A No, that is not correct. The Air Force, as is quite clear from the Fuehrer Order, was quite independent. It had to obey the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and as regards the Navy, only a segment was subordinate to net That is, the admiral who had, first of all, to look after the sea transport from Greece to the Greek islands.
Q You were Hitler's representative in the Southeast. You were responsible only to him, and the rest of the people in the Southeast like Boehme and Bader and Felmy were all subordinate to you. Hitler never consulted with them directly. He always did it through you didn't he?
A No. According to the Fuehrer Directive I was immediately subordinate to Hitler and the commanders in the different areas were subordinate to me.
Q That is what I thought I said, General Kuntze. Perhaps you misunderstood. How many troops......
A Then I must have misunderstood.
Q How many troops did you have under you as Commander in Chief of the 12th Army during the time you were in the Southeast?
A In the Serbian area the Higher Command 65 was subordinate to me, Divisions 704, 714, 717, and 718. Immediately subordinate to the Plenipotentiary were the 113th Division and the 14th Division.
Q You needn't mention them all, General Kuntze. I just want an approximate round number of the troops you had in figures.
A Yes, in the Serbian area two full divisions and four divisions of the 15th Wave. Further there were a number of rifle battalions.....
Q How many were they altogether in numbers?
AAltogether, including the Greek area, there were four full divisions at that time and four divisions of the Second Wave.
Q Yes, but were there 200,000 or 400,000 or 40,000? How many in numbers?
A Well, numerically there may have been about 100,000 or 120,000 men.
Q General, will you turn to Exhibit 133 which is in Document Book VI, Exhibit 153, which is in Document Book VI, Page 76 in the English, Page 55 in the German. This outlines your power and command jurisdiction as of 30th of November 1941. Now, will you turn to Page 74 in the English, Page 59 in the German, to Paragraph 11. In Paragraph 11 there is an indication that there are two types of subordination of units under your command. There is tactical subordination and there is territorial subordination. Now, if you will just keep that in mind for a minute. Your main responsibility in the Southeast was tactically to defeat the bands which were plaguing your troops and installations. And your second job in the Southeast was more of a territorial job. That is to say, to pacify the population and to stop the individual citizens from sabotaging your communication lines -individual citizens who were not members of an organized band. Is that a correct summary of the two main functions you had in the Southeast?
A No, that is only a partial segment of the tasks which I had to carry out in the Southeast.
Q Your tactical job was to defeat the bands. That is correct?
A In the Serbian area I had to see to it that order was restored and that the bands were fought against. And these tasks were transferred to the Commander in Serbia.
Q Isn't it true, Genera 1, that the attacks on your troops and the sabotage in your lines of communication were done by two types of groups? They were done by organized -- by military units -- who attacked you from ambush, who attacked you from the woods, and from the hills; and, in addition, the general population who were not members of insurgent units also were troublesome and sabotaged your troops out every chance they got?
A I cannot agree to the view that they were military units who attacked German soldiers, and I never looked upon them as solders. I looked upon then as bandits, as franc--tireurs. I had to look upon then in that way because they behaved that way. It was never said, and it cannot be proved, that those bands which have brought so much happiness, not only to Serbia but also to Germany, had been soldiers. They were never recognized as soldiers, and as far as I knew they were never recognized as soldiers by Allies.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will take the unusual recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q At the time when you went down to the Southeast in October 1941 there were only regular fights, military fighting, between your troops and the armed bands?
A Regular fights.
Q Divisions of German troops against two or three thousand men armed and members of the insurgents, that is true, isn't it?
A There were larger combat actions, as far as I remember during my time. Not in October, because I only arrived towards the end of October, but that was the fights around Uzice, and these combat actions took place towards the end of November, and I only know that from studying the documents, but in October owing to cert in operations the numbers on the side of the Germans were considerably increased, because that was considered necessary and in order to concentrate on isolated posts.
Q Now, those fights were tactical struggles, were they not; they were between troops of yours and between armed bands of the insurgents; they involved tactical and strategical I considerations from your side?
