THE PRESIDENT: You may do so, Dr. Laternser, at some later session of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the examination.
WILHELM LIST - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Herr Field Marshal, before the recess we were talking about Exhibit 41 contained in the English Document Book II, pages 21-22. I asked you, and I think you didn't quite finish the answer to this question, what most severe measures you meant under figure 2 of this order.
A. I meant by this the use of all means available within a permitted sphere.
Q. Then why did you issue the order that no negotiations were to be made with the insurgents?
A. I have already said that in these days several companies because of their good faith had entered into negotiations with the partisans. They thought that there would be negotiations. In reality these were abominable traps laid by the partisans, and during the negotiations they were raided, disarmed, and deported away, sometimes into the mountains, and sometimes somewhere else, as far as they had not already been killed beforehand.
Q. Why did you order unified command of the undertaking by a commander in this Exhibit 41?
A. I have already said that these divisions were badly equipped, that they were badly made up as regards to personnel and that above all the officers had no kind of training at all. They were young, and it was necessary to employ older officers who were able to take the necessary measures which were necessary by reason of the respective situation.
Q. And why should incapable officers be replaced and brought to account?
A. Officers who were not capable of carrying out this task would mean a great danger for the troops, as was show by the preceding events.
I would also like to state that no officer in such a position could act differently.
Q. What did you mean by reckless use of weapons?
A. The employment of all those weapons which were available, also of the heavy weapons, in order to smash the fighting power of the enemy.
Q. Are you still of the opinion that this teletype, Exhibit 41, was necessary?
A. Yes, I am still of that opinion today.
Q. At that time what was the insurgent movement like?
A. The movement had extended more and more. The attacks increased in number, and it became evident that these were no local, individual happenings, but that it was a general insurgent movement.
Q. And what in the main was the origin of these bands?
A. These bands had various origins. Part of them were exclusively communistic, another part was nationalistic. Those were the Mihajlovic people, and the third part was under Kosta Pecanac.
Q. Would you please spell the last name?
A. P-e-c-a-n-a-c. "C" like in Caesar.
Q. And who was in charge of the communistic band at that time?
A. A unified leadership of the communistic bands was not recognizable at that time.
Q. At that time were organized bands recognizable?
A. Properly organized bands were not recognizable.
Q. You mentioned just now the movement of Kosta Pecanac. What was his political leaning?
A. Kosta Pecanac was an old freedom fighter of the First World War. He was of the opinion that the communistic movement was a national danger for Serbia, and for this reason he was sharply against the communistic movement.
Q. And what was his attitude towards the Germans?
A. For this reason he went together with the Germans against the communists.
Q. Did the bands fight each other?
A. Kosta Pecanac fought with his people against the communists. Later on Mihajlovic also fought against the communists.
Q. Did the bands have a common uniform?
A. No.
Q. Did they have common insignia?
A. No.
Q. Were the attacks frequent?
A. Yes.
Q. For example, could you give a number for August 1941?
A. Altogether several hundred. On many days alone, as far as I can remember, there were dozens.
Q. And what about the beginning of September?
A. The attacks increased at the beginning of September noticeably.
Q. And what were the methods of the bands? Give me a few examples which you know about.
A. In general, they used insidious methods. Cars were shot at from the cornfields; leave trains were forced to stop and they were shot at with machine guns; food transports were plundered.
Q. And how was the terrain in the Balkans suited for this kind of warfare?
A. It was partly favorable for the partisans. It was mountainous steep gulfs, forests with lots of wood undergrowth, and cornfields in which they could easily hide; the roads were difficult to control. Those were the main things.
Q Was the OKW currently informed about the band situation?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. And did the OKW issue directives?
A. I don't remember individual directives at the moment, but I assume with certainty that there were some written orders, and also we kept on receiving orders and directions to take strict measures.
Q. What kind of directives were those?
A. As I have already said, they told us to take strict measures. It was apparent from them that the OKW thought our measures insufficient; therefore they sent orders that the insurgents should he smashed as soon as possible with every means.
Q. At that time what was your opinion about the individual directives of the OKW?
A. Our point of view was that as we were always requesting more troops we would keep the insurgents down by the presence of larger numbers of troops so that insurrections could not flare up at all. In one case, because of a directive, of which I don't remember the details any longer, I made a written objection to the OKW.
Q. Why did you submit this?
A. Because I thought at that time that the measures were too strict and I had asked for more troops.
Q. Did you receive an answer to this objection?
A. No.
Q. And what did you do then?
A. When the then Colonel Foertsch went on leave, I asked him to go to the OKW as soon as possible and present our point of view once again.
