Q Will you look at Exhibit 197 in Document Book VIII, at page 11 of the English and page 9 of the German; these are combat directions of the 718th Infantry Division for the 14th April 1942; you will note under "Interrogation of prisoners," that the following facts were to be ascertained -- what are the names of the leaders, and where are the leaders, including those of smaller insurgent units. According to the rules of war that is not a permissible question to ask of captured prisoners, is it, General?
A Fortunately I was never taken prisoner in the previous wars, but I know that these questions were put everywhere and that Germans that were taken prisoner were obliged not to answer these questions, and that nobody could force them to give such information.
Q You believe that captured insurgents could have without fear of harm refused to answer questions of that kind?
A I cannot answer this question, because I never took part in an interrogation, but I would imagine that if a unit interrogated people that by the way this unit treated its prisoners it will try to get some answers out of them.
Q Is it customary to ask captured prisoners the names of their relatives and where their relatives live?
A No. In an interrogation one does not concern oneself with the family conditions of the prisoner, but with his present conditions as a soldier, that is the unit to which he belongs his superior officers or supply, reinforcements, etc. approximately the questions as they are listed here.
Q. Look at sub-paragraph C, under "interrogations", one of your divisional commanders is here asking his subordinate troops to find out the names and locations of family members of insurgents whom they captured. Isn't it true, General Kuntze, tint your troops took severe reprisal measures with the relatives of prisoners whom they captured?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. Why do you believe a question of this kind was asked?
A. I am struck here by this for the first time in the case of the 184th Division, and it is obvious that the 184th Division believed they might be able to take hold of the members of the families oi these insurgent leaders; the intelligence service often tries to get some knowledge about the relatives and homes of insurgents in order to get a better idea about the structure of the insurrection.
Q. Why should you take measures against the relatives, what had they done?
A. No measures, we only wanted to get more details from the members of the families regarding the extension of the insurgent movement.
Q. Do you believe if the families failed to reveal any information nothing would have happened to them?
A. I don't believe that, because if I want to ask somebody, if I want to get something out of someone he is usually treated in such a manner that I get something out of him.
Q. Now, General Kuntze, will you turn to Exhibit 194, in Document Book VIII, at page 2 of the German and page 2 of the English. This is a report of yours, being a review of the situation in the area of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast including 7 April 1942.
Now, will you look at page 3 of the German and page 3 of the English, under "Losses" under Paragraph III, and under Sub-paragraph B, "Insurgent Losses," - "1262 shot in combat, 66 shot or hanged in retaliation," including the results since 1 September 1941, 11722 shot in combat, 2809 reprisal measures. Isn't that rather a high result of reprisal measures?
A. These reprisal figures contain the unfortunately rather high figures of October, I calculated the number of reprisal measures for my own period of office, and I informed you of that today.
Q. You think this is not particularly high then?
A. I didn't say that. But in these high figures, are the very high figures included, for the reprisal measures, which took place in October, before I assumed office. I have already told you today about the number of reprisal measures which had to be taken before my period of office.
Q. Let's turn to hostages for a moment; do you know who rounded the hostages up?
A. I know an order oi General Bader, where he reserves the right to take hostages to himself. I could not establish when this order was issued. From the fact that a warning to the local commanders was issued by him in June we can draw the conclusion that the order must have been issued sometime in the spring. The carrying out of this measure was often a responsibility of the district and local commanders, (Kreis and Feldkommandanburen). Mistakes have been made and these mistakes were made known to General Bader, and on the basis of these incidents he sent this very severe warning to his local commanders.
Q. What kind of mistakes do you refer to?
A. Mistakes which have been made in the taking hostages, and in his order of Bader reprimands one unit for having taken hostages not by way of the competent sub-area administrative headquarters, but by way of the Serbian authorities. It was not admissible.
Q. You mean a mistake in the procedure, not a mistake in the type of person who was chosen as hostage?
A. No, mistakes in the way the hostages were taken.
Q. Do you know who was chosen as hostages?
A. In the orders of Bader it says the taking of hostages is a very responsible task and that they should be taken from all classes of the population.
