Q General, there are reports here, as you know, that indicate that the partisans, when they captured your troops, took good care of them and treated them to medical care in their own hospitals?
A Yes. There are such reports but I also know why there are such reports.
Q General, do you consider the war by Germany against Yugoslavia an aggressive war on Germany's part?
A No. I did not regard it as such because, according to my information of the situation, there was a clear breach of an agreement.
Q You considered it a justifiable war on Germany's part?
A I regarded the war as justified.
Q Were you aware of the fact that the Yugoslavian people believed that your war was an illegal war and that your troops were in their country illegally and that, therefore, they could take any measures they deemed proper to throw your troops out?
A No. I was not aware of that. I have often had opportunity to talk to Servs. I will probably now be told that those people to whom I could talk, that they belonged to the circle around Nedic and that they were influenced; but I did meet other people as, for instance, the person of General Nedic who made very clear impression on me and who, I am sure, would have told me something if he had anything to say to that effect.
Q Now, General Kuntze, let's talk for a minute about the way the Communist insurgents were organized. Did they have political commissars among their troops?
A They had political commissars who appeared, as far as I remember, towards Spring.
Q Will you look at Exhibit 196 in Document Book No. 8 at Page 5 of the English and Page 4 of the German? These are regulations of General Bader dated 10 April 1942 and you will note on Page 4 of the German and Page 5 of the English General Bader's description of the uniforms of the Cetniks and of the partisans. Will you look under the partisans and under the subdivision "Badges": Soviet star on the cap indicating rank by means of Soviet star and shoulder stripes.
The political commissar has a sickle and hammer on the Soviet star." What functions did the political commissar serve?
A Pardon me?
Q What functions did the political commissar in the insurgent unit serve?
A I don't know that.
Q The Communist insurgents in the South-East were organized along the same military lines as the Soviet Union, Soviet Russian Troops, were they not?
A I couldn't say anything about that as I have read from the files and from one or two reports there are statements to the effect that they were organized after Russian pattern. There is one report about the fact that partisans had appeared in Russian uniform.
Q This whole insurgent movement in the South-East was dictated from Moscow. Isn't it quite likely that the insurgent military units would be organized along the same kind of lines as the Soviet Russian Troops?
A No. That would have nothing to do with it and there weren't only the Communist partisans but parallel to them there existed a Nationalist movement which developed around about July and maybe even before I started my work in the South-East; and in August, September and October they fought together with the Communists. Later on they separated and this separation actually later on came to a fight between the two parties.
Q Let's confine ourselves for the moment to just the Communist insurgents to the South-East.
A Yes.
Q Is it your opinion that the political commissar who wears a sickle and hammer on the Soviet Star, that is referred to in this document, is a different kind of political commissar than those who accompanied the Russian Troops?
A Yes, I well believe that, because in the Russian Army the commissars were part of the Army, whereas the commissars here were members of bands.
Q Well, except for the difference in terminology between Russian Troops and Communist bands, the political commissar attached to each fulfilled the same type of duties, did he not? He was indoctrinated with the troop's political ideology, wasn't he?
A That is possible. I don't know what particular function the commissars had. I only know that the Russian commissar had the task of a political and propaganda nature.
Q Let's turn now, General Kuntze, to a few questions regarding the way you treated the insurgents whom you captured. As I understand your direct testimony you say that you shot some of the insurgents in combat, and the ones you made prisoner, you later shot, after giving them a summary court martial. Is that correct?
A Yes, indeed.
Q Wasn't it a foregone conclusion what the verdict of a summary court martial would be?
A It says in the decree about frantireurs, that franctireurs are punishable by death. That does not exclude that persons arrested in a combat area, and regarded as a partisan by the troops, and then put before a court martial, would be found not guilty, if his innocense was established, and that is how the regulations were to be applied.
Q I do not quite understand. Would you tell me again under what circumstances a man might be acquitted by a summary court martial?
A When he was in a position to prove that he was actually not guilty when he was arrested and brought before the court martial
Q If he were found with a weapon in his hand, the court martial would find him guilty and sentence him to death, would it not?