Q. And what was the result of the discussion of General Foertsch with the OKW?
A. As far as I can remember, the result was very unsatisfactory. I don't remember the details of the answer.
Q. With whom did he speak?
A. He spoke with Keitel.
Q. What did Keitel say?
A. Keitel refused my objection and he said, I think, "Your commander-in-chief seems to be very upset about us. When you come back, you will find new orders. Tell your commander-in-chief that the responsibility lies with Hitler and the OKW. Your commander-in-chief has to carry out the orders."
Q. How did you know this - what you have just told us?
A. Colonel Foertsch told me this at that time.
Q. And were troops also asked for at that time?
A. That was the main purpose of this discussion which Foertsch had with Keitel.
Q. Who else did Foertsch speak to on this matter?
A. He spoke briefly with Generaloberst Haider.
Q. Who was Halder?
A. Halder was chief of the Army General Staff.
Q. And what did Foertsch say to Halder and what answer did he get?
A. Well, in detail I don't know.
Q. Well, what did General Foertsch report to you?
A. He said to me that he found more understanding with Halder than he did with Keitel, but Halder also could not help us at the moment. He had no troops available because of the situation in the East.
Q. And what else was considered at that time?
MR. DENNEY: Your Honors please, Dr. Laternser is going pretty far in asking what Foertsch said to Keitel and Keitel said to Foertsch; what Foertsch said to Halder and Halder said to Foertsch. I think we are relating to hearsay. Foertsch is here and pretty soon we will have him going to Moscow.
DR. LATERNSER: The questions have already been answered, Your Honor. I have now put a question with which this objection is not concerned at all. I have now asked the question "What was considered at that time?", i.e. by the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was not present; he is not in a position to state as to the comments made. The objection which has been made, if timely made, would have been good. Perhaps the motion to strike would be in order, but the Tribunal is not in a position to direct the manner in which this case will be handled. I think you should use care, Dr. Laternser, and not seek to illicit hearsay testimony.
The matter will not be ruled upon at this time.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. And that brings us to the end of the Berlin visit of General Foertsch. I now want to know what else was considered at that time in order to master the bandit situation.
A. The Military Commander Serbia once suggested that troops of other allies should be brought into the Serbian area.
Q. What did they think about at that time?
A. They thought about the Italians and Bulgarians.
Q. And why was that not done?
A. Because I did not think it a good idea, having these men who were in opposition to each other together, with regard to the population.
Q. What was the danger at that time - that is, at the end of August or beginning of September - the danger for military purposes?
A. The main danger consisted in the interruption of the rear communications and the cutting off of the railway and shipping lines, i.e. an interruption of the oil supplies for Germany.
Q. The oil from where?
A. The oil from Rumania. And also an interruption of the whole supply for the occupation troops as such and also under certain circumstances a crippling of the whole occupation troops, apart from the individual attacks against the occupation troops which would have had the result of a smash-up.
Q. What was the importance of the Balkan theater of war for the whole war situation?
A. The Balkan territory of war covered the right flank of the Eastern army as long as the Balkans were occupied by German troops. If this occupation was not there, or collapsed, this would mean a danger for the whole Eastern front.
Q. What other dangers were connected with this theater of war?
A. There was also the danger that the whole Mediterranean area would have been affected, especially if a landing had taken place in Greece by British forces.
Q. Field Marshal, then what did you do in order to find a solution for this situation?
A. In this situation, in order to get out of this situation, I issued the order of the 5th of September.
Q. Your Honor, this is Exhibit 42 and it is also presented the same way in Exhibit 43, Book 2 of the English documents, pages 23 to 26; in the German Document Book 2, pages 21 to 22. You issued the order of the 5th of September 1942 as you have just said. What was the contents of this order?
A. This order gave directives for the activities of the troops in the next period.
Q You said directives; what does that mean?
A I stated in the order that the following points of view had to be followed.
Q What did that mean?
A This meant that the troops, if the necessity arose, would proceed according to the given directives.
Q What is the difference between an order and a directive?
A If I order, I say you must in a certain definite case do that and that definitely, but in a directive, I gave an indication of the possibilities which are available in a corresponding case.
Q And when should these possibilities be used?
A They should be used when it was necessary.
Q The prosecution maintains that in this order you intended punishment expeditions; is that correct?
A No, with these directives I gave the order for the insurgent movement to be smashed.
Q To whom was this document exhibit 42 distributed; please lock at the distribution list?
A It was distributed to the Higher Command 65.
