Q Now, I will show you another document that is contained in Document Book VIII, Exhibit 195; we find it on page 3 of the English and on page 2 and 3 of the German text. Can you tell us here high own losses were, how high the theoretical reprisal quoted would have been, and how high the actual reprisal figure was?
A This document is a report from the Armed Forces Commander Southeast to the OKW, and it deals under Roman Numeral III with losses during the period 21 March until 5 April 1942, there were reported under "Own Losses," 69 Dead, 301 persons wounded, 115 missing. Shot as reprisal 66 -."
What then was the radio between the "Own Dead" and the Reprisal measures."
A The theoretical reprisal quote would have exceeded 4,000.
Q In the same document book will you look at Document Exhibit 209; you will find it on page 47 of the German text, and page 56 of the English text. How high was the figure for "Own Dead," and how high was the figure for "Reprisal measures"?
A This is a report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast dated 8 July 1942, and under Roman Numeral II it give the losses for the period 24 June 1942. It says under "Own Losses," - 305 dead, 365 wounded, and 504 missing. The report states that in the period covered by the report 356 people were shot as reprisal.
Q Is a figure of captured persons mentioned too?
A The figure for those captured is 6641.
Q All right then we will finish looking through this document book for the moment. What is your attitude to those expressions which occur repeatedly in the report, as for instance "Expiation" Prisoners and "Hostages"?
A The expression "Expiation prisoner " as far as I remember, turned up to the first time in an order by General Bader dated approximately the end of December 1951, and he thus designated a 2$ Sept.
Ji7-A-GJ-l$-2-Maloy-(Schaeffcr)Court $ case 7 circle of persons which either is composed of suspects, and, at that suspects which had already been examined, and therefore suspects who can be designated as "band helpers," or on the other hand of prisoners, and there again captured insurgents.
Q In connection with this I will show you a document and it will be Exhibit 161, containing in document book VI, page 78, of the German text, and page 96 of the English text. On page 81, Appendix 3, you will find something that has a connection with this. In this order dated 20 December Bader again summarized the regulation about reprisal measures, arrest of hostages and of captures hostages. He made in this order a clear difference between reprisal hostages who were taken from various classes of the population, or who were to be gathered from the various masses of the population, and who were innocent. And on the other hand reprisal hostages which he designated in this order as "expiation hostage", and who as a result of their behavior, showed that they wore helping the bands, and that they were active. No, I must correct myself, not active but partisans, captured on the occasion of the mopping-up operations, and so forth.
Q Is something mentioned about the treatment of suspects?
A They are the very persons whom I have just mentioned. May I read this part, that is Figure 3: "Prisoners of the unit are persons who are taken in the course of an operation as suspects. In further examination by the administrative sub-area headquaters, they will either be released or transferred to the reprisal prisoners."
Q In the reports it is not always mentioned that court proceedings or summary court martial proceedings took place can you give us an explanation for this?
AA summary court martial sentence all those people who were not captured in actual combat or in the possession of arms, or who otherwise in anyway opposed the German armed forces with weapon or other means, and this circle of persons clearly defined in the so-called Franc-Tireur Reugulations of the OKW, dated November 1939.
These people were to be sentenced, and their sentences were partly reported by the unit, and that was a very clear definition "by a summary court martial". Sometime this term is not used but it reads instead "after interrogation", sometimes not even that is reported. The reason might be found in the fact that such a verdict, since it was ordered, was regarded as a matter of course.
Q Did you, during your term of office, find any violations to this effect in this respect?
AAs far as I remember I sent my Supreme Military Judge to Serbia several times in order to examine this particular point.
Q. And what did he report?
A. As far as I remember he reported no violations.
Q. What purpose, in your opinion, did General Bader pursue with regard to the difference between reprisal and retaliation hostages?
A. I believe this can be clearly seen from the order. People who were not guilty were supposed to be spared, and when harsh measures became necessary, persons should be taken and used who were actually guilty. That is not a new measure and it was already ordered by Field Marshal List on the 4th of October.
