I may add here that there is no regulation anywhere, where the work in the staff is properly described. It is after all, the responsibility for the chief of staff.
Q. Now you have worked through these documents. Has it struck you here that reports of the same incidents appear not only once, but are repeated in a number of documents?
A. Yes, I was struck by that, and that is quite natural, because almost every report is reproduced. First of all in the report from the division to the corps; from the corps to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General; from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast; from the Armed Forces Commander Southeast to the OKW.
It may also happen that we have to add to this, reports of the Battalion to a regiment, and from some regiment to a division, and then all of these reports are also reproduced in the 10-day reports which are issued by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and which are sent on to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, to the OKW, not every 10 days, but approximately every 10 days.
Then we find them again in the war diaries and activity reports.
Q. Can you, for instance, recollect in this connection, the reprisal case Kraljevo?
A. Yes, I was very much interested in this case of Kraljevo. Although this had already been ordered before my time, I took an interest in this case and traced it, and I established and found that this case had been mentioned 8 times, and that it can be proved by means of a 10-day report of that time that the order which was originally ordered by the Chief of the Commanding General could never have been carried out. All of the reports which I have mentioned before, and it is difficult to establish, because the retaliation order had been carried out by a troop unit of the 164th Division, were the 9th company of the 433 Infantry Regiment, which was subordinate to the Guard Regiment in Belgrade, the Regiment 734, and accordingly are subordinate to the 704th Division, and from all of these reports it is quite clear by comparing the diary numbers that the 101 hostages were shot.
Q. I shall submit two documents to you in this connection, Document 1157 Exhibit 124, volume 4, page 80 in the German edition, 132 in the English book.
I must revert to this later on. I am now coming to another question.
How did the situation develop in November 1941?
A. In November, 1941, the 113th division was employed and arrived in northwest Serbia; the area around Valjeva and Losnica was mopped up by the 342nd Division, the 113th Division and the 104th Division, and then Uzice was attacked.
Through the attack on Uzice, the bulk of the insurgents were disperced; parts of them succeeded in escaping into the Slaviber Mountains and other parts to southeast Croatia.
Q. Does anything further from the archives of the Counsellor Wisshaupt appear?
A. Yes, Wisshaupt described the events in detail, and I recall it so that I can reproduce it here.
Q. Yes, please do.
A. Wisshaupt said, approximately this:
"The fight was difficult because the territory near Uzice and in Serbia generally, was exceedingly suitable for the manner of fighting of the partisans, because of the terrain and crevices, and because of the very mountainous nature of the area, which is partly thickly wooded. Where there were any valleys a lot of corn was grown, and the stalks were very tall, and there was a lot of undergrowth which offered great possibilities for sudden popping up and disappearing.
We must not imagine in this fight that the insurgents were stationed in some definite position around Uzice, and were expecting the attack of the Germans.
They kept themselves before the attack started, and in general, well informed, and of course they knew quite well what was going to happen by their information sources before the attack started and they dispersed, and avoided a fight with the closed ranks of the enemy, and the point of their fight was to fight against the rear of the army, and they attacked the signal corps, etc., and everything in the rear of the German army, and it happened also that people only dug themselves in somewhere, and left their positions when they were shot at by artillery. They hid in the undergrowth and then shot at the troops after the troops had already passed, so that especially an combing out this territory, there were heavy losses on the German part.
He emphasizes how difficult it was to differentiate between peaceful peasants and between insurgents.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point we will adjourn until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(In recess until nine-thirty o'clock, September 25, 1937)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of American against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 26 September 1947, 0930, Justice presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please find their seats quickly so I can make an announcement.
Due to the absence of one of the judges, Court will be in recess until 13:30.
Court will now recess until 1330 hours this afternoon.
( A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
"THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Mr. Counsel, with examination.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. MENZEL:
Q Your Honors, when we stopped yesterday we were talking about the work of the man in charge of the Army Archives, Councillor Wisshaupt. I should like to continue here.
Witness, in the work which has just been mentioned, the opponents of Mihajlovic are given different designations. Sometimes they are called Communist bands, other times partisans, and finally communist groups. Did that mean the same or did that mean to make certain differences?
A These various designations mean the something. The designation Communists, or partisans can also be found in the orders and it is clearly recognizable that the partisans are meant.
Q I will now submit to you document Exhibit 139 contained in Document Book 6, page 21 of the English text and page 16 of the German text. Therein is contained a situation report of the Armed Forces commander Southeast dated the 2nd of November 1941. Was that an order or what is the meaning of this document?
AAs I stated already this situation report as the name indicates constitutes no order but is merely informative.
