A: This can be seen from the documents. I believe it is a daily report.
Q: Who was responsible for the security of the railroad lines there?
A: The security of railroads in Athens, that is of the whole railroad line north of Athens, at least up to the Brale bridge, - I know that exactly because I often visited the Bralo bridge, - was the task of the Italians.
Q: If this was the task of the Italians, were the reprisal measures also the responsibility of the Italians?
A: Yes, in tactical and territorial matters, the Italians were responsible.
I have already stated previously that in the harbor Piraeus, it was subordinate under the command of the Germans in that area.
Q: In conclusion I will turn now to the state of health of the Greek population. How did these difficulties in Greece arise?
A: The difficulties in Greece, with regard to the supply, and that I briefly repeat, - first of all they were due to the lack of food stocks for the Greek population; secondly, they were due to the fact that the grain already bought by Greece, awaiting shipment in the harbor of Alexandria, could no longer be brought to Greece, and that was due to the great transportation difficulties, - that is the due routes were made unsafe by English submarines, and also by the very difficult conditions on the railroads which I have already mentioned.
Q: Did the Germans try to improve the security of the sea routes?
A: Yes, we tried to do this by making the coastal positions work again, but most of the coastal positions had been destroyed by the English before the retreat, and it was almost the business of the German Navy to repair the ships in the German docks.
Q: When did you leave the Balkans?
A: I handed over my office to my successor on the 8th of August 1942, and on the 9th of August in the morning, I left.
Q: Subsequent to that what did you do?
A: For a short time I belonged to the Fuehrer Reserve, and then on the 15th of September, effective from the 1st of October, I was appointed Chief of Training for the Home Reserve Army.
Q: Since when did you have your last service rank?
A: My last service rank dates from the 15th of February, 1938.
Q: After that you were not promoted?
A: No.
Q: Was that unusual?
A: In general, it was like this, that Generals, on taking over a new position, whose former incumbent had occupied a higher rank, were promoted after a certain time. I was never appointed Commanding General of the 12th Army or Armed Forces CommanderSoutheast.
Q: What did you personally think was the reason for the fact that you were not included in promotions?
A: I have already said that during my period of office, great differences arose between the OKW and myself, and that the OKW severely criticized my activities on the Balkans and in the end, it is obvious that this must have been the reason for this.
Q: Was the fact that the OKW did not approve of your activities in the Balkans known to your collaborators as well?
A: I do not believe that it remained hidden from them.
Q. Did your associates also know that the criticism had, as its main basis, that according to the OKW you were too mild, too weak?
A: I do not want to give any personal opinion on that here.
DR. MENZEL: I shall prove this by other means.
That is all I have to ask the witness at this stage of the proceedings.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well, are there further questions on the part of the defense counsel.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. HINDEMITH deputizing for Dr. Rauschenbach, for General Foertsch.
Q: General Foertsh was chief of staff under you in the Southeast; did you know him before that?
A: No, I did not know General Foertsch before that.
Q: I have a question. In a question on direct examination you said that you had been with the OKW and Hitler before you took ever your office in the southeast, before you went to the headquarters. Did you interrupt your train journey in Belgrade, and did you discuss matters with the competent headquarters in Belgrade? I want to know whether this decision to break your journey in Belgrade, was based on your own initiative or whether the suggestion was given to you by any other party?
A: There was no suggestion from any third party. There could not have been any suggestion, because I had not discussed anything with the staff. I must tell you here that I did not talk in Belgrade to competent headquarters, but with the then commanding general, Boehme.
Q: Wouldn't it have been possible that this suggestion was issued by the OKW?
A: The trip to Belgrade and the interruption of my trip to the Army Headquarters is based on my own initiative.
Q: I have another question. Had you been getting along smooth with you chief of staff General Foertsch?
A: I can only say that we worked very well together.
Q: Were you informed by him sufficiently?
A: Yes, I was sufficiently informed by him.
Q: Was Foertsch of a very independent -
JUDGE BURKE: Permit a pause between your interrogation and the answer, please.
Q Did you ever establish that he exceeded his powers as Chief of Staff?
A No, I certainly never ascertained that.
Q What was his relationship to the IKW? How did he represent that attitude, that is to say, the attitude of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A General Foertsch agreed with me not only in his judgment of the matters which were ordered by the OKW but also in judging the entire situation. As it became clear, with the continuous failure of reinforcements, he repeatedly reported to me that he talked to the people in the OKW who were responsible for these matters and that he told them what the views of the Staff of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast were.
Q You mentioned that you severely criticized the attitude and measures of the OKW and that you made presentations to the OKW in this connection. Was Foertsch of the same opinion in these matters as you were?