Q Who was the commanding general then of the 65th?
A General of the Artillery Bader. It went to the Commander Serbia.
Q Who was then commander in Serbia?
A The Commander in Serbia was General of the Air Force Dankelmann. It went to the commander in Saloniki
Q Who was that?
A It was Major General (Generalleutnant) Krenski.
Q Why did the order not go to the 18th Mountain Army Corps Headquarters?
A This was not necessary. The situation did not demand this.
Q Where was the 18th Mountain Army Corps at that time?
A Near Athens.
Q Why did this order not go to the command in Southern Greece?
A The commander-Southern Greece had only the area round Piraeus in Southern Greece the Italians had the main responsibility.
Q Field Marshal, what were the main reasons for the issuing of these directives?
A The main reason was the tense situation which made it necessary to break the resistance as quickly as possible.
Q The prosecution maintains that the order.....
MR. DENNEY: Your Honors please, Dr. Laternser several times improperly phrases his questions by saying "the prosecution maintains." Now if the witness is going to testify to something different, he can ask him what he meant to do, but not to prepare him for his answer by saying the prosecution maintains this. I suggest to the Court that he refrain that type of questioning.
DR. LATERNSER: May I say something about this, Your Honor? The question, which I wanted to place, I have not yet finished so the prosecution does not know if this is an admissible or an inadmissible question. It is so that only certain questions can be objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: It is my understanding, Dr. Laternser, that Mr. Denney is objecting to the form of the question and the manner in which it is stated, attributing to the prosecuting your understanding of what the prosecution has endeavored to present in its evidence. Your interpretation of that may be one thing and as to what the prosecution maintain is another. The object as to the form of the question will be sustained.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshal, does this order correspond to a plan, an existing plan for weakening and decimating the population? Did you ever hear anything about such a plan?
MR. DENNEY: Your Honor, I object to the form of the question. The order speaks for itself. Dr. Laternser insists on leading him.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Which plans were in existence in the Balkans with regard to the population?
A Well, there were no kinds of plans there. I never spoke with anybody about any kind of plan.
Q You know that the prosecution maintains that there was a plan?
A I heard for the first time about such a plan in the indictment.
Q Do you know orders or regulations which were issued by the communist party in Serbia for the partisans?
A Yes, I know these regulations.
Q What was in it?
A Of course, I can't remember the details properly but I studied these regulations and my total impression was that these regulations contained the idea that all means were permissible with which to fight the Germans, even illegal action and actions against international law could be used or were recommended to be used.
Q Did these regulations play any part when you issued your order?
A These regulations were one of the main reasons, for issuing this order.
Q May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that those regulations of the communist party of Serbia for the band war are mentioned in Exhibit 56, Document Book 2? I am sorry I can't give the English page.
DR. LATERNSER: In this Exhibit 56, your Honors, as far as I can remember under figure 3, this regulation is mentioned. If I may further draw the attention of the Tribunal
THE PRESIDENT: What is tho number of the exhibit?
DR. LATERNSER: Exhibit 56, under figure 3 these directives are mentioned. Figure 7, I am sorry.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q At the end of this document, it says "one enclosure" but it isn't here. Now with regard to the details of the order, why should the direction of an operation be carried out by older experienced officers?
A This was necessary because only the older and experienced officers could judge when the particular measures were to be used because they were the only people who, if new conditions suddenly arose, to take tho right measures.
Q What does the word "destroy" mean if it occurs in an order, a military order?
A Destroy is the usual term in use which has the meaning that the fighting strength of the enemy should be eliminated.
Q And what is always the aim of an operation?
A Just this--to eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, that is to destroy the enemy.
Q In figure 2 of this order, Exhibit 42, ruthless immediate measures are spoken about when should these be employed?
A They should be employed when over the necessity arose.
Q In figure 2-F in the brackets it states "hanging, burning down of villages involved, increased taking of hostages, and deportation of members of their families." What was this bracket supposed to signify to the subordinate officers?
A This was an indication of the possible action which could be taken if the necessity arose for this.
Q And what was the word "hanging" supposed to mean?
A This word is supposed to mean the manner of carrying out death sentences.
Q And when should hanging take place?
A In especial cases.
Q And how were death sentences carried out in the following periods?
A Mainly by shooting.
Q Why did you set down the possibility that villages involved could be burned down?
A Because just in the fighting of the partisans, this could be militarily necessary, and because, in addition, it is quite in accordance with international law.
Q What do you understand by "villages involved"?
A From these villages or in their immediate neighborhood enemy activities were carried on against the occupation powers.
