Q. As we see, we can deduce reprisal measures from some documents and from another large number of documents we cannot find any reprisal measures. Did you ever look through the entire build of your documents during your period of office in order to gain a picture how these reprisal measures were carried out as contrasted with the German losses in dead and wounded and the losses of the troops allied at that time with the German troops?
A. Yes, I did that. In order to give an account of myself I have examined all reports as far as they are contained in the documents. The following picture was the result, without any gaps, the reports for the whole period of time, by means of the ten-day reports, and also through the situation reports, as you have just mentioned, from the 16th of July to the 5th of August, to give an example, and from the activity report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, which is only represented partly in document here, but was just put at our disposal in separate documents. I furthermore compared the ten-day reports as far as possible with the reports coming in every day in order to eliminate any sources of error, and I came to the following conclusion. The ratio of the losses as reported with the reprisal measures carried out for losses does by no means reach the reprisal guota. It is rather 1 to 1.5. It was not possible for me to establish in how far reprisal measures for sabotage acts are to be calculated into this summary as well, because reports about sabotage acts are very scarce, because as has been stated here repeatedly the daily reports, as well as the ten-day reports did not give the sabotage acts as reason for reprisal measures which might have been planned or carried out. I can only say that the sabotage acts in Serbia were comparatively numerous in December. I remember a ten-day report directed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, in which the number of sabotage acts for two report; periods was given as 78. For the later period the activity report directed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast states that approximately from the spring of 1942 onwards the situation in the Serbian area was in general quiet.
That is to say, there were no large risings. Sabotage acts did, of course, accur nevertheless as I have already stated, in the former insurgent territories in Northwest Serbia and in the neighborhood west of Nish.
Q. Witness, don't let's concern ourselves with the sabotage acts because we can't fix them definitely. I have understood that in your calculation you established first of all the German and Allied losses during your period of office. Can you give us figures regarding the German and Allied losses?
A. The number of dead on the Allied side was 2036.
Q. 2036? Could you subdivide this figure according to Germans and Allies?
A. In my reports three Germans were mentioned; 35 Croatians, 27 Bulgarians; 12 Italians, 167 members of the Gendarmeric, and the Lountain Security Services had three.
Q. Those were the dead. Can you give us figures regarding the wounded?
A. The number of wounded is 2461 according to my calculation.
Q. And these wounded are presumably also spread over these groups which you have just mentioned?
A. Yes, they are also for those groups.
Q. These are the losses on the one side. Did you also add up how may reprisal measures were taken for these losses during your period of office?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I believe the witness has been asked to draw certain conclusions from the documents, and it seems that he has taken the figures mentioned in the documents and added them up and made his own calculations and conclusions. I think he should be asked rather to state facts and what he remembers, rather than conclusions of what he drawn from the documents
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The conclusions of course should conform with the facts, but the objection will be overruled.
DR. MENZEL: I have tried not to get conclusions from the witness, but rather to get actual figures reckoned from the documents.
Q. (By Dr. Menzel) May I ask you how many reprisal measures for these losses on the German and Allied side were found by you in the documents relating to your period of office?
A. Altogether 4097. These figures were reported as reprisal measures, I have established from the documents that the troops repeatedly mention hostages and reports them as such, not cases in which actually the hostages wore shot as a reprisal measure, but rather insurgents captured in combat who had been sentenced by court martial.
I have already stated previously that the bulk of these people were not hostages but insurgents who had deserved death.
Q You have just mentioned figures to us. Have you gone carefully through every document so that at least according to your knowledge you have not left out any figures?
A I have not looked once through these documents but repeatedly, and have checked them according to my best knowledge and belief.
Q I now come to another point. During your period of office, as is asserted, a large part of the occupied Southeast was devastated by burning down of houses and villages?
A I believe I have already stated that I was just as much interested in increasing and improving the economy in Serbia as I was interested in doing it for Greece, and that during my period of office the devastation of villages did not occur, speaking generally. We have a number of reports, I just said something wrong, rather I should say few reports are in existence relating to the burning down of houses, and I have also checked these reports, and I have found that these cases were measures which were dictated by military necessity and are justified by military necessity. In one document a village was in fact burned down by Bulgarian troops during combat action, and that happened during a time in which Bulgarian troops were not subordinated to me, as far as I remember, in November.