Q. Did Bader, in his order, say anything about the responsibility and authority for the ordering of reprisal measures?
A. Bader, in the same order of the 20th of December, that is Document 840 ......
Q. You are talking about Exhibit 161 contained in Document Book VI.
A. In Exhibit 161 Bader reserved for himself the right of ordering the execution of a reprisal measure.
That was a reservation regarding the ordering of retaliation measures. Did Bader also at a later tine reserve the right of arresting hostages to himself?
A. There is an order for a subsequent period in which Bader orders that the hostage-taking could only be carried out on his order and that is on the basis of his written or teletype order.
Q. I shall show you the document Exhibit 204, contained in Document Book VIII, on page 28 of the German text and page 30 of the English text.
A, That is an order by General Bader dated 21 June 1942, subject: Arrest of hostages. He criticizes in this order that hostages had been taken without his consent and he points out under figure 3 under paragraph B that the taking of hostages was only to be carried out on the express order by the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, and that only in case of danger the field and local administrative sub-area headquarters are authorized to arrest hostages.
The arrest, according to the order, was to be reported immediately to him and he points out again the extreme responsibility which was involved in the seizure of hostages.
Q. How now did the Italians behave towards the various groups of bands. Did they treat all bands the same or did they make differences?
A. The Italians in their area also dealt with the two groups of insurgents the same as we did. Whereas the Communist bands were regarded in our area as enemies and threated that way. lower echoelons of the Italians on the other hand negotiated with Cetniks and made use of them in the fight against the Communists.
Q. What was the result of this with respect to the behavior of these National bands towards other groups of Nationals?
A. This had partly very serious consequences, because the fight in the Croatian area, which was partly a religious and partly and ethnic fight was carried out very rigorously. For this reason the Armed Forces Commander Southeast avoided cooperation with the Cetniks. I am afraid the expression "Avoided" is wrong. There was just no question of a cooperation, and I must add that we were extremely worried about the activities of the Croatian Ustasha who were just as cruel against the Orthodox Serbs as bands of Serbs against the Croats.
Q. How did the Croatian Slav population behave?
A. My statements show that the Serbia population in the Croatian area suffered severely.
Q. Did this provoke a flight on the part of the population?
A. The situation was thus: As long as German troops remained in a certain area and had executive power there which had been transferred to the by the Croatian government, the Ustasha were kept in check; but if for some reason the German troops had to leave an area and the Ustasha could enter this area, then a panicky flight started and that was a flight towards the old Serbian area crossing the Drina.
Q. Has this flight anything to do with the so-called medical cordon?
A. The number of the people who were evicted or who voluntarily fled from the terror was extremely large, and in cooperation with the Serbian authorities along the Drina a so-called medical cordon was set up, that is, there were auxilliary posts which were manned by German or Serbian doctors and where the refugees received medical care, food and accommodation. As a consequence of this medical cordon, I can't name a figure now, I believe, a Wisshaupt said concerning a period in January 1941 the following:
after the 342nd Division left, alone at that date more than 40,000 refugees came back over the Drina.
Q. How did you personally stand with regard to the employment of Hungarian and Roumanian troops in Serbia?
A. As everybody who was responsible for the Southeast area it was our endeavor to have as many forces as possible available then. Field Marshal List and later the OKW was frequently informed to the effect that if more troops could possibly be sent to the Southeastern area, it would he much quicker to pacify this area. The OKW only agreed once to this demand, and that was before my time in October in respect to the transfer to the Serbian area of Two divisions which is already known here. The OKW as far as I now remember, it must have been the end of December, beginning of January, suggested that in order to release these two divisions, Hungarian, Romanian, Italian or Bulgarian troops should be transferred to the Serbian area and also to Croatia. The Armed Forces Commander Southeast made representations a almost this attitude, for military reasons in order to preserve the uniformity of the leadership the entry of Italian, Roumanian and Bulgarian forces was for that reason not desirable; and secondly, it was necessary that the life-line, that is the railway line Belgrade-Salonika-Athens remain in German hands and thirdly the Armed Forces Commander Southeast believed that through the accepting of troops of those powers who were hostile towards Jugoslavia would have no good results. OKW did not comply with this suggestion. It was ordered that the Southern part of Serbia was to be occupied by Bulgarian forces. However, a further expansion of the Italians towards Croatia and also acceptance of Hungarian and Roumanian forces was not sustained.
