And then I continue, skipping the next three sentences:
"The Army-group in some cases also acted according to its own point of view in opposition to the Fuehrer's and the Army High Command's orders as for instance in the exchange of prisoners and the start of negotiations with insurgent leaders. But such a procedure was generally only possible in less important individual cases, as the Fuehrer very often received notice of the evasion of his directions anyway sooner or later through special report channels and then usually interfered personally.
"The general situation with regard to personnel forced the personnel-office to retain experienced and proved Army and Army-group Chiefs in their positions as Chief, even if they were eligible for promotion by their years of service although it did not correspond to their employment as Chief of Staff any longer, and generally reject the repeated requests for frontline action. It is known to me that General Foertsch also requested several times to be sent to the front for duty but that this request was rejected before the Spring of the year 1944."
Before I submit the next affidavit, your Honor, which is rather lengthy, I would suggest that we take the recess now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 11:15 o'clock.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, before we pass from this last affidavit which has been put into evidence as Exhibit 24 I would like to read into the record, or perhaps Dr. Raschenbach will do it for me, certain other portions of the affidavit which he omitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The affidavit begins on Page 18, beginning with the sentence---
THE PRESIDENT: Let me make this statement and inquiry. The fact that he does not read it all does not necessarily mean it is not in evidence, does it, and that the Court does not take consideration of it? Unless you want to do it for the purpose of the transcript-doesn't it all go into the transcript?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No, I think only the portion which Dr. Fenstermacher reads goes into the transcript, your Honor. The emphasis I have in mind is that throughout direct case when we failed to read into the record certain portions of our documents the defense counsel asked if they could read the omitted portion.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER. The twelfth line on page 18 of the English Document Book: "I gained the impression from our official relations which according to the tasks of my department were restricted generally to the operational sphere and questions of organization insofar as operational tasks were concerned that General FOERTSCH had taken a special interest in and made himself thoroughly acquainted with the rather difficult problems of operations in the Balkans and that he possessed a considerable and well founded knowledge of a military as well as political and economical nature. General FOERTSCH concerned himself therefore mentally also in addition to his actual military tasks most intensively with all other problems of the Balkan area."
And then just two lines in the next page, page 19 of the English Document Book, the second paragraph: "Of these suggestions I remember best of all:
An exertion of political pressure on the Croatian leader of State in order to bring him to a peaceful agreement with the orthodox Slavs in Croatia."
DR. RASCHENBACH: If the Tribunal, please, I have no objections to the Prosecution reading from any of the documents which I have submitted, or asking me to read a paragraph or a paragraph which I have omitted. I only omit these paragraphs in order to save time and in order not to repeat things which have been expressed in other affidavits.
The next document is Foertsch document 26-A and I offer it as exhibit No. 25. It is an affidavit given by Dr. Hermann Hofmann. I want to prove with it what attitude was taken by General Foertsch so the Southeastern problems and all the questions in connection with the combatting of bands, together with the attitude which he expressed in the staff meetings, which was also part of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. This affidavit by Dr. Hofmann reads as follows and I shall read from the second paragraph, it is on page 23 of the document book, the first page of the document;
"From 1 August 1942 till the end of the war I belonged to the High Command of the 12th Army, Army Group E and F as Army Doctor and later as Army Group Doctor, I have therefore collaborated with General Foertsch as of that date until his withdraw in March 1944 and was constantly in touch with him in my official capacity."
I shall then read from the next page, page 24, the sentence at the top:
"My tasks consisted in the responsible management and directing of all measures, necessary for the maintaining of health of the troops, the care for the wounded and sick of the Army, including war prisoners, the fighting of epidemic, and the medical and hygienic supervision of the civilian population of the occupied territories."