A The first pre-requisite for the Staff was that the Chief of Staff and his first counsellor should conform in their views. General Foertsch, I knew, had the same worries as I had. He had to suffer from the same pressure as I.
Q I may state here that there was complete conformity in the views of both of you?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q In your examination you said that you have tried in particular to oppose the stronger measures which were demanded by the OKW in February and March?
A Yes.
Q And you looked upon those measures which had been requested by the OKW as inexpedient?
A Yes.
Q And in this connection you made representations to the OKW?
A Yes, I made representations to the OKW.
Q Can you give us further details regarding the views you opposed to those of the OKW?
A I believe I have already mentioned that there were two arguments which caused me to make representations to the OKW and which made me oppose their views. The first was that I did not believe that the very harsh measures demanded by the OKW would help in the pacification of the country. And the second argument was that the carrying out of these very harsh measures would have meant a great loss for the Serbian economy.
Q How were your protests received by the OKW?
A I have already stated that they were severely rejected.
Q Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there further questions on the part of defense counsel?
Mr. Denney? Mr. Fenstermacher?
You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTENMACHER:
Q General Kuntze, I think we had better first clarify the extent of your power and command jurisdiction during the time when you were in charge of the 12th Army and simultaneously Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast. You had, did you not, all the cower which Field Marshal List had before you?
A I have stated that in deputizing for Field Marshal List the tasks and the responsibilities which he had were transferred to me.
Q Now, List had two sources of power. He had territorial jurisdiction and he had executive power. Isn't that correct?
A I have not understood your question.
Q It appears from Hitler Order No. 31 that Field Marshal List had all the powers of a territorial commander in addition to having executive power in the Southeast.
Do you recall that?
A Yes.
Q And by executive power we mean control over the whole area and over all the German troops in the area for tactical purposes, do we not?
AAll troops included in the Southeastern Area were subordinate to him as far as they belonged to the Army.
Q And that represents Field Marshal List's executive power, doesn't it? That is to say, tactical.
A No, this is a tactical authority. Executive power of Field Marshal List was also mentioned in the order which was merely a repetition of the first order. Field Marshal List transferred this power to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia for the Serbian area and for Greece to the troop commanders. In southern Greece this was done again and also with the commander in Crete.
Q What is the difference between tactical authority and executive power?
A Tactical subordination means that troops, for instance in combat, or in movement during or after combat, have to act according to orders of the tactical commander. And executive power means that the execitive in the area in question is transferred to the possessors of this power. That is, he ie entitled to issue orders to a point and to lower officials. That is all I can say about this.
Q Administrative matters--matters of administering the occupied area--are they part of executive power?
A No, the commander in question could, of course, in administrative matters give certain orders if they were not contradicted by orders of the OKW or some Reich office, or cancelled by such orders.
Q Can the holder of executive power appoint administrative officials, or is he only permitted to appoint military officials-troops commanders and the like?
AAs I have already said before, it is also valid for peace-time where it sometimes happens that executive newer was transferred to a military commander.
He could give directives to the administrative office in question It is known that for this purpose the Commander Serbia and also other offices had special administrative staffs.
Q Very well. The bearer of executive newer then can appoint administrative officials. Is that what you just said? He can give orders to administrative officials?
A He can give orders to administrative officials, yes.
Q Now, what authority and powers does a territorial commander have? Are they different from those which the bearer of executive power enjoys.
A It's different insofar as the executive power means an extension of his area of command, and a command has in general to do the task of the accommodations and supply. With the transfer of executive cower he has to handle all matters for the security and the law and order of the territory for which he is responsible.
Q The bearer of territorial jurisdiction then has the job of maintaining security and order in his occupied area? Is that correct?
A It executive power has been transferred to him, yes.
Q I don't quite understand, General Kuntze. Are there not two sources of power--territorial jurisdiction and executive power? And are they not both occupied in many cases by two different persons?
A No, in the Southeastern area things were like this: the territorial commanders also had the executive power. There were no two persons side by side.
Q Now, you, as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast, held both sources of power. You had power of the territorial commander over the whole area, and you had executive power over the whole area.
A The executive power had been transferred to the commanders which had been employed in Greece and Serbia, as was possible according to the Fuehrer directive.
Q Yes, but you had it first in order to be able to transfer it to them, did you not? They got it only through you.
A Provisions were made in the Fuehrer directive that the executive power was vested in the Armed Forces Commander Southeast which he could transfer to the commanders subordinate to him, and this happened in the order issued by Field Marshal List and also in the order issued by me on the 5th of November, and, as I have already stated, this order was only in form something new. Instead of the Commanding General in Serbia, the Plenipotentiary General in Serbia was mentioned.
