Q Did your appeals meet with any success?
A No.
Q As an emergency measure were any troops being sent to Serbia?
A Temporarily we had an air force training school being transferred to the Serbian area.
Q You say temporarily; how long did it remain in the Serbian area?
A I cannot recall that in detail. As far as I remember, it can't have been more than a couple of weeks.
Q When did you receive a personal impression for the first time regarding the situation in Serbia?
A The first personal impression I got during a trip at the end of July, 1941.
Q What kind of trip was that?
AA trip which I took for the purpose of visiting troops and in order to visit the commanders there, especially the commanding general, and make their acquaintance and to meet the military commander Serbia.
Q Who was the military commander Serbia at that time?
A The commander Serbia at that time was general of the air force Schroeder.
Q Where was he at the time of your visit?
AAt the time of my visit he was in the military hospital in Belgrade. I had intended to visit him earlier but I had to postpone my visit until the state of health of General Schroeder had become such that I could see him in Belgrade.
Q Where did you go first?
A First of all I traveled to Nish.
Q With whom did you talk there?
A In Nish I talked to one of the divisional commanders or with General Bader, the commanding general of the 65th corps, who at the same time was present there as deputy of the commander Serbia.
Q What did General Bader report to you regarding the situation in Serbia?
A I cannot recall this in detail. The overall impression I had was that at different places insurgent movements became noticeable. Frequently sabotage acts took place and similar things.
Q What was the further course of your journey?
A The continuation of the trip from Nish to Belgrade which had been intended by railroad was not possible because the line, the tracks, had been cut by insurgents in the meantime. For that reason I had to fly from Nish to Belgrade.
Q On the occasion of your stay in Nish did you give any orders for the combatting of bandits?
A Individual orders I did not give. I very likely spoke to the commanders about these matters.
Q When was your inspection trip concluded?
A On the 23rd, of July, 1941.
Q And where did you go after the conclusion of this trip?
A I went to Vienna and Partenkirchen on leave.
Q When did you return from this leave?
A I returned on the 23rd of August.
Q So that from the 23rd of July to the 23rd of August, 1941, you were on leave?
A Yes.
Q As you know, the so-called terror order in which the OKW ordered the pacification of occupied countries by terror measures is dated from the 23d of July, 1941. It is exhibit number 25 and it is in the English document book 1 on page 86 and in the German document book on pages 62 to 66. Your Honor, I would like to use this opportunity to draw the attention of the Court to the following fact. The Tribunal will remember that at the time this exhibit was submitted I objected, but this objection on my part was overruled at that time and I referred without that I want now to touch the ruling of the Court now, I referred at that time to points 1 to 5 for justifying my objec tion and in the meantime I have found out the following, and I only want to draw the attention of the Court to this.
In the German document book the whole order is given, consisting of six paragraphs, whereas in the English document book on page 86 only paragraph number 6 is given, in spite of the fact that in the paragraphs 1 to 5 it is shown quite decisively that this was an order which was and could only be valid for the east. And I only to this did I want to draw the Court's attention, i.e. the fact that in the English document book 5 essential points, points essential for the judgment regarding this order, have been left out and only this one point is given, which is kept in more general terms, but which can only be correctly understood in connection with the five preceding paragraphs. Therefore I shall take the liberty to submit the entire order to the Court in my document book.
As you know, Field Marshal, this order, exhibit 25, bears the date of the 23d of July, 1941. Where were you on that date?
A I was in Belgrade and on the same day I took the train from Belgrade to Vienna.
Q Do you remember whether this order was submitted to you after you returned from your leave?
A No.
Q Did you ever hear whether this order was distributed in the southeast?
A No.
Q Now we come to the time after you returned from your leave. That is the end of August, 1941. What was the partisan situation at that time?
AAfter my return I found that the situation had been considerably aggravated.
Q Where did you hear of that for the first time?
A I heard of this for the first time when I arrived in Belgrade on the 23rd of August, 1941.
