It can be brought in connection with,-regarding the date, with the order of the 714th Division.
Q. General, your troops, even shot wounded insurgents after they were captured them, didn't they?
A. To my extreme regret, I have read that here in the documents, and I must state here that this is a measure which is regrettable.
Q. That never came to your attention while you were in the southeast?
A. No.
Q. If it had you would have issued an order not to do that, wouldn't you?
A. I would have gone into the matter in a court proceedings, and I would have taken the person concerned to account.
Q. General, troops subordinate to your command were often given orders to shoot everybody that was found in a given area, and without exception, were they not?
A. By me such an order was never issued.
Q. They were issued by commanders subordinate to you though, and you must have received knowledge of what your commanders were doing?
A. I have already stated that orders of subordinate officers were not reported to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. But if such an order would exist here, I would then have to establish whether I did gain knowledge of it or not.
Q. We will turn to Exhibit 178 in Document Book 7, page 56 of the English and page 45 of the German. This is an order of the 718th Infantry Division, dated 20 February 1942.
JUDGE BURKE: What is the page of the document, please?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 57 of the English, your Honor.
Q. Turning to paragraph 9 of the Document, the third sentence: "All male Serbian inhabitants from 16 to 60 years of age are to be treated as if they were found in combat with arms in hand".
Did you ever receive any information about an order of this kind issued by the 718th Infantry Division?
A. No. As the distribution list shows, this order went to the troops subordinate to the division, and was reported to the 65th Corps, to the German Commander in Zagrab, and to the II Creatian Corps Commando, and furthermore to some organization in Belgrade.
Q. General, you knew who Fortner was. Fortner was one of your division commanders, you had conferences with him, you know what kind of a man he was. You must have asked him what kind of orders he was issuing.
A. I did not get to know Fortner; I did not know him. I have repeatedly been to Zagrab, once or twice, during the time when he was employed in the area of Sarajeve. If such an order, with the consequences which it had to have, - if any such an order had been executed, and had become known through its consequences, I am convinced that General Glaise-Horstenau, the German General in Zagrab, and also some office of the Creatian government, would have reported it.
Q. Let's turn to some orders that you yourself issued, if you had no knowledge of the kind of orders your subordinate commanders were issuing.
Turn to exhibit 184, document book 7, page 70 of the English, and page 59 of the German, this is your order of the 19th of March, 1942?
A. Yes.
Q. It says, In the second paragraph: "The over-all situation requires that in this area quiet and order be preserved under all circumstances. For this purpose all means are to be employed which lead to success. One cannot count on the bringing up of reinforcements".
You gave your subordinate commanders carte blanche to do whatever they wanted to do to bring about pacification in Serbia and Creatia, didn't you?
A. No, that is not carte blanche. But I meant by "all means" only all means which were militarily permitted.
Q. If Fortner wanted to interpret this as permitting him to issue orders to shoot everybody, that his troops came into contact with in a given area, he could do that?
A. I believe that the Fortner order was issued at a time which proceeds this time we are talking about now.
Q. We will now turn to page 60 of the German document book, part of the same order, page 71 of the English, look at sub-paragraph (c) under paragraph 2:
"I expect troop leaders of all ranks to show special energy and ruthless action" When you say "ruthless action" do you mean legal actions, or didn't you care whether the action taken by your subordinates were legal or not?
A If I had wanted that I would not have pointed out under paragraph 3 with regard to the fighting methods to be applied against the partisans.....
Q We'll come to those in a minute.
A It is No. 3 of the order of the 19th of March, and it reads-I repeat....
Q Let me interrupt you, General Kuntze. We will come to the directives in a minute Interpreter, have we had his full answer to a previous question?
THE INTERPRETER: The witness was reading a paragraph from this order which I have not been able to locate in ay copy.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Well, we'll come to the directives in a moment, General Kuntze. Look under paragraph c of paragraph 2 again, on page 60 of the English and page 71 of the German.