A I don't think one can talk of strategical considerations, because by strategical considerations one would understand the leading of large units. I would say from considerations which had to be madethey show quite clearly from documents--and they arose from the fact that already my predecessor, Field Marshal List had ordered that the bands, as far as one knew where they were located, had to be attacked, and that for this reason not only very weak units, e.g. very small troops, but instead stronger forces, should be applied as had been previously done.
Q Now, in any event, Boehme and Bader fought these armed bands, because of the tactical power and duty that they had, isn't that true? When you refer to the power which you had as a Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and in the paragraph of the document which I called to your attention there were two types of subordination, tactical subordination and territorial subordination. Now, Boehme, and later Bader, fought units by virtue of their tactical subordination to you, didn't they?
A Tactical subordination and territorial subordination overlapped. In the directive about the subordination in the southeast area it says clearly that the commanders had to establish law and order in their own district, and that restoring law and order in Serbia could only be carried out by tactical operations, that is quite obvious.
Q Now, supposing Boehme took measures against individual citizens who were not members of armed bands, because those individual citizens sabotaged your lines of communication; would he act against those individual citizens by virtue of his territorial jurisdiction or by virtue of his tactical jurisdiction?
A On the basis of hisoterritorial jurisdiction.
Q Very well. Now, do you agree that when we speak of tactical subordination we mean Boehme and Bader's duty to wage war and to defeat in battle the armed bands of insurgents, and when we speak of territorial subordination we mean Boehme and Bader's duty in Serbia to take measures against individual citizens, not members of armed bands, because of the actions of those citizens against your troops?
A I don't believe it can be differentiated in this manner. It is quite obvious that the task of General Boehme and General Bader was to g t rid of the spots of unrest. This task cannot be regarded as of a tactical nature. It is a territorial task which, however, necessitated tactical measures that is the use of military unit in order to put down these uprisings.
Q By virtue of their territorial duties Boehme and Bader had to pacify and bring order to Serbia, and one of the methods they employed to bring about that pacification was by the committing of various units of German troops against the bands is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q Well, it is very difficult to differentiate between tactical and territorial duties. About all you can say is it was your duty to pacify the area and to do everything you could and adopt all measures you could to solve that problem?
A Yes, and it was quite clearly ordered in that manner. May I say something else? The conception "troop" also included police forces, as to begin with they were stationed in Serbia, so that wouldn't only include members of the armed forces, but members of the police.
Q And ordinarily police units were used against the civilian population and were not employed the way military units were employed against the armed bands in military operation?
A No, that can clearly be seen from all the directives which the SS and police leader received, and wherein it is emphasized that from now on all police forces were subordinate to him only, and the military commander could only assume command over him in emergencies of a tactical nature, and I believe that part of the trouble existing between the military staff and the administrative staff can be traced back to the fact that there was never a complete agreement between those questions. The police was, of course first of all competent for their police tasks and the troops for the military tasks.
Q Boehme, as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia could give orders to both military offices and civilian offices, couldn't he?
A No. Civilian authorities in Serbia also included the Plenipotentiary for Economy and he could not give any orders from the man in charge of the 4-year plan.
Q Now, Thurner, who was Chief of the .Administrative Staff under Boehme and later under Bader, was Thurner's office considered a civilian office or a military office?
A. It was not a civil authority; it was an administrative authority such as the Army had had previously and quite frequently; Boehme was his superior, but I have already testified that I had to find that Thurner liked to go his own ways, which can be traced back to the fact that all administrative matters were originally under the jurisdiction of the quartermaster General and were channelled directly to Thurner, and that going to all these new regulations this could not be altered.
Q. If Boehme had the power to give orders to Thurner, Thurner was subordinate to Boehme, he was a member of his staff.
A. He was subordinate to Boehme, and later on he was also subordinate to Bader.
Q. And if Thruner wanted to go his own way and Boehme tried to stop him, he could have issued orders to Thurner, couldn't he?
A. He could have issued orders to Thurner, yes.
Q. Will you turn to Exhibit 50, General, in Document Book No. II, on Page 57 of the English and Page 46 of the German. This is Field Marshal List's order of 19 September 1941, and in the second sentence it clearly outlines Boehme's power. "In compliance with Fuehrer order I transfer to General Boehme the entire executive power in Serbia. All command authorities and forces of the Army existing there or to be transferred there are subordinate to him. As the only possessor of executive power in accordance with the Fuehrer order he can give instructions to all military and civilian offices." That order gave Boehme full powers in Serbia. Was this order ever changed and was Thurner's subordination to Boehme and later Bader ever changed during your term as Deputy Armed Forces Commander, Southeast?
