A. No, that isn't correct. The scientists at German universities, during the whole National Socialist period, had a comparatively strong, isolated life. The direct influence of the National Socialist ideology on the universities was slight, as far as the teaching of history was concerned. I am easily in a position to give proof of this by mentioning a discussion between an American professor who entered Germany with the intention of studying exactly this influence of nazi ideology on the university teachings, and the professor for German history at the University of Berlin, Arnold Oscar Meyer, showed this American professor the basis for his lecture on German history and told him: "Colleague, I read from exactly the same manuscript which I used before the year 1933 as a basis for my historical lectures."
Q. Dr. Ibbeken, I am under the impression that one of the main things the nezis tried to do was to influence the youth of Germany and to teach them and instruct them very carefully in nazi ideology. I have also been under the impression that Rosenberg, as one of Hitler's closest advisers, tried very hard to find out what was being taught to the youth and, as a pseudo historical himself, I should think he would have been very alert to ascertain what was being taught in the University of Berlin.
A. This opinion prevailing in foreign countries is erroneous. The party has comparatively a very slight influence on university teachings because the party had at in disposal the very large organizations of the SS and the SA, Hitler Youth, Labor Front, and they were able to disseminate the nazi ideology, and the universities, on the other hand, were regarded more and more as unimportant because these universities only had a very small chance of dissemination.
Q. You are saying that somehow or other in spite of the nazi emphasis on education, German historians and German universities were somehow exempt from nazi supervision?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Dr. Ibberken, I wonder if you can very briefly tell us what your attitude towards four aspects of naziism were?
I think you can answer them either yes or no with perhaps a very short explanation. Did you agree or not with nazi ideology with respect to these four points: nazi ideology regarding the Germans as a superior race?
A. I would like to point here to my paper on Johann Fichte in which he set down the assertion that the German people were a specially selected people and were superior to all other nations, had a special task to fulfill, to this I said in writing some years ago that this was spiritual chauvinism and such qualities could not be applied only one-sidedly to the German people.
Q. I take it you disagreed then with nazi ideology on that point?
A. No.
Q. Let me just clarify this, Dr. Ibberken. You did not agree with nazi ideology regarding the Germans as a superior race and other races as inferior? You did not agree with that?
A. No.
Q. I believe you earlier stated on the second point that you disagreed with nazi ideology regarding the Jews?
A. Only quite under limited circumstances.
Q. I wonder if you can explain that? How much were you in favor and how much were you not in favor of the nazi attitude toward the Jews?
A. The numerous writings of National Socialism on the Jewish question contain amongst other things statistical statements about the participation of the Jews in certain key positions of German economic life, capital, legal life, etc. Under the impression of the high percentage of Jews in these key positions or which they at least were supposed to have in these key positions, we had the impression that this participation of the Jews with regard to the total German population was enormously high, and the reaction was of course that such one-sided occupation of so many key positions by one type had to be guarded against, and therefore I would have had no objection against a numerical clause which would limit the participation of the Jewish population compared with the normal population.
Q. Were you in favor of the Nurnberg Laws of 1935?
A. In ignorance of the possibilities of such laws, I accepted them without as I admit sufficient consideration of these possibilities, a quite suitable form of solving the problem, and I accepted them without expressly agreeing with them. I admit that in this whole Jewish problem, I always had a rather uncomfortable feeling.
Q. Are you familiar, Dr. Ibbeken, with some of the consequences of the Nurnberg Laws and of nazi preachings against the Jews? You know, no doubt, of the acts of 1938 against the Jews, the breaking of shops and the beatings and the torturings. Were you in favor of those?
A. On the day this action was carried out, I walked through a street in Berlin and saw the broken windows and the plundered shops and I remember that the impression I had at that time was that this action could only be regarded as an appeal to the most evil instincts of a people. I reject the idea that I ever welcomed such incidents or that I ever agreed to them.