AA man with a weapon in his hand is a franctireur.
Q Why did you bother to give them a summary court martial if your troops found them with weapons in their hands?
A During combat that person would have been shot, and if he was found in possession of a weapon outside of a combat action, then he was to be sentenced in some way.
Q Why did you need a court procedure; why couldn't the captain or the regimental commander simply give an order to have him shot?
A Because such were the regulations.
Q Then you always arrested people who were only suspected of being partisans? Were they persons who were captured without arms in their hands?
A The situation was like this: The franctireur, when actually some combat actions had taken place, and they were in danger not to be able to escape, then they had their weapons, and appeared as peaceful peasants in order to, at a time convenient to them, retaken their weapons, and I have stated that a large part of the losses of the troops was affected by these people who shot from ambush.
Q Suppose there was a peaceful looking peasant in the neighborhood of a combat action and you arrested him because you suspected him of being a partisan, how could ho prove before the summary court martial that he was not guilty? Was he permitted to bring witnesses?
A It was contained in the regulations that witnesses were allowed to be brought.
Q Which regulation is that, General Kuntze? Is that in the documents?
A No, it is not contained in the documents. It is a decree from the OKH which was issued on the 6th of November, 1939.
Q General Kuntze, do you seriously contend that all of the references in these documents to communists being shot after interrogation, and communists having been shot immediately, mean that they were given a summary court martial before being executed?
A It is contained in the same decree, that every troop unit or every regiment should have at least three summary martisla, and should have them prepared in case of combat action, and I must assume, on the basis of the examinations which my supreme judicial adoisor has made, that this regulation was followed.
Q You never received any reports to the contrary?
A No.
Q Will you turn now to exhibit 159 in document book 6, page,I beg your pardon, Exhibit 165 in Document book 7, page 13 of the English and page 12 of the German, you will note there, General Kuntze, a report of the 342nd Infantry Division, dated 18 December, 1941, and you will note the detailed manner in which the report indicates the number of people shot to death as insurgents during combat action, and the hostages as reprisal measure.
From this, as from other reports, it appears that a very strict arithmetical key was applied in the enforcement of reprisal measures by the German troops, and that the losses of the insurgents during combat were deducted from the number of hostages that had to be shot in enforcing the arithmetical ratio. Are you familiar generally with this and the other reports which you received that indicate the arithmetical ratio that was applied.
A This report of the 342nd Division did not reach the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. It is a report made with regard to a battalion which was subordinate to that division for the period from the 26th of September to the 15th of December, 1941.
Q I do not expect you to have knowledge of any one particular report, but don't you remember generally about the enforcement of the arithmetical key during the execution of reprisal measures in Serbia during your time as deputy Commander Southeast?
A I have already testified that the supposed ratio for the retaliations, with few exceptions, was not fulfilled.
I may point out that this report, with which we are just dealing concerning this one battalion where these very high figures appear, that this report goes as far as September, - into September, and I know also that in these documents, these are other reports for the 342nd division, which shows clearly how the figures recede, and that in November and December there are only very few.
Q Let's turn to one in December, look at Exhibit 159, in Document Book 6, page 93 of the English, and page 75 of the German. This is dated 20th December, 1941:
"Reprisal measures carried out from the beginning of the insurgent movements in Serbia up to 5 December 1941."
Then you see the table at the bottom:
"According to the basic key of 1 to 100 and 1 to 50 the following is given as reprisal measures to be executed."
in Then some multiplication, and some addition of the figures.
It is all very well, and in very great detail worked out, until the report continues, "Thus there would be due for further reprisal, 20,174".Are you quite sure the arithmetical ratio was never applied during your term?
A I beg your pardon. Do you mean the ratios?
Q Yes, one to 100, and one to 50.
I believe we have a case here, where General Bader ordered a high reprisal figure, and this case, which according to my recollection occurred in January, concerns a communist murder band which exercised its activities in the Banat. The initially attempts to this band in a mild form were without success, General Bader had to take severe reprisal measures.