A. No, but it says here in this directive of Field Marshal List that the interests of the four-year plan had to be taken into consideration and safe guarded. I have already testified that I did not succeed in removing Thurner from his position, and that in spite of personal representations with Keitel I could not succeed to solve this problem.
Q. Thurner had nothing to do with the four-year plan in general?
A. No, not directly with the four-year plan. I beg your pardon. I only mentioned this because in the previous sentence it said that the Commanding General had authorities regarding all offices, but this can only be understood in the framework of the measures which executive power necessitates, as, for instance, the suppression of unrest, etc. But if one does not read the second sentence one could be of the opinion that in economic questions Boehme also had authority, and that is not correct, and I also know from the documents that Field Marshal List, when he applied for Boehme to be appointed, pointed out this particular item quite clearly.
Q. You would like to except from Boehme's power authority on his part to give orders with respect to the four-year plan?
A. Yes.
Q. But it is clear, is it not, that Boehme had full power to give orders to Thurner?
A. Yes, he could give to Thurner orders.
Q. Field Marshal List appointed Boehme as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia in September 1941, and you did not arrive in the Southeast until late October, 1941. Boehme, you remember, stayed until December, 1941, so that he was there during the whole month of November when you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander, Southeast?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you feel free to give orders to Boehme?
A. I could give orders to Boehme.
Q. And if Boehme had done anything which you disagreed with, you could have had him replaced, couldn't you?
A. Yes, I could have made an application to have him replaced, but I could not have dismissed him on my own initiative.
Q. You never did ask to have Boehme replaced. Can we assume that you agreed with everything Boehme did?
A. I have already testified I have only gained knowledge here about the excesses which occurred under Boehme, Regarding his tactical measures I had nothing to criticize. His leadership in this sphere, which occupied him fulltime, was without blame, even looking at it now in retrospect.
Q. What about the order to pacify Serbia? Did you agree with the methods Boehme used to bring about pacification and order in Serbia?
A. If by that you mean whether I agreed with all the events which occurred under Boehme and which have been mentioned here, I must say no. What was known to me at that time was that the situation made it necessary that severe measures be applied.
Q. If you had known, General Kuntze, the things you you now know, regarding the measures which Boehme took to pacify Serbia, would you have taken steps to make him stop using those measures?
A. I answer that question with "yes", and I can confirm this answer yes by mentioning my personal attitude during my term of office.
Q. Did the fact that Field Marshal List appointed Boehme have any influence upon you in determining whether or not to replace him? Did you feel obliged to accept Field Marshal List's appointment?
A. That was not the reason. The reason was that a number of events which had occurred in Serbia and of which Boehme must have had knowledge on the basis of these documents, That these facts were not known to us.
Q. You felt free, did you not, General Kuntze, to repeal any of List's previous orders? You felt no restrictions because you were simply List's deputy, did you?
A. I have already testified that certainly I was authorized to cancel orders or to change them, but that it was, of course, very difficult, regarding the large sphere of work, to gain an overall picture, and that further I saw no reason to deviate from orders which had been previously issued as far as I got to know them, and that furthermore of the basic order which ordered everything that actually happened, I only got to know rather late, as far as I remember, and that is to be regarded as the main reason for the change of the whole situation in Serbia which dates as of the fights in Uzice, and that was the reason for my taxing mitigating measures.
Q. You arrived in the southeast, I believe you said, on the 26th or 27th of October, and you learned when you got there that Field Marshal List had been in the hospital since the 15th October. Did you find out who was in charge of the Twelfth Army and who was acting as Armed Forces Commander, Southeast, between the 15th and the time when you arrived?
A. I don't know whether I discussed this question with the staff, but the situation was this, that we were pressed for time because a transfer to Saloniki was expected, and whether I asked the Chief this particular question, I don't know any more now.