Q And what about the remarks contained in this situation report regarding the treatment of prisoners and the treatment of the population?
AAs I have already said, this cannot be considered an order. It merely contains a communication and an information about the manner of treatment used up till now and ordered previously.
Q When you say now as had been ordered previously, can you refer to one fixed order?
A These remarks are partly based on an order of the 4th of October dealing with the treatment of those partisans which are designated as suspects.
Q This expression "suspects" was that later changed in any way into some other designation?
A No, it has never been changed.
Q Wasn't it later so that there were only guilty persons and not guilty persons?
A In my opinion, that is something else. In these directives here, the situation is described in such a way that those suspects are to be examined and investigated, that is by a summary court martial, and that as a result of that, the guilty persons are to be shot, whereas the persons of whom one was not certain whether they were quickly or not were retained as reprisal hostages. That was changed later on to the effect that only persons who were really guilty could be retained whereas everybody else, those who were not guilty, were to be released.
Q Now in this connection I will show you a few other documents. Amongst others, Exhibit 175 contained in Document Book 7, page 39 of the German text and page 48 of the English text. Can you tell us something more from this to the problem we are dealing with?
A This document reproduces an order issued by the 714th Division and that order was issued on the basis of an order by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia dated the 8th of February, 1942. And this order says under figure 3, "Persons who are encountered in combat terrain during the fighting are to to arrested and to be investigated (to be interrogated). According to the result of the interrogation, they are to be released or to be transferred to the competent district headquarters as prisoners for reprisal measures."
In connection with this, I will show you another document, Exhibit 188 contained in the same document book on page 86 of the English text and page 72 of the German text.
A This document is an order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia dated the 25th of March, 1942. This order according to the distribution list was issued to all divisions, all home guard battalions, all local administrative sub-area headquarters, senior SS and Police leader, Bulgarian liaison officer, and the administrative staff.
The order says under paragraph 3. "A. Insurgents not captured in combat.
"B. Insurgents having surrendered and given up their arms.
"C. Persons under arrest because they are suspected of having supported or collaborated with the insurgents, are not to be shot to death but are to be sent to a concentration camp."
Q If in reports, especially in November 1941, there is talk about hostages, were those reprisal hostages or at least the bulk of them band members?
A The reports of November show that only a few cases could have been reprisal hostages. The bulk of the prisoners were captured partisans who had been through a summary court martial.
Q Now a question concerning another sphere--did you have any reason to interfere with General Boehme?
A I had no reason to take any action against General Boehme.
Q Were excesses by any of General Boehme's offices known to you?
A I have already testified that the events of Kragujevac were not reported to me.
Q Did you frequently undertake official trips?
A I made official trips frequently.
Q Were you in also Belgrade?
A I was in Belgrade as of the end of November until the beginning of December 1941.
Q Has anything been said in writing about this trip to Belgrade?
A This trip as well as all later trips was put down in writing.
Q In connection with this I will show you a document, it is Exhibit 156, contained in Volume VI, page 65 of the German text and page 82 of the English text. Is that such a written report?
A This document is a written report made by the escort officer. The purpose was to inform the Staff offices concerned and on the basis of the notes to make suggestions for orders which might be necessary to be issued, so that all departments of the staff could be informed, and that can also be seen from the distribution list.
Q Was that an order?
A No, it was not an order, but as I have already said it was only meant to inform the various departments of the staff,--I meant to inform them of those things that had struck me as particularly interesting, all those things that I intended to discuss, so that possibly on the basis of these notes some orders might be issued.
Q What is the meaning of the remarks about the transferring of parts of the population to the Banat?
A I must say that now I am surprised at all this. The remark shows how little I was informed at that time, because the situation was that a resettlement to the extent as mentioned here, that is evacuation of the wives and children of the insurgents, and the unreliable elements, was not possible, since the Banat, first of all, couldn't even have taken all those people, and secondly because the economy in Serbia would, have been damaged to a considerable extent.
The remark remained merely a remark, and was never changed into the form of an order or instruction.
Q What is your attitude to the further remark about the transfer of Jews and Gypsies into the camp near Semlin?
A This remark, too, shows that at that time I was only very little informed, and it shows that about 16,000 people had to be transferred. It states that the reason for this measure is that these Jews and Gypsies were proved to be carriers of the communication system of the insurgents.
Q You said yesterday that you tried to influence Bader regarding mitigation of the reprisla measures, and thus the order of 22 December followed: was it known to you that this order by Bader, dated 23 December, was in contradiction to the orders of the OKW according to which those stringent measures were to be applied?
AAt that time certainly.