Q Did you also transfer your power as a territorial commander over the Southeast to the individual commanders in Serbia and Saloniki, the Aegian, etc -- in addition to the transferring of your executive power?
A They were territorial commanders.
Q But you were the main territorial commander. That is, you were the territorial commander for the whole Southeast, and they simply had smaller segments of that area?
A Yes, I was commanding the whole area, and under me these people were territorial commanders and also bearers of executive power.
Q Now, you were the most important single military person in the whole Southeast during the time you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast, were you not?
A I say first that I understood this question to be whether I was the most important persons as far as military matters are concerned, and I answered, "You mean the first military person to whom these commanders were subordinate?" This is true, but one can also imagine under the word "important" that everything which was present in the Southeastern area of military forces was subordinate to this "important person." This is not correct. The Air Force was excepted, also the Navy, and it also happened that the official chain of command was not adhered to. For instance, orders were given directly from the superior officers to subordinate officers. And for this reason I cannot answer the question as to who was the most important or the most powerful person. I cannot answer this question with a "yes."
Q Now, General, as Commander in Chief of the 12th Army, you had charge of all the Army troops in the Southeast area, and in your capacity as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast you had not only the Army but the Navy and the Luftwaffe under practical subordination as well.
A No, that is not correct. The Air Force, as is quite clear from the Fuehrer Order, was quite independent. It had to obey the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and as regards the Navy, only a segment was subordinate to net That is, the admiral who had, first of all, to look after the sea transport from Greece to the Greek islands.
Q You were Hitler's representative in the Southeast. You were responsible only to him, and the rest of the people in the Southeast like Boehme and Bader and Felmy were all subordinate to you. Hitler never consulted with them directly. He always did it through you didn't he?
A No. According to the Fuehrer Directive I was immediately subordinate to Hitler and the commanders in the different areas were subordinate to me.
Q That is what I thought I said, General Kuntze. Perhaps you misunderstood. How many troops......
A Then I must have misunderstood.
Q How many troops did you have under you as Commander in Chief of the 12th Army during the time you were in the Southeast?
A In the Serbian area the Higher Command 65 was subordinate to me, Divisions 704, 714, 717, and 718. Immediately subordinate to the Plenipotentiary were the 113th Division and the 14th Division.
Q You needn't mention them all, General Kuntze. I just want an approximate round number of the troops you had in figures.
A Yes, in the Serbian area two full divisions and four divisions of the 15th Wave. Further there were a number of rifle battalions.....
Q How many were they altogether in numbers?
AAltogether, including the Greek area, there were four full divisions at that time and four divisions of the Second Wave.
Q Yes, but were there 200,000 or 400,000 or 40,000? How many in numbers?
A Well, numerically there may have been about 100,000 or 120,000 men.
Q General, will you turn to Exhibit 133 which is in Document Book VI, Exhibit 153, which is in Document Book VI, Page 76 in the English, Page 55 in the German. This outlines your power and command jurisdiction as of 30th of November 1941. Now, will you turn to Page 74 in the English, Page 59 in the German, to Paragraph 11. In Paragraph 11 there is an indication that there are two types of subordination of units under your command. There is tactical subordination and there is territorial subordination. Now, if you will just keep that in mind for a minute. Your main responsibility in the Southeast was tactically to defeat the bands which were plaguing your troops and installations. And your second job in the Southeast was more of a territorial job. That is to say, to pacify the population and to stop the individual citizens from sabotaging your communication lines -individual citizens who were not members of an organized band. Is that a correct summary of the two main functions you had in the Southeast?
A No, that is only a partial segment of the tasks which I had to carry out in the Southeast.
Q Your tactical job was to defeat the bands. That is correct?
A In the Serbian area I had to see to it that order was restored and that the bands were fought against. And these tasks were transferred to the Commander in Serbia.
Q Isn't it true, Genera 1, that the attacks on your troops and the sabotage in your lines of communication were done by two types of groups? They were done by organized -- by military units -- who attacked you from ambush, who attacked you from the woods, and from the hills; and, in addition, the general population who were not members of insurgent units also were troublesome and sabotaged your troops out every chance they got?
A I cannot agree to the view that they were military units who attacked German soldiers, and I never looked upon them as solders. I looked upon then as bandits, as franc--tireurs. I had to look upon then in that way because they behaved that way. It was never said, and it cannot be proved, that those bands which have brought so much happiness, not only to Serbia but also to Germany, had been soldiers. They were never recognized as soldiers, and as far as I knew they were never recognized as soldiers by Allies.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will take the unusual recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q At the time when you went down to the Southeast in October 1941 there were only regular fights, military fighting, between your troops and the armed bands?