Q. Did you renounce your membership in the party out of distaste for what you saw?
A. That would have been professional suicide.
Q. Dr. Ibbeken, you arc no doubt familiar with "Mein Kampf" and some of the other nazi writings and especially as a historian of Hitler's speeches. Did you endorse Hitler's idea of Lebensraum and of the whole emphasis upon militarism in Germany after 1933? Did you accept that plank of the nazi platform?
A. My endorsement of Hitler's idea of Lebensraum went as far as the thought of the unification of all Germans in one Reich. I agree to the belonging-together of all German citizens with the Germans of Austria, of the Sudetenland, and as far as there are any Germans of the Baltic.
I find a fundamental and disastrous discrepancy in Nationalist idea of exterminating other nations. This is a contradiction of terms.
Q. Did you agree with the methods by which Hitler incorporated the Sudeten Germans into Germany?
A. If by methods I understand that this annexation took place without loss of lives, then this seems to me the most human way of joining a separated area with a German population to the Reich.
Q Dr. Ibbeken, I believe as historian you are probably very familiar with how the incorporation of Sudetenland into Germany was accomplished. It was accomplished by duress and by threat of war by Hitler, wasn't it? Do you endorse war as a means of national policy?
A Why should I not regard the Anschluss of the Sudetenland as something good and the methods used as corresponding, if the British government in negotiations had declared itself ready for the Sudetenland to be joined to Germany?
Q You don't agree that the Munich agreement of 1938 was accomplished by Hitler's placing a gun in the back of Franco and England?
A I am not in a position to answer this question off hand.
Q Hitler's war against Poland in 1939 -- did you as a historian consider that a justified war?
A No. We received very little material in the German press in order to find out the exact connections of the diplomatic actions just before the outbreak of war with Poland. I know -- that must have been about six months after the beginning of the Polish campaign -- that I found sufficient material in order to say to myself that this is a broach of low on the part of the Germans.
Q Did you at that time renounce your membership in the party?
A During the war, I was an officer and the membership in the party was not taken into account any rate.
Q That is, you did not renounce your party membership? It simply lapsed because you joined the army?
A I would ask that it be understood that to me party membership and also to many other Germans was not at all an important thing. It was merely that one paid a contribution to an association without having to constantly confess to the membership to the NSDAP.
Q When was it, Dr. Ibbeken, when you were considered politically unreliable?
A In 1943, about in the summer, I held a lecture to officers and made the following statement: "Gentlemen, I think that this war cannot be won for Germany with military means alone if foreign political solutions load us out of the present situation." I would like to state that such a statement in 1943 in a public lecture usually led one into the hands of the Gestapo.
Q And in your case it did not lead to that? In your case, it led to a new job?
A The Reich Organization leader Dr. Ley learned about this statement, presumably by one of the officers present, and at once asked that a party trial should be opened against me, and general headquarters then took up negotiations with party officers and managed that my statement which had not boon taken down in writing was interpreted in a way which made a party trial unnecessary, -- the immediate effect of this statement at that time was that party agencies were forbidden to take part in any kind of lecture given by me. As a result in Frankfurtam-Main, during a lecture, the parties who were invited did not appear. The actual term "politically unreliable" arises from the conflict with SS Standartenfuehrer Sottke and led to the telephonic request from Rosenberg's office to my office that I should be immediately removed from my office as lecturer and this request was followed.
I was told that I should ask for a transfer on account of my war wounds. I refused and I wrote down a few lines to the effect: "since obviously the party asks for prerequisites of a political nature which I cannot fullfill I ask to be released from my activity. I assume -- I think almost certainly -- that my superior Col. Langhaeuser threw this piece of paper in the wastebasket as quickly as possible in order that I shouldn't got into difficulties with the party, and that he got in touch with the General Commander East and arranged I disappeared as quickly as possible to the East.
Q Prior to that time, you hadn't had any trouble with the party. You were considered quite safe enough to instruct German youth? This was your first difference with the party, was it not?
A Yes, because my appearance in public only took place by lectures which I had given inside the Wehrmacht and because before then, apart from my first lecture, I had not done any lecturing, but only carried on research work which didn't interest the party at all.
