reports and the 1-A orders and the war diaries of the various commands?
A. They all were available.
Q. And you remember nothing in all that material that related to the execution of hostages?
A. The material which might have talked especially about the execution of hostages must have been ordered and filed in such a manner that this contents would comparatively easily recognizable. Files in which there was some talk about shootings of hostages I might possibly under the circumstances not even have consulted, because they had little to say to my subject.
Q. You didn't think the execution of hostages had anything to do with the attitude of the occupied peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece towards the German occupation forces?
A. The attitude of the Partisans towards the armed forces was known to me from so many general reports, that specific reports concerning the shootings of hostages did not add anything essential to my particular problems.
Q. You don't think in order to understand the temperament of the Balkan peoples we must also examine as to the causes of unrest in the Balkans and perhaps some of the things which the German people did to the Balkan peoples to give rise to their attitudes?
A. I do mean that the temperament of the Balkan people played an important part in the sharpness of the struggle.
Q. Do you believe the execution of the hostages played any part in the attitude of the Balkan people towards the German occupation forces?
A. The shooting of hostages is already a measure which resulted from the actions of the population, actions which were considered punishable by the Wehrmacht. The situation was that this population, acting because of their temperament committed crimes and then the shootings took place, and not the other way around, that shootings took place which then might have lead to the population committing crimes against the Wehrmacht.
Q. Dr. Ibbeken, which came first, the acts of sabotage by the occupied people or the invasion of their country by the German armed forces?
A. I do not understand the question. It is not clear.
Q. Which happened first, did the people of Serbia and Croatia and Greece commit acts of sabotage against the German armed forces first, or did the German armed forces first invade Yugoslavia and Greece, and then the attacks took place?
A. Before the German Wehrmacht had occupied the area there could be no sabotage acts undertaken against them.
Q. So you answer my question by saying that the acts of sabotage took place only after Germany first invaded the Balkans.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you consider the war against Greece and Yugoslavia aggressive warfare, Doctor Ibbeken?
DR. LATERNSER: I object.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: This goes to the credibility of the Witness, your Honor.
DR. LATERNSER: I object to this question. The witness is thus being asked to judge the legality or illegality of a war, and I am sure is not competent to do that.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I only asked for his opinion.
JUDGE CARTER: I think it is improper cross-examination.
Sustained.
Q. Doctor Ibbeken, in your examination of the files did you discover any references to reprisal measures taken by the German forces, I mean by that the burning of villages and the executing of hostages, the execution of captured partisans?
A. I have read in the files that partisans were captured. Reports about executions I do not recollect.
Q. Do you recall anything about concentration camps?
A. To the best of my knowledge there were no concentration camps, but I do admit that I am possibly not informed about that question. The question of concentration camps did not approach me at all in the course of my commission with the armed forces commander Southeast, and beyond that I don't recollect at any time to have had any discussions where the subject of concentration camps played an important part.
Q. You don't remember seeing any references to concentration Camps in the file which you examined?
A. No.
Q. Do you recollect anything from the files which talked about the rounding up of Jews end gypsies and their subsequent execution?
A. No.
Q. Do you recollect anything in the files about the way the Partisans were dressed, whether they wore any insignia?
A. Concerning the Tito movement there are in the files very detailed statements concerning the equipment and the estimated strength and about the cultural work which was done by some theatre troops for the military troops. I could not picture how one of the various Partisan groups was specifically uniformed or not uniformed. From the reports it is known to me that Partisans did not by any means wear a uniform at all times and did not at all times wear clothing of a military character. The uniform of a Partisan consists quite infrequently, as we read in the descriptions, of womens' clothing.
Court 5, Case 7 .
Q You arrived in tho Southeast in early 1944 wasn't Tito and his forces very well organized according to Companies and Battallions and Regiments and even divisions and weren't they fully clothed and armed with heavy weapons?
A Plans for an orderly military form did exist at that time, whether they were carried out I cannot judge.