Q With whom did you discuss the situation?
A I then talked about the situation with General Danckelmann, General Bader, with the chiefs of staff of both these generals, and also probably with other officers whose names I cannot remember in detail.
Q What was the result?
A I may add that General Danckelmann was the successor of General Schroeder. General Schroeder had suffered a relapse in his state of health and he died shortly afterwards.
Q General Danckelmann was the successor of General Schroeder in which capacity?
A He was successor of the Commander Serbia.
Q Now you were mentioning discussions. What was the result of these discussions and conferences?
A The result was that as regards essentials one tried to take from the existing forces people who could be formed into pursuit commands, that is to say, those men who had been trained in a better way were to be employed in more mobile formations in order to be sent speedily to those spots where they were required.
Q How did you yourself at that time view the situation in Serbia?
A I looked upon the situation as a very serious one.
Q At that time attempts were also made to bring the Serbian population to their senses?
A Yes.
Q By what means?
A By means of radio propaganda, and we also used for this purpose the Serbian government.
Q Who was the Chief of the Serbian Government at that time?
AAt that time I believe there was still a Provisional Government.
Q And a little bit later on?
AA short time afterwards we had the government of Nedic.
Q What did Nedic do?
A He issued a couple of decrees; he also personally made a speech on the wireless for the pacification and enlightenment of the population.
Q We have proceeded too quickly as to time. We are still at the end of august and I would like to ask you where was that area where the greatest amount of insurgent activity took place at that time?
A Roughly speaking in the neighborhood southwest of Belgrade.
Q Could you define it a bit more accurately and perhaps give us some names of localities so that it may become a bit clearer to us.
A Krupanj and Valjevo.
Q What for instance had happened in Krupanj?
A In Krupanj a local guard post had been attacked by communists, one office post and a couple of men had been killed, and the rest of the guard post had been captured. Apart from that other companies had been encircled in Krupanj and partly they had been destroyed.
DR. LATERNSER: May I draw the attention of the court to the fact that this incident of Krupanj is mentioned in Exhibit 94 -- I beg your pardon -- it is exhibit 94 in the German Document Book III, page 43. I'm sorry, your Honor, I cannot give you the English numbers. I am very sorry but I will do this after the recess. I have omitted to ascertain these figures.
THE PRESIDENT: It is Exhibit 55 I am told. Exhibit 94?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, it is Exhibit 94. I shall give the number of the page immediately after the noon recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 55.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much your Honor. The Prosecution has now submitted the teletype of the 4th of September, Exhibit 41, which is in the English Document Book II, page 21 to 22, and which can be found in the German Document Book II on pages 19 to 20.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q For what reason did you at that time demand that a judgment was given on the general situation under figure 1?
A I had the impression that I was insufficiently informed by the Commander Serbia. Now here we had the formation of the government of Nedic and regarding the formation of this government I was not informed, neither about the actual happenings nor about the actual formation. I was only told a couple of days later about what had happened.
At the same time the Serbian Gendarmerie was supplied with weapons and this fact I had learned from a newspaper.
Q Those were the reasons for making the request under figure 1 in this teletype?
A Yes.
Q The Prosecution charges you in regard to this teletype to have ordered most severe measures. What was meant by that?
A Up to then the troops were used to comparatively peaceful ideas with regard to the population and had frequently failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation. The troops had not yet recognized that they had to deal with a very insidious enemy. They had acceded to negotiations and had been made a fool of and in parts they had been captured and it was necessary for this reason to tell the troops that this enemy who now appeared could only be fought by really military actions.
Q What kind of severest measures did you mean by that?
A I meant by that the troops should use those weapons they had at their disposal.
Q Why in this teletype did you issue a prohibition to negotiate with the insurgents?
A These negotiations had led to a state of affairs where whole units had been rendered ineffective as far as fighting was concerned. That in good faith believing that negotiations were to be conducted -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, witness. We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, before you continue your examination the Tribunal wishes to make a statement in connection with your comments which were made yesterday afternoon.