I do know that the deputy of Field Marshal List might have been General Felmy who probably was in Athens at than time, but a handing over of the organization by Felmy to me did not take place. I can't say that. It might have been that way, that I have discussed several matters with General Felmy at that time also concerning his own sphere of work, and it would possibly have been that way, that around on the 18th of October one had expected me to arrive every day, and everything was in abeyance, held in abeyance until my arrival, and that General Felmy only dealt with very specific tasks deputizing for Field Marshal List, and only m specific casks as judicial tasks ete.
Q. General, who would handle such things as an order to execute at the ratoi of 100 to 1 at Kragujovac and Kraljove during the 15th and 26th and 27th when you arrived? Who would determine at Armed Forces Commander Southeast headquarters whether or not to permit that order to be executed?
A. One person had to decide this. I can't say execute it because the execution lies alone with the Commanding General in Serbia. He had to decide. It was possible to intervene with the Military Commander Southeast concerned.
Q. You mean whoever was acting as Arm d Forces Commander Southeast between the 15th, when List went to the hospital, and the 26th or 27th when you arrived, would have had power to intervene and annul Boehme's order to take mass reprisal measures against the population of Kraljevac?
A. He could have intervened if he had gained knowledge of these events.
Q. General, aren't you sure that the man who was in charge of the Southeast Command between the 15th and the 26th was General Felmy? Didn't you talk to Boehme about that when you arrived?
A. No, I am not sure of that.
Q. I believe you said, General, that Greece was rather quiet when you first arrived in the Southeast at the and of October?
A. When I arrived there was peace in Greece.
Q. Will you look at exhibit 83 in document book 3 at page 18 of the English and page 15 of the German? This is a report from the Chief of the Security Police, SD, in Berlin and he, of course, has an SD unit operating in Serbia in October, 1941. Now, if you will turn to page 16 of the German and page 19 of the English under paragraph 3, "Special Events", you will note the reference to General Boehme's order of a hundred to one for each soldier killed and fifty to one for each soldier wounded for the attack on the convoy near Topola. And then the reference to the reprisal measure for Kraljevo.
When you arrived in Belgrado on your way to Southeast Headquarters didn't Boehme tall you about the recent attacks on his troops at Topola and Kraljevo that necessitated his taking severe reprisal measures?
A. No, I have already stated that I cannot remember that, that Boehme circumvented that question altogether.
Q. Now, the same report, the same SD report on page 18 or the German and page 21 of the English describes some events in Greece, and you wall remember that this report is dated 21 October 1941 just weak before you arrived in Greece and you will note the reference, "On the Strymoa Estuary two villages were burned down which were found guilty of having supported bands. All the male inhabitants, 202, were shot." Didn't they tell you about that incident in Greece which was supposedly quiet when you arrived?
A. I can only emphasize that at the time when I came to Greece there was peace and order there. These events became known to me probably by a report; that is, by a monthly report which the Commander SalonikiAegian submitted to me, and possibley the Commander Saloniki-Aegian or the Commander of the 64th Division would have reported to me and I gained the impression that this was a purely military action and that the destruction of the villages and the shootings took place as part of combat action.
Q. General, this report says that the villages were burned down because they supported bands. It doesn't say anything about a combat action.
A. It doesn't say so in this report, but there are other reports where I recollect that an operation, that is, reports which I got to know here in detail, where it says that one village which was later destroyed could not be taken at first because when the German troops approached there was fire and so the operation had to be discontinued at first, and only after a few days was repeated.
Q. Well now, look at exhibit 111 in the same document book 3 at page 98 of the German and Page 144 of the English. This is an activity report of another of your subordinate units, the 164th Infantry Division which was operating in Greece. It is dated the 8th of October, 1941, about two or three weeks before you arrived down there. Look at paragraph 5, "Combating of Unrest. The villages of Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion which, according to proof, had supported bands were leveled by units of the division on the 17th of October and male inhabitants between 16 and 60 years, 207 people, were shot. Woman and children were resettled."
JUDGE BURKE: Presiding: On what page of the English Text?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 144, your Honor.
Q. (Cont'd) Didn't your chief of staff tell you about these events happening in Greece when you arrived?
A. I cannot recollect details. He might have reported to me that there was unrest and that it had become necessary to fight it with troops, and that than peace and order had been reestablished.