Q And why should more hostages be taken?
A This was necessary because the attacks increased in number and because the area of unrest extended.
Q And as a further possibility, the deportation of relatives into concentration camps is set down there. First of all a preliminary question. What did you understand at that time by the term "concentration camps?"
AAt that time, I understood a collective camp for partisans who could be dangerous for the occupation power.
Q And how far did relatives of partisans endanger the occupation power?
A By helping the partisans in various ways.
Q Well then, what kind of persons were to come into those camps?
A Those persons who helped the partisans.
Q Were you justified in ordering such camps?
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, I object to the question. It is what the Court is hero to determine, whether or not he was justified.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q I also meant if you thought you were justified.
A Yes, I thought I was justified in giving this order.
Q And why?
A Because it is a military necessity that the Commander-in-Chief of an occupation army protects his troops against elements who could be a danger to this occupation army. As I have found now, this is also the same in the American army. This can be seen from the regulations issued by the American army.
Q Exhibit 71 in English Document Book No. 2, page 143 and in the German Document Book 2, page 110. In this document the Commanderin-Chief Serbia on the 6th of the 10th ordered the erection of a camp near Zazaniza. Did you know this order -- Exhibit No. 71?
A No.
Q Now to conclude the order of the 5th of the 9th, Exhibit 42, I would like to ask: Why did you set down these measures in 2-F; Why did you order them?
AAs I have already said, because I thought it was necessary in order to save lives to smash this insurgent movement as quickly as possible, because in this extraordinary situation, extraordinary measures had to be taken. It is a situation which can be compared in a small way to the employment of the atomic bomb. At that time, objections had to be set aside because by the employment of this they wanted to save lives and bring the war to a speedy end.
MR. DENNEY: Please, I move that the witness's remarks with reference to the atom bomb be stricken out. It has nothing to do with the case.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the witness's interpretation and idea of this situation and the objection will be overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q And how long was this order to be valid?
A This order was to be valid until the operations for the next period--that is, the smashing of the insurgents were concluded.
Q And the actual main purpose of this order was -
A The actual main purpose of this order was, if I remember rightly, set down the last figure.
Q You don't need to tell the number.
A The only task for the next period was the smashing of the insurgents in Serbia, and as quickly and completely as possible.
Q Your order is dated the 5th of September. At that time, did you have any connection with the OKW?
A There was a connection with the OKW. In the first place, this was done by teletype.
Q In those days did the OKW turn to you?
A On the 5th of September, the OKW had sent a warning request to me to inform them what had been ordered for smashing the insurgents.
Q And did such requests from above come often?
A Yes, they came frequently.
Q And then how did the total situation develop after you had issued this order?
A Then the situation was further aggrevated; the insurgent movement grew.
Q Now I submit to you Exhibit 48 in English Document Book 2, page 41, and in the German Document Book 2, page 40. Do you know this teletype?
A Yes.
Q In this teletype, you ask for the erection of a new office with the OKW?
A Yes.
Q And you suggest as leader of this office General Boehme?
A Yes.
Q I would like to ask you why did you suggest General Boehme?
A The staff of General Boehme could be released. The allocation of a new staff by the OKW could not be expected.
Q Why did you think General Boehme was suitable?
A I knew General Boehme was a reliable and quiet leader of a corps; in addition, he knew conditions in the Balkans from his activities in Austria and he could speak the language.
Q And was General Boehme known to be very strict?
A No, I didn't get that impression from him. And General Dietl said that he didn't think that he was sufficiently strict.
Q Why didn't you suggest Bader or Dankelmann who were in Serbia for this position?
A Bader and Dankelmann were rivals. In addition, the leadership by one these staffs owing to which one would have to be quite subordinate to the other, would not have been favorable. The staffs as such, especially for this new task were not so suitable as the staff of a mobile general commandant for at the same time as this order I asked for further reinforcements. Also for this reason it was necessary that under the leading general a general commando had to be available.
Q Which improvement in the situation did you think the creation of this new office would cause?
A I expected more secure, unified leadership, and with this also a better use of the forces available.
Q Was your application which you made with Exhibit 48 acceded to?
A Yes, it was agreed to.
Q Now I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Exhibit 49 in English Document Book 2, page 53, German Document Book I page 52.
Field Marshal, do you know this order of the OKW contained in Exhibit 49?
A Yes.
Q Which military commission did General Boehme receive through this order?
A He received the commission to smash the insurgent movement in Serbia, to secure communications and especially industrial installations.
Q Where was General Boehme at this time?