Then read from page 26, the paragraph entitled "Attitude towards the Southeast questions:"
"Every officer of the staff participating in the discussions of the Chief knew with how many difficulties, obstructions and lack of understanding on the part of the Armed Forces High Command, the Chief of the General Staff was burdened in the Balkan territory, which was difficult to handle from a military standpoint and politically especially sensitive. The deficient organization, the political inability of the Armed Forces High Command and an entirely insufficient allocation of military forces, paralyzed every effective measure, which after the military occupation of the Balkan territory, could have effected its real pacification.
The already thin network of military effective troups, which had to cover the space which offered such difficulties from the point of view of communications became still thinner on account of the continuous departure of formations. All demands for allocation of military effective divisions were rejected by the O.K.W. Hitler was not interested in the Balkan territory. Improvisation and emergency solutions therefore dominated all measures and thus did not produce a satisfactory result. Rise, consolidation and continuous growing of the partisan movement was a necessary consequence due to the many 'soft spots' in the German occupation. In every conference of the Chief, General Foertsch found bitter words regarding this contrast between the ordered 'musts' and the actual 'can'."
As long as I worked together with him and knew and shared his intentions and hopes, his activity consisted in a continuous struggle with the OKW.
At the conferences of the Chiefs, he criticized in front of the leaders of the departments, and their aides the regulations of the OKW in a frank and open manner, and rejected them if they contradicted the given necessities, or the laws of military and general human ethics. This was done before an assembly of officers, some of whom did not share the political attitude of FOERTSCH at least not entirely----and he thus showed that he stood for his conviction without regard for his own person. This manly attitude was one of the foundations of the complete confidence which all those officers had in him who opposed, because they were deeply worried about the fate of their fatherland, the systematic abolition of all military conceptions of value. The standard of the conferences of the Chiefs, arranged by General FOERTSCH, excelled, apart from the open criticism of all wrong commands of the OKW, also in the clear and objective presentation of the military and political situation. In the notes of my diary, still in my possession, is nearly always mentioned that the situation was presented frankly and openly.
This was a real blessing for thinking people in view of the indiscriminating and highly colored reports, which were made in other places because of a lack of personal courage, or in blind execution of the notorious ("Fuehrerberehl"), that nobody should know anything about a matter, unless he had to do with it directly. The wrong policy on the Balkans, especially in Croatia, was condemned with the same open criticism. The fight which General FOERTSCH, waged against this policy of the OKW, the Croatian authorities and the Ustascha, was a road of suffering for an officer who saw clearly, had a sense of responsibility, and was deeply shocked about the methods of the Ustascha.
All effective measures were voided by the resistance of the O. K. W. or the refusal by Hitler himself. For example, in my diary is a note, dated 16 September 1942, characteristic for the then prevailing conditions, which mentions the report of the First Officer of the General Staff of the Division stationed at Serajewe, stating that a detachment of the Ustascha led by a notorious sadist and designated by the officer in question as a band of murderers, was arrested by German troops, but had to be returned to the Croats on 'highest' order. No measures whatsoever were taken on the part of the Croats. This one small example sheds light on the desperate fight which the High Command and with it the Chief of the General Staff had to wage against the Ustascha which was under the special protection of Hitler and his diplomats working at Zagreb."
From the third paragraph, the attitude toward National Socialism, this is a subject regarding which I have submitted several affidavits in book one, I want to read only one sentence toward the end of page 28. The second sentence in the second paragraph:
"Once in the winter of 1942 when he talked about his then Chief Foertsch, he reported to me a talk, this means Gen. Loehr, which had taken place between Goering and himself about Foertsch and which went as follows: Goering 'How do you get along with your Chief Foertsch?'
Loehr: 'Alright.' Goering: 'Well, that surprises me. Foertsch after all is to be considered an enemy of the Party and the Air Force.'" The next document which I offer is Foertsch document No. 27, which I want to give Exhibit No. 26.
This is a copy from a letter written by the defendant Foertsch to his wife. Let me ask you first, witness is that the complete letter which is contained in the original exhibit; is it your letter and did you write it at the time?
