The order which is not available in full text, but is only mentioned in the memorandum by Oberheevesarchivrat Wisshaupt, stated that the Higher SS and Police Learner himself is subordinate only to the Commanding General in Serbia.
Q: Did you yourself during your term of office, up to the first of February, 1942, issue orders for the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A: No, not later either.
Q: Did you issue orders concerning the treatment of Jews?
A: No.
Q: Did you give any orders about the installation of concentration camps?
A: The expression "concentration camps" is mentioned in an order of the 19th of March, but here I would like to point out that here again collecting camps are meant and not concentration camps, and certainly not under the current meaning of the word.
Q: Did you give orders about the destruction of the economy?
A: No.
Q: In 1942 did you negotiate with the insurgents?
A: I did not negotiate with the insurgents, subinsargents - that is a group of them, under the leadership of the former Serbian Major Dangic, tried to negotiate with the Commanding General in Serbia. Major Dangic led a certain group of Mihajlovic, in the area southeast of Sarajevo, about which there had been much fighting, and his main struggle was concerned with the communists, and the Croatians Ustasha.
He, so far as he was in a position to, kept his people away from fighting contact with German troops. In this area there was a typical picture of the Balkans.
I can only say it was the fight of everybody against everybody. The following people fought together against Dangic, in isolated spots, Moslems, Ustashah, and communists.
There might have been a possibility that if Dangic had been restricted in his demands, then one could have possibly found a way which could have played a part in the pacification of the whole situation. Unfortunately, Dangic made his demands in such a manner that is, he demanded briefly the ceding of the whole Southeastern Croatian area to him - and this demand, in my opinion, could not be granted.
Since the whole question was a political problem, I could not decide myself, but I could only submit my opinion to the OKW. The OKW agreed. I further have to mention that in these contacts, this was not the first attempt. Already in November, 1941, when the conflict between Mihajlovic and the Communists started, at that time Mihajlovic had started negotiations, he also made demands which could not be granted. He wanted to remain independent, and he wanted to have full freedom in the building-up of his organization, and furthermore he wanted to get the equipment to do this, from Germany.
Q: Do you know what happened to Dangic later?
A: Yes, I know that. Dangic, so far as I remember later, roughly about April, was captured; captured by the German roops, and because of his attitude toward us, Dangic was not treated as an insurgent, but as a regular prisoner of war.
Q: I now turn to your order of the 6th of February, 1942. I will show you the document. It is Exhibit 174, contained in Document Book 7, on page 38 of the German text, and page 45 of the English text.
To what this order be traced back?
A: This order was, so far as I remember, mainly due to the failure of a large operation of the 84th Division, stationed in Croatia. It was stationed in a very restless spot in the South Croatian area. It was a failure for this reason, because the operation was carried out without any success. The order which is mentioned here was not only the result of the fact that this operation did not have the desired result, but it was the result mainly of the fear that conditions could again be repeated here, which had brought us many losses in the summer of 1941.
I have already stated here that generally speaking, open fighting was not apparent at all. The difficulty of the fighting was mainly that our opponent was camouflaged as an ordinary civilian, mostly as a peasant, and he hid somewhere and waited cunningly for the troops. When actual fighting contact was established, he hide again and attacked the rear troops, or he tried to paralyze communications behind the front through surprise attacks.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt please? We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(Court in recess until three-fifteen o'clock)
(After recess)
MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q Before the recess, we had stopped at the order of the 6th of February, 1942, and I am now asking you whether this order meant an intensification as compared with the manner in which the reprisal measures were managed until then?
A No, the order does not represent an intensification of the reprisal measures, nor of any other measures. Its purpose was only to direct the attention of the troops to the consequences which behavior could have, which did not take into account the manner of waging war on the part of the partisans.
Q What does your regulation in paragraph 1 of this order mean, that is, that the troops in the case of sabotage and surprise attacks had to report the reprisal measures intended or carried out?
A The regulation had as its purpose, to enable us to control and investigate the measures taken by the troops.
Q And did you order in paragraph 2 of this order?
A In paragraph 2 I ordered that in the combat area, people loitering about would in most cases have to be looked upon as participants in the fight, that is to say, that they are to be arrested, and that they are to be brought to trial. Experience has taught me that people who had nothing to do with the actual fighting, usually kept away from the combat area, and that on the other hand, those persons who were found as peaceful peasants had to be investigated.
Q How did the situation in Croatia develop in the meantime?