Q And the nazis never spied inside the Wehrmacht, did they?
A I would like to answer it in this way. Until 1943, the end of 1943, not later than the beginning of 1933, supervision by the party of the Wehrmacht, especially the influence by the Gestapo, SS, etc. on individual members of the Wehrmacht was very precautionary, while since 1944 and then decisively after the 20th of July, the Gestapo and the party wont all out in order to remove anything which seemed to be dangerous from the Wehrmacht.
Q Do you know whether anybody in the Southeast Command asked to have you sent down to work with them?
A I didn't understand the question.
Q Do you know whether anyone at the headquarters of Army Group F or the Supreme Command Southeast asked to have you sent down to work with them?
A No, it was the initiative of Brig. Gen. von Ross from Berlin which brought me into another area, but then the Commander-in-Chief Southeast found out about what happened to me in Berlin and declared himself ready to accept me there.
Q Who was that?
A The first telephone conversation about that took place between Brig. General von Ross and General Winter.
Q What was General Winter's position at that time -- the time of the telephone call?
A Chief of Staff Commander-in-Chief Southeast.
Q What was the date of that?
A January-February 1944.
Q Where was General Foertsch at that time?
A I think that was during the days or the weeks in which General Winter was already in Belgrade in order to take over the position of General Foertsch who was leaving at this time. He was still in Belgrade when I arrived.
Q You don't know that General Foertsch at that time was Chief of Staff of Army Group F and General Winter was down in Greece as Chief of Staff of Army Group E?
A In January-February?
Q Yes.
A Then it can only be a mistake on my part that my journey to Belgrade took place perhaps four weeks later.
Q Were you sent to the Southeast because you were an expert on the Balkans? Or simply because you were out of a job?
Q Were you sent to the southeast because you were an expert on the Balkans or simply because you were out of a job?
A I think that Brigadier General von Ross, took into account the fact that I was an historian. I asked Brigadier General von Ross to employ me as a kind of 1-C, that is a part of the staff which had tasks for which perhaps a historian could be used.
Q You didn't consider yourself an expert on the Balkans in January or February 1944, did you, you had been in the Army for sometime and had never even lived in the Balkans?
A My knowledge of the Balkans as a historian was that of a generally well and fundamentally educated German historian.
Q Did you consider yourself an expert in all the intricacies and complexities of Balkan life?
A I think I am in a position to cope with every historical problem, as far as I knew the language, necessary for the important literature -during the course of 6 months or 9 months or a year, and in this way I could judge the problem scientifically.
Q Do you believe after 6 or 9 months you could become export on the Balkans and know all about the various problems involved religious, social and economic, in only 6 or 9 months, and then be able to give a scientific judgment about that problem?
A In 6 to 9 months, I know something, in a year I know more, and today, since this time three years have passed and I have never stopped thinking about this problem. In addition I was in the favorable position in the Balkans to study history, not only theoretically but practically, and that was an enormous help for getting the feel of an area.
Q Dr. Tebecken, you didn't study Balkan history as a scientific historian, you studied it from the German side only; all you had at your disposal was German documents, you didn't make an objective study of the Balkans?
A I did everything possible in order to obtain the objective literature, export literature which was not founded on the research of German historians, but was only founded in a very small part on German research, since this land, the darker Eastern World, was primarily know to us from Slav literature, which was then entered into the manuals and into world literature. I would even like to say that the judgment of German historian's about people of countries in the Balkans, if it has been seen as a one-sided problem at all, was seen rather through the spectacles of Slav literature, than through the spectacles of German literature, so if one speaks about tendencies, perhaps it could be contained in these scientific documents, then there were rather more tendencies in favor of these people, -- since this record came from the sources of their own people.
Q Doctor, tho sources and information at your disposal in order to prepare this manual were German orders and reports and captured photographs, and things of that sort. Were you familiar with the other side, were you familiar for example with what the Germans did to the Balkan people, were you familiar with orders, regulations and reports of the Partisans who were opposing the German forces?