Q. Now with reference to the order of the OKW dated the 1st of February 1942 and I am showing you the document. It is Exhibit 529 contained in Volume XXIV, German text on page 67 and the English text on page 103. In this document were the previous measures considered sufficient or not?
A. This order by the OKW is of an extreme rigorousness and criticism against the measures hitherto, taken by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. This order states on page 1, that the bloody losses incurred by the insurgents and the number of those liquidated are small. The number of prisoners is too large. Individual prisoners have been able to escape from activity. According to a report by a confidential agent the people's attitude originally depressed, supposedly gave way to increasing anger and the Cetniks with the skull, or Jugoslavian insignia on their fur caps, were said to move about under the eyes of the occupation forces. Numerous Serbian officers have fled and will organize the next uprising. Others are said to move about openly in their former uniforms. The prevailing opinion supposedly has it that the Germans are unable to cope with the insurgents, and that Hungarians or Bulgarians have to come. Only one thing is certain, that so far it has not been possible to break the backbone of the insurgents through drastic measures.
Q. Is it correct that the number of prisoners is high?
A. The number of prisoners was considerable and not only of the prisoners taken during the course of mopping up operations, but also of prisoners captured actually fighting.
Q. Did you pass on this order of the OKW immediately?
A. No.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I was fully aware that the order could not be carried out in the form as stated and I intended to make representations personally to the OKW.
Q. And what did you do in the meantime? For instance did you gather the opinion of those offices which knew of this situation?
A. Yes. I did that; it was an unusual military measure. I requested the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to make a report in order to be able to submit this report to the OKW as coming from the very authority which was responsible for defense as well as for law and order in Serbia.
W. Was Bader's answer simply awaited, or was it made sure that the necessary objections would be clear from this answer?
A. I didn't understand the question.
Q. Did you simply wait and watch what Bader was going to answer, or was this answer voted?
A. As is usual in such a position on the staff of the Armed Forces Commander South-East, General Foertsch discussed the whole situation with General Bader's Chief of Staff, Colonel Kebitsch.
Q. And what then did you report to the OKW?
A. I can't prove whether this attitude was submitted to the OKW by Teletype or whether I took the report along when I visited the OKW.
Q. You said before that you intended to make representations personally?
A. Yes, and I did that too.
Q. After you had previously received instructions to proceed rigorously what did you then imagine when you now wanted to achieve mitigation?
A. I could imagine that that was a very difficult step to take.
Q. Did you then carry out your intention?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And when was that?
A. That was on the 6th or 7th of March when I went to the OKW regarding a different matter and the order was in abeyance as of that date.
Q: The order was then in abeyance. In the meantime you had currently to report, hadn't you? Was anything done then regarding the number of captured persons to carry out a certain camouflage, or did you simply just report the number of prisoners to higher headquarters?
A: The reports to the OKW were not false, but they were, one can use the expression, "camouflaged". I would rather say they were shaped in such a form that they were kind of expandable measures; - reprisal measures were reported as "ordered," or "intended" or reported as "being in the process of being carried out" which were actually not carried out.
Q: I was not talking of the shottings as much as of the nigh figures of prisoners, because the OKW had criticized especially this high figure of prisoners.
A: The number of prisoners too obscured by using the expressions "arrested" or "temporarily arrested", or something like that.
Q: What now is the meaning of the employment of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Serbia. On the 21st of January, 1942, in accordance with a Fuehrer order.