Q I am submitting a document to you in this connection, Exhibit 85 in Document Book 3, Page 22 of the German Document Book and Page 27 of the English Document Book. At Page 22 of the German book. Is the village of Vutje mentioned in this document?
A It stated under an entry in a war diary issued by the Army Command 65, on the 30th of November, in the area of the 717th Division, Vutje, V-u-t-j-e, 14.5 kilometers south of Lescovac, was burned down as the locality of bandits.
Q Was this reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A I must find it out from the files. I find here a note which refers to Page 93.
Q You have probably referred to Exhibit 108 in the same volume, Page 93 of the German text and Page 135 of the English Document Book.
A That is a daily report of the 30th of November. That is the same day as has been mentioned in the war diary, and this daily report is entered in an activity report of the 717th Division. That is, it was not sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and the Third Section Commander of Nish with Bulgarian Units, set Vutje on fire, 14.5 kilometers south of Lescovac, since it was defended by bandits. I may add that this can only be a case of Bulgarian units which were employed on the railroad line from Nish to Skoplje, and as I have already stated, they were not subordinate to me at that time.
Q Would you look at Exhibit 112 in the same book? That is Page 105 in the German Document Book and 155 in the English Document Book.
A This document is an activity report of the 704th Infantry Division which was not known to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and under the entry of the 8th of December it contains the note that a group of Cetniks reports that on the 17th of November the house of the mayor, who cooperated with Communists, was set on fire. The Division adds to this lengthy report of the Cetnik group the note that the credibility of this report must be doubted very much.
Q In this connection I submit to you Exhibit 151 in Document Book VI, German Page 49 and English Page 61.
A This document is a radio message of the Third Battalion of the Infantry Regiment 697, to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. A note to the fact that it was sent at all, I can't find here. It arrived on the 30th of November and reads in extract, "Tallisavac" - I spell it T-a-l-l-i-s-a-v-a-c - "was taken with artillery support after heavy combat. In many houses here again German equipment was found.
These houses were set fire."
Q I will now ask you another question. Do you know who ordered the transportation of prisoners in the Reich on into other territories occupied at that time by the German Armed Forces?
A I have already stated yesterday that this is not known to me, and that this order for the transportation of captured insurgents was issued either by the Quartermaster General, or through the General in Command of the Police.
Q In this connection, I submit a document to you, Document Book 7, Exhibit 183, page 52 in the German, and page 69 in the English document book. What do you find there?
A May I ask you again for the Exhibit number?
Q Exhibit 183, page 52 in the German book.
A The deportation of labor?
Q No, the deportation of Jews.
A This is a report to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast from one Commanding General and Commander in Serbia. That is an extract from the daily report of the 19th of March, and it says that 500 Jews were transported from Kos-Mitrovica to Semlin. Whether this is only an intention or was actually carried out, I am not quite clear. However, since it says, "transported", it was probably carried out.
Q Were you competent for this matter, or was this an administrative measure?
A This was a police measure.
Q Do you know anything about how the prisoners of allied armed forces were treated in the Balkans?
A The prisoners of allied forces were treated as prisoners of war.
Q Do you know of any case in which there was a deviation from this practice?
A In one report it says that 3 English soldiers , former soldiers who could not however be recognized as such from the state of their clothing, who had joined the bandits, were shot while taking part in combat with the Bulgarians.
Q I now submit to you document 212, in Document Book 8, page 68 of the German, and page 83 of the English document book. This is a supplement to an activity report of the 717th Division. It is a supplement to an activity report from the 1st to the 15th of August, 1942, and it says that during a large operation of the 794th Infantry Regiment, the Bulgarian troops got in the frontier to the west and captured ten men carrying arms, and after having been interrogated they were shot by the Bulgarians. Among them were three Englishmen, one of whom is supposed to have been an officer.
It is not assumed that they were parachutists, but escaped prisoners of war. The bad state of their clothes seems to confirm this.
Q. I submit another document to you, Exhibit 227, Document Book 9; that is on page 51 of the German and on page 36 of the English Document Book.
A This document is a report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, dated the 3rd of August, 1942, addressed to the OKH, Army General Staff, Operations Branch, and it says in the second paragraph that in the Italian occupied territory near Novodinje, 24 Km. southeast of Mostar, a British intelligence officer who apparently had parachuted down, was killed by anti-communists. It is quite clear from this report that this case had nothing to do with German troops. This is clear first of all from the title of this paragraph, "Italian Occupied Territory". A couple of reports have been left out here. Mostar is situated, or was situated in that part of Croatia which was occupied at that time by the Italians.