Q Do you recall whether throughout the period from 1941 to 1944 the Tito partisans wore a Red Star at all times as part of their insignia?
A I do not know that because I worked expressly with a staff and in the offices of that staff and I had no occasion to see the uniformed Tito partisans.
Q And you received no information as to the manner in which the partisans were dressed?
A I did not receive such information.
Q Did you receive any information as to the insignia which the Cetniks were?
A I am not in a position to designate one insignia of a specific kind that was known to me as a characteristic for a Cetnik.
Q Dr. Ibbeken you said that you saw some photographs of the mutilation of soldiers presumably by the partisans; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you ever see any photographs showing the mutilation of soldiers, which was done by the German soldiers; did you ever see any photographs of a Red Star cut into the fact of a captured partisan?
A No.
Q You said that Croatia and Jugoslavia was an independent state; do you really mean that after Germany invaded and conquered Yugoslavia that any Government could exist in Croatia without the support and the knowledge and the acquiescence of the German government?
A The consent of the German government was definitely a pre-requisite for the existence of Croatia, but only one, because the most essential and most supporting factor of the Croat Poglavnik's was Italy.
Q Do you mean that Croatia was independent and free to do whatever it wanted to, not standing the attitude of Germany?
A Croatia took good care not to risk an open test and the German government, which for general military reasons had to hold on to that district, would have certainly -- if Croatia for any reason had opposed the Wehrmacht or the Germans -- made its influence on Croatia belt.
Q Germany could have replaced any of the leaders of the Croatian Government at any time; could it not?
A I do not believe that. Compulsory measure like that could have for instance caused an immediate break with Italy.
Q But after the capitulation of Italy, there was no doubt about German supremacy in Croatia; was there?
AAs to the support of Croatia by Germany after Italy had capitulated. ---- My answer would only consist now of guess work as the proper information is missing.
Q Dr. Ibbeken, isn't it true that the German policy in occupied Greece and Yugo Slavia was the old one of "divided rule". It was the policy of playing Tito off against Mihajlovik, the Serbs off against the Croats in order thereby to maintain supremacy?
A To play Tito off against Mihajlovik would have been entirely superfluous because that contrast existed and was so stubborn that there was no need for any German initiative to incite them against each other.
Q You disagree when that it was Germany's policy to play one group off against another and to capitalize on the Religious & Social differences in Greece and Yuto Slavia.
A The contrasts, the tensions and conflicts which existed between the various groups in that area, between the Cetniks, Ustasna, etc., were not at all influenced by German policy, or by the German Wehrmacht, for all practical purposes.
Q You don't believe that German policy was calculated and invented to increase the tension between the various religious and economic groups in the Balkans?
A I am convinced that if the German Wehrmacht had a proscription on how to abolish and overcome those difficulties, they would have certainly grasped that prescription with both hands as that would have saved a lot of blood if they coped with the situation by any other means though I cannot imagine any other means possible.
Q When we talk about tho characteristics of the Balkan people must we not also talk about the traditional love of independence and freedom of those people?
A I personally in many offices of the German Wehrmacht have never hesitated to recognize in the partisan activity also the love of these people to their Fatherland, however, it is a difficult combination, the honorable motives of a fighter combined with his cruel methods so that sometimes one can have doubts whether there are any honorable national motives or if they are just purely bandits.
Q Doctor, isn't it true that the undeclared bombing of Belgrade on 6 April 1941 and the execution of the hostages at the ratio of one hundred to one shortly after the campaign began, let to the unrest, and the sabotage and the methods of resistance, which the German troops faced in Yugo Slavia and Greece?
A I cannot judge the psychological effect of the bombardment of Belgrade because I did not have any documentary evidence about that. The psychological effect of the shooting of the hostages, I would judge, to the effect that the armed forces had only resorted to these shootings when the corresponding offenses had occurred and one cannot refrain from justified shooting in the idea that other people through that shooting might get excited and annoyed.