Q. Look at the next page, General, page 99 of the German, page 145 of the English, at the top of the page: "It can be assumed with safety concerning the villages Kizonia, Kliston and Amebelofito that they likewise served as retreat for bandits. The three villages were leveled on 25 October and male inhabitants between 16 and 60 years, 67 persons, were shot. Women and children were resettled farther away." That doesn't sound as though Greece was very quiet two days before you arrived. Now turn to -
A. May I say something in this connection? These are areas full of bands and robber bands which always carried out their activities there, and I believe that I took it from the report either from the chief of staff or from the military commander Aegian, that these operations were carried out not only by the German troops but in close collaboration with the Greek police on request of the General Governor Macedonia.
Q. Well, I think you are correct in that. If you turn to page 101 of the same report, 101 in the German, 149 in the English, you will note under paragraph 2, "Bands", second sentence: "The male population of Mesovunos between the ages of 16 and 60 years, 42 persons in all were shot. The remaining inhabitants were handed over to the Greek police for resettlement." It appears that there were some collaboration between your troops and the Greek police.
A. Yes, there was collaboration and that is what I said. I must have been misunderstood. I had just emphasized that these operations were not only carried out by the German troops, but took place in cooperation with the Greek police on request of the Greek General Governor Saloniki.
Q. The Greek General Governor of Saloniki was subordinate to you, General? You could tell the Greek police what to do, couldn't you, General?
A. No, the Military Commander Saloniki-Aegian could give order to the Greek police.
Q. But you could give orders to the commander of SalonikiAegian?
A. Yes, certainly I could give orders to the military commander Saloniki-Aegian, but the situation was such that the Greek police here worked in close cooperation with the German troops.
Q. They were subordinate to you? They were subordinate to you, weren't they? They would do anything you told them to do?
A. No, I don't think one can formulate it that way because then one can well picture a situation where, for instance, a unit which is subordinate to me and which obeys orders, still not quite carries out that order. In Serbia, for instance, it was like that, that police units - which can also be seen from documents - had to be disarmed If the inhabitants were taken into account I can well imagine that the cooperation between these two organizations, Greek police and German troops, was not as close as it was really afterwards described to me when the success had been gained.
Q. Yes, but General, if any of the men or units subordinate to you did things which the. OKW or Hitler disapproved of, you would be held responsible for that as their commander, would you not? You would be held responsible, not they directly?
A. Yes, I was responsible.
Q. Now, General Kuntze. will you turn to exhibit 211 in document book 8, page 62 of the English and page 53 of the German. Let me ask you one question first, General Kuntze. When did Greece begin to stir with activity against the German occupation forces?
A. I can't say that, only after my time.
Q. After your time, only after you left?
A. After my time, yes.
Q. This document which I have just asked you to look at is one of your own reports. It is an activity report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast dated the 28th of February 1942, and you ill not on page 53 of the German and page 62 of the English, you deal with Greece in your report; "5 February, three attacks with explosives on motor vehicles in Saloniki, 20 Greeks shot in reprisal," Is that an exceptional incident or were things like this happening all the time?
A. No, they didn't happen all the time. There were --- I would put it that way there were terror waves in Greece. How they came into existence I can't, of course say exactly. I suppose that they can be traced back to the influence not of Greek circles, but of other circles. These terror waves were directed, as far as I remember, that was one in December and one in February, and one later in June --- directed against personalities partly and partly against the motor traffic as in reported here in this report. That this assumption that we deal here with the influence from an outside power is confirmed by the fact that the explosives with which the attacks were carried out were always of the same origin. They were always explosives which sometimes were attacked to motor vehicles, sometimes ships, et cetera. Maybe one says it is only a mere trifle if one realizes the position of other countries regarding motor vehicles, but to us motor vehicles were very important in Greece, and without motor vehicles we could not have fulfilled our tasks or those of the Wehrmacht. I repeat, to us the motor vehicles were a very important weapon when there were difficulties in the transport, we had to counter them. During like this way in February.
That a permanent connection between Saloniki and Athens was not possible because the Bralo Bridge was only later repaired. We therefore had to rely on this detour. We had to rely on small boats and on motor vehicles. The whole traffic between Saloniki and Athens could not have been coped with if we had not employed motor vehicles.