Q. You knew that had been done, you knew that Communists, democrats, nationalists, and Jews were all rounded up as hostages?
A. There is an order in existence issued by Thurner which I only got to know here, and which points out these classes of the population, and I must emphasize I have only read this order here. The order of Bader does not mention any particular classes of the population, or groups of the population, but says that hostages are to be taken from all classes of the population.
Q. Didn't Boehme tell you about his order of 10 October 1941, an order which he issued just two weeks before you got down there, providing for the taking of Communists and Jews as hostages and for their execution at the 100 to 1 ratios? Didn't he tell you about that?
A. No. Boehme did not report that to me.
Q. You heard about that order for the first time here in Nurnberg?
A. No. I have heard of it before. I learnt of it in about December and as I knew of this order and as the situation had quieted down I made the decision to mitigate measures as I have stated here already.
Q. Suppose you take a look at Boehme's order of 10 October 1941 which is Exhibit 88 in Document Book III, page 34 of the English, page 27 of the German. Look at paragraph 2 - "In all commands in Serbia all Communists, male residents suspicious as such, all Jews, a certain number of nationalistic and demoratically inclined residents are to be arrested as hostages, by means of sudden actions. It is to be explained to these hostages and to the population that the hostages will be shot in case of attacks on Germans or on Volksdeutsche." Didn't you know that that procedure was in effect throughout your reign as Armed Forces Commander SOUTHEAST?
A. No. It cannot have been in force because during the direct examination today a report was mentioned, according to which only, I believe it must have been in March, Jews were deported from the neighborhood of Kosmitrowitza.
Q. I didn't mean that you executed all the Jews in October 1941, but weren't they all taken into custody and held as hostages on or about that time?
A. No. This is clear from the report which I have just read that that this order cannot have been carried out in the manner which is said here.
Q. Look at paragraph 4 of the Boehme order on page 28 of the German, page 35 of the English- "In the burying of those shot care is to be taken that no Serbian memorials arise.
Placing of crosses on the graves, decorations, etc., is to be prevented. Burials are accordingly to be carried out best in distant localities." Did you hear nothing about that procedure?
A. I ask you to allow me not to answer this question. I believe that I frequently have made my inner attitude to questions of this kind quite clear.
Q. I just want to make sure, General Knutze. You mean that you never heard of this procedure being in effect while you were Armed Forces Commander SOUTHEAST?
A. No
Q. Did you ever hear about large numbers of hostages being executed while you were Armed Forces Commander SOUTH EAST?
A. I have not heard of any greater numbers of hostages apart from those cases which were not hostages but reprisal prisoners which were taken in January as reprisal measures for the murder of three German guards, a reprisal measure which had been ordered by General Boehme as milder measures against this band had met with no success.
Q. There were quite a few hostages executed in October and November 1941 who were not reprisal prisoners. Will you look at Exhibit 135 in Document Book VI, page 7 in the German and page 10 in the English. Here are series of orders by General Boehme regarding the execution of hostages. The first is dated 19 October 1941. "By virtue of the order for the suppression of the Communist rebellion movement for wounding of a guard of the 220th Pz. Jaeg. Gn. in Belgarde on 15 October - 50 hostages are to be shot." And turn to the next page of Boehme's order dated 30 October 41 - reprisal for the murdering of 8 German prisoners on 9 Oct. 41 - 800 hostages are to be shot. And on the next page an order for 31 October 1941 - reprisal for the murder of one German soldier wounded - 200 hostages are to be shot. And on the next page a order dated 20 November 1941 - 385 hostages are to be shot. Finally, on the next succeeding page an order for 29 November 1941.
100 hostages are to be shot for the death of one German soldier.
Did you never hear of these high ratios being applied in the execution of hostages?
A. The documents have been read in such a manner that one could gain the impression that these high numbers of prisoners were really shot. And in the order of 30 October, the second which has been mentioned here, not the figure 800 is relevant but the figure 200. Apart from that I reject that orders were carried out in this manner and can prove that by documents submitted by the Prosecution.