A Regular fights.
Q Divisions of German troops against two or three thousand men armed and members of the insurgents, that is true, isn't it?
A There were larger combat actions, as far as I remember during my time. Not in October, because I only arrived towards the end of October, but that was the fights around Uzice, and these combat actions took place towards the end of November, and I only know that from studying the documents, but in October owing to cert in operations the numbers on the side of the Germans were considerably increased, because that was considered necessary and in order to concentrate on isolated posts.
Q Now, those fights were tactical struggles, were they not; they were between troops of yours and between armed bands of the insurgents; they involved tactical and strategical I considerations from your side?
A I don't think one can talk of strategical considerations, because by strategical considerations one would understand the leading of large units. I would say from considerations which had to be madethey show quite clearly from documents--and they arose from the fact that already my predecessor, Field Marshal List had ordered that the bands, as far as one knew where they were located, had to be attacked, and that for this reason not only very weak units, e.g. very small troops, but instead stronger forces, should be applied as had been previously done.
Q Now, in any event, Boehme and Bader fought these armed bands, because of the tactical power and duty that they had, isn't that true? When you refer to the power which you had as a Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and in the paragraph of the document which I called to your attention there were two types of subordination, tactical subordination and territorial subordination. Now, Boehme, and later Bader, fought units by virtue of their tactical subordination to you, didn't they?
A Tactical subordination and territorial subordination overlapped. In the directive about the subordination in the southeast area it says clearly that the commanders had to establish law and order in their own district, and that restoring law and order in Serbia could only be carried out by tactical operations, that is quite obvious.
Q Now, supposing Boehme took measures against individual citizens who were not members of armed bands, because those individual citizens sabotaged your lines of communication; would he act against those individual citizens by virtue of his territorial jurisdiction or by virtue of his tactical jurisdiction?
A On the basis of hisoterritorial jurisdiction.
Q Very well. Now, do you agree that when we speak of tactical subordination we mean Boehme and Bader's duty to wage war and to defeat in battle the armed bands of insurgents, and when we speak of territorial subordination we mean Boehme and Bader's duty in Serbia to take measures against individual citizens, not members of armed bands, because of the actions of those citizens against your troops?
A I don't believe it can be differentiated in this manner. It is quite obvious that the task of General Boehme and General Bader was to g t rid of the spots of unrest. This task cannot be regarded as of a tactical nature. It is a territorial task which, however, necessitated tactical measures that is the use of military unit in order to put down these uprisings.
Q By virtue of their territorial duties Boehme and Bader had to pacify and bring order to Serbia, and one of the methods they employed to bring about that pacification was by the committing of various units of German troops against the bands is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q Well, it is very difficult to differentiate between tactical and territorial duties. About all you can say is it was your duty to pacify the area and to do everything you could and adopt all measures you could to solve that problem?
A Yes, and it was quite clearly ordered in that manner. May I say something else? The conception "troop" also included police forces, as to begin with they were stationed in Serbia, so that wouldn't only include members of the armed forces, but members of the police.
Q And ordinarily police units were used against the civilian population and were not employed the way military units were employed against the armed bands in military operation?
A No, that can clearly be seen from all the directives which the SS and police leader received, and wherein it is emphasized that from now on all police forces were subordinate to him only, and the military commander could only assume command over him in emergencies of a tactical nature, and I believe that part of the trouble existing between the military staff and the administrative staff can be traced back to the fact that there was never a complete agreement between those questions. The police was, of course first of all competent for their police tasks and the troops for the military tasks.
Q Boehme, as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia could give orders to both military offices and civilian offices, couldn't he?
A No. Civilian authorities in Serbia also included the Plenipotentiary for Economy and he could not give any orders from the man in charge of the 4-year plan.
Q Now, Thurner, who was Chief of the .Administrative Staff under Boehme and later under Bader, was Thurner's office considered a civilian office or a military office?
A. It was not a civil authority; it was an administrative authority such as the Army had had previously and quite frequently; Boehme was his superior, but I have already testified that I had to find that Thurner liked to go his own ways, which can be traced back to the fact that all administrative matters were originally under the jurisdiction of the quartermaster General and were channelled directly to Thurner, and that going to all these new regulations this could not be altered.
Q. If Boehme had the power to give orders to Thurner, Thurner was subordinate to Boehme, he was a member of his staff.
A. He was subordinate to Boehme, and later on he was also subordinate to Bader.
Q. And if Thruner wanted to go his own way and Boehme tried to stop him, he could have issued orders to Thurner, couldn't he?