Q. Well now, General, if I may interrupt, don't you consider the attacks on your motor vehicles manifestations of unrest?
A. No, that was not a manifestation of unrest. It was a manifestation of a sabotage action consciously incited by an outside power, and this power knew exactly where to hit us when they undertook these sabotage acts. I admit that the measures which were applied were harsh, but I believe that I have given the reason for them. It was necessary from the very beginning to stop these sabotage acts by military measures.
Q. Well, how can you say that Greece was quiet if attacks on your lines of communications were occurring so often?
A. It didn't happen frequently. We succeeded through these measures to limit these terror waves and one cannot say that an attack on a communication line actually took place. Attacks on communication lines took place in Serbia if, for instance, the main railway line was dynamited every day which is seen from reports of a later time, when everyday any number of attacks were carried out on the line between Zagreb and Belgrade.
Q. Crete was under your jurisdiction wasn't it, General, the Greek island of Crete?
A. Crete was under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and at that time also under the Military Commander of Southeast Greece. It was an indirect subordination. It meant that I was responsible in Greece for the supplies which had to be brought to Crete.
Q. Now, will you turn to page 58 of the German document book which you have there? It is part of the same exhibit I have been referring to until now, page 69 of the English. This is still one of your reports as Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. This one is dated 30 June 1942. Will you look at paragraph 4, on page 58 of the German, page 69 of the English? "In Athens two dynamite attacks on Wehrmacht motor vehicles, one attack on railroad track north of Athens, culprits and hostages respectively were shot to death. A sharp warning was published. In Crete several mayors installed by the occupation authorities were murdered. Accomplices and a number of hostages shot to death." And then under enclosure 25, "Attack on airport Iraklion which is on the island of Crete. During the night of 14 June despite additional security, sabotage and air attack on airport Iraklion, 16 planes damaged.
Commandant of fortress Crete has let 50 hostages be shot to death."
Did you hear of those events in Athens and on Crete?
A. This event must have been reported because it is reproduced in the activity report of the armed forces Commander Southeast. Whether the report actually reached me, this first report in Athens I cannot say anymore. There is some talk here about attacks against the railway line as well as against motor vehicles in Athens taking place. What was done against this, is not clear, and who had ordered it, and I have already said previously that the guarding of the railway line at least from the Bralo Bridge was the task of the Italians and the responsibility of the Italians.
Q. What were your German motor vehicles doing in Athems if Athems was under the jurisdiction of the Italians and if you had no German troops in Athems?
A. Troops were in Athems in the harbor area of Piraeus and that columns must have been there, can be clearly seen from the fact that from Piraeus all shipping was directed towards the islands, above all towards Crete, and one needed motor vehicles for this traffic even if there was a railway line to a district near the harbor.
Q. How far is Piraeus from Athens.
A. They were opposite each other.
Q. So that in effect your troops were coming back and forth between the port of Piraeus and the city of Athens itself constantly?
A. Yes, they went through Athens. I don't know whether Piraeus had its own stations. I wouldn't assume that it had it own station. On another occasion it has already been stated that quite a number of German officers were stationed in Athens and if I may say something in connection with this, one cannot clearly see whether reprisal measures were taken against the perpetrators and who ordered them, and in Crete there was another terror wave which can be connected up with the attack on the air field of Iraklion.
This event is particularly interesting to me, and I did know of it because it took place at the time when I returned from a trip through Serbia. As far as I remember it was the first commando operation which was carried out under English leadership, that is, by British and Gaullist soldiers and as can be seen clearly from other reports and interrogations, with the support of the Greek population.
This operation succeeded in spite of severe guarding of the air field and the commander of Crete, as a reprisal, who managed to establish that the population was involved, took reprisal measures, and I must insert here that the commander of Crete and the Commander of the air corps were one and the same person. This event had, of course, to be examined in a court proceedings. At that time I was approached by General Field Marshal Kesselring, the Commander-in-Chief South as Commander -inChief of the air forces over the Mediterranean and he requested me to transfer to him the court proceedings which was possible according to the regulations, and from another report it can be clearly seen that Group South carried cut this trail.
JUDGE BURKE - Presiding: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)