A The information service of the German Wehrmacht frequently intercepted radio messages from which one could learn a lot about the Partisans ideas, Partisans activities and intentions, etc. This is perhaps a good supplement of the one-sided opinion which was obtained from tho German material.
Q Do you speak Serbror Croat?
A No.
Q Then you weren't able to talk to the people and find out their ideas, -- your information was from the German orders and reports?
A No, there were very many people who know about the country and who spoke German, and therefore in this way I had the possibility of speaking frequently to one or the other educated and intelligent men, so that I could check whether their statements corresponded in detail with the information which I received from the documents.
Q The people who were German down there were Volksdeutsch, persons who formed a potential 5th Column for the Germans, isn't that true?
AAs far as I know I didn't speak one single word with a Volksdeutsche. I mean Croats and Serbs who belonged to the intelligensia and had an above-average knowledge of the German language.
Q Doctor, Ibbeken, in spite of the fact you were considered politically unreliable you were interested in preparing a manual for the German soldiers of the Southeast, which did you put in that manual, -how big was it? -- what subjects were touched upon?
A My work for the Commander in Chief of the Southeast reached the following state: I studied all the files, I took out notes which seemed important to me, and created copies of files which seemed important to me, and in addition I made a disposition about those points, which during the course of further work seemed to me to be important. The work contained about 100 to 120, no perhaps 200 typewritten pages, which were concerned less with the topical events of 1941 to 1944 and 1945, but rather more about the prior historical conditions of the problems in that area.
Q Was a copy of that manual given to every German soldier in the Balkans?
A It wasn't finished. In addition, the first part of my work was concerned with the military political course of events, and I didn't even get to the actual manual during that time.
Q If I understand you correctly, Dr. Ibbeken, you didn't come to the Southeast until later, January or February 1944, and in a few months, October or September 1944 you left because the German troops were gone, and if I understood you correctly further you say your work was not concerned so much with 1941-1944, but during the period prior to 1941, am I correct?
A No, the period from 1941 to 1944 was fundamentally worked on by me by taking out all the files and copying them as far as they were important, and then in addition I did the historical work in order to get a complete view of events.
Q Well, now, let us see how much you remember about the files. Do you remember seeing anything in the files about the talking and execution of hostages at rather large ratios?
A Not one single memo is known to me, or which I can remember which talked about shooting, figures about shootings.
Q Did you have access to the orders which were sent by Army Group F to the subordinate units in the Southeast, and reports which those subordinate units sent back to higher headquarters?
A Yes.
Q And you saw nothing in them about execution of hostages?
AAbout the actual execution I remember no report, but I do know that the orders went out containing instructions about the shootings of hostages. I didn't especially study this question because it was almost outside my sphere of research.
Q Do you remember any orders which were sent by higher headquarters in the Southeast to lower commands stating that hostages should be executed at the rate of 50 to one, if a German soldier was killed?
A I remember that orders were there in which a number was mentioned larger than the losses of the German troops. Definite figures I don't remember, but there was a ratio number, but it didn't say that for one German soldier shot one other must be shot. I remember there were ratio figures but a definite ratio I don't remember.
Q You don't remember whether a ratio of 100 to one was ordered in case a German soldier was killed?
A In the corridor of the Palace of Justice in a conversation, -- who was it with, -- or was it in the room of the lawyer, when I first came here, I heard about a figure of one to 100, and the fact that such orders are supposed to exist, but I don't remember that in my work on the files and from my work on the files that this figure of one to 100 remained in my memory.
JUDGE CARTER: We will recess until 1:30.
(Thereupon the noon recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
AFTERNOON SESSION The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
RUDOLF IBBEKEN CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Doctor Ibbeken, prior to the luncheon recess we were examining some of your qualifications as an expert on Balkan characteristics. Will you tell us again what files were available to you in the Southeast area?
A. The files of the 12th Army and of the Army Groups E and F.
Q. Were all of the files available to you, the 1-C reports and the 1-A orders and the war diaries of the various commands?