Q Now, the Prosecution has submitted a certain number of reports and communications in which comparatively high reprisal figures are mentioned. Can you tell us something in connection with this? From which thime do these high reprisal figures date?
A. These figures still dated from your time.
Q And from which month, -- that is just what I wanted to ask you, whether these reprisal figures, as far as you recollect, were actually named during your time or not?
A Yes, such reprisal figures were mentioned. As far as I remember in a few isolated documents, high figures appear for the months of January and February, but that has a special reason.
Q And what about the time subsequent to that?
A Perhaps I may quite briefly add something. These reprisal figures, which were at that time reported to the OKW, were not actually carried out.
In the subsequent period reprisal ratios diminished quite considerably.
Q Was it so then that between the figure which would theoretically have been the right reprisal figure, and the reprisal figure which was actually carried out there was a considerable difference?
A Yes, there was a considerable difference.
Q I will now show you a document, and that is contained in Document Book VII, Exhibit 170, at page 53 and page 34 in the German text and in the English text pages 37 to 39. Looking at such a document, can you give us an example for your previous assertion?
A The document, NOKW 1256 contains excerpts from 10-Day reports which the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast in January, and these 10-day reports say on the first page, under Roman Numeral IV, "Own and Enemy Osses for the period of 6 January to the 15 of January." "Own losses: 9 dead and 48 wounded. Enemy losses: 191 dead, and of those 185 by reprisal measures." On page 2 there is a 10-day report of the 30th January, and under Roman Numeral V "Losses and Booty for the period 16 to 25 January," we find under "Own losses, 40 dead, 160 wounded; enemy losses 761 dead," and out of these 25 shot as reprisal." "33 wounded, 1471 prisoners."
Q How high would have been the theoretical reprisal ratio?
A In accordance with the order which was to be applied the ratio would have been one to 50.
Q Now, I will show you another document that is contained in Document Book VIII, Exhibit 195; we find it on page 3 of the English and on page 2 and 3 of the German text. Can you tell us here high own losses were, how high the theoretical reprisal quoted would have been, and how high the actual reprisal figure was?
A This document is a report from the Armed Forces Commander Southeast to the OKW, and it deals under Roman Numeral III with losses during the period 21 March until 5 April 1942, there were reported under "Own Losses," 69 Dead, 301 persons wounded, 115 missing. Shot as reprisal 66 -."
What then was the radio between the "Own Dead" and the Reprisal measures."
A The theoretical reprisal quote would have exceeded 4,000.
Q In the same document book will you look at Document Exhibit 209; you will find it on page 47 of the German text, and page 56 of the English text. How high was the figure for "Own Dead," and how high was the figure for "Reprisal measures"?
A This is a report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast dated 8 July 1942, and under Roman Numeral II it give the losses for the period 24 June 1942. It says under "Own Losses," - 305 dead, 365 wounded, and 504 missing. The report states that in the period covered by the report 356 people were shot as reprisal.
Q Is a figure of captured persons mentioned too?
A The figure for those captured is 6641.
Q All right then we will finish looking through this document book for the moment. What is your attitude to those expressions which occur repeatedly in the report, as for instance "Expiation" Prisoners and "Hostages"?
A The expression "Expiation prisoner " as far as I remember, turned up to the first time in an order by General Bader dated approximately the end of December 1951, and he thus designated a 2$ Sept.
Ji7-A-GJ-l$-2-Maloy-(Schaeffcr)Court $ case 7 circle of persons which either is composed of suspects, and, at that suspects which had already been examined, and therefore suspects who can be designated as "band helpers," or on the other hand of prisoners, and there again captured insurgents.
Q In connection with this I will show you a document and it will be Exhibit 161, containing in document book VI, page 78, of the German text, and page 96 of the English text. On page 81, Appendix 3, you will find something that has a connection with this. In this order dated 20 December Bader again summarized the regulation about reprisal measures, arrest of hostages and of captures hostages. He made in this order a clear difference between reprisal hostages who were taken from various classes of the population, or who were to be gathered from the various masses of the population, and who were innocent. And on the other hand reprisal hostages which he designated in this order as "expiation hostage", and who as a result of their behavior, showed that they wore helping the bands, and that they were active. No, I must correct myself, not active but partisans, captured on the occasion of the mopping-up operations, and so forth.
Q Is something mentioned about the treatment of suspects?
A They are the very persons whom I have just mentioned. May I read this part, that is Figure 3: "Prisoners of the unit are persons who are taken in the course of an operation as suspects. In further examination by the administrative sub-area headquaters, they will either be released or transferred to the reprisal prisoners."
Q In the reports it is not always mentioned that court proceedings or summary court martial proceedings took place can you give us an explanation for this?
