I do know that the deputy of Field Marshal List might have been General Felmy who probably was in Athens at than time, but a handing over of the organization by Felmy to me did not take place. I can't say that. It might have been that way, that I have discussed several matters with General Felmy at that time also concerning his own sphere of work, and it would possibly have been that way, that around on the 18th of October one had expected me to arrive every day, and everything was in abeyance, held in abeyance until my arrival, and that General Felmy only dealt with very specific tasks deputizing for Field Marshal List, and only m specific casks as judicial tasks ete.
Q. General, who would handle such things as an order to execute at the ratoi of 100 to 1 at Kragujovac and Kraljove during the 15th and 26th and 27th when you arrived? Who would determine at Armed Forces Commander Southeast headquarters whether or not to permit that order to be executed?
A. One person had to decide this. I can't say execute it because the execution lies alone with the Commanding General in Serbia. He had to decide. It was possible to intervene with the Military Commander Southeast concerned.
Q. You mean whoever was acting as Arm d Forces Commander Southeast between the 15th, when List went to the hospital, and the 26th or 27th when you arrived, would have had power to intervene and annul Boehme's order to take mass reprisal measures against the population of Kraljevac?
A. He could have intervened if he had gained knowledge of these events.
Q. General, aren't you sure that the man who was in charge of the Southeast Command between the 15th and the 26th was General Felmy? Didn't you talk to Boehme about that when you arrived?
A. No, I am not sure of that.
Q. I believe you said, General, that Greece was rather quiet when you first arrived in the Southeast at the and of October?
A. When I arrived there was peace in Greece.
Q. Will you look at exhibit 83 in document book 3 at page 18 of the English and page 15 of the German? This is a report from the Chief of the Security Police, SD, in Berlin and he, of course, has an SD unit operating in Serbia in October, 1941. Now, if you will turn to page 16 of the German and page 19 of the English under paragraph 3, "Special Events", you will note the reference to General Boehme's order of a hundred to one for each soldier killed and fifty to one for each soldier wounded for the attack on the convoy near Topola. And then the reference to the reprisal measure for Kraljevo.
When you arrived in Belgrado on your way to Southeast Headquarters didn't Boehme tall you about the recent attacks on his troops at Topola and Kraljevo that necessitated his taking severe reprisal measures?
A. No, I have already stated that I cannot remember that, that Boehme circumvented that question altogether.
Q. Now, the same report, the same SD report on page 18 or the German and page 21 of the English describes some events in Greece, and you wall remember that this report is dated 21 October 1941 just weak before you arrived in Greece and you will note the reference, "On the Strymoa Estuary two villages were burned down which were found guilty of having supported bands. All the male inhabitants, 202, were shot." Didn't they tell you about that incident in Greece which was supposedly quiet when you arrived?
A. I can only emphasize that at the time when I came to Greece there was peace and order there. These events became known to me probably by a report; that is, by a monthly report which the Commander SalonikiAegian submitted to me, and possibley the Commander Saloniki-Aegian or the Commander of the 64th Division would have reported to me and I gained the impression that this was a purely military action and that the destruction of the villages and the shootings took place as part of combat action.
Q. General, this report says that the villages were burned down because they supported bands. It doesn't say anything about a combat action.
A. It doesn't say so in this report, but there are other reports where I recollect that an operation, that is, reports which I got to know here in detail, where it says that one village which was later destroyed could not be taken at first because when the German troops approached there was fire and so the operation had to be discontinued at first, and only after a few days was repeated.
Q. Well now, look at exhibit 111 in the same document book 3 at page 98 of the German and Page 144 of the English. This is an activity report of another of your subordinate units, the 164th Infantry Division which was operating in Greece. It is dated the 8th of October, 1941, about two or three weeks before you arrived down there. Look at paragraph 5, "Combating of Unrest. The villages of Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion which, according to proof, had supported bands were leveled by units of the division on the 17th of October and male inhabitants between 16 and 60 years, 207 people, were shot. Woman and children were resettled."
JUDGE BURKE: Presiding: On what page of the English Text?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 144, your Honor.
