Q How did the change of the order of the 19th of March, regarding treatment of prisoners come about?
A On the basis of a protest which General Bader made against this order of the 19th of March. The explanation is this: General Bader had received, through administrative channels, a direct order from the Quatermaster General, according to which captured insurgents --and he says this later on--are to be transferred to German spheres of interest. This is again proof of the direct traffic which was still through official administrative channels between Serbia and the superior offices. If the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had got knowledge of this order, this order would certainly have been included in the order of the 19th of March.
Q What do you understand by "Suspects" in this order?
A I believe I have already stated previously that it had become common usage a very unfortunate usage that persons who were actively supporting the bands were described as "suspects."
Q Were such suspects to be shot at once or not?
A No, they were to be arrested and to be sentenced according to martial law.
Q I must now submit a document to you, Exhibit 529, in Volume 24, German Page 69, English Page 106. For whom was this document intended?
A We have already discussed this question. This was the answer of General Bader to the OKW Order of the first of February 1942. In this answer General Bader says under "4" arrested suspects the question of guilt after has been investigated in accordance with martial law are subjected to the following procedure: (a) those found to be guilty are to be shot; (b) all persons where the question of guilt cannot be clarified without doubt, are to be transfered to a prison camp for the execution of reprisal measures, (c) those found to be innocent are to be released.
Q In this context, I submit another document to you--Exhibit 175 in Document Book 7, in the German Document Book it is Page 39, and in the English Document Book it is on Page 48.
A. This document is an order by the 714th Division of the 15th of February 1942. Under "3" it says, "Persons who are encountered in the combat terrain during the fighting are to be arrested and to be investigated and to be interrogated. Depending on the result of the interrogation, they are to be released or they are to be sent to the competent District Headquarters as prisoners for reprisal measures."
Q. We now go back to the directives which were annexed to this order. In. No. 6 of these directives you spoke of the destruction of villages. Can you tell us something regarding this?
A. Regarding the destriction of villages, the same is said as in the Usac record, that is, that villages in which weapons and ammunition are found are to be destroyed, and these directives, in addition to the effect that villages near places where sabotage acts have taken place and also villages which are strongly suspected of having helped bands, are to be destroyed. In my view this is a completely justified reprisal under military necessity, because experience has told us that again and again in the same neighborhood and from the same villages surprise attacks and sabotage acts originated. If one follows the reports about sabotage acts, (as far as these reports are present in documents, in most cases they arc lacking,) -- one can always establish the same source of unrest , roughly speaking near Uzice and Sarajevo and some places south of the border of southern and northern Serbia.
Q. Under No. 6 you talk of other reprisal measures?
A. They were included probably. I cannot prove this, but I believe it because in the OKW order they must also be included. The directives represent a summary. These reprisal measures are, however, considerably restricted by the fact that they cannot be used as orders , because under "6" it says, it may, and then for instance, this can be done.
Q. I understand you consider that they were potential directives, but not obligatory directives?
A. Yes, they were potential directives.
Q. If you now speak of male inhabitants in the immediate neighborhood, what do you mean by that?
A. We mean by this the hostage prisoners who had been taken from these well-known sources of unrest, and who had been put into the hostages camps and who in such cases were to be used in cases of reprisal.
Q. What did you rule under "3" of the order?
A. It was clear to me that the order would have results with the troops , which I did not fathom, and which I did not intend it to have, and for this reason I pointed out under "3" that in the case of excesses and plunder, severe punishments would be meted out, that the soldier had to restrain himself in his behaviour towards the population.
Q.The order also says that if there is a suspicion of mines the mopping-up operations are to be carried out if possible by the insurgents or by the population. What do you mean by "suspicion of mines," and "mopping-up operations?"
A. This passage is contained in the directives under "F", and in the case of "suspicion of mines" it states that the mopping up operation is to be carried out by insurgents or by the Serbian population, if at all possible , also block-off and destruction. I believe as an old engineer , I may say that, it is , linguistic usage, especially in regard to the clearing of mines, that the destruction of these mines is ordered by the words , "mopping-up." That is, if a "moppingup" of mines is ordered , the units which has been ordered to carry out this operation with the instruments at their disposal, must remove these mines; but everyone who has had anything to do with these matters knows that the clearing of mines, for instance, on roads causes a lot of damages.