Q The prisoners that you took in combat, General Kuntze, some of them were shot after an interrogation, and as you say, after a summary court martial trial, others were retained and sent to big collecting camps where they were later executed at the prescribed ratios in reprisal for attacks which were committed against your troops. Isn't that true?
A No, it was like this. In the collecting camps a screening took place and among the persons which were delivered into these camps, there were of course a great number of insurgents who had been sentenced. When reprisals were to be taken, we took those people for this purpose as I have already testified.
Q Look at Exhibit 175, in Document Book 7, page 48 of the English, and page 39 of the German. This is an order of the 714th Infantry Division dated 15 February 1942. Look at paragraph 3:
"Persons who are encountered in the combat terrain during the fighting are to be arrested and to be investigated, to be interrogated. Depending on the result of the interrogation they are to be released or sent to be competent district headquarters as prisoners for reprisal measures."
What does that mean, - "the retention of prisoners for reprisal measures"?
A Prisoners for reprisal measures means according to the order of General Bader from the 20th of December, these people who were to be taken as reprisal hostages, who, however, were not innocent as the name, "hostages," should indicate, but who were guilty as can be seen from the order.
The Commander of the 714th Division who issued this order, says clearly that according to the result of the interrogation they are to be released, or to be retained and to be brought to the competent district headquarters as retaliation prisoners.
A. Your reasoning is that these captured insurgents could be snot anyway, and it was perfectly all right for you to retain them until a later time and then execute them in reprisal for attacks upon your troops?
A. I don't think it was quite that way, that there was, so-to-speak, a stocking up of these victims, out actually, the retaliations as were ordered, were to follow the offense very closely, and I have also stated that it was my endeavor to mitigate the treatment of prisoners, and in that I was strongly rejected by the OKW, so that nothing was left to me but to take a crooked way instead of a straight one, a fact which for me as a soldier of the old school was very bidder, and I did not do it for my own sake but for the sake of the Serbian population.
Q. General, this order states that, "depending on the result of the interrogation, these men who were captured were either to be released or sent to the prisoner of war camp for reprisal measures". There is no talk here about a summary court martial. It is only a reference to an interrogation.
A. Generally speaking, the expression is "interrogation", even if one talks about a court procedure.
Q. Is it customary to say one thing in German orders and reports, and to mean another, or is this just an exceptional case?
A. I have already stated that unfortunately the expressions are changing here, not only regarding the designation of the prisoners, of the insurgents, but especially in this point. I remember for instance that General Stahl, who later on led the group West Bosnia, said in his report "250 partisans were retained here who are to be sentenced by court martial".
In another report about the same incident from headquarters, under the same date this remark was omitted and instead it said, "after interrogation to be shot". Some time later with regard to an operation to the Bend, there was no talk at all about a summary court martial, but only of an interrogation.
Q. General, will you turn to Exhibit 180 in Document Book 7, it is on page 62 of the English, and page 48 of the German. This is an activity report of the 704th Infantry Division.
Will you turn to page 29 of the German document book and page 63 of the English, to the entry for 16 February '42:
Division publishes decree of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General, according to which all insurgents participating in battle are to be shot. According to this prisoners can only be made in exceptional cases, when an interrogation becomes necessary. After interrogation the prisoners are to be shot immediately. These are to be differentiated from "reprisal prisoners" and "hostages". Do you believe that the interrogation referred to there means "summary court martial"?
A. I must assume that. The whole entry is made in a very brief form.
It can be brought in connection with,-regarding the date, with the order of the 714th Division.
Q. General, your troops, even shot wounded insurgents after they were captured them, didn't they?
A. To my extreme regret, I have read that here in the documents, and I must state here that this is a measure which is regrettable.
Q. That never came to your attention while you were in the southeast?
A. No.
Q. If it had you would have issued an order not to do that, wouldn't you?
A. I would have gone into the matter in a court proceedings, and I would have taken the person concerned to account.
Q. General, troops subordinate to your command were often given orders to shoot everybody that was found in a given area, and without exception, were they not?
