DR. LATERNSER: In this Exhibit 56, your Honors, as far as I can remember under figure 3, this regulation is mentioned. If I may further draw the attention of the Tribunal
THE PRESIDENT: What is tho number of the exhibit?
DR. LATERNSER: Exhibit 56, under figure 3 these directives are mentioned. Figure 7, I am sorry.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q At the end of this document, it says "one enclosure" but it isn't here. Now with regard to the details of the order, why should the direction of an operation be carried out by older experienced officers?
A This was necessary because only the older and experienced officers could judge when the particular measures were to be used because they were the only people who, if new conditions suddenly arose, to take tho right measures.
Q What does the word "destroy" mean if it occurs in an order, a military order?
A Destroy is the usual term in use which has the meaning that the fighting strength of the enemy should be eliminated.
Q And what is always the aim of an operation?
A Just this--to eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, that is to destroy the enemy.
Q In figure 2 of this order, Exhibit 42, ruthless immediate measures are spoken about when should these be employed?
A They should be employed when over the necessity arose.
Q In figure 2-F in the brackets it states "hanging, burning down of villages involved, increased taking of hostages, and deportation of members of their families." What was this bracket supposed to signify to the subordinate officers?
A This was an indication of the possible action which could be taken if the necessity arose for this.
Q And what was the word "hanging" supposed to mean?
A This word is supposed to mean the manner of carrying out death sentences.
Q And when should hanging take place?
A In especial cases.
Q And how were death sentences carried out in the following periods?
A Mainly by shooting.
Q Why did you set down the possibility that villages involved could be burned down?
A Because just in the fighting of the partisans, this could be militarily necessary, and because, in addition, it is quite in accordance with international law.
Q What do you understand by "villages involved"?
A From these villages or in their immediate neighborhood enemy activities were carried on against the occupation powers.
Q And why should more hostages be taken?
A This was necessary because the attacks increased in number and because the area of unrest extended.
Q And as a further possibility, the deportation of relatives into concentration camps is set down there. First of all a preliminary question. What did you understand at that time by the term "concentration camps?"
AAt that time, I understood a collective camp for partisans who could be dangerous for the occupation power.
Q And how far did relatives of partisans endanger the occupation power?
A By helping the partisans in various ways.
Q Well then, what kind of persons were to come into those camps?
A Those persons who helped the partisans.
Q Were you justified in ordering such camps?
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, I object to the question. It is what the Court is hero to determine, whether or not he was justified.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q I also meant if you thought you were justified.
A Yes, I thought I was justified in giving this order.
Q And why?
A Because it is a military necessity that the Commander-in-Chief of an occupation army protects his troops against elements who could be a danger to this occupation army. As I have found now, this is also the same in the American army. This can be seen from the regulations issued by the American army.
Q Exhibit 71 in English Document Book No. 2, page 143 and in the German Document Book 2, page 110. In this document the Commanderin-Chief Serbia on the 6th of the 10th ordered the erection of a camp near Zazaniza. Did you know this order -- Exhibit No. 71?
A No.
Q Now to conclude the order of the 5th of the 9th, Exhibit 42, I would like to ask: Why did you set down these measures in 2-F; Why did you order them?
AAs I have already said, because I thought it was necessary in order to save lives to smash this insurgent movement as quickly as possible, because in this extraordinary situation, extraordinary measures had to be taken. It is a situation which can be compared in a small way to the employment of the atomic bomb. At that time, objections had to be set aside because by the employment of this they wanted to save lives and bring the war to a speedy end.
MR. DENNEY: Please, I move that the witness's remarks with reference to the atom bomb be stricken out. It has nothing to do with the case.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the witness's interpretation and idea of this situation and the objection will be overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q And how long was this order to be valid?
A This order was to be valid until the operations for the next period--that is, the smashing of the insurgents were concluded.
Q And the actual main purpose of this order was -
A The actual main purpose of this order was, if I remember rightly, set down the last figure.
Q You don't need to tell the number.
A The only task for the next period was the smashing of the insurgents in Serbia, and as quickly and completely as possible.
Q Your order is dated the 5th of September. At that time, did you have any connection with the OKW?
A There was a connection with the OKW. In the first place, this was done by teletype.
Q In those days did the OKW turn to you?
A On the 5th of September, the OKW had sent a warning request to me to inform them what had been ordered for smashing the insurgents.