A I wrote that letter on 15 March 1942.
Q The letter deals again with the defendant's attitude toward the O.K.W. and his efforts against the O.K.W. I shall read only one sentence which is roughly in the middle of the letter of the extract in the document book:
"Total tendency: Our worries here are entirely uninteresting. 'If we cannot master the insurrections, the leadership, i.e., we are to be blamed.' This according to Jodl. Naturally, there is practically no help whatsoever. One may call it a success, that they don't take troops from us."
The next document I offer is Foertsch document No. 29, which in on page 33 and I shall give it the exhibit No. 27. It is a letter by the defendant addressed to his wife on 8 May, 1943. Witness, I am handing you the letter and I would like to ask you if this is the complete letter and did you write it at that time in that form?
A I wrote this letter on 8 May 1942 in Belgrade.
Q This letter again shows General Foertsch's efforts which were opposed to the O.K.W. in the period of May, 1942. It reads as follows:
"Tonight I returned from a 3 days inspection trip with Warlimont to B and am proceeding to S. at 1030."
Let me ask you a question, who was Warlimont at the time.
A He was the deputy chief of the Wehrmacht operational staff, he was Joel's constant deputy at the time.
Q What do the letters B and S stand for?
A B means Belgrade and at 1030 I went on to Salonina.
Q I continue:
"It was a journey obviously ordered by the O.K.W. for the purpose of a check-up, in order to find out who is to blame for the impardonable state of affairs prevailing in the Southeast."
Witness, what do you mean by "the impardonable state of affairs?"
A Well, the OKW designed our work in the Southeast, i.e. the whole state of affairs, an unforgivable mess.
Q Why did they?
A Because the O.K.W. was dissatisfied with the work and attitude of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q Does that mean that the O.K.W. was of the opinion that you had been too strong and too ruthless towards the bands and the population?
A No, on the contrary. I believe this letter shows this.
Q "Warlimont, who is very reasonable was deeply impressed by all things, realized as he repeated all the time that there was being done 'What was humanly possible', recognized the prejudices as such and is going to report just as we wish. How far he will thereby impress these Keitel and Joel in the first place who is the main instigator and nearly God-like, that I do not know. We are being blamed for not taking strong enough measures, that we are unnecessarily entangled with the Italians, that we do not report correctly, etc.
...
"L. is not coming back."
Who is L?
A Field Marshal List.
Q "He is chosen for a new task again with Creiffenberg as chief Ku is rather in disgrace."
Who is Ku?
A General Kuntze.
Q "I expect a change before long. For myself a change is out of question. I now have the reputation as an expert in the Balkans and am likely to finish my days here without thanks and distinction, unless I manage to make myself unpopular enough to be given a division..."
The next document which I offer is Foertsch document No. 30 on page 34 of the document book, which I offer as exhibit No. 28. I am handing the letter, which is again a letter addressed to General Foertsch's wife, to him. Did you write this letter at the time and is it complete in the exhibit?
A This is the complete letter which I wrote on 17 May 1942.
Q It concerns discussions held by the Commander in Chief Southeast with the O.K.W. I shall read the first paragraph of the extract in the document book.
"I was only exasperated by the damned way K and J up there thought fit to treat us, that means rather KU, regarding the people in Serbia as imbecile idlers and themselves showing off as demigods.
Witness, what does K, J and Ku stand for?
A K stands for Keitel, J for Jodl and Ku for General Kuntze.
Q My position is not different from that of the chiefs in the West, who cannot achieve anything at all. Now I have at least achieved that we here are recognized as operational area and are mentioned in the internal situation reports of the O.K.W., and in some matters are treated in the same way as the Eastern operational area. Au himself called that a great success of the open talks with Warl.
Who is Warl?
A That is Warlimont.
Q "If I can now manage to get him here to the Southern area and to show him what I told him during our ride through Serbia things will improve here too. Above all I am too glad not to sit in the O.K.W. like W., as a serf in the Byzantine forest..."