In reply to the inquiry of counsel for the defense concerning the procedure to be followed by them in adducing evidence in support of their case following the delay of the prosecution in procuring the documentary evidence required by the order of the Tribunal under date of August 14, 1947, the prosecution having indicated its intention to comply with alternative (b) of said order, the Tribunal states:
(a) That defendants may adduce any and all evidence, documentary or oral in the order it deems advisable without being required to rest his or their case prior to the examination of said documentary evidence:
(b) That defendants after completion of their oral evidence may be withdrawn from the witness stand without being-cross-examined until opportunity to examine the documentary evidence referred to in the order of August 14, 1947 is afforded:
(c) That if such order of August 14, 1947, be not complied with at such a time as not to prejudice the rights of these defendants, the situation will be handled by a supplemental order of the Tribunal.
That is the statement that the Tribunal wishes to make in connection with the comments made by Dr. Laternser.
DR. SAUTER: (for defendants von Geitner and Lanz): Your Honor, since the presentation of evidence for the defense is now taking place, I would like to make a request about a point which is rather unclear to me. This is the question if after the presentation of evidence the defense is only to submit pleas, or if ever defense counsel should also submit a closing brief for his client. I am referring to this question, because the former practice has varied in previous trials. In the International Tribunal, for instance, it was the rule that we had to submit a plea - but not a closing brief.
At that time, however, the Prosecution submitted closing briefs, but we didn't see them. We defense counsel, therefore, at that time limited ourselves to pleas which we submitted orally. In the next trial, the Doctors' trial, the Tribunal asked that we should submit a detailed closing brief which was not to be read, and that in addition to the closing brief we had to submit a plea which summarized the evidence. This plea had to be submitted during the proceedings. In these days now another trial is coming toward its end, the trial against Pohl and the SS, and in this trial the Tribunal took the opposite point of view. The Tribunal ruled a few days ago in this Pohl trial that the defense counsel were only to present pleas and not closing briefs. The President stated that the Tribunal doesn't want to have so much to read. That is exactly contrary to what happened in the Doctors' trial.
Now, I think it would be expedient if the defense counsel were told, by the Tribunal, as soon as possible, how this Tribunal will rule in this matter, because if we know that in addition to the plea we also have to submit a closing brief, then during the presentation of evidence for the defendants we can prepare ourselves for this, and if this Tribunal does not require a closing brief then we don't need to do this, and then we can direct our attention mainly to the plea. I think that it would be expedient if the Tribunal would clarify this question as soon as possible, so that we can conduct ourselves accordingly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not heretofore given consideration to the matter you have referred to, Dr. Sauter, but we shall discuss it in chambers and then advise you here at some session of the Tribunal. You may be sure that this matter will be brought back to your attention as quickly as possible.
May I inquire, Dr. Sauter, as to whether or not you know what the wish of all the defense counsel are?
DR. SAUTER: I am afraid I don't know. I have only spoken for myself, because I personally want to know the opinion of the Tribunal as soon as possible, because in our further work we must abide by this.
Your Honor, it would perhaps also be desirable if we could have clarity on another point as well, so that later on the proceedings will not be delayed. This is the question of whether the Tribunal intends at the end of the presentation for the defense to have a recess, so that the work of the defense for the pleas and the closing briefs can be prepared or not, because if such a recess is not intended then of course we must start our preparations for the pleas and the closing briefs and speed them up. Perhaps it would be expedient if the Tribunal would also clarify this question and would tell the defense counsel their attitude.
THE PRESIDENT: We will give consideration to that question, also, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, with regard to this matter I would like to state in my capacity as defense counsel for Field Marshal List and von Reichs, and also in my capacity as spokesman for the defense, I would like to make a statement on this point before a decision is reached. After I have spoken with all the other defense counsel I would like to tell the Tribunal the attitude of the defense.