AAt this time General Boehme was in Athens, in a suburb of Athens.
Q And where were you?
A I was in Kifisia near Athens.
Q Did General Boehme report to you before taking over this office?
A Yes.
Q When was that?
A That was on the 18th of September, 1941.
Q What commission did you give General Boehme orally on this occasion?
A I gave him the commission to carry out and lead military operations in Serbia.
Q And what kind of a commission was this?
A This was a commission to smash the insurgent movement.
Q And what else did you talk about on this occasion?
A He talked about the general idea, how he would use the forces against the main insurgent forces and on this occasion he also said that the evacuation of the villages on the edge of the insurgent territory, which was an idea I objected. Then Boehme, didn't go into this point any further and we didn't talk any more about this matter.
Q Why did you object to this intended evacuation? For which reason?
A I didn't know how he could say that that was already necessary. As it wasn't necessary, I didn't see why it should be done.
Q Can you remember which villages were concerned?
A I can't say for certain but I think that it was probably Sabac.
Q On the occasion of this report by General Boehme to you, did you also talk about reprisal measures against the civilian population?
A No.
Q When did you talk for the last time to General Boehme?
A The last occasion was here in the prison.
Q Did he remember on this occasion this oral discussion about which we have just been talking?
MR. DENNEY: I object to the witness testifying about the memory of somebody in the past who isn't here.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshal, I asked you whether you - when you spoke for the last time with General Boehme?
A Here in the prison.
Q On this occasion in the prison, did you talk with General Boehme about this discussion in Athens?
A Yes.
Q What did he say to you?
MR. DENNEY: I object to what General Boehme said to him in the talk they had in the prison.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, this question is certainly admissible. This is a fact which the witness experienced, himself. Of course I can ask him about this and of course he can answer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q What did he say to you about the contents of the discussion at that time?
A He confirmed to me what I just said. He had at that time a purely tactical commission from me.
Q I would now like you to look at Exhibit 50, English Document Book 2, page 57, and in German Document Book page 46. Do you know this radio message contained in Exhibit 50?
A Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, before you start into the discussion of this exhibit, we will have our recess - afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until three-fifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Your Honor, we were just discussing Exhibit 50 which in the English Document Book II on page 57 and which is on page 46 of the German Document Book. Field Marshal, do you know this teletype?
A Yes.
Q Why was this teletype sent?
A It is usual that an order received from a superior office is transmitted to the subordinate office in one's own words. Apart from that I wanted to find out through General Boehme in particular the military operations and I have done this under figure 1, under No. 1 of this radio message.
Q Which order arrived from the OKW during the time General Boehme was appointed?
AAt this time the order from the OKW of the 16th of September was received which asked us to adopt the most severe measures and requested us at the same time to have a certain ratio of the shooting of hostages.
Q What is the date of this order?
A 16th of September.
Q Your Honor, this is Exhibit 53, Volume II, page 67 of the English text, and in the German text, Volume II, page 52. Did you at that time get to know of this order?
A Yes.
Q Do you know whether orders of the OKW were examined before they were sent out?
A That I don't know but I assumed it. In any case I considered orders and directives issued by the OKW to be legal.
Q What was your personal attitude to this order?
A I rejected this order from purely humane reasons.
Q Did you undertake to take any steps in regard to this order?
A In my preliminary examination I stated that during that time I protested very energetically to an order received from the OKW.
I did this by protesting to the 1-A who was my deputy at that time. For a long time I did not know and could not explain to myself against which order I protested. Knowing the facts now I must assume with certainty that it must have been the order of the 16th of September because apparently no other order was received from the OKW during these days.
Q In what manner did you protest against this order.
A I think I protested to the deputy chief in a very clear manner and I ordered him to bring this, my opinion, to the notice of the OKW.
Q Who was deputy at that time?
A That was Colonel Kuechler at that time.
Q Did he do that?
A Yes, he did it.
Q What did he report to you about it?
A The protest in connection with this was rejected.
Q Why did you not resign from your office then?
A Resignation of an officer in wartime does not exist or did not exist; in fact Hitler had forbidden it and he had expressly said that it was he who decided when a General or an officer was to resign.
Q In what manner was this order received by your office?
A It was received in written form.
Q In several copies?
A It was received with subsidiary copies.
Q What do you mean by subsidiary copies.
A That means the superior office sends along to this office all the copies which are to be sent to all the subordinate offices.
Q What happened to these subsidiary copies?
A These subsidiary copies were passed on.
Q Was anything added to this order when it was passed on?
A No.