Q Isn't it true, Doctor, that large sections of the Serbian population were inclined at first to be friendly to the German occupation, but as soon as the reprisal methods were instituted those Serbs turned against Germany?
A The answer to this question would mean that I would have to know Serbs who during the first weeks were friendly and that I later talked to them again when they were under the impression of later events. I cannot judge any such immediate change of opinion, because I did not encounter the same people in both situations.
Q Doctor, you are an export on the Balkan people, how they feel, what makes them tick, how they react on various situations, I ask you, didn't the severe reprisal measures which the Germans took, I mean by that the burning of villages, execution of hostages and the arbitrary arrest of Jew's and Gypsies and the collections of innocent victims into the concentration camps; didn't that increase the resistance which the German troops faced?
A To an earlier question I have answered that, I knew nothing about concentration camps or about the seizure of Jews and Gypsies. I cannot draw any conclusion from an occurrence which is unknown to me.
Q Doctor, isn't it true that the shortage of troops and the fact that most of the occupation troops were old men; wasn't that important in connection with the occupation of the Balkan countries?
A It is a difficult question to answer, what number of troops would have been sufficient in the Balkans and what number would have been insufficient. At first it was very difficult to guess how many troops would be necessary to dominate what area, because that area was inhabitated by a population the attitude of which could not possibly be estimated. I don't know whether this is correct, but compared for instance with a normal German population those troops would have been more than sufficient to carry out a complete demobilization, but a population which lived in those mountain recluses area and had such a fighter temperament, with such a population it was a miracle to estimate the necessary strength of the troops with certainty.
Q. You don't believe that the reasons for which the German troops enforced severe reprisal measures was in order to make up for a lack of troops?
A. I consider this a question which I cannot answer post festum.
Q. Would you repeat that please.
A. I consider that a question I cannot answer post festum.
Q. Doctor, do you believe that the preachings of Hitler to the National Socialists regarding the inferiority of the Balkan people and the superiority of the German nation had anything to do with the measures taken against the population of Greece and Yugo Slavia?
A. I believe that the leadership of the German Wehrmacht in the Southeast was completely free of any consideration of Nazi ideology when they considered what measures they had to take.
Q. You don't believe they had to enforce the orders which they received from Berlin?
A. That is a matter of course, that a subordinate authority has to carry out the orders of his superior leaders.
Q. Well, you are familiar no doubt with the type of orders which Hitler and Keitel issued regarding the inferiority of Balkan people. The bestiality of the Serbian race, generally, do you believe that the Southeast Command need not have executed orders of that nature?
A. The translation was not quite clear to me. I do not remember that an OKW or Reich Government order or decree had for its reason the inferiority of the population in that area. Independant of that, there was in any case the duty and obligation on the part of the military leadership in southeastern Europe to execute given orders. The question to what extent a given order is a general order, which can then be adapted to the conditions there, can only be decided from case to case.
Q. You never heard of any orders of Hitler or by OKW which said in effect that the Balkan people are used to cruel and harsh methods, therefore, you must adopt those kind of measures in dealing with them?
A. That they applied cruel methods, I do not doubt for a moment that was reported in some orders and mentioned there. If in my previous answer or in an answer before that I said that the orders from the O.K.W. and the instructions from foreign office did not give as a motive the inferiority of the population in the Balkans then this does not exclude that such an order might contain a sentence like "considering the well known cruel methods of fighting harsh measures are to be applied."
Q. Doctor, in American we have an expression which says in effect that "You can catch more flies with sugar than with vinegar," looking back on your experience in the Balkans would you say that the occupation of Greece and Yugo Slavia would have been more successful if the methods used had been those of kindness, sympathy and understanding rather than reprisal methods and the nailed fist?