A. They all were available.
Q. And you remember nothing in all that material that related to the execution of hostages?
A. The material which might have talked especially about the execution of hostages must have been ordered and filed in such a manner that this contents would comparatively easily recognizable. Files in which there was some talk about shootings of hostages I might possibly under the circumstances not even have consulted, because they had little to say to my subject.
Q. You didn't think the execution of hostages had anything to do with the attitude of the occupied peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece towards the German occupation forces?
A. The attitude of the Partisans towards the armed forces was known to me from so many general reports, that specific reports concerning the shootings of hostages did not add anything essential to my particular problems.
Q. You don't think in order to understand the temperament of the Balkan peoples we must also examine as to the causes of unrest in the Balkans and perhaps some of the things which the German people did to the Balkan peoples to give rise to their attitudes?
A. I do mean that the temperament of the Balkan people played an important part in the sharpness of the struggle.
Q. Do you believe the execution of the hostages played any part in the attitude of the Balkan people towards the German occupation forces?
A. The shooting of hostages is already a measure which resulted from the actions of the population, actions which were considered punishable by the Wehrmacht. The situation was that this population, acting because of their temperament committed crimes and then the shootings took place, and not the other way around, that shootings took place which then might have lead to the population committing crimes against the Wehrmacht.
Q. Dr. Ibbeken, which came first, the acts of sabotage by the occupied people or the invasion of their country by the German armed forces?
A. I do not understand the question. It is not clear.
Q. Which happened first, did the people of Serbia and Croatia and Greece commit acts of sabotage against the German armed forces first, or did the German armed forces first invade Yugoslavia and Greece, and then the attacks took place?
A. Before the German Wehrmacht had occupied the area there could be no sabotage acts undertaken against them.
Q. So you answer my question by saying that the acts of sabotage took place only after Germany first invaded the Balkans.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you consider the war against Greece and Yugoslavia aggressive warfare, Doctor Ibbeken?
DR. LATERNSER: I object.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: This goes to the credibility of the Witness, your Honor.
DR. LATERNSER: I object to this question. The witness is thus being asked to judge the legality or illegality of a war, and I am sure is not competent to do that.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I only asked for his opinion.
JUDGE CARTER: I think it is improper cross-examination.
Sustained.
Q. Doctor Ibbeken, in your examination of the files did you discover any references to reprisal measures taken by the German forces, I mean by that the burning of villages and the executing of hostages, the execution of captured partisans?
A. I have read in the files that partisans were captured. Reports about executions I do not recollect.
Q. Do you recall anything about concentration camps?
A. To the best of my knowledge there were no concentration camps, but I do admit that I am possibly not informed about that question. The question of concentration camps did not approach me at all in the course of my commission with the armed forces commander Southeast, and beyond that I don't recollect at any time to have had any discussions where the subject of concentration camps played an important part.
Q. You don't remember seeing any references to concentration Camps in the file which you examined?
A. No.
Q. Do you recollect anything from the files which talked about the rounding up of Jews end gypsies and their subsequent execution?
A. No.
Q. Do you recollect anything in the files about the way the Partisans were dressed, whether they wore any insignia?
A. Concerning the Tito movement there are in the files very detailed statements concerning the equipment and the estimated strength and about the cultural work which was done by some theatre troops for the military troops. I could not picture how one of the various Partisan groups was specifically uniformed or not uniformed. From the reports it is known to me that Partisans did not by any means wear a uniform at all times and did not at all times wear clothing of a military character. The uniform of a Partisan consists quite infrequently, as we read in the descriptions, of womens' clothing.
Court 5, Case 7 .
Q You arrived in tho Southeast in early 1944 wasn't Tito and his forces very well organized according to Companies and Battallions and Regiments and even divisions and weren't they fully clothed and armed with heavy weapons?
A Plans for an orderly military form did exist at that time, whether they were carried out I cannot judge.
Q Do you recall whether throughout the period from 1941 to 1944 the Tito partisans wore a Red Star at all times as part of their insignia?