JUDGE BURKE: Are you sure it isn't 71 of the English.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I beg your pardon?
JUDGE BURKE: Are you sure it isn't 71 of the English?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Oh, I thought that's what I said. That's what I do mean. I'm sorry, your Honor--71.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q "Captured insurgents are to be hanged or to be shot to death as a matter of principle. If they're used for reconnaissance purposes, it merely means a slight delay in their death." The slight delay-does that permit time for a summary court martial?
A That is a prerequisite for that.
Q Well, let's turn to the directives which are on page 53 of the German and page 73 of the English. You distributed a lot of copies of your order of the 19th of March 1942-- a hundred copies, in fact. Do you know whether you distributed that many copies of the directives?
A I would think so, the directives went out as an inclosure to the order.
Q Well, look at paragraph 1 of the directives, the second sentence:
"No false sentimentality; it is preferable that fifty suspects are liquidated than one German soldier lose his life."
What do you mean by "no false sentimentality"?
A I have already testified that this order was issued because there was a great amount of information, according to which we had to expect a large insurgent movement. According to the experiences of the summer I saw myself forced to point out that the soldier had to take care and to be on the alert, and that in case a larger insurgent movement would break out harsh measures had to be taken.
Q Well, you say, General Kuntze, that "it is preferable that fifty suspects are liquidated," did you mean by "suspects" persons who were captured with weapons in their hands or just persons who were captured within the area of the combat action?
A These wore people who had been captured and whose guilt had been established.
Q Now, turn to page 55 of the German, page 75 of the English Document Book, under sub-paragraph "c"--5c--of the directives. "If the presence of mines is suspected the clearing up is to be done as far as possible by insurgents or by the Serbian population."
Q How were mines usually cleared up?
A The clearing up of mines can be carried out in various manners. Generally speaking, the partisans had applied the means of camouflage so that it was difficult and sometimes impossible to find out where the mines were, and we needed special instruments for this. If have already stated that there was a difference made in the former with respect to the expressions "clearing up" and "cleaning up." German Army. The expression "clearing up" which was ordered here can only be carried out by combat engineers. And since the "clearing up" is the usual thing, the combat engineers are needed to take away the fuse, or if they do not recognize the type of the mines they have to dynamite the mines, and thus groat craters appear so that the road must be blocked off in the area where the dynamiting becomes necessary, and thus a great traffic block occurs, which is obvious.
Q You wouldn't have asked the civilian population to risk their lives in clearing mines the way special mine clearing troops have to risk theirs, would you, General Kuntze?
A If I had wanted to do that I would have simply said that "I order that in front of every troop a group of inhabitants has to march so that the mines will explode under them, in areas where mines are suspected." That would have been very simple.
Q That would have been in violation of the Rules of War if you had ordered something like that, wouldn't it?
A That would have been in violation of the Rules of War. That's right.
Q General Kuntze, you testified on direct examination that after conferences with General Bader you succeeded in having him reduce the hostage ration from 100 to 1 to 50 to 1, and that reduction place sometime early in December, 1941. Is that what you said?
A I said that my first discussion with General Bader took place during the time of my second visit to Belgrade. That was between the end of November and the beginning of December. I recollect that in December after I had gained knowledge of the so-called hostage orders, I talked to Bader, and that both of us, because the situation had quieted down and harsh measures as up until then were no longer necessary, agreed that from now on we would apply milder measures. And I further said in direct examination that not even this reduced ration, according to the reports as I now got to know them, was fulfilled. Sometime ago I mentioned an exceptional case which I remember-the one where General Bader was forced to sharply in the Banat against murderous bands which expanded there.
Q In any event, the hostage ration was reduced from 100 to 1 to 50 to 1 in December, 1941. Is that correct?
A That happened, as far as I remember, on the basis of an order by Bader of the 20th or 22nd, which was effective as of the beginning of December.
Q You were pleased to have the hostage ratio reduced?