For instance, in order to remove the mines the surface of the roads has to be torn up, and the removal of this damage causes a lot of work. Clearing means to put this damage in order again.
Q. Do you mean to say that the clearing of the mines was not to be carried out by the population?
A. No, not by the population.
Q. I now submit to you two further documents, Exhibit 188, in Document Book VII, page 72 of the German text and page 86 of the English text. Is there any connection between this document and your order of March 19?
A. This Document 330 is an order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, dated the 25 March, relating to the order of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast of March 19, and refers to further orders of the Commanding General and Commander of the 28 March and 21 March. Under "3" it says that "insurgents not captured in combat, insurgents having surrendered and given up their arms, and persons under arrest because they are suspected of having supported or collaborated with the insurgents, that all these three categories are not to be shot to death, but are to be sent to a concentration camp, and the Deputy of the Senior SS and Police Leader will interrogate them and order their dispostion, -For instance, transport them to the interest of Germany for compulsory labor."
The other document, 1035, is an order of the 714th Division, subordinate to the Plenipotentiary General, issued on 13 March.
Q. What is the exhibit number?
A. That is Exhibit 190.
Q. That is the German text on page 74, and the English text page 90 of the Document Book VII.
A. Yes, and it contains under "3" the same as I have already read from the order of the Commanding General in Serbia of 25 March.
Q Were these people who were to he transported and used as laborers to be shot according to martial law?
A Yes, according to the laws of war they were to be shot.
Q Is there then a mitigation in this regulation?
A Yes, I see a mitigation in this order.
Q How did the situation in Serbia develop until your recall?
A The situation in Serbia remained peaceful contrary to the expectation that in the Spring a new wave of unrest would break out-part from a few isolated cases of sabotage in the neighborhood of Northwest Serbia and around Nish. However the position in Croatia, in spite of the measures for a joint operation, for subsequent joint operation, became restless. The operation which had been agreed on in Usac failed chiefly because the Italian forces which were to take part, arrived too lake. The subsequent operations dealt with areas in the neighborhood east of Sarajevo and as soon as the operations stopped, unrest broke out again; and the operations further concerned themselves with the sources of unrest east of Sarajevo and near Prejidor, and in that neighborhood too the difficulty was that the troops used for the Italians demanded for collaboration did not appear in full numbers, and that the young Coratian armed forces had reverses from time to time. It became necessary constantly to transfer new forces in the Serbia area to Croptia.
Q What was the result of this behavior of the Italians for the insurgents?
A I have already said that the passivity of the Italians was the cause of the insurgents getting additional followers from all these areas, and that at the start of an operation by the Germans and Croatians, they could evade and flee into the Italian territory. I must also emphasize here again that the use of the Chetnicks against the Croats was one of the main reasons for the great losses under which not only the Croatian troops but the Croatian population had to suffer.
Q How does it come about that during the fighting the insurgents and the Partisans received much larger losses than the German troops?
A I have already told in my description of the fighting near Uzice how a fight took place between military troops and partisans. May I repeat quite briefly that there was certainly no open fighting and generally speaking a fight with an opponent who fought from ambush or from hiding. We also had actions in which the enemy who used his evasive tactics too late was captured in positions because in most cases he was not trained, and in most cases these people had turned to the partisans without any training, as they were captured in positions where they had assembled in great force. To this we have to add that the partisans lacked heavy weapons, such as artillery and heavy machine guns, mortars, etc. I must add here that what the insurgents had of artillery and it was little enough, they were deprived of this in Uzice, or in January in Croatia and what they lost in material in Uzice and Eastern Croatia was very high, and when I investigated the number of rifles conformed to the number of dead and this is proof how greatly the insurgents must have suffered from loss of material at that time especially.
Q How does it come about that during your period of office, losses were listed for a certain period in your reports to the OKW?
A The cause of this is that as far as I remember in December I had ordered that summaries were to be made.
Q If apart from the losses, higher reprisal, measures were listed, were these always carried out in the manner in which they were listed?
A No, as has already been stated in the beginning, the reprisal measures were reported in a disguised manner especially in January and February because they were reported as intended and planned without actually being carried out in the ratio in which they had been reported.
Q I now submit to you Exhibit 159 in Volume VI, in the German page 75; in the English page 93. If you look at the last page of this document, can you tell us something about the number of reprisal measures which were be to speak in arrears?