A. He could have issued orders to Thurner, yes.
Q. Will you turn to Exhibit 50, General, in Document Book No. II, on Page 57 of the English and Page 46 of the German. This is Field Marshal List's order of 19 September 1941, and in the second sentence it clearly outlines Boehme's power. "In compliance with Fuehrer order I transfer to General Boehme the entire executive power in Serbia. All command authorities and forces of the Army existing there or to be transferred there are subordinate to him. As the only possessor of executive power in accordance with the Fuehrer order he can give instructions to all military and civilian offices." That order gave Boehme full powers in Serbia. Was this order ever changed and was Thurner's subordination to Boehme and later Bader ever changed during your term as Deputy Armed Forces Commander, Southeast?
A. No, but it says here in this directive of Field Marshal List that the interests of the four-year plan had to be taken into consideration and safe guarded. I have already testified that I did not succeed in removing Thurner from his position, and that in spite of personal representations with Keitel I could not succeed to solve this problem.
Q. Thurner had nothing to do with the four-year plan in general?
A. No, not directly with the four-year plan. I beg your pardon. I only mentioned this because in the previous sentence it said that the Commanding General had authorities regarding all offices, but this can only be understood in the framework of the measures which executive power necessitates, as, for instance, the suppression of unrest, etc. But if one does not read the second sentence one could be of the opinion that in economic questions Boehme also had authority, and that is not correct, and I also know from the documents that Field Marshal List, when he applied for Boehme to be appointed, pointed out this particular item quite clearly.
Q. You would like to except from Boehme's power authority on his part to give orders with respect to the four-year plan?
A. Yes.
Q. But it is clear, is it not, that Boehme had full power to give orders to Thurner?
A. Yes, he could give to Thurner orders.
Q. Field Marshal List appointed Boehme as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia in September 1941, and you did not arrive in the Southeast until late October, 1941. Boehme, you remember, stayed until December, 1941, so that he was there during the whole month of November when you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander, Southeast?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you feel free to give orders to Boehme?
A. I could give orders to Boehme.
Q. And if Boehme had done anything which you disagreed with, you could have had him replaced, couldn't you?
A. Yes, I could have made an application to have him replaced, but I could not have dismissed him on my own initiative.
Q. You never did ask to have Boehme replaced. Can we assume that you agreed with everything Boehme did?
A. I have already testified I have only gained knowledge here about the excesses which occurred under Boehme, Regarding his tactical measures I had nothing to criticize. His leadership in this sphere, which occupied him fulltime, was without blame, even looking at it now in retrospect.
Q. What about the order to pacify Serbia? Did you agree with the methods Boehme used to bring about pacification and order in Serbia?
A. If by that you mean whether I agreed with all the events which occurred under Boehme and which have been mentioned here, I must say no. What was known to me at that time was that the situation made it necessary that severe measures be applied.
Q. If you had known, General Kuntze, the things you you now know, regarding the measures which Boehme took to pacify Serbia, would you have taken steps to make him stop using those measures?
A. I answer that question with "yes", and I can confirm this answer yes by mentioning my personal attitude during my term of office.
Q. Did the fact that Field Marshal List appointed Boehme have any influence upon you in determining whether or not to replace him? Did you feel obliged to accept Field Marshal List's appointment?
A. That was not the reason. The reason was that a number of events which had occurred in Serbia and of which Boehme must have had knowledge on the basis of these documents, That these facts were not known to us.
Q. You felt free, did you not, General Kuntze, to repeal any of List's previous orders? You felt no restrictions because you were simply List's deputy, did you?
A. I have already testified that certainly I was authorized to cancel orders or to change them, but that it was, of course, very difficult, regarding the large sphere of work, to gain an overall picture, and that further I saw no reason to deviate from orders which had been previously issued as far as I got to know them, and that furthermore of the basic order which ordered everything that actually happened, I only got to know rather late, as far as I remember, and that is to be regarded as the main reason for the change of the whole situation in Serbia which dates as of the fights in Uzice, and that was the reason for my taxing mitigating measures.
Q. You arrived in the southeast, I believe you said, on the 26th or 27th of October, and you learned when you got there that Field Marshal List had been in the hospital since the 15th October. Did you find out who was in charge of the Twelfth Army and who was acting as Armed Forces Commander, Southeast, between the 15th and the time when you arrived?
A. I don't know whether I discussed this question with the staff, but the situation was this, that we were pressed for time because a transfer to Saloniki was expected, and whether I asked the Chief this particular question, I don't know any more now.