THE PRESIDENT: You may do so, Dr. Laternser, at some later session of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the examination.
WILHELM LIST - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Herr Field Marshal, before the recess we were talking about Exhibit 41 contained in the English Document Book II, pages 21-22. I asked you, and I think you didn't quite finish the answer to this question, what most severe measures you meant under figure 2 of this order.
A. I meant by this the use of all means available within a permitted sphere.
Q. Then why did you issue the order that no negotiations were to be made with the insurgents?
A. I have already said that in these days several companies because of their good faith had entered into negotiations with the partisans. They thought that there would be negotiations. In reality these were abominable traps laid by the partisans, and during the negotiations they were raided, disarmed, and deported away, sometimes into the mountains, and sometimes somewhere else, as far as they had not already been killed beforehand.
Q. Why did you order unified command of the undertaking by a commander in this Exhibit 41?
A. I have already said that these divisions were badly equipped, that they were badly made up as regards to personnel and that above all the officers had no kind of training at all. They were young, and it was necessary to employ older officers who were able to take the necessary measures which were necessary by reason of the respective situation.
Q. And why should incapable officers be replaced and brought to account?
A. Officers who were not capable of carrying out this task would mean a great danger for the troops, as was show by the preceding events.
I would also like to state that no officer in such a position could act differently.
Q. What did you mean by reckless use of weapons?
A. The employment of all those weapons which were available, also of the heavy weapons, in order to smash the fighting power of the enemy.
Q. Are you still of the opinion that this teletype, Exhibit 41, was necessary?
A. Yes, I am still of that opinion today.
Q. At that time what was the insurgent movement like?
A. The movement had extended more and more. The attacks increased in number, and it became evident that these were no local, individual happenings, but that it was a general insurgent movement.
Q. And what in the main was the origin of these bands?
A. These bands had various origins. Part of them were exclusively communistic, another part was nationalistic. Those were the Mihajlovic people, and the third part was under Kosta Pecanac.
Q. Would you please spell the last name?
A. P-e-c-a-n-a-c. "C" like in Caesar.
Q. And who was in charge of the communistic band at that time?
A. A unified leadership of the communistic bands was not recognizable at that time.
Q. At that time were organized bands recognizable?
A. Properly organized bands were not recognizable.
Q. You mentioned just now the movement of Kosta Pecanac. What was his political leaning?
A. Kosta Pecanac was an old freedom fighter of the First World War. He was of the opinion that the communistic movement was a national danger for Serbia, and for this reason he was sharply against the communistic movement.
Q. And what was his attitude towards the Germans?
A. For this reason he went together with the Germans against the communists.
Q. Did the bands fight each other?
A. Kosta Pecanac fought with his people against the communists. Later on Mihajlovic also fought against the communists.
Q. Did the bands have a common uniform?
A. No.
Q. Did they have common insignia?
A. No.
Q. Were the attacks frequent?
A. Yes.
Q. For example, could you give a number for August 1941?
A. Altogether several hundred. On many days alone, as far as I can remember, there were dozens.
Q. And what about the beginning of September?
A. The attacks increased at the beginning of September noticeably.
Q. And what were the methods of the bands? Give me a few examples which you know about.
A. In general, they used insidious methods. Cars were shot at from the cornfields; leave trains were forced to stop and they were shot at with machine guns; food transports were plundered.
Q. And how was the terrain in the Balkans suited for this kind of warfare?
A. It was partly favorable for the partisans. It was mountainous steep gulfs, forests with lots of wood undergrowth, and cornfields in which they could easily hide; the roads were difficult to control. Those were the main things.
Q Was the OKW currently informed about the band situation?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. And did the OKW issue directives?
A. I don't remember individual directives at the moment, but I assume with certainty that there were some written orders, and also we kept on receiving orders and directions to take strict measures.
Q. What kind of directives were those?
A. As I have already said, they told us to take strict measures. It was apparent from them that the OKW thought our measures insufficient; therefore they sent orders that the insurgents should he smashed as soon as possible with every means.