Q. You don't believe these hostages were ever executed, General. You believe these are orders that were not carried out?
A. These orders were not carried out and I can explain the thing to myself like this that Boehme, as it is already clear from a note in the War Diary, issued a restrictive measure, a resistive directive, as far as I can remember. This note can be found in the War Diary of the Higher Command 65.
Q. What is the purpose of issuing orders if they are not to be carried out?
A. I don't hesitate to state that I find it quite inexplicable that such decisive and weighty orders were not signed by the flenipotentiary Commanding General but by the Chief of Staff.
Q. I don't understand. You mean unless the order is signed by the Commanding General it need not be carried out?
A. I don't want to say that. I already said that Boehme must have issued an order according to a note in the War Diary of the 65th Higher Command according to which the originally ordered reprisal measures were considerably restricted in their execution. I only wanted to point out that in my view it is quite inexplicable that such weighty and decisive measures were not signed by the Commanding General himself as would have been his duty but by his Chief of Staff. The Chief could not sign these orders on his own initiative.
Q. You believe that subordinate units receiving an order signed by the Chief could disregard it?
A. No, of course, they had to pay attention. I merely wanted to express that I didn't understand why such an order was not signed by Boehme himself.
Q. General, do you understand by the law of hostages that the hostages must be taken before any attacks occur, that an announcement must be made to the population, that if attacks occur the hostages will be shot. Is that your understanding of the procedure that must be used with respect to the taking and execution of hostages?
A. Yes.
Q. And, if a particular unit has suffered losses and has no hostages on hand may hostages from another area be shot to avenge the losses of the particular unit involved.
A. From another territory?
Q. Yes
A. No. According to General Bader's order the troops could not execute reprisal on their own initiative. These reprisal measures had to be approved by the Commanding General.
Q. Would you look at Exhibit 148 in Document Book VI, page 51 of the English, and page 43 of the German. This is a report dated 18 November 1941 sent to General Boehme as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. Will you look at the last part of that report, page 43 of the German, page 52 of the English, the next to last paragraph - "Since no hostages are available at the Battalion, the Battalion asks that a unit in Sabac be assigned with the shooting of 150 hostages."
Isn't this a breach of the prescribed procedure for the execution of hostages?
A. No. I did not issue any directives regarding the way in which the hostages were to be executed and I have already stated that the carrying out of reprisal measures was the competency of the respective Territorial Commander.
Q. Territorial Commanders were subordinate to you?
A. The Territorial Commanders were subordinate to me.
Q. You must have known the procedure and methods they were following in the taking and execution of hostages?
A. I should have been informed in writing, by way of reports about such measures. I must state here this is a report about a combat action of the 3rd Batallion Sgt. 697 directed to the Commanding General in Serbia.
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 161 in Document Rook VI, page 96 or the English, and page 78 of the German. These are orders of General Bader who on 20 December 1941 was Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. Will you look at one of the inclosures to General Bader's orders which appears on page 81 of the German and page 100 of the English. This is N0KW-840 and the part I am asking you to look at is on page 81 of the German. Here General Bader outlines the procedure that is to be used in the taking and execution of hostages. Will you look at page 82 of the German, page 101 of the English, under paragraph 2. It says "The seizing of hostages is the task of administrative sub-area, district and local headquarters." The second paragraph, sub-paragraph 2 "The hostages are to be held in readiness in camps."
A. Yes.
Q. Then turn over to the next page, page 82 of the German, page 102 of the English, paragraph 5. "Reprisal prisoners and hostages may from now on be shot only on my previously given written order, which is to be obtained for each individual case. The principle is that the unit is to avenge its losses itself, if at all possible. Since, however, the reprisal prisoners are collected in few camps, this principle cannot always be followed; therefore, troops must be used accordingly for the execution, troops which have nothing to do with the case and are only in the proximity of the reprisal prisoners' camp."
Now, General Kuntze, if these reprisal prisoners and hostages were held in a few central camps isn't it quite likely that if attacks were made upon your troop in Village X you would retaliate by executing hostages and prisoners who would not come from Village X but came from Village Y or Z?