The next document is Foertsch document No. 31, which I offer as exhibit No. 29. It is again a letter by Foertsch to his wife of 26 May 1942. I will hand it to the defendant and would like to ask him whether the letter is complete in the exhibit and whether you wrote it at the time?
A The letter is complete and I wrote it on 26 May 1942.
Q I shall read the brief extract contained in the document book on page 35, it reads as follows:
OKW has made us a nice little present for Whitsuntide by a silly administrative decree. Silly stuff doesn't become more reasonable by being signed by a F.M.
What does F.M. stand for?
A I should read: "Silly stuff doesn't become more reasonable by being signed by a Field Marshal and I meant Keitel.
Q "Our request that the Referent should take the trouble to come here has been turned down of course."
Witness can you tell us whether that letter went through the Field post?
A Yes, certainly it must have done that.
Q The next document is Foertsch document No. 32, which I offer as exhibit 30. It is an affidavit given by Warlimont concerning the attitude taken by the command posts in the Southeast towards the O.K.W. and at the same time about experiences made by Warlimont concerning the bands in the Southeast. The affidavit reads as follows, but let me ask you first once more, who was Warlimont?
A Warlimont was the deputy chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff.
Q Beginning with No. 1:
"1) I recollect the following significant orders and declarations of Hitler as well as of Field-Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jode regarding the conduct of the Commands in the South East; Hitler ordered, about the beginning of 1942, that the prosecution of members of the Croatian Ustascha should he discontinued which had been started by General Bader in agreement with the Commander South-East because of excesses in the fighting against the insurgents. On the contrary, he tried to present the way of action of the Ustascha as an example to the German leadership, which he called "too soft".
For the same reasons Hitler repeatedly declared that the German Generals in the South-East should take Tito as an example, in order to get the necessary toughness.
Keitel did not submit a memorandum by Colonel General Loehr to Hitler, because it was apt to appear as an evasion of the draconic measures intended by Hitler. Jodl rejected, following a command and by order of Hitler, at the beginning of 1942, plans, submitted to him by General Kuntze for the further dealings with the insurgent movement in the South-East, as "too mild".
"2) From my first informatory journey in the Southeast I recollect the following facts:
In Spring 1942 I got Jodl, after persistent requests, to let me travel to the South-East in order to gather first-hand impressions of the situation. Foertsch, receiving me at the Belgrade air-port, had, for that purpose, prepared a drive from Belgrade to Serajevo. Accompanied by General von Glaise, we covered that distance in a day.
We drove in automobiles which were escorted by armoured cars. Likewise, at each stop military security measures were taken. A German unit we met on our way, marched under cover of security detachments. There were no incidents. In north-western Serbia we passed several villages which had been destroyed in the course and as a result of the fighting but were still partly inhabited.
My observations in this region as well as on other occasions that the population did not show any hostility, were answered by Foertsch and Glaise by stating
a) that the German soldiers still enjoyed the respect of most of the Serbs,
b) that behind each seemingly peaceable inhabitant an insurgent may be disguised, appearing today as a peasant, but to-morrow again as a franc-tireur.
In many places we also met indigenous forces in uniform who had placed themselves in the service of the German occupational power. Next day we observed for a time an action against bands in the Sarajevo area. On this occasion the immeasurable difficulties which the German commands encountered in the South-East became clearly evident.
The enemy never disclosed his whereabouts, but kept his positions stubbornly, broken into the smallest groups, hidden in woods and caves, and emerging treacherously again behind the troops who had combed out the area. The German troops at that time were deficient in the necessary equipment to follow the enemy up in that inaccessible territory of mountains and forests. The Croatian Domobrans, on the other hand, could hardly have been used in view of their equipment and age, but also because of their lack of military discipline. Nor was it possible to rely on the Italians.
Some captured partisans I saw made a completely savage impression and did not show in the least the character, let alone the insignia of a regular unit or militia.
