A Relations changed by the fact that the Italians took over the occupation.
Q What is the explanation of the worsening of the relations?
A The Greeks understood that we occupied the country after the Greek Army had been beaten by us. In addition they offered capitulation to us and therefore they found it very painful that the larger part of Greece was given over for occupation by the Italians. A Greek General once said that, "you Germans have conquered us; this is an honor for us; but the fact that you have let the Italians into the country, we will never forgive you this."
Q At that time was there a strong worsening of the relations between the German troops and the population?
AAt the beginning, no. Gradually of course a certain stiffening came on.
Q Did you on your trips have any kind of protection in Greece?
AAs long as I was in office I went around in my own car throughout Greece without protection.
Q What about the food situation when you were in Greece?
A The food situation during the course of the summer became more tense. In these months there couldn't be seen so very much because at this time Greece still had a large amount of fruit. In late summer, as far as I can remember, there was a shortage, especially of bread.
Q At that time could there be any talk of famine?
A No.
Q Who was responsible for the supply?
A The supply for the Greek area was the responsibility of the Italians.
Q And what did the Germans have to do?
A On the part of the Germans the Plenipotentiary of the Reich endeavoured to increase the food imports and I made the same requests through my official channels.
Q Then what happened, what was the result?
A The result was that food deliveries, food transports, especially flour, arrived.
Q Where from?
A From Germany. It didn't come to the places where it should have gone because transport was so difficult.
Q And how did these difficulties arise?
A The difficulties lay in the fact of the destruction of the only railway line between Salonika and Athens, especially in the destruction of a very difficult viaduct.
Q Destruction by whom?
A Destruction by the British on their retreat.
Q Which viaduct was this?
A That was the so-called Pralo Bridge near Thermopylae. And there were also difficulties caused by the fact that the sea transports from Salonika to Athens was frequently interrupted by British submarines.
Q Were there any sinkings?
A. Yes. I remember myself two, one of these sinkings is mentioned in one of the documents here, the sinking of the ship "Gotial", in the first days of November, this ship having flour from Germany on board.
Q Can these difficulties be traced back alone to transport difficulties?
A No, Greece always had to rely on imports.
Q And what about the stocks.
A Stocks at that time, when we came to Greece, were very small.
Q How do you know that?
A During the first trial here in Nurnberg I read a memorandum from the Greek government which stated that the Germans upon their entry into Greece already found an exhausted country.
Q Were there further sources set up for the improvement of the food situation?
A Yes, at that time we allowed fishing on a large scale.
Q Did this cause any complications?
A Yes, it caused complications because various offices objected to this, the enemy intelligence service having thus the possibility to aid people in their attempts to escape.
Q But nevertheless was it carried out?
A Yes, it was carried out.
Q Now about this food question, did military offices also provide food for the Greek population?
A From the Army directly, especially at the beginning food stocks were given up and meals were provided.
Q While you were in Greece what was done in the cultural sphere?
A In the staff had a lecturer whose job it was to insure that if now fortifications or airfields were set up ancient monuments were not destroyed or damaged.
Q Could you give an example for this?
A I can't exactly give an example for the protection of an old cultural monument but another example. By order of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force a new airfield had to be established near Athens. As the terrain was very mountainous, this was the only place that came into the question, but this would have meant that a settlement had to be partly evacuated and also had to be destroyed partly, therefore at that time an objection was made to me and I personally found out what the situation was, and as there was no other possibility we decided to consider the interests of the Greek population as far as it was possible. We did this by avoiding i.e. getting around the security provisions of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. And so we disregarded security of the occupation in order to help the population.
Q. What was the result?
A The result was that part of this settlement remained standing.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q I have some further questions regarding Greece. Apart from Italians and Germans, were there any other troops in Greece?
A Bulgarians.
Q How did the Bulgarians behave towards the Greeks?
A In some places they treated them pretty roughly.
Q How did you get to know of that?
A By complaints on the part of the Greek government.
Q What did you do after receiving these complaints?
A I repeatedly asked the Bulgarian liaison officer to come to see me, General Chilkov, and I talked to him and told him very urgently that he should advise his officers to make the troops stop this kind of behavior.
Q Did these complaints to the Bulgarian authorities have any success?
A I must assume that because I did get no more complaints.