Q. (Cont'd) Didn't your chief of staff tell you about these events happening in Greece when you arrived?
A. I cannot recollect details. He might have reported to me that there was unrest and that it had become necessary to fight it with troops, and that than peace and order had been reestablished.
Q. Look at the next page, General, page 99 of the German, page 145 of the English, at the top of the page: "It can be assumed with safety concerning the villages Kizonia, Kliston and Amebelofito that they likewise served as retreat for bandits. The three villages were leveled on 25 October and male inhabitants between 16 and 60 years, 67 persons, were shot. Women and children were resettled farther away." That doesn't sound as though Greece was very quiet two days before you arrived. Now turn to -
A. May I say something in this connection? These are areas full of bands and robber bands which always carried out their activities there, and I believe that I took it from the report either from the chief of staff or from the military commander Aegian, that these operations were carried out not only by the German troops but in close collaboration with the Greek police on request of the General Governor Macedonia.
Q. Well, I think you are correct in that. If you turn to page 101 of the same report, 101 in the German, 149 in the English, you will note under paragraph 2, "Bands", second sentence: "The male population of Mesovunos between the ages of 16 and 60 years, 42 persons in all were shot. The remaining inhabitants were handed over to the Greek police for resettlement." It appears that there were some collaboration between your troops and the Greek police.
A. Yes, there was collaboration and that is what I said. I must have been misunderstood. I had just emphasized that these operations were not only carried out by the German troops, but took place in cooperation with the Greek police on request of the Greek General Governor Saloniki.
Q. The Greek General Governor of Saloniki was subordinate to you, General? You could tell the Greek police what to do, couldn't you, General?
A. No, the Military Commander Saloniki-Aegian could give order to the Greek police.
Q. But you could give orders to the commander of SalonikiAegian?
A. Yes, certainly I could give orders to the military commander Saloniki-Aegian, but the situation was such that the Greek police here worked in close cooperation with the German troops.
Q. They were subordinate to you? They were subordinate to you, weren't they? They would do anything you told them to do?
A. No, I don't think one can formulate it that way because then one can well picture a situation where, for instance, a unit which is subordinate to me and which obeys orders, still not quite carries out that order. In Serbia, for instance, it was like that, that police units - which can also be seen from documents - had to be disarmed If the inhabitants were taken into account I can well imagine that the cooperation between these two organizations, Greek police and German troops, was not as close as it was really afterwards described to me when the success had been gained.
Q. Yes, but General, if any of the men or units subordinate to you did things which the. OKW or Hitler disapproved of, you would be held responsible for that as their commander, would you not? You would be held responsible, not they directly?
A. Yes, I was responsible.
Q. Now, General Kuntze. will you turn to exhibit 211 in document book 8, page 62 of the English and page 53 of the German. Let me ask you one question first, General Kuntze. When did Greece begin to stir with activity against the German occupation forces?
A. I can't say that, only after my time.
Q. After your time, only after you left?
A. After my time, yes.
Q. This document which I have just asked you to look at is one of your own reports. It is an activity report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast dated the 28th of February 1942, and you ill not on page 53 of the German and page 62 of the English, you deal with Greece in your report; "5 February, three attacks with explosives on motor vehicles in Saloniki, 20 Greeks shot in reprisal," Is that an exceptional incident or were things like this happening all the time?
A. No, they didn't happen all the time. There were --- I would put it that way there were terror waves in Greece. How they came into existence I can't, of course say exactly. I suppose that they can be traced back to the influence not of Greek circles, but of other circles. These terror waves were directed, as far as I remember, that was one in December and one in February, and one later in June --- directed against personalities partly and partly against the motor traffic as in reported here in this report. That this assumption that we deal here with the influence from an outside power is confirmed by the fact that the explosives with which the attacks were carried out were always of the same origin. They were always explosives which sometimes were attacked to motor vehicles, sometimes ships, et cetera. Maybe one says it is only a mere trifle if one realizes the position of other countries regarding motor vehicles, but to us motor vehicles were very important in Greece, and without motor vehicles we could not have fulfilled our tasks or those of the Wehrmacht. I repeat, to us the motor vehicles were a very important weapon when there were difficulties in the transport, we had to counter them. During like this way in February.