A I believe you can see the figure from the file note of the 20 of December 1941. I dislike treating these measures in such a mathematical and calculating way.
Q Do you want to tell us that there were great arrears in these reprisal measures. During year period of office in general were the reprisal measures decreased?
A Yes, I have already stated there was a considerable decrease of reprisal measures, and happily in the months of that summer thanks to the Serbian population remaining quiet we could report that we had taken no reprisal measures at all.
Q I submit to you Exhibit 533 in Document Book 24, page 92 of the German text and page 131 of the English. Can you tell us that no reprisal measures were taken for certain periods of time.
A I may add here that the office of the Commanding General in Serbia was as far as I remember changed in February to Commanding General and Commander in Serbia. These reports include the time from the 21st of June to the 11th of August and reprisal measures are not mentioned. In first report we cannot describe as a reprisal measure in the situation report of the period between the 21st to the 31st of July where it states under 5 that under prisoners, 1,346 prisoners were captured; 69 partisans were shot.
TEE PRESIDENT: Pardon me please. We will not be able to complete examination concerning this exhibit so the Tribunal will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow meaning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours tomorrow morning)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 26 September 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the Defendant Von Weichs who is absent to prepare his case.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
WALTER LUNTZE - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) DR. MENZEL: Your Honor, yesterday we had stopped with Document Exhibit 533, Document Book XXIV, Page 92 of the German text and Page 131 of the English Document Book.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The document book number, please?
DR. MENZEL: This is Document Book No. XXIV, Exhibit 533, page 92 in the German book and Page 131 of the English.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q. Witness, would you kindly tell us something from this document about losses on the one side and reprisal measures on the other?
A. The document contains situation reports of the Commanding General of Serbia directed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, regarding losses for the period from the 16th of July to the 5th of August. From the 16th of July to the 5th of August the losses of the German-Croation Armed forces were very considerable. Reprisal measures are not given in this situation report.
Q. As we see, we can deduce reprisal measures from some documents and from another large number of documents we cannot find any reprisal measures. Did you ever look through the entire build of your documents during your period of office in order to gain a picture how these reprisal measures were carried out as contrasted with the German losses in dead and wounded and the losses of the troops allied at that time with the German troops?
A. Yes, I did that. In order to give an account of myself I have examined all reports as far as they are contained in the documents. The following picture was the result, without any gaps, the reports for the whole period of time, by means of the ten-day reports, and also through the situation reports, as you have just mentioned, from the 16th of July to the 5th of August, to give an example, and from the activity report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, which is only represented partly in document here, but was just put at our disposal in separate documents. I furthermore compared the ten-day reports as far as possible with the reports coming in every day in order to eliminate any sources of error, and I came to the following conclusion. The ratio of the losses as reported with the reprisal measures carried out for losses does by no means reach the reprisal guota. It is rather 1 to 1.5. It was not possible for me to establish in how far reprisal measures for sabotage acts are to be calculated into this summary as well, because reports about sabotage acts are very scarce, because as has been stated here repeatedly the daily reports, as well as the ten-day reports did not give the sabotage acts as reason for reprisal measures which might have been planned or carried out. I can only say that the sabotage acts in Serbia were comparatively numerous in December. I remember a ten-day report directed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, in which the number of sabotage acts for two report; periods was given as 78. For the later period the activity report directed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast states that approximately from the spring of 1942 onwards the situation in the Serbian area was in general quiet.
That is to say, there were no large risings. Sabotage acts did, of course, accur nevertheless as I have already stated, in the former insurgent territories in Northwest Serbia and in the neighborhood west of Nish.
Q. Witness, don't let's concern ourselves with the sabotage acts because we can't fix them definitely. I have understood that in your calculation you established first of all the German and Allied losses during your period of office. Can you give us figures regarding the German and Allied losses?
A. The number of dead on the Allied side was 2036.
Q. 2036? Could you subdivide this figure according to Germans and Allies?
A. In my reports three Germans were mentioned; 35 Croatians, 27 Bulgarians; 12 Italians, 167 members of the Gendarmeric, and the Lountain Security Services had three.