Q The prosecution has submitted Document 071-PS as Exhibit 4. Your Honors, it is on page 8 to 10 of Document Book I, the English Document Book I, and on page 6 to 10 of the German Document Book I. It is the disputed Rosenberg letter. Did you know Rosenberg personally?
A Yes.
Q When and where did you got to know him?
A I cannot recall the occasion in detail. I made his acquaintance on an official or public occasion. That was the only time that I met him and without my discussing anything with him. It may have been around about 1934.
Q And after that, you did not speak to him again?
A I never met him again.
Q What is your opinion regarding this letter, namely Exhibit 4?
A Well, that is a letter, a private letter, from Rosenberg to Bormann. I had no influence on what he wrote. He gives his own opinion. If he talks of his agencies in Belgrade being active with my permission, that is not correct because at that time I had no authority to give any orders in Belgrade. Belgrade was not subordinate to me. He further states that his special task command could also be employed in Salonika.
Q In Exhibit 10, which is on page 38 and 39 of the English Document Book I and on page 27 of the German Document Book I, there is an order of the AOK 12, Ic, of the 19th of April, according to this order a special task command of Rosenberg's was to confiscate material which was directed against the German Reich. I am now asking you, did you know anything of this order?
A No.
Q As leader of the special task command, a Lieutenant von Ingram is being mentioned. Did you know this lieutenant?
A Lieutenant von Ingram means nothing to me today but I remember vaguely to have received a lieutenant in Salonika who had received the Knight's Cross during the western campaign. At that time, that was a very exceptional case and was either told over the telephone by the chief, i.e. by the Ia or by the Ic, that this lieutenant would report to me.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I received his report. He probably reported to me that he had an order to look up these archives. I pointed out to him that I expected that this would be done in the correct form and manner and that nothing would happen.
Q. Why did you tell him that?
A. Because I had a certain suspicion, certain distrust against everything coming from that side.
Q. But after all, he was a lieutenant, wasn't he?
A. He wore the uniform. He was an officer of the Reserve. I expect, but nevertheless he remained in this case of Rosenberg's employee.
Q. Was the special task commando Rosenberg subordinate to the Army?
A. No.
Q. What was its relationship to the Army?
A. As I now see from this document and from another document as well, it was provisioned and paid.
Q. What do you mean by being provisioned and paid?
A. That meant that he was entitled to get quarters and food in the area of the Army.
Q. Can a provisioned and paid command be given orders?
A. No.
Q. Did you know in detail what the extent of the activities of this command was?
A. No.
Q. From Exhibit 130 -- this is in the English document book 5 as a supplement after page 150 and in the German document book 5 on page 98-A.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly repeat, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: It is in volume 5 of the English document book as a supplement after page 150, and it is exhibit 130.
Q. (By Dr. Laternser cont'd) From this exhibit we see that the Rosenberg command would start the Jewish action in Salonika. Was this reported to you?
A. No.
Q. What is the date of the this report?
A. The report is of the 29th of July.
Q. Where were you on that date?
A. From the 21st of July onwards I was absent from the High Command. On the 29th of July I was on leave.
Q. Did you know whether, during your time of activity on the Balkans, offices of the Security Service were subordinate to you? No, I correct myself - whether at that time there were any offices of the Security Service in the Balkans at all?
A. No.
Q. Were any offices of the Security Service subordinate to you at that time?
A. No.
Q. We now turn to the Serbian area. At the end of June, 1941 the commander Serbia was subordinate to you a.s you told us. First of all, a preliminary question. How was Serbia occupied at that time?
A. In Serbia these were at that time Security divisions, divisions of the 15th wave.
Q. Apart from German troops were any others present?
A. The southern part of Bulgaria, south Macedonia, was occupied by Bulgarians.
Q. I don't know whether I understood you correctly. Did you say in the southern part of Serbia or the southern part of Bulgaria?
A. I mean the same thing. I am sorry, the southern part of Serbia, the southern part of Macedonia I wanted to say, was occupied by Bulgarians.
Q. Now, what was the situation at the end of June of 1941 in Serbia?
A. With the start of the campaign in Russia we found that a lot of propaganda became noticeable, by wireless, posters, which both had their effect and which resulted in acts of sabotage especially as regards lines of communications and attacks on members of the armed forces.