A. That is a conditional question which can in practise not be answered if one knows the conditions in the Balkans. I don't mean that I am afraid of the answer to the question and I do not hesitate to give a guess, but it remains merely a guess so, that for instance some other day I might compare facts differently than I would today, and I don't want to submit such a vague testimony here.
Q. Doctor, perhaps you can identify some of the following persons for me. Do you know who Kwaternik was? K-w-a-t-e-r-n-i-k.
A. Would you please repeat that?
Q. K-w-a-t-e-r-n-i-k.
A. Kwaternik, he was a Croatian, I believe there were two Kwaternik's. One of them was the decisive leader of the Domobranew and he played a decisive part in the Croatian Ministry of War.
Q. Who was King of Yugo Slavia prior to Peter?
A. Prior to Peter of Yugo Slavia -- Prior to Peter of Yugo Slavia?
Q. Yes.
A. Before that Yugo Slavia was Serbia.
Q. Do you know when Peter became King?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. You don't know who was King before him?
A. The question of dynasty concerned me at the time I worked there only to the extent that I saw a rough outline of the family tree and looked at it and I found out that seven or eight murders of Kings had occurred in a century and a half, that the period of reigh of Serbian kings was almost a special study because one king was usually living abroad while the other king deputized for him and carried by for some party or the other. The Karageorgevitch went against the Branovic and as far as my studies were concerned the question of dynasty was practically immaterial.
Q. You don't think that was at all relevant to the understanding of the Balkan people; the names of the Kings and periods during which they reigned?
A. In my opinion, it is as unimportant in the Balkans as in hardly any other area.
Q. Who was the great Croat leader after the first World war the first World War?
A. After the first World war the Croatians had in no single person seen a unified leadership. The splitting up of the Croatian interests was so manifold that I can not name one individual person as the leader of the Croatians.
Q. You don't think Macek dominated Croatian politics after the first World war?
A. I believe that Macek never had the strength to give Croatia the position of a state in any way but he had to succumb to the Serbs.
Q. Do you know who King Alexander, II was?
A. King or Emporer?
Q. King.
A. King Alexander II of Serbia is known to me alright, but his part in Serbian history is in my opinion of secondary importance.
Q. Does the name of Rhallis mean anything to you?
A. No.
Q. You never heard of Rhallis in connection with the Greek government that was in power during the occupation by the German troops in Greece?
A. Will you please repeat the name?
Q. Rhallis - R-h-a-l-l-i-s.
A. Concerning the Greal Eam and Edes Movements and concerning the leading men in the Greek partisan activities, I have comparatively little knowledge because I was foremost interested in the Serbian Croatian areas, which I made the most important part of my testimony.
Q. You don't consider yourself an expert on Greece?
A. No.
Q. When did you leave the Balkans?
A. I left the area of various times, I flew to Vianna, to Leignitz and in January 1945, I believe I worked with the Staff of the C-I-C Southeast for the last time.
Q. When did you leave Belgrade?
A. I cannot name the exact date because I changed my residence so frequently. I did not leave Belgrade in connection with the evacuation of that town with the staff but at that time I was in Vienna and I then returned to the staff in Zagreb.
Q. Would you say you left Belgrade in August or later in the fall or earlier in the summer?
A. I cannot name these dates exactly. May I mention at this point that I have a very bad memory for figures and for dates, especially for a historian. I am interested in the problems of history, of the course of history, and I like to get at the root and the causes of the thing without having to be bound to dates and dated events.
To put it differently. The psychological nucleous of a certain situation is of more interest to me than the chronological events.
Q. Do you have a good memory for national characteristics and racial temperaments, Doctor? You don't get those mixed up.
A. I believe I am fairly certain in that respect.
Q. In any event, Doctor, you were only in the Balkans from February 1944 to some time at least prior to October 1944 because that is when the German troops evacuated.
A. Yes, I have forgot the figure now. What were the dates you gave -- as of what date?
Q. I suggested from about February 1944 until certainly some time prior to October 1944.
A. February and March 1944 was the time when I received the commission and I believe that for the last time I left Zagreb around February 1945.