Q. Those were the dead. Can you give us figures regarding the wounded?
A. The number of wounded is 2461 according to my calculation.
Q. And these wounded are presumably also spread over these groups which you have just mentioned?
A. Yes, they are also for those groups.
Q. These are the losses on the one side. Did you also add up how may reprisal measures were taken for these losses during your period of office?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I believe the witness has been asked to draw certain conclusions from the documents, and it seems that he has taken the figures mentioned in the documents and added them up and made his own calculations and conclusions. I think he should be asked rather to state facts and what he remembers, rather than conclusions of what he drawn from the documents
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The conclusions of course should conform with the facts, but the objection will be overruled.
DR. MENZEL: I have tried not to get conclusions from the witness, but rather to get actual figures reckoned from the documents.
Q. (By Dr. Menzel) May I ask you how many reprisal measures for these losses on the German and Allied side were found by you in the documents relating to your period of office?
A. Altogether 4097. These figures were reported as reprisal measures, I have established from the documents that the troops repeatedly mention hostages and reports them as such, not cases in which actually the hostages wore shot as a reprisal measure, but rather insurgents captured in combat who had been sentenced by court martial.
I have already stated previously that the bulk of these people were not hostages but insurgents who had deserved death.
Q You have just mentioned figures to us. Have you gone carefully through every document so that at least according to your knowledge you have not left out any figures?
A I have not looked once through these documents but repeatedly, and have checked them according to my best knowledge and belief.
Q I now come to another point. During your period of office, as is asserted, a large part of the occupied Southeast was devastated by burning down of houses and villages?
A I believe I have already stated that I was just as much interested in increasing and improving the economy in Serbia as I was interested in doing it for Greece, and that during my period of office the devastation of villages did not occur, speaking generally. We have a number of reports, I just said something wrong, rather I should say few reports are in existence relating to the burning down of houses, and I have also checked these reports, and I have found that these cases were measures which were dictated by military necessity and are justified by military necessity. In one document a village was in fact burned down by Bulgarian troops during combat action, and that happened during a time in which Bulgarian troops were not subordinated to me, as far as I remember, in November.
Q I am submitting a document to you in this connection, Exhibit 85 in Document Book 3, Page 22 of the German Document Book and Page 27 of the English Document Book. At Page 22 of the German book. Is the village of Vutje mentioned in this document?
A It stated under an entry in a war diary issued by the Army Command 65, on the 30th of November, in the area of the 717th Division, Vutje, V-u-t-j-e, 14.5 kilometers south of Lescovac, was burned down as the locality of bandits.
Q Was this reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A I must find it out from the files. I find here a note which refers to Page 93.
Q You have probably referred to Exhibit 108 in the same volume, Page 93 of the German text and Page 135 of the English Document Book.
A That is a daily report of the 30th of November. That is the same day as has been mentioned in the war diary, and this daily report is entered in an activity report of the 717th Division. That is, it was not sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and the Third Section Commander of Nish with Bulgarian Units, set Vutje on fire, 14.5 kilometers south of Lescovac, since it was defended by bandits. I may add that this can only be a case of Bulgarian units which were employed on the railroad line from Nish to Skoplje, and as I have already stated, they were not subordinate to me at that time.
Q Would you look at Exhibit 112 in the same book? That is Page 105 in the German Document Book and 155 in the English Document Book.
A This document is an activity report of the 704th Infantry Division which was not known to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and under the entry of the 8th of December it contains the note that a group of Cetniks reports that on the 17th of November the house of the mayor, who cooperated with Communists, was set on fire. The Division adds to this lengthy report of the Cetnik group the note that the credibility of this report must be doubted very much.
Q In this connection I submit to you Exhibit 151 in Document Book VI, German Page 49 and English Page 61.
A This document is a radio message of the Third Battalion of the Infantry Regiment 697, to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. A note to the fact that it was sent at all, I can't find here. It arrived on the 30th of November and reads in extract, "Tallisavac" - I spell it T-a-l-l-i-s-a-v-a-c - "was taken with artillery support after heavy combat. In many houses here again German equipment was found.
These houses were set fire."
Q I will now ask you another question. Do you know who ordered the transportation of prisoners in the Reich on into other territories occupied at that time by the German Armed Forces?
A I have already stated yesterday that this is not known to me, and that this order for the transportation of captured insurgents was issued either by the Quartermaster General, or through the General in Command of the Police.