Q We now turn to the Commissar order, which is contained in Exhibit 14, Document Bonk 1, page 34 of the German, and page 49 of the English, and which was repeatedly mentioned here. May I repeat, Exhibit 14, Volume 1, page 49 of the English book. Did you receive this commissar order?
A I received the Commissar order after I entered upon my duties in the east, in June, 1941.
Q Did you receive it orally or in written form?
A I received it orally from General Strauss who was Commanding General at that time.
Q What was General Strauss' attitude toward this order?
A General Strauss did give his order in the form in which it is submitted here. Quite briefly, an order had been issued by the OKW to the effect that Commissars were to be shot. He added that in his army command the commissars were to be treated as prisoners of war and were not to be shot. I transmitted this order in this form to the officers subordinate to me at that time.
Q If you say, "in this form" what was meant by it?
A That commissars were to be treated as prisoners of war.
Q: Were commissars Captured in your area?
A: Not as came to my knowledge.
Q: Did you hear something about the capturing of commissars by other units of the 9th army?
A: I heard about this during my imprisonment. My Division commander told me at that time, that as Regimental Commander, he had captured commissars and that these commissars were treated as prisoners of war as he had been ordered. This was the case of a unit which was employed in the area of the 9th army.
Q: This was the commissar order. Now what about the so-called Commando order?
A: The commando order was, according to the document issued when I was no longer armed forces commander southeast.
Q: When did you leave the southeast?
A: On the 8th of August, 1942, I left the southeast and handed it over to my successor.
Q: In this connection I submit the commando order. This is exhibit 225, document book 9, page 41 of the German text, and page 28 of the English.
Is it correct that you received this order?
A: The report is dated the 18th of October 1942, and I cannot have received it in my capacity as deputy armed forced commander southeast.
Q: Where were you during October, 1942?
A: In October, 1942, I was Chief of Training for the Home Reserve Army in Berlin. In this capacity I had nothing to do with troops at the front, only with training of the Home Reserve Army.
Q: Was it known to you that in Athens, hostages were executed for sabotage committed on the railroad lines?
A: This can be seen from the documents. I believe it is a daily report.
Q: Who was responsible for the security of the railroad lines there?
A: The security of railroads in Athens, that is of the whole railroad line north of Athens, at least up to the Brale bridge, - I know that exactly because I often visited the Bralo bridge, - was the task of the Italians.
Q: If this was the task of the Italians, were the reprisal measures also the responsibility of the Italians?
A: Yes, in tactical and territorial matters, the Italians were responsible.
I have already stated previously that in the harbor Piraeus, it was subordinate under the command of the Germans in that area.
Q: In conclusion I will turn now to the state of health of the Greek population. How did these difficulties in Greece arise?
A: The difficulties in Greece, with regard to the supply, and that I briefly repeat, - first of all they were due to the lack of food stocks for the Greek population; secondly, they were due to the fact that the grain already bought by Greece, awaiting shipment in the harbor of Alexandria, could no longer be brought to Greece, and that was due to the great transportation difficulties, - that is the due routes were made unsafe by English submarines, and also by the very difficult conditions on the railroads which I have already mentioned.
Q: Did the Germans try to improve the security of the sea routes?
A: Yes, we tried to do this by making the coastal positions work again, but most of the coastal positions had been destroyed by the English before the retreat, and it was almost the business of the German Navy to repair the ships in the German docks.
Q: When did you leave the Balkans?
A: I handed over my office to my successor on the 8th of August 1942, and on the 9th of August in the morning, I left.
Q: Subsequent to that what did you do?
A: For a short time I belonged to the Fuehrer Reserve, and then on the 15th of September, effective from the 1st of October, I was appointed Chief of Training for the Home Reserve Army.
Q: Since when did you have your last service rank?
A: My last service rank dates from the 15th of February, 1938.
Q: After that you were not promoted?
A: No.
Q: Was that unusual?
A: In general, it was like this, that Generals, on taking over a new position, whose former incumbent had occupied a higher rank, were promoted after a certain time. I was never appointed Commanding General of the 12th Army or Armed Forces CommanderSoutheast.