A: Up to that time the police forces had been subordinate to the administrative staff of the commanding general. The administrative staff also issued the orders regarding police measure, certainly after consent and after submission to the commanding general. Through the employment of the higher SS and police leader, a completely new note was struck, and that through the fact that from now on all orders concerning police matters were issued directly from Himmler to the Higher SS and Police Leader, and that all police forces were subordinate to this SS and Police leader.
The order which is not available in full text, but is only mentioned in the memorandum by Oberheevesarchivrat Wisshaupt, stated that the Higher SS and Police Learner himself is subordinate only to the Commanding General in Serbia.
Q: Did you yourself during your term of office, up to the first of February, 1942, issue orders for the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A: No, not later either.
Q: Did you issue orders concerning the treatment of Jews?
A: No.
Q: Did you give any orders about the installation of concentration camps?
A: The expression "concentration camps" is mentioned in an order of the 19th of March, but here I would like to point out that here again collecting camps are meant and not concentration camps, and certainly not under the current meaning of the word.
Q: Did you give orders about the destruction of the economy?
A: No.
Q: In 1942 did you negotiate with the insurgents?
A: I did not negotiate with the insurgents, subinsargents - that is a group of them, under the leadership of the former Serbian Major Dangic, tried to negotiate with the Commanding General in Serbia. Major Dangic led a certain group of Mihajlovic, in the area southeast of Sarajevo, about which there had been much fighting, and his main struggle was concerned with the communists, and the Croatians Ustasha.
He, so far as he was in a position to, kept his people away from fighting contact with German troops. In this area there was a typical picture of the Balkans.
I can only say it was the fight of everybody against everybody. The following people fought together against Dangic, in isolated spots, Moslems, Ustashah, and communists.
There might have been a possibility that if Dangic had been restricted in his demands, then one could have possibly found a way which could have played a part in the pacification of the whole situation. Unfortunately, Dangic made his demands in such a manner that is, he demanded briefly the ceding of the whole Southeastern Croatian area to him - and this demand, in my opinion, could not be granted.
Since the whole question was a political problem, I could not decide myself, but I could only submit my opinion to the OKW. The OKW agreed. I further have to mention that in these contacts, this was not the first attempt. Already in November, 1941, when the conflict between Mihajlovic and the Communists started, at that time Mihajlovic had started negotiations, he also made demands which could not be granted. He wanted to remain independent, and he wanted to have full freedom in the building-up of his organization, and furthermore he wanted to get the equipment to do this, from Germany.
Q: Do you know what happened to Dangic later?
A: Yes, I know that. Dangic, so far as I remember later, roughly about April, was captured; captured by the German roops, and because of his attitude toward us, Dangic was not treated as an insurgent, but as a regular prisoner of war.
Q: I now turn to your order of the 6th of February, 1942. I will show you the document. It is Exhibit 174, contained in Document Book 7, on page 38 of the German text, and page 45 of the English text.
To what this order be traced back?
A: This order was, so far as I remember, mainly due to the failure of a large operation of the 84th Division, stationed in Croatia. It was stationed in a very restless spot in the South Croatian area. It was a failure for this reason, because the operation was carried out without any success. The order which is mentioned here was not only the result of the fact that this operation did not have the desired result, but it was the result mainly of the fear that conditions could again be repeated here, which had brought us many losses in the summer of 1941.
I have already stated here that generally speaking, open fighting was not apparent at all. The difficulty of the fighting was mainly that our opponent was camouflaged as an ordinary civilian, mostly as a peasant, and he hid somewhere and waited cunningly for the troops. When actual fighting contact was established, he hide again and attacked the rear troops, or he tried to paralyze communications behind the front through surprise attacks.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt please? We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(Court in recess until three-fifteen o'clock)
(After recess)
MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q Before the recess, we had stopped at the order of the 6th of February, 1942, and I am now asking you whether this order meant an intensification as compared with the manner in which the reprisal measures were managed until then?
A No, the order does not represent an intensification of the reprisal measures, nor of any other measures. Its purpose was only to direct the attention of the troops to the consequences which behavior could have, which did not take into account the manner of waging war on the part of the partisans.