Q In this connection, I submit a document to you, Document Book 7, Exhibit 183, page 52 in the German, and page 69 in the English document book. What do you find there?
A May I ask you again for the Exhibit number?
Q Exhibit 183, page 52 in the German book.
A The deportation of labor?
Q No, the deportation of Jews.
A This is a report to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast from one Commanding General and Commander in Serbia. That is an extract from the daily report of the 19th of March, and it says that 500 Jews were transported from Kos-Mitrovica to Semlin. Whether this is only an intention or was actually carried out, I am not quite clear. However, since it says, "transported", it was probably carried out.
Q Were you competent for this matter, or was this an administrative measure?
A This was a police measure.
Q Do you know anything about how the prisoners of allied armed forces were treated in the Balkans?
A The prisoners of allied forces were treated as prisoners of war.
Q Do you know of any case in which there was a deviation from this practice?
A In one report it says that 3 English soldiers , former soldiers who could not however be recognized as such from the state of their clothing, who had joined the bandits, were shot while taking part in combat with the Bulgarians.
Q I now submit to you document 212, in Document Book 8, page 68 of the German, and page 83 of the English document book. This is a supplement to an activity report of the 717th Division. It is a supplement to an activity report from the 1st to the 15th of August, 1942, and it says that during a large operation of the 794th Infantry Regiment, the Bulgarian troops got in the frontier to the west and captured ten men carrying arms, and after having been interrogated they were shot by the Bulgarians. Among them were three Englishmen, one of whom is supposed to have been an officer.
It is not assumed that they were parachutists, but escaped prisoners of war. The bad state of their clothes seems to confirm this.
Q. I submit another document to you, Exhibit 227, Document Book 9; that is on page 51 of the German and on page 36 of the English Document Book.
A This document is a report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, dated the 3rd of August, 1942, addressed to the OKH, Army General Staff, Operations Branch, and it says in the second paragraph that in the Italian occupied territory near Novodinje, 24 Km. southeast of Mostar, a British intelligence officer who apparently had parachuted down, was killed by anti-communists. It is quite clear from this report that this case had nothing to do with German troops. This is clear first of all from the title of this paragraph, "Italian Occupied Territory". A couple of reports have been left out here. Mostar is situated, or was situated in that part of Croatia which was occupied at that time by the Italians.
Q We now turn to the Commissar order, which is contained in Exhibit 14, Document Bonk 1, page 34 of the German, and page 49 of the English, and which was repeatedly mentioned here. May I repeat, Exhibit 14, Volume 1, page 49 of the English book. Did you receive this commissar order?
A I received the Commissar order after I entered upon my duties in the east, in June, 1941.
Q Did you receive it orally or in written form?
A I received it orally from General Strauss who was Commanding General at that time.
Q What was General Strauss' attitude toward this order?
A General Strauss did give his order in the form in which it is submitted here. Quite briefly, an order had been issued by the OKW to the effect that Commissars were to be shot. He added that in his army command the commissars were to be treated as prisoners of war and were not to be shot. I transmitted this order in this form to the officers subordinate to me at that time.
Q If you say, "in this form" what was meant by it?
A That commissars were to be treated as prisoners of war.
Q: Were commissars Captured in your area?
A: Not as came to my knowledge.
Q: Did you hear something about the capturing of commissars by other units of the 9th army?
A: I heard about this during my imprisonment. My Division commander told me at that time, that as Regimental Commander, he had captured commissars and that these commissars were treated as prisoners of war as he had been ordered. This was the case of a unit which was employed in the area of the 9th army.
Q: This was the commissar order. Now what about the so-called Commando order?
A: The commando order was, according to the document issued when I was no longer armed forces commander southeast.
Q: When did you leave the southeast?
A: On the 8th of August, 1942, I left the southeast and handed it over to my successor.
Q: In this connection I submit the commando order. This is exhibit 225, document book 9, page 41 of the German text, and page 28 of the English.
Is it correct that you received this order?
A: The report is dated the 18th of October 1942, and I cannot have received it in my capacity as deputy armed forced commander southeast.
Q: Where were you during October, 1942?
A: In October, 1942, I was Chief of Training for the Home Reserve Army in Berlin. In this capacity I had nothing to do with troops at the front, only with training of the Home Reserve Army.
Q: Was it known to you that in Athens, hostages were executed for sabotage committed on the railroad lines?