A discussion with General Bader, who, like Foertsch and Glaise, faced the unusual military task with the greatest earnestness had mainly the purpose of gaining the assistance of the OKW against acts of subordination and excesses on the part of the Croatian Ustascha through my intervention.
My main efforts after my return from this journey were directed both to this aim and to a reinforcement of the German troops and an improvement in their equipment.
The next document, which I offer is document No. 33 on page 39, which I offer as Exhibit No. 31. It is an affidavit by Theodor Jestrabek and it concerns the efforts made by General Foertsch to protect the population and the economic measures thereby to improve their situation. It also deals with his attitude toward the Jewish question in the East.
I read as follows:
"In June 1941 in Athens, the Head-Quarters of the AOK 12, I made, on the occasion of an official report, the acquaintance of the former General Foertsch, who, a short while before, had been appointed Chief of the General Staff of that unit.
I had been serving for some time on that staff as a Captain d.R.z.V. and was entrusted with the tasks of a Supply Officer. In the same capacity I later served under Foertsch at Salonica in the staffs of the Army Group E and finally at Belgrade in that of the Army Group F, until the transfer of General Foertsch in Spring 1944. Apart from my tasks as a Supply Officer I had to perform extensive welfare work which embraced all the members of the staff including the foreign auxiliary workers employed with the staff such as Italians, Greeks, Serbs, Croats.
In order to be able to carry out that welfare work, an agricultural enterprise was formed at Foertsch's suggestion with the purpose of producing the additional foodstuffs required for the supply of kitchens, canteens on special occasions without tapping the resources of the country, that means, with our own means, for example, by way of cultivation of waste land, creation of vegetable gardens, raising of cattle, etc. In the execution of this welfare and economical tasks I was direct under the Chief of Staff.
"Foertsch always used his influence for a just treatment of the population of the South-East. It was contrary to his whole nature and to his outspoken humanity to apply unjustly harsh measures. Foertsch saw in a contented population the best guarantee for the security of the occupation force.
"Even in the staff itself the measures ordered showed his attitude towards the population. When, in autumn 1941, an order by Goering banned the participation of civilian employees, even of those who were employed directly in soldiers' kitchens, canteens, officers' club etc., in the supply for the troops, Foertsch ordered, in direct opposition to the Goering order, that the indigenous civilian employees might continue to take part in the supply for the troops.
"In addition, at all commands in the occupied territory messes were established for the civilian employees and the food supplies were taken from Army stocks. But he did not only look after the civilians employed with the German agencies, but he also endeavored to help the rest of the population of the occupied territory, to the best of his ability. As an evidence I should like to point out, that the feeding of the population, the deliveries from the Red Cross, were to a large extent helped and furthered by Foertsch in particular in Greece.
"Furthermore, I remember repeated orders issued by Foertsch purporting the protection of public and private property. Any removal if installations was strictly prohibited or made dependent on previous explicit permission.
"When, in autumn 1943, the Army Group Foertsch took over the Municipal Estate Rewa at Belgrade, the socalled- fore-court with vegetable fields of about 60 hectars was left to the Municipality of Belgrade so as not to endanger the supply of vegetables for the municipal employees."
I shall skip the next paragraph and read the last one.
"Significant for his attitude to the Jewish question is the following fact: I was in close contact with the population in the exercise of my duties as a Supply Officer under Foertsch in the Southeast area. He knew and approved that I was dealing with many Jewish firms and suppliers, particularly at Salonica."
The next document is Document No. 34 which I offer as Exhibit No. 32, an affidavit by Christoph von L'Estocq. I shall only read a brief extract. He also speaks about Foertsch's attitude towards the civilian population in the Balkans and the collective measures of reprisal. It starts:
"The former General Hermann Foertsch has been known to me since the summer of 1942 when I was transferred to the staff of the former Army High Command 12 at Salonika. Until 31 January 1943 I have served under Foertsch as 1st Adjutant on the staff of the AOK 12, respectively later Army Group E."