Q And did such requests from above come often?
A Yes, they came frequently.
Q And then how did the total situation develop after you had issued this order?
A Then the situation was further aggrevated; the insurgent movement grew.
Q Now I submit to you Exhibit 48 in English Document Book 2, page 41, and in the German Document Book 2, page 40. Do you know this teletype?
A Yes.
Q In this teletype, you ask for the erection of a new office with the OKW?
A Yes.
Q And you suggest as leader of this office General Boehme?
A Yes.
Q I would like to ask you why did you suggest General Boehme?
A The staff of General Boehme could be released. The allocation of a new staff by the OKW could not be expected.
Q Why did you think General Boehme was suitable?
A I knew General Boehme was a reliable and quiet leader of a corps; in addition, he knew conditions in the Balkans from his activities in Austria and he could speak the language.
Q And was General Boehme known to be very strict?
A No, I didn't get that impression from him. And General Dietl said that he didn't think that he was sufficiently strict.
Q Why didn't you suggest Bader or Dankelmann who were in Serbia for this position?
A Bader and Dankelmann were rivals. In addition, the leadership by one these staffs owing to which one would have to be quite subordinate to the other, would not have been favorable. The staffs as such, especially for this new task were not so suitable as the staff of a mobile general commandant for at the same time as this order I asked for further reinforcements. Also for this reason it was necessary that under the leading general a general commando had to be available.
Q Which improvement in the situation did you think the creation of this new office would cause?
A I expected more secure, unified leadership, and with this also a better use of the forces available.
Q Was your application which you made with Exhibit 48 acceded to?
A Yes, it was agreed to.
Q Now I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Exhibit 49 in English Document Book 2, page 53, German Document Book I page 52.
Field Marshal, do you know this order of the OKW contained in Exhibit 49?
A Yes.
Q Which military commission did General Boehme receive through this order?
A He received the commission to smash the insurgent movement in Serbia, to secure communications and especially industrial installations.
Q Where was General Boehme at this time?
AAt this time General Boehme was in Athens, in a suburb of Athens.
Q And where were you?
A I was in Kifisia near Athens.
Q Did General Boehme report to you before taking over this office?
A Yes.
Q When was that?
A That was on the 18th of September, 1941.
Q What commission did you give General Boehme orally on this occasion?
A I gave him the commission to carry out and lead military operations in Serbia.
Q And what kind of a commission was this?
A This was a commission to smash the insurgent movement.
Q And what else did you talk about on this occasion?
A He talked about the general idea, how he would use the forces against the main insurgent forces and on this occasion he also said that the evacuation of the villages on the edge of the insurgent territory, which was an idea I objected. Then Boehme, didn't go into this point any further and we didn't talk any more about this matter.
Q Why did you object to this intended evacuation? For which reason?
A I didn't know how he could say that that was already necessary. As it wasn't necessary, I didn't see why it should be done.
Q Can you remember which villages were concerned?
A I can't say for certain but I think that it was probably Sabac.
Q On the occasion of this report by General Boehme to you, did you also talk about reprisal measures against the civilian population?
A No.
Q When did you talk for the last time to General Boehme?
A The last occasion was here in the prison.
Q Did he remember on this occasion this oral discussion about which we have just been talking?
MR. DENNEY: I object to the witness testifying about the memory of somebody in the past who isn't here.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshal, I asked you whether you - when you spoke for the last time with General Boehme?
A Here in the prison.
Q On this occasion in the prison, did you talk with General Boehme about this discussion in Athens?
A Yes.
Q What did he say to you?
MR. DENNEY: I object to what General Boehme said to him in the talk they had in the prison.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, this question is certainly admissible. This is a fact which the witness experienced, himself. Of course I can ask him about this and of course he can answer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q What did he say to you about the contents of the discussion at that time?
A He confirmed to me what I just said. He had at that time a purely tactical commission from me.
Q I would now like you to look at Exhibit 50, English Document Book 2, page 57, and in German Document Book page 46. Do you know this radio message contained in Exhibit 50?
A Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, before you start into the discussion of this exhibit, we will have our recess - afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until three-fifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Your Honor, we were just discussing Exhibit 50 which in the English Document Book II on page 57 and which is on page 46 of the German Document Book. Field Marshal, do you know this teletype?
A Yes.
Q Why was this teletype sent?