That a permanent connection between Saloniki and Athens was not possible because the Bralo Bridge was only later repaired. We therefore had to rely on this detour. We had to rely on small boats and on motor vehicles. The whole traffic between Saloniki and Athens could not have been coped with if we had not employed motor vehicles.
Q. Well now, General, if I may interrupt, don't you consider the attacks on your motor vehicles manifestations of unrest?
A. No, that was not a manifestation of unrest. It was a manifestation of a sabotage action consciously incited by an outside power, and this power knew exactly where to hit us when they undertook these sabotage acts. I admit that the measures which were applied were harsh, but I believe that I have given the reason for them. It was necessary from the very beginning to stop these sabotage acts by military measures.
Q. Well, how can you say that Greece was quiet if attacks on your lines of communications were occurring so often?
A. It didn't happen frequently. We succeeded through these measures to limit these terror waves and one cannot say that an attack on a communication line actually took place. Attacks on communication lines took place in Serbia if, for instance, the main railway line was dynamited every day which is seen from reports of a later time, when everyday any number of attacks were carried out on the line between Zagreb and Belgrade.
Q. Crete was under your jurisdiction wasn't it, General, the Greek island of Crete?
A. Crete was under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and at that time also under the Military Commander of Southeast Greece. It was an indirect subordination. It meant that I was responsible in Greece for the supplies which had to be brought to Crete.
Q. Now, will you turn to page 58 of the German document book which you have there? It is part of the same exhibit I have been referring to until now, page 69 of the English. This is still one of your reports as Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. This one is dated 30 June 1942. Will you look at paragraph 4, on page 58 of the German, page 69 of the English? "In Athens two dynamite attacks on Wehrmacht motor vehicles, one attack on railroad track north of Athens, culprits and hostages respectively were shot to death. A sharp warning was published. In Crete several mayors installed by the occupation authorities were murdered. Accomplices and a number of hostages shot to death." And then under enclosure 25, "Attack on airport Iraklion which is on the island of Crete. During the night of 14 June despite additional security, sabotage and air attack on airport Iraklion, 16 planes damaged.
Commandant of fortress Crete has let 50 hostages be shot to death."
Did you hear of those events in Athens and on Crete?
A. This event must have been reported because it is reproduced in the activity report of the armed forces Commander Southeast. Whether the report actually reached me, this first report in Athens I cannot say anymore. There is some talk here about attacks against the railway line as well as against motor vehicles in Athens taking place. What was done against this, is not clear, and who had ordered it, and I have already said previously that the guarding of the railway line at least from the Bralo Bridge was the task of the Italians and the responsibility of the Italians.
Q. What were your German motor vehicles doing in Athems if Athems was under the jurisdiction of the Italians and if you had no German troops in Athems?
A. Troops were in Athems in the harbor area of Piraeus and that columns must have been there, can be clearly seen from the fact that from Piraeus all shipping was directed towards the islands, above all towards Crete, and one needed motor vehicles for this traffic even if there was a railway line to a district near the harbor.
Q. How far is Piraeus from Athens.
A. They were opposite each other.
Q. So that in effect your troops were coming back and forth between the port of Piraeus and the city of Athens itself constantly?
A. Yes, they went through Athens. I don't know whether Piraeus had its own stations. I wouldn't assume that it had it own station. On another occasion it has already been stated that quite a number of German officers were stationed in Athens and if I may say something in connection with this, one cannot clearly see whether reprisal measures were taken against the perpetrators and who ordered them, and in Crete there was another terror wave which can be connected up with the attack on the air field of Iraklion.
This event is particularly interesting to me, and I did know of it because it took place at the time when I returned from a trip through Serbia. As far as I remember it was the first commando operation which was carried out under English leadership, that is, by British and Gaullist soldiers and as can be seen clearly from other reports and interrogations, with the support of the Greek population.
This operation succeeded in spite of severe guarding of the air field and the commander of Crete, as a reprisal, who managed to establish that the population was involved, took reprisal measures, and I must insert here that the commander of Crete and the Commander of the air corps were one and the same person. This event had, of course, to be examined in a court proceedings. At that time I was approached by General Field Marshal Kesselring, the Commander-in-Chief South as Commander -inChief of the air forces over the Mediterranean and he requested me to transfer to him the court proceedings which was possible according to the regulations, and from another report it can be clearly seen that Group South carried cut this trail.