A I do not know that because I worked expressly with a staff and in the offices of that staff and I had no occasion to see the uniformed Tito partisans.
Q And you received no information as to the manner in which the partisans were dressed?
A I did not receive such information.
Q Did you receive any information as to the insignia which the Cetniks were?
A I am not in a position to designate one insignia of a specific kind that was known to me as a characteristic for a Cetnik.
Q Dr. Ibbeken you said that you saw some photographs of the mutilation of soldiers presumably by the partisans; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you ever see any photographs showing the mutilation of soldiers, which was done by the German soldiers; did you ever see any photographs of a Red Star cut into the fact of a captured partisan?
A No.
Q You said that Croatia and Jugoslavia was an independent state; do you really mean that after Germany invaded and conquered Yugoslavia that any Government could exist in Croatia without the support and the knowledge and the acquiescence of the German government?
A The consent of the German government was definitely a pre-requisite for the existence of Croatia, but only one, because the most essential and most supporting factor of the Croat Poglavnik's was Italy.
Q Do you mean that Croatia was independent and free to do whatever it wanted to, not standing the attitude of Germany?
A Croatia took good care not to risk an open test and the German government, which for general military reasons had to hold on to that district, would have certainly -- if Croatia for any reason had opposed the Wehrmacht or the Germans -- made its influence on Croatia belt.
Q Germany could have replaced any of the leaders of the Croatian Government at any time; could it not?
A I do not believe that. Compulsory measure like that could have for instance caused an immediate break with Italy.
Q But after the capitulation of Italy, there was no doubt about German supremacy in Croatia; was there?
AAs to the support of Croatia by Germany after Italy had capitulated. ---- My answer would only consist now of guess work as the proper information is missing.
Q Dr. Ibbeken, isn't it true that the German policy in occupied Greece and Yugo Slavia was the old one of "divided rule". It was the policy of playing Tito off against Mihajlovik, the Serbs off against the Croats in order thereby to maintain supremacy?
A To play Tito off against Mihajlovik would have been entirely superfluous because that contrast existed and was so stubborn that there was no need for any German initiative to incite them against each other.
Q You disagree when that it was Germany's policy to play one group off against another and to capitalize on the Religious & Social differences in Greece and Yuto Slavia.
A The contrasts, the tensions and conflicts which existed between the various groups in that area, between the Cetniks, Ustasna, etc., were not at all influenced by German policy, or by the German Wehrmacht, for all practical purposes.
Q You don't believe that German policy was calculated and invented to increase the tension between the various religious and economic groups in the Balkans?
A I am convinced that if the German Wehrmacht had a proscription on how to abolish and overcome those difficulties, they would have certainly grasped that prescription with both hands as that would have saved a lot of blood if they coped with the situation by any other means though I cannot imagine any other means possible.
Q When we talk about tho characteristics of the Balkan people must we not also talk about the traditional love of independence and freedom of those people?
A I personally in many offices of the German Wehrmacht have never hesitated to recognize in the partisan activity also the love of these people to their Fatherland, however, it is a difficult combination, the honorable motives of a fighter combined with his cruel methods so that sometimes one can have doubts whether there are any honorable national motives or if they are just purely bandits.
Q Doctor, isn't it true that the undeclared bombing of Belgrade on 6 April 1941 and the execution of the hostages at the ratio of one hundred to one shortly after the campaign began, let to the unrest, and the sabotage and the methods of resistance, which the German troops faced in Yugo Slavia and Greece?
A I cannot judge the psychological effect of the bombardment of Belgrade because I did not have any documentary evidence about that. The psychological effect of the shooting of the hostages, I would judge, to the effect that the armed forces had only resorted to these shootings when the corresponding offenses had occurred and one cannot refrain from justified shooting in the idea that other people through that shooting might get excited and annoyed.
Q Isn't it true, Doctor, that large sections of the Serbian population were inclined at first to be friendly to the German occupation, but as soon as the reprisal methods were instituted those Serbs turned against Germany?