A. By me such an order was never issued.
Q. They were issued by commanders subordinate to you though, and you must have received knowledge of what your commanders were doing?
A. I have already stated that orders of subordinate officers were not reported to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. But if such an order would exist here, I would then have to establish whether I did gain knowledge of it or not.
Q. We will turn to Exhibit 178 in Document Book 7, page 56 of the English and page 45 of the German. This is an order of the 718th Infantry Division, dated 20 February 1942.
JUDGE BURKE: What is the page of the document, please?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 57 of the English, your Honor.
Q. Turning to paragraph 9 of the Document, the third sentence: "All male Serbian inhabitants from 16 to 60 years of age are to be treated as if they were found in combat with arms in hand".
Did you ever receive any information about an order of this kind issued by the 718th Infantry Division?
A. No. As the distribution list shows, this order went to the troops subordinate to the division, and was reported to the 65th Corps, to the German Commander in Zagrab, and to the II Creatian Corps Commando, and furthermore to some organization in Belgrade.
Q. General, you knew who Fortner was. Fortner was one of your division commanders, you had conferences with him, you know what kind of a man he was. You must have asked him what kind of orders he was issuing.
A. I did not get to know Fortner; I did not know him. I have repeatedly been to Zagrab, once or twice, during the time when he was employed in the area of Sarajeve. If such an order, with the consequences which it had to have, - if any such an order had been executed, and had become known through its consequences, I am convinced that General Glaise-Horstenau, the German General in Zagrab, and also some office of the Creatian government, would have reported it.
Q. Let's turn to some orders that you yourself issued, if you had no knowledge of the kind of orders your subordinate commanders were issuing.
Turn to exhibit 184, document book 7, page 70 of the English, and page 59 of the German, this is your order of the 19th of March, 1942?
A. Yes.
Q. It says, In the second paragraph: "The over-all situation requires that in this area quiet and order be preserved under all circumstances. For this purpose all means are to be employed which lead to success. One cannot count on the bringing up of reinforcements".
You gave your subordinate commanders carte blanche to do whatever they wanted to do to bring about pacification in Serbia and Creatia, didn't you?
A. No, that is not carte blanche. But I meant by "all means" only all means which were militarily permitted.
Q. If Fortner wanted to interpret this as permitting him to issue orders to shoot everybody, that his troops came into contact with in a given area, he could do that?
A. I believe that the Fortner order was issued at a time which proceeds this time we are talking about now.
Q. We will now turn to page 60 of the German document book, part of the same order, page 71 of the English, look at sub-paragraph (c) under paragraph 2:
"I expect troop leaders of all ranks to show special energy and ruthless action" When you say "ruthless action" do you mean legal actions, or didn't you care whether the action taken by your subordinates were legal or not?
A If I had wanted that I would not have pointed out under paragraph 3 with regard to the fighting methods to be applied against the partisans.....
Q We'll come to those in a minute.
A It is No. 3 of the order of the 19th of March, and it reads-I repeat....
Q Let me interrupt you, General Kuntze. We will come to the directives in a minute Interpreter, have we had his full answer to a previous question?
THE INTERPRETER: The witness was reading a paragraph from this order which I have not been able to locate in ay copy.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Well, we'll come to the directives in a moment, General Kuntze. Look under paragraph c of paragraph 2 again, on page 60 of the English and page 71 of the German.
JUDGE BURKE: Are you sure it isn't 71 of the English.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I beg your pardon?
JUDGE BURKE: Are you sure it isn't 71 of the English?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Oh, I thought that's what I said. That's what I do mean. I'm sorry, your Honor--71.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q "Captured insurgents are to be hanged or to be shot to death as a matter of principle. If they're used for reconnaissance purposes, it merely means a slight delay in their death." The slight delay-does that permit time for a summary court martial?
A That is a prerequisite for that.
Q Well, let's turn to the directives which are on page 53 of the German and page 73 of the English. You distributed a lot of copies of your order of the 19th of March 1942-- a hundred copies, in fact. Do you know whether you distributed that many copies of the directives?