A I have already given a short picture of the situation in Croatia during the first months of 1942. After the withdrawal of the 342nd Division, which had to be transported back on the order of the OKW, a vacuum had again occurred, and the result of that vacuum was new unrest, and the main sources of unrest were east of Sarajeve, and here mopping up operations had become necessary.
These operations were carried out by the 718th Division which had been in Croatia since 1941; in order to prevent excess as by the Ustasha, the area between Drina and Save, and the demarcation line was declared to be an oparational area, and the executive power in this area was transferred from the Croatian government to the Commander of the 718th Division.
Further, the Armed Forces Commander Southeast repeatedly demanded during this period a common operation between Germans, Italians and Croatians, with a view to using the Italians who had great forces at their disposal, for purposes of pacification.
Q Was this question discussed at a joint conference?
A This question had already been discuss ad between the OKW and the Commando Supreme, and these two offices with the agreement of the Croatian government, were given an order to carry out a joint operation between the Italians and Croatian forces in the east Croatian area and also a conference was to take place in Ustasha.
Q Now what did this conference decide?
A This conference decided on this operation, Eastern Croatia, and the forces which were to take part in it, were three Italian divisions, one German division, and the available forces of the Croatians, approximately 8-4 battalions with artillery and technical formations; the Supreme Command had been transferred to the Commanding General of the 2nd Italian Army, General Roatta.
Q I am now submitting a documentary Exhibit, Exhibit No. 530, Volume 24, German Page 74, English Page 111. What can you tell us about this document?
A The document contains, as I have already stated, first of all the operational plan.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the book and exhibit number again please?
DR. MENZEL: It is Exhibit 430, English Document Book 24, Page 111.
BY DR. MENZEL:
A This document contains, first of all, the operational plan; the forces which were to be made available; and then under "8" a provision regarding the occupation of the mopped-up areas and the police services which were to be carried out there; under "10" the provision regarding the fact that no liaison was to take place with the insurgents, neither with the Cetniki nor with the Communists; under "11" the treatment of the rebels and the population. All rebels caught bearing arms had to be shot, as well as any persons in their employ or who were supporting them in localities in which arms and ammunition were found or from which the rebels have in any way been favored, the villages are to be burned down; and that during and after the operations the population was to be treated with understanding and justice by the occupation troops. And then there's material about the exchange of information regarding this case.
Q Did this record come into force at once? Did it need the approval of the OKW and the Commando Supreme and the Croatian Government?
A Noo that was merely a record of the agreements made in Usac on the 3rd of March which needed the consent of the Commando Supreme, the OKW, and the Croatian Government.
Q Did Italy and Croatia give their consent?
A Yes, approval was given by them, as well as by the OKW. I don't remember when it happened, but it must have been about the 10th or 11th of March.
Q You also mentioned approval by the QKW, and for this purpose I went to Headquarters on the 6th or 7th of March.
Q To whom did you report?
A I reported to Jodl, as Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and to Keitel, as Chief of the OKW. I tried to approach Hitler, but I was unsuccessful.
Q You have already said that this record had been approved by the OKW. Now, in this direction did you discuss any other questions with Jodl or Keitel?
A I have already said that it was my intention because of the OKW Order of the first of February to travel to the OKW and there to make representations. And on this occasion I did make representations.
Q What was the result of your endeavors in this respect?
A In spite of the fact that it had been pointed out to me quite clearly and unequibacably that the request or demands of the OKW for the treatment of prisoners were wrong and would not contribute in any way to restore law and order in the country quickly, and that the economy demanded other measures, all these representations of mine were rejected in a singularly severe manner by Jodl, as well as by Keitel.
Q You said in a "severe manner." Do you mean that that was objectively speaking severe, or a manner which also hurt your personally?
A In both ways.
Q Meanwhile you had been deputizing for quite a time for Field Marshal List. Did you reflect at that time whether you would now, so to speak at last, become Supreme Commander?
A Of course I was interested in this question and thinking about it.
Q And after this discussion in the OKW did you still count on it?
A No.
Q After your attempt had been unsuccessful, what did you do with regard to the order of the first of February 1942?
A I had to deal with this order not only because the order was there, but also because the situation necessitated it, because all news pointed to the fact that we should have again to count on an uprising in Serbia.
Q Did you issue a new order then?
A A new order was issued on the 19th of March.