A I wasn't pleased. But I may say that I caused this to happen. Even if proof for that is not immediately visible from the documents here, I had Bader issue that order then, for the reason that the basic order had been issued by Boehme that as Boehme's predecessor and the competent territorial commander.
Q Why did you reduce the hostage ratio? Did you believe that the 100 to 1 ratio was illegal?
A No, not because of that, but we wanted to avoid after the situation had become more peaceful, that there would be unnecessary victims.
Q You felt that the hostage ratio of 50 to 1 was legal and that a 100 to 1 ratio was also legal?
A I was of the opinion that this order from above, which I considered as judicially examined, was permissible.
Q General Kuntze, you had the hostage ratio reduced in December, 1941, but here in your order of the 19th of March 1942 you raise it again from 50 to 1 to 100 to 1, do you not? Will you look at the last paragraph of your order of the 19th of March 1942, which is on page 58 of the German and page 76 of the English?
A Such a figure is mentioned here, but one has to consider the context. I said in my direct examination, that restrictions apply to this last figure. That is not an order, but it says: "Reprisal measures of a general kind might be advisable." And I must emphasize again that this whole order was toned to a situation which fortunately did not occur, and that is a situation which means that an insurrection of a large extent might break out again in Serbia, which did not happen.
JUDGE BURKE: We'll take the usual recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS EXAMINATION (continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Kuntze, just prior to the recess we were looking at your order of 19 March 1942, and particularly to the last paragraph of that order. Do you say that the reference to 100 to one was simple a suggestion rather than an order on your part?
A It was not an order, because it says clearly that "reprisal measures of a general nature may be warranted -- for instance."
Q Then you gave as an example the execution of reprisal measures at a ratio of 100 to one for each German soldier killed and 50 to one for each German soldier wounded. Is a suggestion of that kind coming from the Armed Forces Commander Southeast usually given great weight by the Division commanders and other subordinate units?
A If such a suggestion had had the importance as it is now maintained, General Bader would surely have objected to it as he has done in another case.
Q Could General Bader object to orders and suggestions which he received from you as his superior?
A He certainly could do that. Ho objected regarding the treatment of prisoners, because my order of 19 March had clashed with an order from someone else. I don't know whether it was the Quartermaster General or the Chief of Police, regarding the deportation of workers to German spheres of economic interest, and he took this as an opportunity to make representations regarding the order of 19 March.
Q But you needn't have honored General Bader's suggestions, you were his superior, you could have disregarded them, couldn't you?
A I could have disregarded them, yes, but the objection as such, I don't know if this is in the directives or not, would not have been in accordance with the procedure we had followed so far. In December Bader had concentrated all authority regarding the issuing of reprisal orders that would be necessary in his area of command in his own hands. Up to then no orders of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had interfered with that authority of Bader's regarding reprisal measures. In any event Bader would have talked to me about such matters.
Q In addition to executing captured insurgents your troops also deported some of them to other spheres outside the southeastern area, isn't that true?
A I did not do that, as I said already on 18 March or about 18 March an order was directly issued to General Bader, as the competent territorial Commander in Serbia, from the Quartermaster General or from Police headquarters, according to which prisoners were to be deported to German territories or territories under German occupation. Bader inquired at my office, and I agreed. I agreed for the following reasons --
Q We need not go into that, General, at the moment. Those insurgents could not have been deported without your consent, could they, you had to give your approval?
A No, that was not the case. In general these matters that were purely administrative matters were carried out without my being asked.
Q You don't mean that the execution of insurgents is an administrative matter?
A We were just talking about deportation. I was asked whether these deportations could have taken place without my consent or not, and I answered that such a measure or that such measures could be ordered from above without my knowledge.
Q If the execution and ultimated disposal of captured insurgents is a technical rather than an administrative matter, isn't the deportation of some of those insurgents to other territories similarly a technical rather than an administrative matter?