Q. Who instigated these things at that time?
A. They were instigated first of all by Moscow through a liaison office, the Russian delegation in Sofia.
Q. How do you know that?
A. These reports came to us through the IC channel.
Q. What did you do when this situation became aggravated?
A. First of all we tried to explain things to the population by propaganda, and of course, we took severe steps against the sabotage acts over the local commanders.
Q. Did you ask for more troops?
A. As soon as I saw that this movement grew we appealed to the High Command of the Armed Forces to let us have troops in Serbia, especially more mobile and more effective troops than those we had at the spot.
Q. What were the disadvantages of the troops on the spot in Serbia?
A. The troops in Serbia were exclusively made up for the occupational tasks in a quiet and pacified country. The divisions only had two regiments, very little artillery, a very meagre state of training. The troops were older people, usually married. The officers were usually former officers who had not been retrained.
Q. How often approximately speaking did you ask for new troops?
A. IT is very difficult to give you any numbers.
Q. Then please give us an estimate.
A. I took every opportunity that offered itself to me to ask the OKW for troops.
Q Did your appeals meet with any success?
A No.
Q As an emergency measure were any troops being sent to Serbia?
A Temporarily we had an air force training school being transferred to the Serbian area.
Q You say temporarily; how long did it remain in the Serbian area?
A I cannot recall that in detail. As far as I remember, it can't have been more than a couple of weeks.
Q When did you receive a personal impression for the first time regarding the situation in Serbia?
A The first personal impression I got during a trip at the end of July, 1941.
Q What kind of trip was that?
AA trip which I took for the purpose of visiting troops and in order to visit the commanders there, especially the commanding general, and make their acquaintance and to meet the military commander Serbia.
Q Who was the military commander Serbia at that time?
A The commander Serbia at that time was general of the air force Schroeder.
Q Where was he at the time of your visit?
AAt the time of my visit he was in the military hospital in Belgrade. I had intended to visit him earlier but I had to postpone my visit until the state of health of General Schroeder had become such that I could see him in Belgrade.
Q Where did you go first?
A First of all I traveled to Nish.
Q With whom did you talk there?
A In Nish I talked to one of the divisional commanders or with General Bader, the commanding general of the 65th corps, who at the same time was present there as deputy of the commander Serbia.
Q What did General Bader report to you regarding the situation in Serbia?
A I cannot recall this in detail. The overall impression I had was that at different places insurgent movements became noticeable. Frequently sabotage acts took place and similar things.
Q What was the further course of your journey?
A The continuation of the trip from Nish to Belgrade which had been intended by railroad was not possible because the line, the tracks, had been cut by insurgents in the meantime. For that reason I had to fly from Nish to Belgrade.
Q On the occasion of your stay in Nish did you give any orders for the combatting of bandits?
A Individual orders I did not give. I very likely spoke to the commanders about these matters.
Q When was your inspection trip concluded?
A On the 23rd, of July, 1941.
Q And where did you go after the conclusion of this trip?
A I went to Vienna and Partenkirchen on leave.
Q When did you return from this leave?
A I returned on the 23rd of August.
Q So that from the 23rd of July to the 23rd of August, 1941, you were on leave?
A Yes.
Q As you know, the so-called terror order in which the OKW ordered the pacification of occupied countries by terror measures is dated from the 23d of July, 1941. It is exhibit number 25 and it is in the English document book 1 on page 86 and in the German document book on pages 62 to 66. Your Honor, I would like to use this opportunity to draw the attention of the Court to the following fact. The Tribunal will remember that at the time this exhibit was submitted I objected, but this objection on my part was overruled at that time and I referred without that I want now to touch the ruling of the Court now, I referred at that time to points 1 to 5 for justifying my objec tion and in the meantime I have found out the following, and I only want to draw the attention of the Court to this.
In the German document book the whole order is given, consisting of six paragraphs, whereas in the English document book on page 86 only paragraph number 6 is given, in spite of the fact that in the paragraphs 1 to 5 it is shown quite decisively that this was an order which was and could only be valid for the east. And I only to this did I want to draw the Court's attention, i.e. the fact that in the English document book 5 essential points, points essential for the judgment regarding this order, have been left out and only this one point is given, which is kept in more general terms, but which can only be correctly understood in connection with the five preceding paragraphs. Therefore I shall take the liberty to submit the entire order to the Court in my document book.