A. The carrying out of reprisal measures was in the hands of the Commanding General and he says here - this is clear from the sentence that this principle cannot always be adhered to and it proves that he was endeavoring to adhere to the principle, to have the troops shoot such people as reprisal measures that had something to do with the offense.
Q. He also says that the reprisal prisoners and hostages are held in a few central camps.
A. The number of camps has been mentioned. I do not know by heart how many camps existed. That was a later time when Serbia had become much more pacified. This is clear from the report that the number of hostages was exceedingly small, that large scale arrest as for instance Truner had ordered them were never carried out shortly before or after my arrival.
Q. Did you ever hear of the rotation of hostages?
A. Do you mean the exchange of hostages?
Q. No, I mean rotation of hostages. Some people would be taken from the population and held as hostages for a given time, perhaps two weeks or a month, and then released and other hostages taken.
A. Yes, this is mentioned in Bader's order, no, not in this order, but it is mentioned in a later order, that prisoners were to be exchanged in order not to keep hostages in camps for longer periods of time since after all they were quite innocent people.
Q. Every time hostages were taken, General, is it your understanding that announcements were made to the population from the village from which the hostages were taken?
A. It was ordered in this way. I must assume that this order was carried out.
Q. Don't you know, General, that there was serious abuse in the taking of hostages, that they were rounded up "willy nilly", taken from churches, from the streets, and from their places of work?
A. No.
Q. That never came to your attention?
A. No.
Q. Let's turn now, General Kuntze, to your knowledge and information regarding concentration camps in the SOUTHEAST during your term of office. I believe you stated on direct examination that "concentration camp" was simple another way of saying "collecting camp."
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 165 in Document Book 7, page 12, of the English and page 11 of the German. These are reports from the 342nd Infantry Division and this particular one is dated 17 December 1941. You will note the sentence - "Accordingly the Division had a total of 4189 hostages at its disposal. Of these 3618 were transferred to Concentration Camp Sabac and 343 were transferred to Collecting Camp Belgrade." If those two terms, concentration camp and collecting camp, are synonomous why are they used at two different times in the same report?
A. I cannot give you an explanation for this. We may find a explanation in the fact that the expression "concentration camp Sabac" had unfortunately once appeared in a report and the troop continued to use this expression. That at that time a concentration camp should have existed in Sabac in the sence in which we now must unfortunately understand the expression "concentration camp" is quite impossible because the camp Sabac was only established after Sabac had been conquered by the 342nd Division, and that was at the end of September, And from then on this expression was repeatedly used. In my order of 19 March I too, have used the word "concentration camp" without knowing what this would mean to us in the year 1947. Concentration camp abbreviation K. Z. we called all those camps at that time which were to function as collecting camps. That the designations are confused in this order can only be explained by the fact that when the collecting camp Sabac was founded not the designation "collecting camp" was used, but that this camp was from the first called a concentration camp.
A. This is another case in which the report say one thing and really mean something else? Similar to the reports which say "shot after interrogation" when it really means "shot after summary court martial."
A. Shooting after interrogation, shot after summary court martial that is what I understood.
Q. I mean the confusion in use of the word concentration camp in the reports when a collecting camp is really meant is similar to the confusion which becomes apparent in the use of the term "shot after interrogation" when in reality "shot after summary court martial" is meant.
A. Yes, that is an error in the language used in orders and reports.
Q. Do you believe that people in these, as you call them, collecting camps were very well treated, had enough to eat, weren't worked too hard, had a nice place to sleep?
A. I am convinced that everything was done which could be done. The sleeping accommodation were at first probably very unsatisfactory. Everyone will know that who after this war was accommodated in a collecting camp. My first collecting camp was a cave in the ground without blankets, without straw. In order to be able to get me some food I had to look for an empty can. I think I need not mention further details.
Q. General Kuntze, will you turn to exhibit 180 in document book 7 at page 48 of the German and page 62 of the English?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Document Book 7 or 8?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Document book 7, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: What page?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 48 of the German, page 62 of the English.