Q: What did you personally think was the reason for the fact that you were not included in promotions?
A: I have already said that during my period of office, great differences arose between the OKW and myself, and that the OKW severely criticized my activities on the Balkans and in the end, it is obvious that this must have been the reason for this.
Q: Was the fact that the OKW did not approve of your activities in the Balkans known to your collaborators as well?
A: I do not believe that it remained hidden from them.
Q. Did your associates also know that the criticism had, as its main basis, that according to the OKW you were too mild, too weak?
A: I do not want to give any personal opinion on that here.
DR. MENZEL: I shall prove this by other means.
That is all I have to ask the witness at this stage of the proceedings.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well, are there further questions on the part of the defense counsel.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. HINDEMITH deputizing for Dr. Rauschenbach, for General Foertsch.
Q: General Foertsh was chief of staff under you in the Southeast; did you know him before that?
A: No, I did not know General Foertsch before that.
Q: I have a question. In a question on direct examination you said that you had been with the OKW and Hitler before you took ever your office in the southeast, before you went to the headquarters. Did you interrupt your train journey in Belgrade, and did you discuss matters with the competent headquarters in Belgrade? I want to know whether this decision to break your journey in Belgrade, was based on your own initiative or whether the suggestion was given to you by any other party?
A: There was no suggestion from any third party. There could not have been any suggestion, because I had not discussed anything with the staff. I must tell you here that I did not talk in Belgrade to competent headquarters, but with the then commanding general, Boehme.
Q: Wouldn't it have been possible that this suggestion was issued by the OKW?
A: The trip to Belgrade and the interruption of my trip to the Army Headquarters is based on my own initiative.
Q: I have another question. Had you been getting along smooth with you chief of staff General Foertsch?
A: I can only say that we worked very well together.
Q: Were you informed by him sufficiently?
A: Yes, I was sufficiently informed by him.
Q: Was Foertsch of a very independent -
JUDGE BURKE: Permit a pause between your interrogation and the answer, please.
Q Did you ever establish that he exceeded his powers as Chief of Staff?
A No, I certainly never ascertained that.
Q What was his relationship to the IKW? How did he represent that attitude, that is to say, the attitude of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A General Foertsch agreed with me not only in his judgment of the matters which were ordered by the OKW but also in judging the entire situation. As it became clear, with the continuous failure of reinforcements, he repeatedly reported to me that he talked to the people in the OKW who were responsible for these matters and that he told them what the views of the Staff of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast were.
Q You mentioned that you severely criticized the attitude and measures of the OKW and that you made presentations to the OKW in this connection. Was Foertsch of the same opinion in these matters as you were?
A The first pre-requisite for the Staff was that the Chief of Staff and his first counsellor should conform in their views. General Foertsch, I knew, had the same worries as I had. He had to suffer from the same pressure as I.
Q I may state here that there was complete conformity in the views of both of you?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q In your examination you said that you have tried in particular to oppose the stronger measures which were demanded by the OKW in February and March?
A Yes.
Q And you looked upon those measures which had been requested by the OKW as inexpedient?
A Yes.
Q And in this connection you made representations to the OKW?
A Yes, I made representations to the OKW.
Q Can you give us further details regarding the views you opposed to those of the OKW?
A I believe I have already mentioned that there were two arguments which caused me to make representations to the OKW and which made me oppose their views. The first was that I did not believe that the very harsh measures demanded by the OKW would help in the pacification of the country. And the second argument was that the carrying out of these very harsh measures would have meant a great loss for the Serbian economy.
Q How were your protests received by the OKW?
A I have already stated that they were severely rejected.
Q Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there further questions on the part of defense counsel?
Mr. Denney? Mr. Fenstermacher?
You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTENMACHER:
Q General Kuntze, I think we had better first clarify the extent of your power and command jurisdiction during the time when you were in charge of the 12th Army and simultaneously Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast. You had, did you not, all the cower which Field Marshal List had before you?
A I have stated that in deputizing for Field Marshal List the tasks and the responsibilities which he had were transferred to me.
Q Now, List had two sources of power. He had territorial jurisdiction and he had executive power. Isn't that correct?
A I have not understood your question.
Q It appears from Hitler Order No. 31 that Field Marshal List had all the powers of a territorial commander in addition to having executive power in the Southeast.