As you know, Field Marshal, this order, exhibit 25, bears the date of the 23d of July, 1941. Where were you on that date?
A I was in Belgrade and on the same day I took the train from Belgrade to Vienna.
Q Do you remember whether this order was submitted to you after you returned from your leave?
A No.
Q Did you ever hear whether this order was distributed in the southeast?
A No.
Q Now we come to the time after you returned from your leave. That is the end of August, 1941. What was the partisan situation at that time?
AAfter my return I found that the situation had been considerably aggravated.
Q Where did you hear of that for the first time?
A I heard of this for the first time when I arrived in Belgrade on the 23rd of August, 1941.
Q With whom did you discuss the situation?
A I then talked about the situation with General Danckelmann, General Bader, with the chiefs of staff of both these generals, and also probably with other officers whose names I cannot remember in detail.
Q What was the result?
A I may add that General Danckelmann was the successor of General Schroeder. General Schroeder had suffered a relapse in his state of health and he died shortly afterwards.
Q General Danckelmann was the successor of General Schroeder in which capacity?
A He was successor of the Commander Serbia.
Q Now you were mentioning discussions. What was the result of these discussions and conferences?
A The result was that as regards essentials one tried to take from the existing forces people who could be formed into pursuit commands, that is to say, those men who had been trained in a better way were to be employed in more mobile formations in order to be sent speedily to those spots where they were required.
Q How did you yourself at that time view the situation in Serbia?
A I looked upon the situation as a very serious one.
Q At that time attempts were also made to bring the Serbian population to their senses?
A Yes.
Q By what means?
A By means of radio propaganda, and we also used for this purpose the Serbian government.
Q Who was the Chief of the Serbian Government at that time?
AAt that time I believe there was still a Provisional Government.
Q And a little bit later on?
AA short time afterwards we had the government of Nedic.
Q What did Nedic do?
A He issued a couple of decrees; he also personally made a speech on the wireless for the pacification and enlightenment of the population.
Q We have proceeded too quickly as to time. We are still at the end of august and I would like to ask you where was that area where the greatest amount of insurgent activity took place at that time?
A Roughly speaking in the neighborhood southwest of Belgrade.
Q Could you define it a bit more accurately and perhaps give us some names of localities so that it may become a bit clearer to us.
A Krupanj and Valjevo.
Q What for instance had happened in Krupanj?
A In Krupanj a local guard post had been attacked by communists, one office post and a couple of men had been killed, and the rest of the guard post had been captured. Apart from that other companies had been encircled in Krupanj and partly they had been destroyed.
DR. LATERNSER: May I draw the attention of the court to the fact that this incident of Krupanj is mentioned in Exhibit 94 -- I beg your pardon -- it is exhibit 94 in the German Document Book III, page 43. I'm sorry, your Honor, I cannot give you the English numbers. I am very sorry but I will do this after the recess. I have omitted to ascertain these figures.
THE PRESIDENT: It is Exhibit 55 I am told. Exhibit 94?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, it is Exhibit 94. I shall give the number of the page immediately after the noon recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 55.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much your Honor. The Prosecution has now submitted the teletype of the 4th of September, Exhibit 41, which is in the English Document Book II, page 21 to 22, and which can be found in the German Document Book II on pages 19 to 20.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q For what reason did you at that time demand that a judgment was given on the general situation under figure 1?
A I had the impression that I was insufficiently informed by the Commander Serbia. Now here we had the formation of the government of Nedic and regarding the formation of this government I was not informed, neither about the actual happenings nor about the actual formation. I was only told a couple of days later about what had happened.
At the same time the Serbian Gendarmerie was supplied with weapons and this fact I had learned from a newspaper.
Q Those were the reasons for making the request under figure 1 in this teletype?
A Yes.
Q The Prosecution charges you in regard to this teletype to have ordered most severe measures. What was meant by that?
A Up to then the troops were used to comparatively peaceful ideas with regard to the population and had frequently failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation. The troops had not yet recognized that they had to deal with a very insidious enemy. They had acceded to negotiations and had been made a fool of and in parts they had been captured and it was necessary for this reason to tell the troops that this enemy who now appeared could only be fought by really military actions.