A No, one cannot say so in my opinion. There is a difference whether a decision must be made regarding life or death of a human being. I wanted already to say today that the deportation of prisoners was welcome to me, because I believed that this measure would bring out a change in the attitude of the OKW which had been prevailing so far. I had thought to utilize these labor forces for work in the Serbian area, and this is quite clear from Bader's answer to my inquiry of February 17.
Q General, ordinarily when you capture enemy troops in time of war you only ask them their name and the unit to which they belonged. Didn't you interrogate much more fully the insurgents whom you captured in the Southeast, you asked them where their units were located, what their future intentions were, and you sought information of that nature as well?
A Personally I did not interrogate anyone. I don't know in detail how the troops managed this. It depended on the situations which existed with the troops. Under certain circumstances information may not be necessary at all, because the situation is so clear that I know; for instance, I am opposite this particular enemy, but I can think of situations where one places some value on getting information as to reinforcements which are to be expected, where there are collecting points where munitions and supplies can be fetched by the troops, etc.
Q Will you look at Exhibit 197 in Document Book VIII, at page 11 of the English and page 9 of the German; these are combat directions of the 718th Infantry Division for the 14th April 1942; you will note under "Interrogation of prisoners," that the following facts were to be ascertained -- what are the names of the leaders, and where are the leaders, including those of smaller insurgent units. According to the rules of war that is not a permissible question to ask of captured prisoners, is it, General?
A Fortunately I was never taken prisoner in the previous wars, but I know that these questions were put everywhere and that Germans that were taken prisoner were obliged not to answer these questions, and that nobody could force them to give such information.
Q You believe that captured insurgents could have without fear of harm refused to answer questions of that kind?
A I cannot answer this question, because I never took part in an interrogation, but I would imagine that if a unit interrogated people that by the way this unit treated its prisoners it will try to get some answers out of them.
Q Is it customary to ask captured prisoners the names of their relatives and where their relatives live?
A No. In an interrogation one does not concern oneself with the family conditions of the prisoner, but with his present conditions as a soldier, that is the unit to which he belongs his superior officers or supply, reinforcements, etc. approximately the questions as they are listed here.
Q. Look at sub-paragraph C, under "interrogations", one of your divisional commanders is here asking his subordinate troops to find out the names and locations of family members of insurgents whom they captured. Isn't it true, General Kuntze, tint your troops took severe reprisal measures with the relatives of prisoners whom they captured?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. Why do you believe a question of this kind was asked?
A. I am struck here by this for the first time in the case of the 184th Division, and it is obvious that the 184th Division believed they might be able to take hold of the members of the families oi these insurgent leaders; the intelligence service often tries to get some knowledge about the relatives and homes of insurgents in order to get a better idea about the structure of the insurrection.
Q. Why should you take measures against the relatives, what had they done?
A. No measures, we only wanted to get more details from the members of the families regarding the extension of the insurgent movement.
Q. Do you believe if the families failed to reveal any information nothing would have happened to them?
A. I don't believe that, because if I want to ask somebody, if I want to get something out of someone he is usually treated in such a manner that I get something out of him.
Q. Now, General Kuntze, will you turn to Exhibit 194, in Document Book VIII, at page 2 of the German and page 2 of the English. This is a report of yours, being a review of the situation in the area of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast including 7 April 1942.
Now, will you look at page 3 of the German and page 3 of the English, under "Losses" under Paragraph III, and under Sub-paragraph B, "Insurgent Losses," - "1262 shot in combat, 66 shot or hanged in retaliation," including the results since 1 September 1941, 11722 shot in combat, 2809 reprisal measures. Isn't that rather a high result of reprisal measures?
A. These reprisal figures contain the unfortunately rather high figures of October, I calculated the number of reprisal measures for my own period of office, and I informed you of that today.
Q. You think this is not particularly high then?
A. I didn't say that. But in these high figures, are the very high figures included, for the reprisal measures, which took place in October, before I assumed office. I have already told you today about the number of reprisal measures which had to be taken before my period of office.