Q. But you had left Belgrade at least earlier than October 1944.
A. Yes, to go to Vienna but I cannot tie myself down to that date in October. There were so many journeys to and from that I cannot remember at what exact date I left one place or the other.
Q. You became an expert on the Balkans after a few months down there in 1944 after looking at all the files which were available to you and after a previous background of having studied European history.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think he has answered that two or three or four times. I don't think we ought to pursue it further.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, your Honor.
Q. How, Doctor, just a few questions with regard to General Foertsch. Did you ever read anything which General Foertsch wrote?
A. Well, there was one essay, the title of which I do not remember at the moment. It was a paper concerning -- it could have been entitled according to the meaning, "The Spirit of the German Armed Forces." It was an essay concerning the character of a German officer, the way an officer ought to be, at cetera, but I don't remember any details.
Q. Did you get the impression in reading that essay that there was a lot of National Socialist idealogy contained in it?
A. I don't believe that.
Q. Do you consider Foertsch to have been an extremely influential person at Southeast Headquarters?
A. He was, as a person well familiar with the Balkans, naturally the man who know best how to clarify the existing problems.
Q. Do you believe that his opinions were highly regarded by the commanders under whom he served?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I don't know how the witness can be expected to answer that question.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, I will try it another way, Your Honor.
Q. Do you get the impression from your experience, at Supreme Commander Southeast Headquarters, that Foertsch exercised a dominating influence on the policy of the German Armed Forces in Greece and Jugoslavia?
A. That would have not been in accordance with his position to have a dominating influence on the German policy in Southeastern Europe. He lacked the means and official position to do that.
Q. Yes but, Doctor, you have testified that Foertsch was very intelligent. He was considered an expert on the Balkans. He had been down there and had a lot of experience. Do you not think that played a large part with respect to the way his opinions and judgments were regarded by his commanders?
A. You asked after his measures. Measures of General Foertsch are not known to me.
Q. What I meant to say is, wasn't it true that by virtue of Foertsch's experience in the Balkans and by virtue of his superior intelligence that he was in a position to exercise a dominating influence upon the commanders under whom he served?
A. The decisive influence goes from the higher to the lower echelons and not the other way around. The basic instructions come from the OEM to the Military Commander and all influence of the Chief to the Commander up is only of a secondary nature in this process started by the OEM. Besides I would ask you to consider my position with the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, that I was there in the rank of a First Lieutenant, I carried out a commission of a military-scientific nature and I can have no judgment how a Chief of Staff affects his military commander.
Q. Did you know Field Marshal Weichs?
A. Not personally.
Q. Which of the defendants do you know personally?
A. I don't know any one of the defendants personally except General Foertsch.
Q. Do you feel any particular loyalty towards General Foertsch?
A. Through discussions with General Foertsch I have gained the impression that General Foertsch has a gift which is not generally apparent in an officer. General Foertsch has a special gift to regard problems objectively. I have felt how General Foertsch approached the difficulties, I might say with a kind of a psychological method, the entanglements of the whole area, in order to disentangle them. If I may give an example, there is the proverb of the Gordion Knot. Alexander cut through it. General Foertsch gave me the impression that he felt the personal need to disentangle that knot.
Q. Foertsch was rather a unique personality, wasn't he? He was very highly regarded by his commanders?
A. I do not know how he was regarded with his military commanders.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have no further questions, your Honors.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honors, there is one point which I would like to clarify.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for defendants List and von Weichs)
Q. Dr. Ibbeken, you were asked by the prosecution about your attitude and about your political activities during Hitler's time. I now have the question to put to you: has this activity already been examined by British authorities?
A. All statements which I have made regarding my political past I have also made in greater detail to a denazification chamber in the British Zone. This procedure is now completed and the competent control authority of the British Zone has decided that I can carry out my present occupation and that they have no objection.