A It is usual that an order received from a superior office is transmitted to the subordinate office in one's own words. Apart from that I wanted to find out through General Boehme in particular the military operations and I have done this under figure 1, under No. 1 of this radio message.
Q Which order arrived from the OKW during the time General Boehme was appointed?
AAt this time the order from the OKW of the 16th of September was received which asked us to adopt the most severe measures and requested us at the same time to have a certain ratio of the shooting of hostages.
Q What is the date of this order?
A 16th of September.
Q Your Honor, this is Exhibit 53, Volume II, page 67 of the English text, and in the German text, Volume II, page 52. Did you at that time get to know of this order?
A Yes.
Q Do you know whether orders of the OKW were examined before they were sent out?
A That I don't know but I assumed it. In any case I considered orders and directives issued by the OKW to be legal.
Q What was your personal attitude to this order?
A I rejected this order from purely humane reasons.
Q Did you undertake to take any steps in regard to this order?
A In my preliminary examination I stated that during that time I protested very energetically to an order received from the OKW.
I did this by protesting to the 1-A who was my deputy at that time. For a long time I did not know and could not explain to myself against which order I protested. Knowing the facts now I must assume with certainty that it must have been the order of the 16th of September because apparently no other order was received from the OKW during these days.
Q In what manner did you protest against this order.
A I think I protested to the deputy chief in a very clear manner and I ordered him to bring this, my opinion, to the notice of the OKW.
Q Who was deputy at that time?
A That was Colonel Kuechler at that time.
Q Did he do that?
A Yes, he did it.
Q What did he report to you about it?
A The protest in connection with this was rejected.
Q Why did you not resign from your office then?
A Resignation of an officer in wartime does not exist or did not exist; in fact Hitler had forbidden it and he had expressly said that it was he who decided when a General or an officer was to resign.
Q In what manner was this order received by your office?
A It was received in written form.
Q In several copies?
A It was received with subsidiary copies.
Q What do you mean by subsidiary copies.
A That means the superior office sends along to this office all the copies which are to be sent to all the subordinate offices.
Q What happened to these subsidiary copies?
A These subsidiary copies were passed on.
Q Was anything added to this order when it was passed on?
A No.
Q Was the transmission signed?
A Yes.
Q By whom?
A By the deputy chief.
Q What would you say in what manner the command in the Southeast was designated by Hitler and OKW in general?
A It was repeatedly called weak.
Q This order Exhibit No. 53 of the 16th of September had been issued. What did you do?
A In the beginning of October I issued a teletype dated the 4th of October.
Q May I point out to the court that the teletype of the 4th of October is Exhibit 70 which in the English Document Book II is on page 141 and in the German Document Book it is on page 108. To whom did you address this teletype of the 4th of October?
A To the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia.
Q Who else did you address it to?
A No one else.
Q Why not to other officers?
A That wasn't necessary because the Plenipotentiary Commanding General was in Serbia and he alone was the person responsible in Serbia for the issuing of the orders for crushing of the Serbian movement, and he possessed executive power in those respects.
Q. Did you assume that this office then informed all the other offices?
A. That was their task; they had to do that.
Q. Under point 2 of this order you ordered, and I quote: "Men in the insurgent territories who were not encountered in battle are to be examined, and b), if they are only suspected of having taken part in combat of having offered the bandits support of any sort or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way there are to be held in ta collecting camp. They are to serve as hostages in the event that bandits appear or if anything against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory of their home localities and in such cases they are to be shot." What is your present attitude to the order which I have just read?
A. I am of the opinion that under the conditions existing at that time it was militarily speaking necessary and that it was admissible under International law.
Q. Why didn't you order any ratios?
A. Because it seemed difficult to me to fix ratios; the retaliation measures or reprisal measures should generally adapt themselves to the facts of the case.
Q. Who may order reprisals?
A. Every commander from every divisional commander upwards.
Q. Where was that laid down?
A. In the ten commandments.
Q. Which ten commandments do you mean?
A. Those which every soldier had to carry or was supposed to carry.
Q. What were the contents quite briefly?
A. Essentially the provisions of the Hague Convention.
Q. And where were those ten commandments for the soldiers contained?
A. In his pay-book.
Q. I shall submit this pamphlet or manual to the court as an exhibit. Now, I should like you to take a look at Exhibit 7 which is Volume I and is on page 20 of the English Document Book and on page 17 of the First Volume of German Document Book. In the first part of this exhibit your office asks on the 27th of June 1941 the Military Commander Serbia whether the Russian radio reports are correct; that for the killing of German soldiers 100 Serbs had been shot in Belgrade. Why was this inquiry made by you?