Q. At that time what was your opinion about the individual directives of the OKW?
A. Our point of view was that as we were always requesting more troops we would keep the insurgents down by the presence of larger numbers of troops so that insurrections could not flare up at all. In one case, because of a directive, of which I don't remember the details any longer, I made a written objection to the OKW.
Q. Why did you submit this?
A. Because I thought at that time that the measures were too strict and I had asked for more troops.
Q. Did you receive an answer to this objection?
A. No.
Q. And what did you do then?
A. When the then Colonel Foertsch went on leave, I asked him to go to the OKW as soon as possible and present our point of view once again.
Q. And what was the result of the discussion of General Foertsch with the OKW?
A. As far as I can remember, the result was very unsatisfactory. I don't remember the details of the answer.
Q. With whom did he speak?
A. He spoke with Keitel.
Q. What did Keitel say?
A. Keitel refused my objection and he said, I think, "Your commander-in-chief seems to be very upset about us. When you come back, you will find new orders. Tell your commander-in-chief that the responsibility lies with Hitler and the OKW. Your commander-in-chief has to carry out the orders."
Q. How did you know this - what you have just told us?
A. Colonel Foertsch told me this at that time.
Q. And were troops also asked for at that time?
A. That was the main purpose of this discussion which Foertsch had with Keitel.
Q. Who else did Foertsch speak to on this matter?
A. He spoke briefly with Generaloberst Haider.
Q. Who was Halder?
A. Halder was chief of the Army General Staff.
Q. And what did Foertsch say to Halder and what answer did he get?
A. Well, in detail I don't know.
Q. Well, what did General Foertsch report to you?
A. He said to me that he found more understanding with Halder than he did with Keitel, but Halder also could not help us at the moment. He had no troops available because of the situation in the East.
Q. And what else was considered at that time?
MR. DENNEY: Your Honors please, Dr. Laternser is going pretty far in asking what Foertsch said to Keitel and Keitel said to Foertsch; what Foertsch said to Halder and Halder said to Foertsch. I think we are relating to hearsay. Foertsch is here and pretty soon we will have him going to Moscow.
DR. LATERNSER: The questions have already been answered, Your Honor. I have now put a question with which this objection is not concerned at all. I have now asked the question "What was considered at that time?", i.e. by the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was not present; he is not in a position to state as to the comments made. The objection which has been made, if timely made, would have been good. Perhaps the motion to strike would be in order, but the Tribunal is not in a position to direct the manner in which this case will be handled. I think you should use care, Dr. Laternser, and not seek to illicit hearsay testimony.
The matter will not be ruled upon at this time.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. And that brings us to the end of the Berlin visit of General Foertsch. I now want to know what else was considered at that time in order to master the bandit situation.
A. The Military Commander Serbia once suggested that troops of other allies should be brought into the Serbian area.
Q. What did they think about at that time?
A. They thought about the Italians and Bulgarians.
Q. And why was that not done?
A. Because I did not think it a good idea, having these men who were in opposition to each other together, with regard to the population.
Q. What was the danger at that time - that is, at the end of August or beginning of September - the danger for military purposes?
A. The main danger consisted in the interruption of the rear communications and the cutting off of the railway and shipping lines, i.e. an interruption of the oil supplies for Germany.
Q. The oil from where?
A. The oil from Rumania. And also an interruption of the whole supply for the occupation troops as such and also under certain circumstances a crippling of the whole occupation troops, apart from the individual attacks against the occupation troops which would have had the result of a smash-up.
Q. What was the importance of the Balkan theater of war for the whole war situation?
A. The Balkan territory of war covered the right flank of the Eastern army as long as the Balkans were occupied by German troops. If this occupation was not there, or collapsed, this would mean a danger for the whole Eastern front.
Q. What other dangers were connected with this theater of war?
A. There was also the danger that the whole Mediterranean area would have been affected, especially if a landing had taken place in Greece by British forces.