JUDGE BURKE - Presiding: The Tribunal will stand in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing Reconvened at 1335 hours, 26 September 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, your Honor.
WALTER KUNTZE - Resumed.
CROSS EXAMINATION - Continued BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Kuntze, prior to the luncheon we were talking about events in Greece during the time you were Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Let us move on now from Greece to Yugoslavia. Whether or not Greece was quiet, it was certainly more quiet in Greece than it was in Yugoslavia during your tenure. I believe you said that there were three kinds of insurgent groups fighting in Serbia at this time the Communists and the Cetniks and the Kosta Pecanag group that was collaborating with the Germans, is that correct?
A That is correct for the first two groups, but not for the last one. The last one, too, can be designated as an insurgent group.
Q Did the Kosta Pecanag insurgents fight on your side against the Communists?
A The Kosta Pecanag group was an auxiliary gendarmerie and was last combined with the Serbian gendarmerie.
Q And they fought with your troops in order to pacify Serbia?
A They fought partly together with us and for the most part independently in the Serbian Area which was quiet and was cleaned of Communist bands by Kosta Pecanags.
Q But the Pecanag group never did fight against your troops. You didn't have to worry about attacks from them.
A I do not recall any report that Kosta Pecanag people fought against us.
Q Now I believe you also said that these insurgent groups never wore any insignia.
Is that true for the whole time during which you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast, or just for a portion of the time?
A I beg your pardon, I was either misunderstood or I did not express myself clearly. I did not say they did not wear any insignia but I said they did not wear any insignia that was clearly recognizable from a distance, as is prescribed by the Hague Conventions for Land Warfare. A great number of reports were stating that the Communist bands wore a Soviet star on their fur caps and that the other partisans wore a Serb coat-of-arms or some stripes on their arm.
Q Couldn't you see the star on their caps from a distance?
A No, I personally was not engaged in any fight with the partisans but such a small red star on a black cap is only visible from a short distance, or few meters; I know out of my own experience that the clothing of the partisans was at that time peasant clothing; even if here and there they are described as wearing dark uniforms, it is not correct. The whole population in the country wore dark clothes and the male population, almost throughout, a high fur cap.
Q Your troops used camouflage on occasion, didn't they?
A During fighting of course camouflage is being used but it is obvious that in a military unit a troop is recognizable by the whole equipment which they have; otherwise, for an artillery observer, for instance, it would be impossible even during normal fighting where the front line is. You can see that by the equipment and by the manner it is carried and you can thus distinguish whether you have a friend or foe in front of you.
Q But the whole purpose of camouflage, General, is to come up upon the enemy without his knowing it and to get within a very close distance of him before he is aware of your presence, isn't that true?
A The purpose of camouflage is one of protection against air attacks and against artillery. Everybody who has ever been at the front know it. For infantry purposes possibly the best camouflage is in use.
Q Now, suppose these insurgent bands did not wear insignia withdraw -- suppose the bands did wear insignia, when they fought against your troops, would you have treated them any differently upon capture?
A No, in spite of insignia they would have remained Franctireuers because the other prerequisites of such a formation or group which would make such a group a regular troop, did not apply in that case.
Q General, didn't you say...weren't you of the opinion on one occasion that if insurgents did not wear insignia -- withdrawn -weren't you of the opinion on one occasion that if the partisans did wear insignia, then they would not be considered Franc-tireurs?
A No. As far as I remember, I have always emphasized that the most important prerequisite for the recognition of a regular troop on the part of the Germans and Allies - the Italians and the Croats and even of the Allies, that is, American and the English, etc., these were people who, after a very clearly defined capitulation agreement, still fought and were therefore Franc-tireurs.
Q General, do you remember being interrogated before you were indicted in this case?
A Yes, indeed.
Q Do you remember being interrogated on the 6th of March 1947 and being asked this question and giving this answer:
"Q. Did, according to your memory, the partisans wear badges?
"A. No."
Do you recall being asked that question and giving that answer?