Q. (Cont'd) This is an activity report of the 704th Infantry Division. Will you turn now to the next page, page 49 in the German document book, page 63 in the English, and note the entry for 11 January 1942, the last sentence of that entry. "The workers made available for forced labor by the concentration camp Sabac were not fit to work because of lack of clothes and because of vermin and illness. They were returned to Sabac on 25 December." Did you ever hear anything to that effect?
A. I have not heard anything about this, but I have tried to get clarity regarding this incident from the documents, because if it had taken place in this manner, it would have to be condemned. In fact, the whole measure was wrong in itself. One can't take people into mines, one cant put them to work in a mine if they have not been trained at all. That people were needed in coal pits was not the fault of the Germans; it was the fault of the partisans. It is quite clear from previous reports that the workers, because of the terror of the partisans, were prevented from working, since these coal mines are situated near Pozarevac and had above all to supply Belgrade, and since the electricity works in Belgrade were just about to stop work, we had to use workers from the camp of Sabac. Whether the conditions stated here were really the reason or the lack of efficiency of the untrained workers, we cannot determine here.
Q. Did you ever hear of any camps of Jews and Gypsies?
A. As I found from the documents, and I think I got a report to that effect when I was in Belgrade, there was a collecting camp at Semlin
Q. Do you know how many Jews and Gypsies were kept in that camp?
A. No, I cannot tell you that offhand
Q. That was a camp just for Jews and Gypsies, wasn't it? They were put there because they were Jews and because they were Gypsies?
A. As far as I recall, the first deportation of Jews to Semlin was ordered because the Jews and Gypsies who had been sent there were connected with the insurgent movement. I remember that I was reported in Belgrade that such elements had to be sent there because it had been proved it had been proved, I emphasize that, that they were working for the enemies' intelligence service. The deportation of such people was a military necessity. It has nothing to do with their belonging to a particular race.
Q. General Kuntze, will you turn to exhibit 162 in document book 6, at page 105 of the English and page 85 of the German. This is a tenday report from General Bader, dated 20 December 1941, and you will note under paragraph 3 of the report, subparagraph C, an itemized total of the persons kept in concentration camps, and at the bottom of that table you will note 5,281 persons were delivered to the newly constructed Jew and Gypsy camp in Semlin up to 15 December 1941. Do you believe all those Jews and Gypsies were guilty of being in the service of the insurgents?
A. Many more must have been guilty because I heard a much higher figure when I was first in Belgrade. This report could give rise to the impression that these persons were taken there in a relatively short time but I believe that I remember that here the transfer of a camp is concerned which had existed for a long time in Belgrade, and was now moved to Semlin.
Q. Did you know of the existence of that camp in Belgrade?
A. It was certainly reported to me, but I cannot tell you exactly as it has only become clear to me now that I was reported in Belgrade that such a camp did exist in Belgrade.
Q. General Kuntze, you were aware of Hitler's ideas regarding the Jews. You know the orders which OKW issued preaching hatred of the Jews and of the Slavic race generally.
Aren't you aware that these people were arrested because they were Jews?
A. No, no, this is not clear to me. We now have the year 1947 and we soldiers too have gained quite a different impression regarding the time of 1941 and the time shortly before the war. I only know of measures against the Jews from that time on, v. e. after the murder of a member of the German Legation, that then synagogues were burned down.
Q. Well, you knew of Hitler's measures against the Jews in Germany, didn't you?
A. No, not to that extent to which it has became clear to me now.
Q. Where were you in 1938 when the pogroms against the Jews took place in Germany?
A. In 1938 I was active with the extension of the "Westwall" near Kaiserslautern.
Q. You never heard of measures of the Nazis against the Jews?
A. Later I got to know of them. I have emphasized that. Until 1941 the importance of this whole Jewish question in Hitler's sense was not clear to me at all.