A I would think so, the directives went out as an inclosure to the order.
Q Well, look at paragraph 1 of the directives, the second sentence:
"No false sentimentality; it is preferable that fifty suspects are liquidated than one German soldier lose his life."
What do you mean by "no false sentimentality"?
A I have already testified that this order was issued because there was a great amount of information, according to which we had to expect a large insurgent movement. According to the experiences of the summer I saw myself forced to point out that the soldier had to take care and to be on the alert, and that in case a larger insurgent movement would break out harsh measures had to be taken.
Q Well, you say, General Kuntze, that "it is preferable that fifty suspects are liquidated," did you mean by "suspects" persons who were captured with weapons in their hands or just persons who were captured within the area of the combat action?
A These wore people who had been captured and whose guilt had been established.
Q Now, turn to page 55 of the German, page 75 of the English Document Book, under sub-paragraph "c"--5c--of the directives. "If the presence of mines is suspected the clearing up is to be done as far as possible by insurgents or by the Serbian population."
Q How were mines usually cleared up?
A The clearing up of mines can be carried out in various manners. Generally speaking, the partisans had applied the means of camouflage so that it was difficult and sometimes impossible to find out where the mines were, and we needed special instruments for this. If have already stated that there was a difference made in the former with respect to the expressions "clearing up" and "cleaning up." German Army. The expression "clearing up" which was ordered here can only be carried out by combat engineers. And since the "clearing up" is the usual thing, the combat engineers are needed to take away the fuse, or if they do not recognize the type of the mines they have to dynamite the mines, and thus groat craters appear so that the road must be blocked off in the area where the dynamiting becomes necessary, and thus a great traffic block occurs, which is obvious.
Q You wouldn't have asked the civilian population to risk their lives in clearing mines the way special mine clearing troops have to risk theirs, would you, General Kuntze?
A If I had wanted to do that I would have simply said that "I order that in front of every troop a group of inhabitants has to march so that the mines will explode under them, in areas where mines are suspected." That would have been very simple.
Q That would have been in violation of the Rules of War if you had ordered something like that, wouldn't it?
A That would have been in violation of the Rules of War. That's right.
Q General Kuntze, you testified on direct examination that after conferences with General Bader you succeeded in having him reduce the hostage ration from 100 to 1 to 50 to 1, and that reduction place sometime early in December, 1941. Is that what you said?
A I said that my first discussion with General Bader took place during the time of my second visit to Belgrade. That was between the end of November and the beginning of December. I recollect that in December after I had gained knowledge of the so-called hostage orders, I talked to Bader, and that both of us, because the situation had quieted down and harsh measures as up until then were no longer necessary, agreed that from now on we would apply milder measures. And I further said in direct examination that not even this reduced ration, according to the reports as I now got to know them, was fulfilled. Sometime ago I mentioned an exceptional case which I remember-the one where General Bader was forced to sharply in the Banat against murderous bands which expanded there.
Q In any event, the hostage ration was reduced from 100 to 1 to 50 to 1 in December, 1941. Is that correct?
A That happened, as far as I remember, on the basis of an order by Bader of the 20th or 22nd, which was effective as of the beginning of December.
Q You were pleased to have the hostage ratio reduced?
A I wasn't pleased. But I may say that I caused this to happen. Even if proof for that is not immediately visible from the documents here, I had Bader issue that order then, for the reason that the basic order had been issued by Boehme that as Boehme's predecessor and the competent territorial commander.
Q Why did you reduce the hostage ratio? Did you believe that the 100 to 1 ratio was illegal?
A No, not because of that, but we wanted to avoid after the situation had become more peaceful, that there would be unnecessary victims.
Q You felt that the hostage ratio of 50 to 1 was legal and that a 100 to 1 ratio was also legal?
A I was of the opinion that this order from above, which I considered as judicially examined, was permissible.
Q General Kuntze, you had the hostage ratio reduced in December, 1941, but here in your order of the 19th of March 1942 you raise it again from 50 to 1 to 100 to 1, do you not? Will you look at the last paragraph of your order of the 19th of March 1942, which is on page 58 of the German and page 76 of the English?