AA summary court martial sentence all those people who were not captured in actual combat or in the possession of arms, or who otherwise in anyway opposed the German armed forces with weapon or other means, and this circle of persons clearly defined in the so-called Franc-Tireur Reugulations of the OKW, dated November 1939.
These people were to be sentenced, and their sentences were partly reported by the unit, and that was a very clear definition "by a summary court martial". Sometime this term is not used but it reads instead "after interrogation", sometimes not even that is reported. The reason might be found in the fact that such a verdict, since it was ordered, was regarded as a matter of course.
Q Did you, during your term of office, find any violations to this effect in this respect?
AAs far as I remember I sent my Supreme Military Judge to Serbia several times in order to examine this particular point.
Q. And what did he report?
A. As far as I remember he reported no violations.
Q. What purpose, in your opinion, did General Bader pursue with regard to the difference between reprisal and retaliation hostages?
A. I believe this can be clearly seen from the order. People who were not guilty were supposed to be spared, and when harsh measures became necessary, persons should be taken and used who were actually guilty. That is not a new measure and it was already ordered by Field Marshal List on the 4th of October.
Q. Did Bader, in his order, say anything about the responsibility and authority for the ordering of reprisal measures?
A. Bader, in the same order of the 20th of December, that is Document 840 ......
Q. You are talking about Exhibit 161 contained in Document Book VI.
A. In Exhibit 161 Bader reserved for himself the right of ordering the execution of a reprisal measure.
That was a reservation regarding the ordering of retaliation measures. Did Bader also at a later tine reserve the right of arresting hostages to himself?
A. There is an order for a subsequent period in which Bader orders that the hostage-taking could only be carried out on his order and that is on the basis of his written or teletype order.
Q. I shall show you the document Exhibit 204, contained in Document Book VIII, on page 28 of the German text and page 30 of the English text.
A, That is an order by General Bader dated 21 June 1942, subject: Arrest of hostages. He criticizes in this order that hostages had been taken without his consent and he points out under figure 3 under paragraph B that the taking of hostages was only to be carried out on the express order by the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, and that only in case of danger the field and local administrative sub-area headquarters are authorized to arrest hostages.
The arrest, according to the order, was to be reported immediately to him and he points out again the extreme responsibility which was involved in the seizure of hostages.
Q. How now did the Italians behave towards the various groups of bands. Did they treat all bands the same or did they make differences?
A. The Italians in their area also dealt with the two groups of insurgents the same as we did. Whereas the Communist bands were regarded in our area as enemies and threated that way. lower echoelons of the Italians on the other hand negotiated with Cetniks and made use of them in the fight against the Communists.
Q. What was the result of this with respect to the behavior of these National bands towards other groups of Nationals?
A. This had partly very serious consequences, because the fight in the Croatian area, which was partly a religious and partly and ethnic fight was carried out very rigorously. For this reason the Armed Forces Commander Southeast avoided cooperation with the Cetniks. I am afraid the expression "Avoided" is wrong. There was just no question of a cooperation, and I must add that we were extremely worried about the activities of the Croatian Ustasha who were just as cruel against the Orthodox Serbs as bands of Serbs against the Croats.
Q. How did the Croatian Slav population behave?
A. My statements show that the Serbia population in the Croatian area suffered severely.
Q. Did this provoke a flight on the part of the population?
A. The situation was thus: As long as German troops remained in a certain area and had executive power there which had been transferred to the by the Croatian government, the Ustasha were kept in check; but if for some reason the German troops had to leave an area and the Ustasha could enter this area, then a panicky flight started and that was a flight towards the old Serbian area crossing the Drina.
Q. Has this flight anything to do with the so-called medical cordon?
A. The number of the people who were evicted or who voluntarily fled from the terror was extremely large, and in cooperation with the Serbian authorities along the Drina a so-called medical cordon was set up, that is, there were auxilliary posts which were manned by German or Serbian doctors and where the refugees received medical care, food and accommodation. As a consequence of this medical cordon, I can't name a figure now, I believe, a Wisshaupt said concerning a period in January 1941 the following:
after the 342nd Division left, alone at that date more than 40,000 refugees came back over the Drina.