Q Now, I submit to you this document, that is, Exhibit 184, Document Book 7, Page 53 of the German, and Page 70 of the English. It is Volume 7, English Document Book 70. Now, I am going to discuss this order in detail. Under "2-d" you talked of brutal police measures. Was this concept taken over or did you coin it yourself?
A No, this was taken over from the order of the OKW.
Q To which order of the OKW are you referring?
A The order which has already been discussed, that is the order of the 1st of February 1942.
Q If you say in your order that "by means of brutal police and secret police measures the formation of insurgent bands is to be recognized in its conception and is to be burned out." Do you want to say by this that this was literally taken over from the OKW order?
A I believe, yes.
Q What do you imagine these police measures to be?
A That if one had to count on an insurgent movement, all measures had to be taken in order to recognize the sources of the insurgent movement. That was quite clear, and for this purpose severe police measures had been carried out. That was also equally clear. I understand under those measures that the free movement of the population was to be restricted, that blocked zones were to be erected in order to prevent the transfer of populations or insurgents from one part of the country to the other; that the villages were to be searched frequentlysearched for ammunition and weapons, as well as for those persons who were no longer residents in this localities.
And that, in order to obtain news about the insurgents, one had to make use of information systems.
Q A summary of the directives for the treatment of insurgents was annexed to this order. Now, what are these directives about?
A The introductory part of the order says under "3". No, I'm sorry; I mean "3", yes. We again refer to directives for the crushing of partisans, which was issued by the Commander in Chief of the Army on the 25th of October 1941 and which was distributed by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast on the 22nd of November 1941 to his troops. The most important directives are again summarized in the enclosure.
Q You said you wanted to recall these directives again. Do you have another reason to mention these directives again, which after all were issued in October, 1941?
A Yes, I was interested for these directives to be mentioned again for one reason then not only contained tactical measures, but another reason may have been that these directives were placed prominantly in the foreground in view of the first part which contained quite a number of severe phrases which originated in the OKW order.
Q Which seemed milder to you, these directives of October, 1941, or the nee OKW Order of the first of February 1942?
A There is no doubt that these directives were much milder than the OKW Order of the 1st of February.
Q This order, now, which you issued--did it remain in its original form or was it changed. This was cancelled by a order dated. I believe, the 22nd of March. All the partisans who had previously been found guilty of taking part in insurgent movements were to be shot.
Q Just a moment--I want to submit to you the Supplement with the change. I refer to Exhibit 187. That is German Document Book 7.
Page 71, English Document Book Page 84. Can you tell us anything about this?
A Yes, this order states that the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had agreed that insurgents not captured in combat are to be transferred to work in Norway.
Q Was something cancelled in the original version of the order?
AAnd further No. "2", in the directives under "6" in the first paragraph, the following was to be cancelled. The words were, "or has supported." That was to be cancelled.
Q How did the change of the order of the 19th of March, regarding treatment of prisoners come about?
A On the basis of a protest which General Bader made against this order of the 19th of March. The explanation is this: General Bader had received, through administrative channels, a direct order from the Quatermaster General, according to which captured insurgents --and he says this later on--are to be transferred to German spheres of interest. This is again proof of the direct traffic which was still through official administrative channels between Serbia and the superior offices. If the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had got knowledge of this order, this order would certainly have been included in the order of the 19th of March.
Q What do you understand by "Suspects" in this order?
A I believe I have already stated previously that it had become common usage a very unfortunate usage that persons who were actively supporting the bands were described as "suspects."
Q Were such suspects to be shot at once or not?
A No, they were to be arrested and to be sentenced according to martial law.
Q I must now submit a document to you, Exhibit 529, in Volume 24, German Page 69, English Page 106. For whom was this document intended?
A We have already discussed this question. This was the answer of General Bader to the OKW Order of the first of February 1942. In this answer General Bader says under "4" arrested suspects the question of guilt after has been investigated in accordance with martial law are subjected to the following procedure: (a) those found to be guilty are to be shot; (b) all persons where the question of guilt cannot be clarified without doubt, are to be transfered to a prison camp for the execution of reprisal measures, (c) those found to be innocent are to be released.
Q In this context, I submit another document to you--Exhibit 175 in Document Book 7, in the German Document Book it is Page 39, and in the English Document Book it is on Page 48.
A. This document is an order by the 714th Division of the 15th of February 1942. Under "3" it says, "Persons who are encountered in the combat terrain during the fighting are to be arrested and to be investigated and to be interrogated. Depending on the result of the interrogation, they are to be released or they are to be sent to the competent District Headquarters as prisoners for reprisal measures."