Q What does your regulation in paragraph 1 of this order mean, that is, that the troops in the case of sabotage and surprise attacks had to report the reprisal measures intended or carried out?
A The regulation had as its purpose, to enable us to control and investigate the measures taken by the troops.
Q And did you order in paragraph 2 of this order?
A In paragraph 2 I ordered that in the combat area, people loitering about would in most cases have to be looked upon as participants in the fight, that is to say, that they are to be arrested, and that they are to be brought to trial. Experience has taught me that people who had nothing to do with the actual fighting, usually kept away from the combat area, and that on the other hand, those persons who were found as peaceful peasants had to be investigated.
Q How did the situation in Croatia develop in the meantime?
A I have already given a short picture of the situation in Croatia during the first months of 1942. After the withdrawal of the 342nd Division, which had to be transported back on the order of the OKW, a vacuum had again occurred, and the result of that vacuum was new unrest, and the main sources of unrest were east of Sarajeve, and here mopping up operations had become necessary.
These operations were carried out by the 718th Division which had been in Croatia since 1941; in order to prevent excess as by the Ustasha, the area between Drina and Save, and the demarcation line was declared to be an oparational area, and the executive power in this area was transferred from the Croatian government to the Commander of the 718th Division.
Further, the Armed Forces Commander Southeast repeatedly demanded during this period a common operation between Germans, Italians and Croatians, with a view to using the Italians who had great forces at their disposal, for purposes of pacification.
Q Was this question discussed at a joint conference?
A This question had already been discuss ad between the OKW and the Commando Supreme, and these two offices with the agreement of the Croatian government, were given an order to carry out a joint operation between the Italians and Croatian forces in the east Croatian area and also a conference was to take place in Ustasha.
Q Now what did this conference decide?
A This conference decided on this operation, Eastern Croatia, and the forces which were to take part in it, were three Italian divisions, one German division, and the available forces of the Croatians, approximately 8-4 battalions with artillery and technical formations; the Supreme Command had been transferred to the Commanding General of the 2nd Italian Army, General Roatta.
Q I am now submitting a documentary Exhibit, Exhibit No. 530, Volume 24, German Page 74, English Page 111. What can you tell us about this document?
A The document contains, as I have already stated, first of all the operational plan.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the book and exhibit number again please?
DR. MENZEL: It is Exhibit 430, English Document Book 24, Page 111.
BY DR. MENZEL:
A This document contains, first of all, the operational plan; the forces which were to be made available; and then under "8" a provision regarding the occupation of the mopped-up areas and the police services which were to be carried out there; under "10" the provision regarding the fact that no liaison was to take place with the insurgents, neither with the Cetniki nor with the Communists; under "11" the treatment of the rebels and the population. All rebels caught bearing arms had to be shot, as well as any persons in their employ or who were supporting them in localities in which arms and ammunition were found or from which the rebels have in any way been favored, the villages are to be burned down; and that during and after the operations the population was to be treated with understanding and justice by the occupation troops. And then there's material about the exchange of information regarding this case.
Q Did this record come into force at once? Did it need the approval of the OKW and the Commando Supreme and the Croatian Government?
A Noo that was merely a record of the agreements made in Usac on the 3rd of March which needed the consent of the Commando Supreme, the OKW, and the Croatian Government.
Q Did Italy and Croatia give their consent?
A Yes, approval was given by them, as well as by the OKW. I don't remember when it happened, but it must have been about the 10th or 11th of March.
Q You also mentioned approval by the QKW, and for this purpose I went to Headquarters on the 6th or 7th of March.
Q To whom did you report?
A I reported to Jodl, as Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and to Keitel, as Chief of the OKW. I tried to approach Hitler, but I was unsuccessful.
Q You have already said that this record had been approved by the OKW. Now, in this direction did you discuss any other questions with Jodl or Keitel?