I shall skip the next ten sentences and I shall come, on page 42, to:
"Above all, Foertsch believed in justice which he applied to everyone whether German or foreigner, whether young or old, soldier or civilian, High Commander or groom, once he had acquired for himself an exact picture of the man and his problems.
"Terror, arbitrary rule, ill treatment, pillage, enslavement, not to mention extermination, did not exist in his vocabulary. His thinking and striving never were directed towards such things and I claim that Foertsch was the last person who would ever have recommended to his commander measures of the above mentioned kind against the population that had come to know him personally. Thus, Foertsch also looked upon collective measures, such as the taking of hostages as ordered by the OKW and other reprisals very critically, however as being sometimes unavoidable. At any rate, I have never heard any utterance from his mouth that could have been understood as an approval of such measures."
The next document is Foertsch Document No. 36. I shall not read from 35. Foertsch No. 36 which I beg to offer is Exhibit No. 33 is on page 49. It is an affidavit by Hans Erxleben. He was as becomes clear from the introduction, a Colonel and Army Signal Corps Leader with the Staff of the Army High Command in Salonika. Foertsch was his immediate superior. I shall read only the part which begins on the bottom of page 49.
"His conferences were particularly witty and humorous, party sharply ironical, especially, as to measures and directives of the OKW and other higher up agencies. Every participant at those conferences could immediately feel FOERTSCH's inner opposition to the whole system.
"All his endeavours were directed towards securing the safety of the troop and of the communications to the rear. Inhuman, criminal actions or inclinations to exterminate whole groups of people were entirely foreign to his whole character. Intentional actions of that kind cannot even be discussed. The extermination of the Jews was not favored by him or promoted. When I related to him, at the occasion of a oral report, that Jews had been driven together around Saloniki, which I had witnessed I could but notice his disagreement with this senseless measure. Since this herding together was not carried out by military forces, but by the Gestapo and (S.D.) he could not interfere.
"He tried particularly to improve living conditions of the Greek civilian population, as far as it was in his power. He always particularly supported the endeavours of the Reich plenipotentiary in Athens to stabilize Greek currency.
Also he took a vigorous interest in the food situation of the civilian population."
The next document will be Foertsch Document No. 37 which I offer as Exhibit No. 34, an affidavit by Dr. Emil Hans Haller and it tries to prove at least that General Foertsch, unlike the assertion of the prosecution concerning extermination tendencies, did everything to make the situation of the population bearable. There follows as well the nature and character of bandit warfare and the manner in which members of the bands attacked German troops.
It begins on page 52 of the document book. We can see from this that he as an orderly officer of the 1st Adjutant belonged to Army Group E and F or the staff of the AOK and he also deputized for the Staff Officer of the Chief of the General Staff. As far as the general contents are concerned, I shall read a sentence on page 52-A -- or perhaps it is still on page 52 in the English version, the last sentence probably:
"I know that General Foertsch complained again and again that the men "higher up" were insufficiently acquainted with conditions in the Balkans and therefore very frequently adopted opinions that were completely at variance with realities."
On the next page, skipping one sentence, I shall read:
"I am convinced that Foertsch did everything in his power whenever this was left to his personal decision, to make the situation created by the occupation and the guerilla warfare as bearable as possible for the suffering population. So far as I remember, FOERTSCH especially concerned himself with the stabilization of the depreciating Greek currency and with exhausting every possibility in order to keep the occupation costs as low as possible as primary conditions for the economic recovery of the country.
"In this connection I do not wish to omit that the partisan fighting in the Southeast, in the opinion of all those engaged in it, cannot be given the character of normal military actions. By this I understand such actions as could be judged according to international military law. The reason for this lies in the circumstance that in general the bands themselves did not bother about these agreements, even if on occasion and in certain localities they attached importance to being treated as regular military formations.