Q. We now go back to the directives which were annexed to this order. In. No. 6 of these directives you spoke of the destruction of villages. Can you tell us something regarding this?
A. Regarding the destriction of villages, the same is said as in the Usac record, that is, that villages in which weapons and ammunition are found are to be destroyed, and these directives, in addition to the effect that villages near places where sabotage acts have taken place and also villages which are strongly suspected of having helped bands, are to be destroyed. In my view this is a completely justified reprisal under military necessity, because experience has told us that again and again in the same neighborhood and from the same villages surprise attacks and sabotage acts originated. If one follows the reports about sabotage acts, (as far as these reports are present in documents, in most cases they arc lacking,) -- one can always establish the same source of unrest , roughly speaking near Uzice and Sarajevo and some places south of the border of southern and northern Serbia.
Q. Under No. 6 you talk of other reprisal measures?
A. They were included probably. I cannot prove this, but I believe it because in the OKW order they must also be included. The directives represent a summary. These reprisal measures are, however, considerably restricted by the fact that they cannot be used as orders , because under "6" it says, it may, and then for instance, this can be done.
Q. I understand you consider that they were potential directives, but not obligatory directives?
A. Yes, they were potential directives.
Q. If you now speak of male inhabitants in the immediate neighborhood, what do you mean by that?
A. We mean by this the hostage prisoners who had been taken from these well-known sources of unrest, and who had been put into the hostages camps and who in such cases were to be used in cases of reprisal.
Q. What did you rule under "3" of the order?
A. It was clear to me that the order would have results with the troops , which I did not fathom, and which I did not intend it to have, and for this reason I pointed out under "3" that in the case of excesses and plunder, severe punishments would be meted out, that the soldier had to restrain himself in his behaviour towards the population.
Q.The order also says that if there is a suspicion of mines the mopping-up operations are to be carried out if possible by the insurgents or by the population. What do you mean by "suspicion of mines," and "mopping-up operations?"
A. This passage is contained in the directives under "F", and in the case of "suspicion of mines" it states that the mopping up operation is to be carried out by insurgents or by the Serbian population, if at all possible , also block-off and destruction. I believe as an old engineer , I may say that, it is , linguistic usage, especially in regard to the clearing of mines, that the destruction of these mines is ordered by the words , "mopping-up." That is, if a "moppingup" of mines is ordered , the units which has been ordered to carry out this operation with the instruments at their disposal, must remove these mines; but everyone who has had anything to do with these matters knows that the clearing of mines, for instance, on roads causes a lot of damages.
For instance, in order to remove the mines the surface of the roads has to be torn up, and the removal of this damage causes a lot of work. Clearing means to put this damage in order again.
Q. Do you mean to say that the clearing of the mines was not to be carried out by the population?
A. No, not by the population.
Q. I now submit to you two further documents, Exhibit 188, in Document Book VII, page 72 of the German text and page 86 of the English text. Is there any connection between this document and your order of March 19?
A. This Document 330 is an order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, dated the 25 March, relating to the order of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast of March 19, and refers to further orders of the Commanding General and Commander of the 28 March and 21 March. Under "3" it says that "insurgents not captured in combat, insurgents having surrendered and given up their arms, and persons under arrest because they are suspected of having supported or collaborated with the insurgents, that all these three categories are not to be shot to death, but are to be sent to a concentration camp, and the Deputy of the Senior SS and Police Leader will interrogate them and order their dispostion, -For instance, transport them to the interest of Germany for compulsory labor."
The other document, 1035, is an order of the 714th Division, subordinate to the Plenipotentiary General, issued on 13 March.
Q. What is the exhibit number?
A. That is Exhibit 190.
Q. That is the German text on page 74, and the English text page 90 of the Document Book VII.
A. Yes, and it contains under "3" the same as I have already read from the order of the Commanding General in Serbia of 25 March.
Q Were these people who were to he transported and used as laborers to be shot according to martial law?
A Yes, according to the laws of war they were to be shot.
Q Is there then a mitigation in this regulation?
A Yes, I see a mitigation in this order.
Q How did the situation in Serbia develop until your recall?