A I have already said that it was my intention because of the OKW Order of the first of February to travel to the OKW and there to make representations. And on this occasion I did make representations.
Q What was the result of your endeavors in this respect?
A In spite of the fact that it had been pointed out to me quite clearly and unequibacably that the request or demands of the OKW for the treatment of prisoners were wrong and would not contribute in any way to restore law and order in the country quickly, and that the economy demanded other measures, all these representations of mine were rejected in a singularly severe manner by Jodl, as well as by Keitel.
Q You said in a "severe manner." Do you mean that that was objectively speaking severe, or a manner which also hurt your personally?
A In both ways.
Q Meanwhile you had been deputizing for quite a time for Field Marshal List. Did you reflect at that time whether you would now, so to speak at last, become Supreme Commander?
A Of course I was interested in this question and thinking about it.
Q And after this discussion in the OKW did you still count on it?
A No.
Q After your attempt had been unsuccessful, what did you do with regard to the order of the first of February 1942?
A I had to deal with this order not only because the order was there, but also because the situation necessitated it, because all news pointed to the fact that we should have again to count on an uprising in Serbia.
Q Did you issue a new order then?
A A new order was issued on the 19th of March.
Q Now, I submit to you this document, that is, Exhibit 184, Document Book 7, Page 53 of the German, and Page 70 of the English. It is Volume 7, English Document Book 70. Now, I am going to discuss this order in detail. Under "2-d" you talked of brutal police measures. Was this concept taken over or did you coin it yourself?
A No, this was taken over from the order of the OKW.
Q To which order of the OKW are you referring?
A The order which has already been discussed, that is the order of the 1st of February 1942.
Q If you say in your order that "by means of brutal police and secret police measures the formation of insurgent bands is to be recognized in its conception and is to be burned out." Do you want to say by this that this was literally taken over from the OKW order?
A I believe, yes.
Q What do you imagine these police measures to be?
A That if one had to count on an insurgent movement, all measures had to be taken in order to recognize the sources of the insurgent movement. That was quite clear, and for this purpose severe police measures had been carried out. That was also equally clear. I understand under those measures that the free movement of the population was to be restricted, that blocked zones were to be erected in order to prevent the transfer of populations or insurgents from one part of the country to the other; that the villages were to be searched frequentlysearched for ammunition and weapons, as well as for those persons who were no longer residents in this localities.
And that, in order to obtain news about the insurgents, one had to make use of information systems.
Q A summary of the directives for the treatment of insurgents was annexed to this order. Now, what are these directives about?
A The introductory part of the order says under "3". No, I'm sorry; I mean "3", yes. We again refer to directives for the crushing of partisans, which was issued by the Commander in Chief of the Army on the 25th of October 1941 and which was distributed by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast on the 22nd of November 1941 to his troops. The most important directives are again summarized in the enclosure.
Q You said you wanted to recall these directives again. Do you have another reason to mention these directives again, which after all were issued in October, 1941?
A Yes, I was interested for these directives to be mentioned again for one reason then not only contained tactical measures, but another reason may have been that these directives were placed prominantly in the foreground in view of the first part which contained quite a number of severe phrases which originated in the OKW order.
Q Which seemed milder to you, these directives of October, 1941, or the nee OKW Order of the first of February 1942?
A There is no doubt that these directives were much milder than the OKW Order of the 1st of February.
Q This order, now, which you issued--did it remain in its original form or was it changed. This was cancelled by a order dated. I believe, the 22nd of March. All the partisans who had previously been found guilty of taking part in insurgent movements were to be shot.
Q Just a moment--I want to submit to you the Supplement with the change. I refer to Exhibit 187. That is German Document Book 7.
Page 71, English Document Book Page 84. Can you tell us anything about this?
A Yes, this order states that the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had agreed that insurgents not captured in combat are to be transferred to work in Norway.
Q Was something cancelled in the original version of the order?
AAnd further No. "2", in the directives under "6" in the first paragraph, the following was to be cancelled. The words were, "or has supported." That was to be cancelled.