Q. Let's turn to hostages for a moment; do you know who rounded the hostages up?
A. I know an order oi General Bader, where he reserves the right to take hostages to himself. I could not establish when this order was issued. From the fact that a warning to the local commanders was issued by him in June we can draw the conclusion that the order must have been issued sometime in the spring. The carrying out of this measure was often a responsibility of the district and local commanders, (Kreis and Feldkommandanburen). Mistakes have been made and these mistakes were made known to General Bader, and on the basis of these incidents he sent this very severe warning to his local commanders.
Q. What kind of mistakes do you refer to?
A. Mistakes which have been made in the taking hostages, and in his order of Bader reprimands one unit for having taken hostages not by way of the competent sub-area administrative headquarters, but by way of the Serbian authorities. It was not admissible.
Q. You mean a mistake in the procedure, not a mistake in the type of person who was chosen as hostage?
A. No, mistakes in the way the hostages were taken.
Q. Do you know who was chosen as hostages?
A. In the orders of Bader it says the taking of hostages is a very responsible task and that they should be taken from all classes of the population.
Q. You knew that had been done, you knew that Communists, democrats, nationalists, and Jews were all rounded up as hostages?
A. There is an order in existence issued by Thurner which I only got to know here, and which points out these classes of the population, and I must emphasize I have only read this order here. The order of Bader does not mention any particular classes of the population, or groups of the population, but says that hostages are to be taken from all classes of the population.
Q. Didn't Boehme tell you about his order of 10 October 1941, an order which he issued just two weeks before you got down there, providing for the taking of Communists and Jews as hostages and for their execution at the 100 to 1 ratios? Didn't he tell you about that?
A. No. Boehme did not report that to me.
Q. You heard about that order for the first time here in Nurnberg?
A. No. I have heard of it before. I learnt of it in about December and as I knew of this order and as the situation had quieted down I made the decision to mitigate measures as I have stated here already.
Q. Suppose you take a look at Boehme's order of 10 October 1941 which is Exhibit 88 in Document Book III, page 34 of the English, page 27 of the German. Look at paragraph 2 - "In all commands in Serbia all Communists, male residents suspicious as such, all Jews, a certain number of nationalistic and demoratically inclined residents are to be arrested as hostages, by means of sudden actions. It is to be explained to these hostages and to the population that the hostages will be shot in case of attacks on Germans or on Volksdeutsche." Didn't you know that that procedure was in effect throughout your reign as Armed Forces Commander SOUTHEAST?
A. No. It cannot have been in force because during the direct examination today a report was mentioned, according to which only, I believe it must have been in March, Jews were deported from the neighborhood of Kosmitrowitza.
Q. I didn't mean that you executed all the Jews in October 1941, but weren't they all taken into custody and held as hostages on or about that time?
A. No. This is clear from the report which I have just read that that this order cannot have been carried out in the manner which is said here.
Q. Look at paragraph 4 of the Boehme order on page 28 of the German, page 35 of the English- "In the burying of those shot care is to be taken that no Serbian memorials arise.
Placing of crosses on the graves, decorations, etc., is to be prevented. Burials are accordingly to be carried out best in distant localities." Did you hear nothing about that procedure?
A. I ask you to allow me not to answer this question. I believe that I frequently have made my inner attitude to questions of this kind quite clear.
Q. I just want to make sure, General Knutze. You mean that you never heard of this procedure being in effect while you were Armed Forces Commander SOUTHEAST?
A. No
Q. Did you ever hear about large numbers of hostages being executed while you were Armed Forces Commander SOUTH EAST?
A. I have not heard of any greater numbers of hostages apart from those cases which were not hostages but reprisal prisoners which were taken in January as reprisal measures for the murder of three German guards, a reprisal measure which had been ordered by General Boehme as milder measures against this band had met with no success.