Q. How did you personally stand with regard to the employment of Hungarian and Roumanian troops in Serbia?
A. As everybody who was responsible for the Southeast area it was our endeavor to have as many forces as possible available then. Field Marshal List and later the OKW was frequently informed to the effect that if more troops could possibly be sent to the Southeastern area, it would he much quicker to pacify this area. The OKW only agreed once to this demand, and that was before my time in October in respect to the transfer to the Serbian area of Two divisions which is already known here. The OKW as far as I now remember, it must have been the end of December, beginning of January, suggested that in order to release these two divisions, Hungarian, Romanian, Italian or Bulgarian troops should be transferred to the Serbian area and also to Croatia. The Armed Forces Commander Southeast made representations a almost this attitude, for military reasons in order to preserve the uniformity of the leadership the entry of Italian, Roumanian and Bulgarian forces was for that reason not desirable; and secondly, it was necessary that the life-line, that is the railway line Belgrade-Salonika-Athens remain in German hands and thirdly the Armed Forces Commander Southeast believed that through the accepting of troops of those powers who were hostile towards Jugoslavia would have no good results. OKW did not comply with this suggestion. It was ordered that the Southern part of Serbia was to be occupied by Bulgarian forces. However, a further expansion of the Italians towards Croatia and also acceptance of Hungarian and Roumanian forces was not sustained.
Q. Now with reference to the order of the OKW dated the 1st of February 1942 and I am showing you the document. It is Exhibit 529 contained in Volume XXIV, German text on page 67 and the English text on page 103. In this document were the previous measures considered sufficient or not?
A. This order by the OKW is of an extreme rigorousness and criticism against the measures hitherto, taken by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. This order states on page 1, that the bloody losses incurred by the insurgents and the number of those liquidated are small. The number of prisoners is too large. Individual prisoners have been able to escape from activity. According to a report by a confidential agent the people's attitude originally depressed, supposedly gave way to increasing anger and the Cetniks with the skull, or Jugoslavian insignia on their fur caps, were said to move about under the eyes of the occupation forces. Numerous Serbian officers have fled and will organize the next uprising. Others are said to move about openly in their former uniforms. The prevailing opinion supposedly has it that the Germans are unable to cope with the insurgents, and that Hungarians or Bulgarians have to come. Only one thing is certain, that so far it has not been possible to break the backbone of the insurgents through drastic measures.
Q. Is it correct that the number of prisoners is high?
A. The number of prisoners was considerable and not only of the prisoners taken during the course of mopping up operations, but also of prisoners captured actually fighting.
Q. Did you pass on this order of the OKW immediately?
A. No.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I was fully aware that the order could not be carried out in the form as stated and I intended to make representations personally to the OKW.
Q. And what did you do in the meantime? For instance did you gather the opinion of those offices which knew of this situation?
A. Yes. I did that; it was an unusual military measure. I requested the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to make a report in order to be able to submit this report to the OKW as coming from the very authority which was responsible for defense as well as for law and order in Serbia.
W. Was Bader's answer simply awaited, or was it made sure that the necessary objections would be clear from this answer?
A. I didn't understand the question.
Q. Did you simply wait and watch what Bader was going to answer, or was this answer voted?
A. As is usual in such a position on the staff of the Armed Forces Commander South-East, General Foertsch discussed the whole situation with General Bader's Chief of Staff, Colonel Kebitsch.
Q. And what then did you report to the OKW?
A. I can't prove whether this attitude was submitted to the OKW by Teletype or whether I took the report along when I visited the OKW.
Q. You said before that you intended to make representations personally?
A. Yes, and I did that too.
Q. After you had previously received instructions to proceed rigorously what did you then imagine when you now wanted to achieve mitigation?
A. I could imagine that that was a very difficult step to take.
Q. Did you then carry out your intention?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And when was that?
A. That was on the 6th or 7th of March when I went to the OKW regarding a different matter and the order was in abeyance as of that date.
Q: The order was then in abeyance. In the meantime you had currently to report, hadn't you? Was anything done then regarding the number of captured persons to carry out a certain camouflage, or did you simply just report the number of prisoners to higher headquarters?
A: The reports to the OKW were not false, but they were, one can use the expression, "camouflaged". I would rather say they were shaped in such a form that they were kind of expandable measures; - reprisal measures were reported as "ordered," or "intended" or reported as "being in the process of being carried out" which were actually not carried out.
Q: I was not talking of the shottings as much as of the nigh figures of prisoners, because the OKW had criticized especially this high figure of prisoners.
A: The number of prisoners too obscured by using the expressions "arrested" or "temporarily arrested", or something like that.
Q: What now is the meaning of the employment of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Serbia. On the 21st of January, 1942, in accordance with a Fuehrer order.
A: Up to that time the police forces had been subordinate to the administrative staff of the commanding general. The administrative staff also issued the orders regarding police measure, certainly after consent and after submission to the commanding general. Through the employment of the higher SS and police leader, a completely new note was struck, and that through the fact that from now on all orders concerning police matters were issued directly from Himmler to the Higher SS and Police Leader, and that all police forces were subordinate to this SS and Police leader.