Do you recall that?
A Yes.
Q And by executive power we mean control over the whole area and over all the German troops in the area for tactical purposes, do we not?
AAll troops included in the Southeastern Area were subordinate to him as far as they belonged to the Army.
Q And that represents Field Marshal List's executive power, doesn't it? That is to say, tactical.
A No, this is a tactical authority. Executive power of Field Marshal List was also mentioned in the order which was merely a repetition of the first order. Field Marshal List transferred this power to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia for the Serbian area and for Greece to the troop commanders. In southern Greece this was done again and also with the commander in Crete.
Q What is the difference between tactical authority and executive power?
A Tactical subordination means that troops, for instance in combat, or in movement during or after combat, have to act according to orders of the tactical commander. And executive power means that the execitive in the area in question is transferred to the possessors of this power. That is, he ie entitled to issue orders to a point and to lower officials. That is all I can say about this.
Q Administrative matters--matters of administering the occupied area--are they part of executive power?
A No, the commander in question could, of course, in administrative matters give certain orders if they were not contradicted by orders of the OKW or some Reich office, or cancelled by such orders.
Q Can the holder of executive power appoint administrative officials, or is he only permitted to appoint military officials-troops commanders and the like?
AAs I have already said before, it is also valid for peace-time where it sometimes happens that executive newer was transferred to a military commander.
He could give directives to the administrative office in question It is known that for this purpose the Commander Serbia and also other offices had special administrative staffs.
Q Very well. The bearer of executive newer then can appoint administrative officials. Is that what you just said? He can give orders to administrative officials?
A He can give orders to administrative officials, yes.
Q Now, what authority and powers does a territorial commander have? Are they different from those which the bearer of executive power enjoys.
A It's different insofar as the executive power means an extension of his area of command, and a command has in general to do the task of the accommodations and supply. With the transfer of executive cower he has to handle all matters for the security and the law and order of the territory for which he is responsible.
Q The bearer of territorial jurisdiction then has the job of maintaining security and order in his occupied area? Is that correct?
A It executive power has been transferred to him, yes.
Q I don't quite understand, General Kuntze. Are there not two sources of power--territorial jurisdiction and executive power? And are they not both occupied in many cases by two different persons?
A No, in the Southeastern area things were like this: the territorial commanders also had the executive power. There were no two persons side by side.
Q Now, you, as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast, held both sources of power. You had power of the territorial commander over the whole area, and you had executive power over the whole area.
A The executive power had been transferred to the commanders which had been employed in Greece and Serbia, as was possible according to the Fuehrer directive.
Q Yes, but you had it first in order to be able to transfer it to them, did you not? They got it only through you.
A Provisions were made in the Fuehrer directive that the executive power was vested in the Armed Forces Commander Southeast which he could transfer to the commanders subordinate to him, and this happened in the order issued by Field Marshal List and also in the order issued by me on the 5th of November, and, as I have already stated, this order was only in form something new. Instead of the Commanding General in Serbia, the Plenipotentiary General in Serbia was mentioned.
Q Did you also transfer your power as a territorial commander over the Southeast to the individual commanders in Serbia and Saloniki, the Aegian, etc -- in addition to the transferring of your executive power?
A They were territorial commanders.
Q But you were the main territorial commander. That is, you were the territorial commander for the whole Southeast, and they simply had smaller segments of that area?
A Yes, I was commanding the whole area, and under me these people were territorial commanders and also bearers of executive power.
Q Now, you were the most important single military person in the whole Southeast during the time you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast, were you not?
A I say first that I understood this question to be whether I was the most important persons as far as military matters are concerned, and I answered, "You mean the first military person to whom these commanders were subordinate?" This is true, but one can also imagine under the word "important" that everything which was present in the Southeastern area of military forces was subordinate to this "important person." This is not correct. The Air Force was excepted, also the Navy, and it also happened that the official chain of command was not adhered to. For instance, orders were given directly from the superior officers to subordinate officers. And for this reason I cannot answer the question as to who was the most important or the most powerful person. I cannot answer this question with a "yes."
Q Now, General, as Commander in Chief of the 12th Army, you had charge of all the Army troops in the Southeast area, and in your capacity as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast you had not only the Army but the Navy and the Luftwaffe under practical subordination as well.