Q. Did you ever hear of the Nurnberg Laws which were passed as early as 1935 against the Jews?
A. Yes, I got to know of the Nurnberg Laws through the press.
Q. Will you turn to exhibit 105 in document book 3, at page 96 of the English and page 71 of the German? This is an order that went out from General Boehme's subordinate, Turner, on the 26th of October, 1941, the same day that you arrived in Belgrade. Will you turn to page 71 of the German, 97 of the English, to the paragraph beginning, "As a matter of principle it must be said that Jews and Gypsies in general represent an element of insecurity, and thus a danger to public order and safety. It is the Jewish intellect which has brought about this war and which must be annihilated. The gypsy, because of his internal and external make-up, cannot be a useful member of a peoples' community.
It has been found that the Jewish element participates considerably in the leadership of the bands and that Gypsies in particular are responsible for special atrocities and for the communication systems. That is why it is a matter of principle in each case to put all Jewish men and all male Gypsies at the disposal of the units for hostages. Moreover it is intended to transfer the women and children of Jews and Gypsies in a collection camp in the near future and to remove this disquieting element from Serbian territory by way of resettlement. Proper preparations for this are to be made." Did General Boehme tell you on the 26th of October, 1941 of his intentions in this regard?
A. No, That General Boehme did not tell me about this is clear from the fact that he did not sign this but rather his chief of the administrative staff. Boehme did not tell me about this. I have repeatedly stated that in connection with other transfers, I was told in Belgrade of the intention to transfer a greater number of Jews to a camp because these Jews had been active in the intelligence service of the enemy. This order only speaks incidentally of an entanglement of Jews and Gypsies with the insurgent movements especially Jews, but it is quite clear from it that Jews and Gypsies did not take a neutral part but were active in the insurgent movement.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Before the conclusion of the session today which will adjourn to October 6, 1947, at 9:30 a.m., the presiding Judge will make a statement on behalf of the Tribunal with reference to certain matters which he deems of importance.
THE PRESIDENT: Earlier in the week at which time the Tribunal granted to the defense adjournment in order to study the documents from Washington, the Tribunal made a statement in which it cautioned and advised counsel as to the necessity of having all their document books in by Monday, October 6, 1947. We again wish to call to the attention of all the counsel the necessity of getting their document books in at that time. If you fail to do so, it will not reflect upon your defendants but it will reflect upon counsel and will not be appreciated nor countenanced by the Tribunal.
My attention has also been called by the Translation Department to the fact that in some other cases, I do not know whether it is true in this case and I hope it will not be true, that the Translation Department and other departments in connection with the administration of these courts have been asked to translate and to submit to the courts what very apparent is material that cannot be pertinent to the case. For instance, one counsel asked that an entire play by Tolstoi be translated. Now all courts want to be more than cooperative with the defense, but when a request like that comes in it just seems that it is entirely out of the question, so if any requests of that nature come in from counsel in this case, we will not rule on it in advance, but we will try to discuss the matter in a way in which this Court will not be burdened with unnecessary materials. May I ask that counsel who are absent as to the announcement here made.
MR DENNEY: Your Honor, over the period of recess, in order that the defendant Kuntze might not be hampered in the preparation of his defense, the prosecution has no objection at all to any conferences that his counsel wishes to have with him. However, we would appreciate it if he would avoid the subject of the cross examination, but we don't want to in any way deprive him of this time, particularly with reference to documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal will stand adjourned until the time and hour first mentioned.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 6 October, 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 6 October 1947, 0930, Justice Carter Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain whether all the defendants are present.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all defendants are present in the court room.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I merely want to announce that I, after the examination of witness Kuntze, shall examine the following witnesses. They have been approved by the court for some time already. First, Dr. Ibb eken; Second, Krage; Third, Kraeutler; Fourth, Konrad; fifth, von Greiffenberg.
GENERAL WALTER KUNTZE - Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION - Continued BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:May it please the Tribunal:
Q General Kuntze, at the last session of the court we were talking towards the end of that session about concentration camps in the Southeastern area for Jews and Gypsies. I asked you several questions regarding the arrest of Jews and Gypsies and their eventual execution. Will you tell us again what your attitude is towards that matter.
A I repeat that during my first trip to Belgrade I was told of the intention to collect Jews and Gypsies who were active in the intelligence service in a collection camp, that is, those persons who were connected with the insurgent movement.