Q. There were quite a few hostages executed in October and November 1941 who were not reprisal prisoners. Will you look at Exhibit 135 in Document Book VI, page 7 in the German and page 10 in the English. Here are series of orders by General Boehme regarding the execution of hostages. The first is dated 19 October 1941. "By virtue of the order for the suppression of the Communist rebellion movement for wounding of a guard of the 220th Pz. Jaeg. Gn. in Belgarde on 15 October - 50 hostages are to be shot." And turn to the next page of Boehme's order dated 30 October 41 - reprisal for the murdering of 8 German prisoners on 9 Oct. 41 - 800 hostages are to be shot. And on the next page an order for 31 October 1941 - reprisal for the murder of one German soldier wounded - 200 hostages are to be shot. And on the next page a order dated 20 November 1941 - 385 hostages are to be shot. Finally, on the next succeeding page an order for 29 November 1941.
100 hostages are to be shot for the death of one German soldier.
Did you never hear of these high ratios being applied in the execution of hostages?
A. The documents have been read in such a manner that one could gain the impression that these high numbers of prisoners were really shot. And in the order of 30 October, the second which has been mentioned here, not the figure 800 is relevant but the figure 200. Apart from that I reject that orders were carried out in this manner and can prove that by documents submitted by the Prosecution.
Q. You don't believe these hostages were ever executed, General. You believe these are orders that were not carried out?
A. These orders were not carried out and I can explain the thing to myself like this that Boehme, as it is already clear from a note in the War Diary, issued a restrictive measure, a resistive directive, as far as I can remember. This note can be found in the War Diary of the Higher Command 65.
Q. What is the purpose of issuing orders if they are not to be carried out?
A. I don't hesitate to state that I find it quite inexplicable that such decisive and weighty orders were not signed by the flenipotentiary Commanding General but by the Chief of Staff.
Q. I don't understand. You mean unless the order is signed by the Commanding General it need not be carried out?
A. I don't want to say that. I already said that Boehme must have issued an order according to a note in the War Diary of the 65th Higher Command according to which the originally ordered reprisal measures were considerably restricted in their execution. I only wanted to point out that in my view it is quite inexplicable that such weighty and decisive measures were not signed by the Commanding General himself as would have been his duty but by his Chief of Staff. The Chief could not sign these orders on his own initiative.
Q. You believe that subordinate units receiving an order signed by the Chief could disregard it?
A. No, of course, they had to pay attention. I merely wanted to express that I didn't understand why such an order was not signed by Boehme himself.
Q. General, do you understand by the law of hostages that the hostages must be taken before any attacks occur, that an announcement must be made to the population, that if attacks occur the hostages will be shot. Is that your understanding of the procedure that must be used with respect to the taking and execution of hostages?
A. Yes.
Q. And, if a particular unit has suffered losses and has no hostages on hand may hostages from another area be shot to avenge the losses of the particular unit involved.
A. From another territory?
Q. Yes
A. No. According to General Bader's order the troops could not execute reprisal on their own initiative. These reprisal measures had to be approved by the Commanding General.
Q. Would you look at Exhibit 148 in Document Book VI, page 51 of the English, and page 43 of the German. This is a report dated 18 November 1941 sent to General Boehme as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. Will you look at the last part of that report, page 43 of the German, page 52 of the English, the next to last paragraph - "Since no hostages are available at the Battalion, the Battalion asks that a unit in Sabac be assigned with the shooting of 150 hostages."
Isn't this a breach of the prescribed procedure for the execution of hostages?
A. No. I did not issue any directives regarding the way in which the hostages were to be executed and I have already stated that the carrying out of reprisal measures was the competency of the respective Territorial Commander.
Q. Territorial Commanders were subordinate to you?
A. The Territorial Commanders were subordinate to me.
Q. You must have known the procedure and methods they were following in the taking and execution of hostages?
A. I should have been informed in writing, by way of reports about such measures. I must state here this is a report about a combat action of the 3rd Batallion Sgt. 697 directed to the Commanding General in Serbia.