A The situation in Serbia remained peaceful contrary to the expectation that in the Spring a new wave of unrest would break out-part from a few isolated cases of sabotage in the neighborhood of Northwest Serbia and around Nish. However the position in Croatia, in spite of the measures for a joint operation, for subsequent joint operation, became restless. The operation which had been agreed on in Usac failed chiefly because the Italian forces which were to take part, arrived too lake. The subsequent operations dealt with areas in the neighborhood east of Sarajevo and as soon as the operations stopped, unrest broke out again; and the operations further concerned themselves with the sources of unrest east of Sarajevo and near Prejidor, and in that neighborhood too the difficulty was that the troops used for the Italians demanded for collaboration did not appear in full numbers, and that the young Coratian armed forces had reverses from time to time. It became necessary constantly to transfer new forces in the Serbia area to Croptia.
Q What was the result of this behavior of the Italians for the insurgents?
A I have already said that the passivity of the Italians was the cause of the insurgents getting additional followers from all these areas, and that at the start of an operation by the Germans and Croatians, they could evade and flee into the Italian territory. I must also emphasize here again that the use of the Chetnicks against the Croats was one of the main reasons for the great losses under which not only the Croatian troops but the Croatian population had to suffer.
Q How does it come about that during the fighting the insurgents and the Partisans received much larger losses than the German troops?
A I have already told in my description of the fighting near Uzice how a fight took place between military troops and partisans. May I repeat quite briefly that there was certainly no open fighting and generally speaking a fight with an opponent who fought from ambush or from hiding. We also had actions in which the enemy who used his evasive tactics too late was captured in positions because in most cases he was not trained, and in most cases these people had turned to the partisans without any training, as they were captured in positions where they had assembled in great force. To this we have to add that the partisans lacked heavy weapons, such as artillery and heavy machine guns, mortars, etc. I must add here that what the insurgents had of artillery and it was little enough, they were deprived of this in Uzice, or in January in Croatia and what they lost in material in Uzice and Eastern Croatia was very high, and when I investigated the number of rifles conformed to the number of dead and this is proof how greatly the insurgents must have suffered from loss of material at that time especially.
Q How does it come about that during your period of office, losses were listed for a certain period in your reports to the OKW?
A The cause of this is that as far as I remember in December I had ordered that summaries were to be made.
Q If apart from the losses, higher reprisal, measures were listed, were these always carried out in the manner in which they were listed?
A No, as has already been stated in the beginning, the reprisal measures were reported in a disguised manner especially in January and February because they were reported as intended and planned without actually being carried out in the ratio in which they had been reported.
Q I now submit to you Exhibit 159 in Volume VI, in the German page 75; in the English page 93. If you look at the last page of this document, can you tell us something about the number of reprisal measures which were be to speak in arrears?
A I believe you can see the figure from the file note of the 20 of December 1941. I dislike treating these measures in such a mathematical and calculating way.
Q Do you want to tell us that there were great arrears in these reprisal measures. During year period of office in general were the reprisal measures decreased?
A Yes, I have already stated there was a considerable decrease of reprisal measures, and happily in the months of that summer thanks to the Serbian population remaining quiet we could report that we had taken no reprisal measures at all.
Q I submit to you Exhibit 533 in Document Book 24, page 92 of the German text and page 131 of the English. Can you tell us that no reprisal measures were taken for certain periods of time.
A I may add here that the office of the Commanding General in Serbia was as far as I remember changed in February to Commanding General and Commander in Serbia. These reports include the time from the 21st of June to the 11th of August and reprisal measures are not mentioned. In first report we cannot describe as a reprisal measure in the situation report of the period between the 21st to the 31st of July where it states under 5 that under prisoners, 1,346 prisoners were captured; 69 partisans were shot.
TEE PRESIDENT: Pardon me please. We will not be able to complete examination concerning this exhibit so the Tribunal will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow meaning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours tomorrow morning)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 26 September 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the Defendant Von Weichs who is absent to prepare his case.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
WALTER LUNTZE - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) DR. MENZEL: Your Honor, yesterday we had stopped with Document Exhibit 533, Document Book XXIV, Page 92 of the German text and Page 131 of the English Document Book.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The document book number, please?
DR. MENZEL: This is Document Book No. XXIV, Exhibit 533, page 92 in the German book and Page 131 of the English.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q. Witness, would you kindly tell us something from this document about losses on the one side and reprisal measures on the other?
A. The document contains situation reports of the Commanding General of Serbia directed to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, regarding losses for the period from the 16th of July to the 5th of August. From the 16th of July to the 5th of August the losses of the German-Croation Armed forces were very considerable. Reprisal measures are not given in this situation report.