Q What kind of severest measures did you mean by that?
A I meant by that the troops should use those weapons they had at their disposal.
Q Why in this teletype did you issue a prohibition to negotiate with the insurgents?
A These negotiations had led to a state of affairs where whole units had been rendered ineffective as far as fighting was concerned. That in good faith believing that negotiations were to be conducted -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, witness. We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, before you continue your examination the Tribunal wishes to make a statement in connection with your comments which were made yesterday afternoon.
In reply to the inquiry of counsel for the defense concerning the procedure to be followed by them in adducing evidence in support of their case following the delay of the prosecution in procuring the documentary evidence required by the order of the Tribunal under date of August 14, 1947, the prosecution having indicated its intention to comply with alternative (b) of said order, the Tribunal states:
(a) That defendants may adduce any and all evidence, documentary or oral in the order it deems advisable without being required to rest his or their case prior to the examination of said documentary evidence:
(b) That defendants after completion of their oral evidence may be withdrawn from the witness stand without being-cross-examined until opportunity to examine the documentary evidence referred to in the order of August 14, 1947 is afforded:
(c) That if such order of August 14, 1947, be not complied with at such a time as not to prejudice the rights of these defendants, the situation will be handled by a supplemental order of the Tribunal.
That is the statement that the Tribunal wishes to make in connection with the comments made by Dr. Laternser.
DR. SAUTER: (for defendants von Geitner and Lanz): Your Honor, since the presentation of evidence for the defense is now taking place, I would like to make a request about a point which is rather unclear to me. This is the question if after the presentation of evidence the defense is only to submit pleas, or if ever defense counsel should also submit a closing brief for his client. I am referring to this question, because the former practice has varied in previous trials. In the International Tribunal, for instance, it was the rule that we had to submit a plea - but not a closing brief.
At that time, however, the Prosecution submitted closing briefs, but we didn't see them. We defense counsel, therefore, at that time limited ourselves to pleas which we submitted orally. In the next trial, the Doctors' trial, the Tribunal asked that we should submit a detailed closing brief which was not to be read, and that in addition to the closing brief we had to submit a plea which summarized the evidence. This plea had to be submitted during the proceedings. In these days now another trial is coming toward its end, the trial against Pohl and the SS, and in this trial the Tribunal took the opposite point of view. The Tribunal ruled a few days ago in this Pohl trial that the defense counsel were only to present pleas and not closing briefs. The President stated that the Tribunal doesn't want to have so much to read. That is exactly contrary to what happened in the Doctors' trial.
Now, I think it would be expedient if the defense counsel were told, by the Tribunal, as soon as possible, how this Tribunal will rule in this matter, because if we know that in addition to the plea we also have to submit a closing brief, then during the presentation of evidence for the defendants we can prepare ourselves for this, and if this Tribunal does not require a closing brief then we don't need to do this, and then we can direct our attention mainly to the plea. I think that it would be expedient if the Tribunal would clarify this question as soon as possible, so that we can conduct ourselves accordingly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not heretofore given consideration to the matter you have referred to, Dr. Sauter, but we shall discuss it in chambers and then advise you here at some session of the Tribunal. You may be sure that this matter will be brought back to your attention as quickly as possible.
May I inquire, Dr. Sauter, as to whether or not you know what the wish of all the defense counsel are?
DR. SAUTER: I am afraid I don't know. I have only spoken for myself, because I personally want to know the opinion of the Tribunal as soon as possible, because in our further work we must abide by this.
Your Honor, it would perhaps also be desirable if we could have clarity on another point as well, so that later on the proceedings will not be delayed. This is the question of whether the Tribunal intends at the end of the presentation for the defense to have a recess, so that the work of the defense for the pleas and the closing briefs can be prepared or not, because if such a recess is not intended then of course we must start our preparations for the pleas and the closing briefs and speed them up. Perhaps it would be expedient if the Tribunal would also clarify this question and would tell the defense counsel their attitude.
THE PRESIDENT: We will give consideration to that question, also, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, with regard to this matter I would like to state in my capacity as defense counsel for Field Marshal List and von Reichs, and also in my capacity as spokesman for the defense, I would like to make a statement on this point before a decision is reached. After I have spoken with all the other defense counsel I would like to tell the Tribunal the attitude of the defense.