A. I cannot remember now this particular form of the question and of my answer. This interrogation was made at that time without my being able now to call a witness for it, without counsel, and I was at that time, asked why one regarded those partisans as insurgents and the insurgents as partisans; and, as far as I remember, I said they had to be regarded and treated as insurgents because they were not members of a regular army.
Q. General, you were not threatened in any may during the interrogations, were you?
A. Pardon?
Q. You were not threatened during your interrogation?
A. No, no.
Q. You were not promised that if you did not answer the questions something harsh would happen to you?
A. No; that was not the case.
Q. And at the time these interrogations were conducted you were not indicted, were you?
A. No.
Q. Now, do you recall being asked this question and giving this answer on the same day, 6 March, 1947:
"QUESTION: Does the absence of badges make a big difference in the struggle against the partisans?
"ANSWER: Yes. If the partisans had worn badges they would not have been partisans."
A. Well, I can only say that the interrogation couldn't have been taken down properly because it is quite obvious that the prerequisite was that the insignia which was to be regarded as a proper insignia would have to be recognizable from a distance.
Q. General, would you turn to Exhibit 137 in Document Book VI, Page 19 in the English and Page 14 of the German? This is a report of the 342nd Infantry Division for the 1 November 1941. Do you recall that on that date the 342nd Infantry Division was subordinate to General Boehme in Serbia?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. And on the first of November you had already assumed the duties of Armed Forces Commander, South-East?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Look at Paragraph 10: "The insignia of the various units has not changed. The Cetniks as a rule wear on their lamb fur caps a Serbian cockade and underneath it a skull and cross-bones. The Communists bear on their headgear a red star, sometimes below it a arrow strip of ribbon in Yugoslav colors with the Serbian emblem of hammer and sickle and also plain red stripes. Armbands with the word "Partisan" written on them were encountered. Leaders often wear in addition tassels in their caps: The Cetniks, gold-colored ones, the Communists, red ones."
Now, is it your opinion that this insignia could not be seen from a given distance?
A. Yes, I am of that opinion.
Q. Now, will you turn to Exhibit 149 in the same document book at Page 57 of the English and Page 45 of the German? This is a report of a subordinate unit dated 20 November 1941 and in the second sentence it says: "In a short, violent exchange of fire, six Communists were shot. They were fully uniformed."
Now, if these insurgents were in full uniforms, I take it those could have been seen from a distance by your troops?
A. Yes; unfortunately it does not say in this report what type of uniform that was. From a number of reports it can be seen that their first and foremost interest was -- that is, those of the Communist Partisans - to discard the uniforms of the German soldiers which fell into their hands and to wear them themselves. That one cannot regard such an opponent as a regular soldier is quite obvious.
For instance, I remember another report where the Serbian Auxiliary Guards had arrested a partisan who wore a German uniform, that of a non-commissioned officer, and he can also be regarded as fully uniformed.
Q. And you believe the reference in this document to the Communists being fully uniformed means to a uniform of the Serbian Gendarmerie. Why would they have been shot if they were wearing the uniform of the Serbian Gendarms?
A. Because the right to wear a Serbian uniform was only given to the Serbian Gendarmerie and not to the insurgents.
Q. And you believe these Communists mentioned here were given a summary court martial before they were shot?
A.It says hero in a short combat fire six Communists were shot. So you can assume they were shot in combat. And the regulation for frontier says that they are to be shot in combat and if they are taken prisoner while combat rests they have to be given a court martial.
Q. In any event, no matter what insignia these insurgents wore you would have still treated them as franctireurs?
A. They had to be, for the reasons which have been mentioned here repeatedly, regarded as franctireurs and treated as such.
Q. General, you are familiar with the requisites for belligerent status laid down in the Rules of War of the Hague Convention?
A. Yes.
Q. And in addition to the requirement for wearing insignia there is also a requirement to the effect that the units must be organized in a military way and led by responsible leaders. Do you recall that provision?
A. Yes, indeed. The Hague Conventions say approximately that a common leader has to be in existence to whom all the units are subordinated. I think the most important point is the actually existing responsibility of a leader over those units.
Q. You believe that the Hague rules say that there must be a common leader or a leader of all the insurgents? General, don't those rules simply say that each particular or individual unit has to be led by a responsible leader?