A. Since this was a radio report of Russian origin and I did not know anything of it yet I had to make sure regarding this message. Apart from that the number appeared rather conspicious to me.
Q. What was the result of your inquiry?
A. The result was that this radio report was erroneous.
Q. We are reverting now to Exhibit 70 which in the English Document Book II is on page 141 and in the German Document Book II on page 108. In this teletype of the 4th of October and that is Exhibit 70, you talk about collection camps, whereas in the order of the 5th of September, Exhibit 42, you talked of concentration camps. What is the difference you intended?
A. There is no difference because I meant by concentration camps the same as by collection comps because in the army as such there were no concentration camps.
Q. What was the actual purpose of Exhibit 70, that is, of the teletype of the 4th of October.
A. The actual purpose was to create orderly conditions and at the same time to mitigate the decree of the OKW of the 16th of September and to bring about milder retaliatory measures.
Q. If you are just mentioning the OKW order of 16th September, do you mean Exhibit 53 which I submitted to you before?
A. Yes I do.
Q. I should then like you to look at Exhibit 76. Exhibit 76 is in Volume II, page 156 of the English text and in the IInd volume on page 120 of the German Document Book. This order was issued to General Boehme and in it he requested him to collaborate as far as possible in crushing the uprising. Was this order known to you?
A. No.
Q. In spite of your teletype of the 4th of October General Boehme --- this teletype we discussed previously as Exhibit 70 -General Boehme -- in spite of this order and in spite of his own order, issued the very severe order of the 10th of October, Exhibit 88, which in the English Document Book III is to be found on page 34 and in the German Document Book III on page 27. How do you explain to yourself and to us this fact?
A This order of the 10 October of General Boehme was preceded-
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please, Dr. Laternser, will you kindly repeat the last reference?
DR. LATERNSER: That is English Document Book III, page 34, and in the German Volume III on page 27.
THE PRESIDENT: And the exhibit number?
DR. LATERNSER: Exhibit 88.
A This order of General Boehme was preceded by the shooting of 22 soldiers of the Army Intelligence Regiment, which were mutilated and maimed. I recall, but not very strongly though, that the order relating to the ratio of one to 100 in retaliation was ordered by the OKW directly.
Q Which case are you referring to?
A The case of the shooting of the 22 soldiers of the Army Intelligence Regiment 521, and I could imagine that General Boehme on his part, on the basis of this OKW DIRECTIVE, and on the other hand by reason of these bestial murder of his soldiers arrived at his order. He probably said to himself that in view of such actions by members of the bandit groups.
MR. DENNEY: I think the witness is speculating about what Dr. Boehme said to himself. It is improper testimony, and I move that part should be stricken.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I have noticed this myself, as I have noticed myself that this is a case of arguing, and not proper testifying and at the same moment I wanted to intervene myself.
THE PRESIDENT: In view of the statements made by Dr. Laternser apparently approving the motion of counsel for the prosecution, the motion to strike this will be sustained.
Q Field Marshal, when did you hear of this order of October 10, Exhibit 88, for the first time consciously?
A The first time consciously here in Nurnberg.
Q From the distribution, however, we see that this order was re ceived by way of information by the Commander Southeast; can you remember having received it at that time?
A No.
Q How do you explain this fact to yourself?
A This order was sent to me by way of information. That is to say from the sender as well as on the receiver it was probably not treated in a very expeditious manner. The mail from Belgrade to Athens and vice-versa took sometimes a long time and sometimes not so long. There is no receiving stamp on this document. I myself fell sick on the 15th. I was no longer in my office and I have to assume definitely that I did not receive this order.
Q When were you operated on?
A I was operated on the 17 October.
Q Exhibit 93 was submitted here, which is an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia dated October 14 which is Contained in Volume III, page 53 of the English Book, and in Volume III, page 43 of the German book, - have you got this order in front of you?
A Yes.
Q Did you at that time receive knowledge of this order?
A No.
Q How do you explain this?
A This order did not even for information purposes go to the armed forces commander Southeast.