Q. Field Marshal, then what did you do in order to find a solution for this situation?
A. In this situation, in order to get out of this situation, I issued the order of the 5th of September.
Q. Your Honor, this is Exhibit 42 and it is also presented the same way in Exhibit 43, Book 2 of the English documents, pages 23 to 26; in the German Document Book 2, pages 21 to 22. You issued the order of the 5th of September 1942 as you have just said. What was the contents of this order?
A. This order gave directives for the activities of the troops in the next period.
Q You said directives; what does that mean?
A I stated in the order that the following points of view had to be followed.
Q What did that mean?
A This meant that the troops, if the necessity arose, would proceed according to the given directives.
Q What is the difference between an order and a directive?
A If I order, I say you must in a certain definite case do that and that definitely, but in a directive, I gave an indication of the possibilities which are available in a corresponding case.
Q And when should these possibilities be used?
A They should be used when it was necessary.
Q The prosecution maintains that in this order you intended punishment expeditions; is that correct?
A No, with these directives I gave the order for the insurgent movement to be smashed.
Q To whom was this document exhibit 42 distributed; please lock at the distribution list?
A It was distributed to the Higher Command 65.
Q Who was the commanding general then of the 65th?
A General of the Artillery Bader. It went to the Commander Serbia.
Q Who was then commander in Serbia?
A The Commander in Serbia was General of the Air Force Dankelmann. It went to the commander in Saloniki
Q Who was that?
A It was Major General (Generalleutnant) Krenski.
Q Why did the order not go to the 18th Mountain Army Corps Headquarters?
A This was not necessary. The situation did not demand this.
Q Where was the 18th Mountain Army Corps at that time?
A Near Athens.
Q Why did this order not go to the command in Southern Greece?
A The commander-Southern Greece had only the area round Piraeus in Southern Greece the Italians had the main responsibility.
Q Field Marshal, what were the main reasons for the issuing of these directives?
A The main reason was the tense situation which made it necessary to break the resistance as quickly as possible.
Q The prosecution maintains that the order.....
MR. DENNEY: Your Honors please, Dr. Laternser several times improperly phrases his questions by saying "the prosecution maintains." Now if the witness is going to testify to something different, he can ask him what he meant to do, but not to prepare him for his answer by saying the prosecution maintains this. I suggest to the Court that he refrain that type of questioning.
DR. LATERNSER: May I say something about this, Your Honor? The question, which I wanted to place, I have not yet finished so the prosecution does not know if this is an admissible or an inadmissible question. It is so that only certain questions can be objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: It is my understanding, Dr. Laternser, that Mr. Denney is objecting to the form of the question and the manner in which it is stated, attributing to the prosecuting your understanding of what the prosecution has endeavored to present in its evidence. Your interpretation of that may be one thing and as to what the prosecution maintain is another. The object as to the form of the question will be sustained.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshal, does this order correspond to a plan, an existing plan for weakening and decimating the population? Did you ever hear anything about such a plan?
MR. DENNEY: Your Honor, I object to the form of the question. The order speaks for itself. Dr. Laternser insists on leading him.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Which plans were in existence in the Balkans with regard to the population?
A Well, there were no kinds of plans there. I never spoke with anybody about any kind of plan.
Q You know that the prosecution maintains that there was a plan?
A I heard for the first time about such a plan in the indictment.
Q Do you know orders or regulations which were issued by the communist party in Serbia for the partisans?
A Yes, I know these regulations.
Q What was in it?
A Of course, I can't remember the details properly but I studied these regulations and my total impression was that these regulations contained the idea that all means were permissible with which to fight the Germans, even illegal action and actions against international law could be used or were recommended to be used.
Q Did these regulations play any part when you issued your order?
A These regulations were one of the main reasons, for issuing this order.
Q May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that those regulations of the communist party of Serbia for the band war are mentioned in Exhibit 56, Document Book 2? I am sorry I can't give the English page.