A. I don't understand it in that manner. There must really be a superior leader, high authority, who combines under his command, the responsibility for all units and to whom these units are obedient.
Q. Now, were these insurgent units that you faced in the South-East organized in fact along military lines? Did your intelligence tell you that there were companies and battalions and regiments among these insurgents?
A. Occasionally there might have been reports stating that they were combined in a kind of company. That might apply, but how these reports regarding organization are to be evaluated can best be seen from the big report regarding the Mihailovic Movement which was issued by the OKH and which is also available amongst the documentary evidence.
It says there, for instance, that the Mihailovic Movement has 26 Army Corps and 115 Brigades and that the brigades again are sometimes two to three companies strong. Even if the designation here is the same as used in military language for a regular army, it cannot be applied according to the facts as I have described them to these organizations here.
Q. Turn to Exhibit 152 in Document Book VI, Page 65 of the English and Page 51 of the German. These are excerpts from the War Diary of the 113 Infantry Division which, as you know, was subordinate to General Boehme and later to General Bader.
Will you look at the entry in the War Diary for the 5th of December 1941 on Page 51 of your Book and Page 65 of the English? You will note there in the second sentence: "The leader of the Third Partisan Company of the Cacak Battalion was also arrested."
Doesn't this mean that as early as the 5 December there were recognizable military units among the insurgents?
A. No. Through the fact that some band gives itself a military designation, it cannot be concluded that this band now becomes a regular unit.
Q. Look at Exhibit 139 in that same Document Book VI on Page 22 of the English and Page 16 of the German.
This is a portion of your report as Wehrmacht Commander, South-East, dated the 2 November, 1941, and you will note under Paragraph 6-B you talk about carriers of the revolt in Serbia. Under Sub-paragraph 3 -
A May I please have the number again?
Q Page 16 of the German, Paragraph 6-B. You talk about carriers of the revolt and under Sub-paragraph 3 you say: "National units of the Cetniks. The Cetniks are a freecorps organized in a military manner." What did you mean by that: "organized in a military manner"?
A This report has been issued just when I arrived there, and not by me, according to the signature. But the remark proves, as we can say now, of our knowledge of the whole situation, that a formation was concerned which had long since existed and which had been moulded into a certain form which they expressly called a freecorps but not a military unit, not a militia because otherwise that expression would have been used, if the expression "militia" had been applicable to the Cetniks.
Q Now, General, weren't these Communist units and Cetniks units in fact the militia of the Yugoslavian government in exile?
A No.
Q Weren't these units established by the Yugoslavian government in exile in order to free Yugoslavia from German occupation?
A No. I don't believe that and I conclude my opinion from the fact that the Communist band developed from freecorps. These formations, these bands, did not develop by order of the Serb government in exile but primarily the Communist bands by order of Moscow.
Q Well -- excuse me; continue.
A (Continuing) That can be seen from the fact that, as director for the activities of the Communist bands, there was not a Yugoslavian directive but the directives of the Communist Party in Serbia.
Q A part of these insurgents were remnants of the old Yugoslavian Army which were not completely disarmed. Weren't they bearers and representatives of the Yugoslavian Government which had gone into exile before signing the capitulation?
A No. There has never been a report to the effect that any complete Yugoslav military unit which would have been called into existence by order of the government in exile had entered combat. They never said, "We are here by order of our government. We are, therefore, a legal formation and we demand a political recognition."
What a clear difference I especially have always made can clearly be seen that I declined to negotiate either personally or through any of my subordinate just in order to make it clear to the opposite side, that we did not regard them as a regular military formation. The whole movement could easily have petered out which, however, did not happen.
If Mihailovic reduced his demands or later on had done it, which they did not do, that was unfortunate. But they were so stubborn and so set on their ideas that they did not want to deviate from their exaggerated demands that there was no basis for negotiations anywhere. I could never have accounted for it to the OKW if I had asked them to meet either Mihailovic or had done it half way.
Q Do you believe then that all the insurgents were illegal because some Yugoslavs had entered into a capitulation agreement with Germany? Is that correct?
A Because the capitulation was signed and there were more reasons. There was the whole manner in which the band acted in that country. This whole manner was in contrast to anything which one might have expected of regular troops.