A Such a figure is mentioned here, but one has to consider the context. I said in my direct examination, that restrictions apply to this last figure. That is not an order, but it says: "Reprisal measures of a general kind might be advisable." And I must emphasize again that this whole order was toned to a situation which fortunately did not occur, and that is a situation which means that an insurrection of a large extent might break out again in Serbia, which did not happen.
JUDGE BURKE: We'll take the usual recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS EXAMINATION (continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Kuntze, just prior to the recess we were looking at your order of 19 March 1942, and particularly to the last paragraph of that order. Do you say that the reference to 100 to one was simple a suggestion rather than an order on your part?
A It was not an order, because it says clearly that "reprisal measures of a general nature may be warranted -- for instance."
Q Then you gave as an example the execution of reprisal measures at a ratio of 100 to one for each German soldier killed and 50 to one for each German soldier wounded. Is a suggestion of that kind coming from the Armed Forces Commander Southeast usually given great weight by the Division commanders and other subordinate units?
A If such a suggestion had had the importance as it is now maintained, General Bader would surely have objected to it as he has done in another case.
Q Could General Bader object to orders and suggestions which he received from you as his superior?
A He certainly could do that. Ho objected regarding the treatment of prisoners, because my order of 19 March had clashed with an order from someone else. I don't know whether it was the Quartermaster General or the Chief of Police, regarding the deportation of workers to German spheres of economic interest, and he took this as an opportunity to make representations regarding the order of 19 March.
Q But you needn't have honored General Bader's suggestions, you were his superior, you could have disregarded them, couldn't you?
A I could have disregarded them, yes, but the objection as such, I don't know if this is in the directives or not, would not have been in accordance with the procedure we had followed so far. In December Bader had concentrated all authority regarding the issuing of reprisal orders that would be necessary in his area of command in his own hands. Up to then no orders of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had interfered with that authority of Bader's regarding reprisal measures. In any event Bader would have talked to me about such matters.
Q In addition to executing captured insurgents your troops also deported some of them to other spheres outside the southeastern area, isn't that true?
A I did not do that, as I said already on 18 March or about 18 March an order was directly issued to General Bader, as the competent territorial Commander in Serbia, from the Quartermaster General or from Police headquarters, according to which prisoners were to be deported to German territories or territories under German occupation. Bader inquired at my office, and I agreed. I agreed for the following reasons --
Q We need not go into that, General, at the moment. Those insurgents could not have been deported without your consent, could they, you had to give your approval?
A No, that was not the case. In general these matters that were purely administrative matters were carried out without my being asked.
Q You don't mean that the execution of insurgents is an administrative matter?
A We were just talking about deportation. I was asked whether these deportations could have taken place without my consent or not, and I answered that such a measure or that such measures could be ordered from above without my knowledge.
Q If the execution and ultimated disposal of captured insurgents is a technical rather than an administrative matter, isn't the deportation of some of those insurgents to other territories similarly a technical rather than an administrative matter?
A No, one cannot say so in my opinion. There is a difference whether a decision must be made regarding life or death of a human being. I wanted already to say today that the deportation of prisoners was welcome to me, because I believed that this measure would bring out a change in the attitude of the OKW which had been prevailing so far. I had thought to utilize these labor forces for work in the Serbian area, and this is quite clear from Bader's answer to my inquiry of February 17.
Q General, ordinarily when you capture enemy troops in time of war you only ask them their name and the unit to which they belonged. Didn't you interrogate much more fully the insurgents whom you captured in the Southeast, you asked them where their units were located, what their future intentions were, and you sought information of that nature as well?
A Personally I did not interrogate anyone. I don't know in detail how the troops managed this. It depended on the situations which existed with the troops. Under certain circumstances information may not be necessary at all, because the situation is so clear that I know; for instance, I am opposite this particular enemy, but I can think of situations where one places some value on getting information as to reinforcements which are to be expected, where there are collecting points where munitions and supplies can be fetched by the troops, etc.