"In the Balkans a boy is likely to be born, so to speak, with his rifle in his hand; the struggle of all against all -- an armed struggle -- has been a characteristic of this focus of unrest at the "edge of Europe" for generations.
The customary standards of the civilized world cannot, accordingly, be applied directly to the Balkans. I myself constantly had the impression that the conditions prevailing in Germany at the time of the Thirty Years War had been perpetuated there in the Balkans. The partisan war was more or less a struggle -whether waged under nationalist or other political slogans (socialist, communist) -- of those who had nothing more to lose against those from whom they hoped, by plundering or destroying them, to get something for their momentary needs or even for later on. The peasant of today is the plunderer of tomorrow who has lost everything himself through plundering. One can speak of uniformed and militarily organized units only by way of exception and then only with the greatest qualifications. How little the laws of warfare were observed by the bands I can show from one example which I recall particularly well because it concerns my own brother who was captured by the partisans on the Peloponnesus in 1943. The Italians captured with him at the same time who did not agree to join the band were shot off hand. A few days after his capture my brother himself was released when the band was surrounded by German forces after he had escaped shooting several times only due to the circumstance that the well-intentioned elements outnumbered the radicals who advocated the immediate shooting of all prisoners."
THE PRESIDENT: We will interrupt here at this time, Dr. Kauschenbach, and take our noon recess.
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours.
16 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
HERMANN FOETSCH - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued
DUR. RAUSCHENBACH: Before the recess I stopped at Foertsch Document No. 37 which I offered as Exhibit No. 34. This it on page 54 of the document book. I continue where I left off, where we were speaking about how the brother of the witness was captured by the bands. I continue in roughly the middle of the page.
"My brother described this band to me as being led by a major of of the former Greek army who had with him a former gymnasium professor from Athens as his commissar. A large part of the men had no uniforms and taken together resembled a motley band of robbers which in addition outright adventurers and political muddleheads, also included a number of former peasants who in the course of the perpetual plundering had lost all their property and had now "taken to the woods" themselves. This impression has been constantly confirmed for me in a large number of conversations with well-informed officers. I can also remember very well that these bands were the terror of the entire country, that is the peace-loving and hard-working part of the native population, who sought protection against them from the German Wehrmacht.
"Accordingly, the partisan war was primarily waged not against but rather for the country. It was not the occupation or the exploitation of the country by the country by the occupying power which kept the people from work and prevented the recovery of the economy but rather the bands roaming and plundering through the country as partisans who in time brought about chaotic conditions in spite of all our efforts, because of the weakness of the occupation units, and at first made normal life difficult and then to a large extent impossible.
From a military point of view the "war" in the Balkans was a perpetual war of attrition with a sly and crafty, as well as cruel enemy."
And then I skip the next sentence and continue on page 55:
"I am firmly convinced, and gained this impression from many remarks of the Chief, that he never regarded the war against the partisans as an end in itself, more or less like an extermination campaign, but rather as a military and economic necessity."
I skip the next five sentences and continue as follows:
"From his own philosophy of life FOERTSCH repudiated the way of life and tendencies of National Socialism. It was not at all in his line. Towards officers of the SS, as well as toward the SS in general, he shoed a reserve modified only by convention or by official necessity, which might wound their feelings and which perhaps in some cases was even intended to do so.
"He was deeply interested in the free expression of opinion in "his" soldiers' newspaper, the "Watch in the Southeast", just as he was always concerned with raising the intellectual and cultural level on his staff".
And then on page 56 another paragraph:
"Next to dishonesty it was chiefly stupidity which was repugnant to FOETSCH, even if he did not think too severely of this, either. Characteristic here is a resigned remark - as in general at the end of our acquaintance FOERTSCH was dominated by a mood of strong resignation - of the military author: "If ever in my life I should write a book, I would call it 'The Arse-holes of the Wehrmacht'. I have had enough material for this for a long time. The first 10 pages are intended for the OKW."