Q The order was issued by the Administrative Staff of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General; what kind of an office is that?
A The Commander in Serbia had two staffs, the command staff and the administrative staff.
Q Who was the chief of the Administrative Staff?
A The Chief of the administrative staff was Turner, T-u-r-n-e-r.
Q Who was Turner?
A He was an SS Obergruppenfuehrer, and also a Prussian State Councillor as well.
Q What was his attitude?
A Turner was not a very straight forward personality, and was also a very difficult person. He certainly liked to show off, and in Belgrade and in Serbia he wanted to be the main figure.
Q Did you yourself gain this impression and did you experience this?
A Yes.
Q At what occasions?
A When the new Serbian Government was formed. I was neither informed regarding the forming of this Government nor was I informed in time that the formation of this Government had taken place, and I only heard this several days later.
Q Regarding the armament and weapons conceded to the new Serbian Government and to the Gendarmery, I found out only through a note in the newspapers.
Q After making these experiences with Turner what did you do?
A Because of these experiences which were aggravated by reports from my Chief, I asked the Chief of the Administrative staff for me to explain to him that he was actually bound to inform his commander about the most important happenings. Apart from that I sent Police Director Loos to Boehme in order that he should assist him directly.
Q who was Loos?
A Chief of the Secret Field police in the Staff in the Army command of the Army Southeast.
Q What was his attitude?
A Loos was a clever and adroit man and he was moderate.
Q When did you send him to Belgrade?
A He arrived at Belgrade on October 13. I must have ordered him to do so on the 12th, at the latest. My intention to do so was probably formed a couple of days prior to that.
Q What was Loos' actual task when you sent him to Belgrade?
AAs far as I can recall his assignment was to become police adviser to General Boehme to make up for Turner.
Q What did Loos report later on?
A I no longer learned that.
Q Why not?
A Because at the time when Loos returned I was at the military hospital.
Q Who gave Turner directives and orders?
A He received directives and orders from his superior, the commander of Serbia, and he also received directives via the Quartermaster General. He received directives directly from the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler in a police matters, and I am firmly convinced, but I cannot check this, that as State Councillor, he received orders and directives from Reichsmarshal Goering, who at the same time had the right to give direct orders to the plenipotentiary for the 4-year plan in Belgrade.
Q Before I go into the discussion of individual points I want by some preliminary questions to give a general picture to the Tribunal. How did you communicate with your subordinate offices?
A The telephone, the teletype and radio.
Q And what were your lines of communication to the OKW, that is, to your superior offices?
A The same, although we mainly used the radio, because of the great distance the telephone communications were usually disturbed.
Q The Prosecution submitted a number of reports from all kinds of offices; I wanted to ask you quite generally which of the reports and news do you know?
A I do not know of those reports which were not addressed to my office.
Q In other words, all of those were not directed to your office, and why are these reports not known to you?
A If they were not received by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast I could not know them.
Q Who received the messages for your office?
A They were directed to the departments to which they were addressed. They were received by an orderly officer.
Q I would like to ask you, and will you give examples, please, which were the departments competent for each case?
A For messages of a technical nature, for the employment of the troops, Department 1-A. For messages concerning the enemy news, it was Department 1-C.
Q What was the competent department for the news regarding shootings or burning down of villages?
A. That was the department 1-C. Later on this was taken over by Department 1-A, but at that time it was the Department 1-C.
Q. In what way was such a message received, what possibilities did exist?
A. They were received by telephone, by radio. They could also arrive as a teletype. That could come as a telephone messages immediately to the officer.
Q. One question, Field Marshall, what was the most frequent way in which a message was received?
A. The most frequent way was the teletype.
Q. To whom was this teletype submitted?
A. The teletype was submitted to the orderly officer of the department in question who was on duty.
Q. And to whom did he submit it?
A. This orderly officer submitted it to 1-A or to the 1-C.
Q. And what did the Chief of the department in question do, that is the 1-A or 1-C?
A. With the collected messages he went to see the chief and he reported to the chief about these news.
Q. In what manner were you informed about these things?
A. I was informed by the Chief of Staff.
Q. In which form?
A. The chief of staff reported to me about the messages received.
Q. To what did his report refer?
A. The report referred to everything that had happened, chiefly how the over-all situation had developed, where new centers of unrest had appeared.
Q. Now, what was the gist of this report and what had to be the gist of it?