A In 1943.
Q "To Babelsberg/Potsdam, (17 days), Reason: Recreation leave, stamp, 15 March 1943, Signed: Loehr, General." And this entry too does not contain the complete number of days of your actual absence. And does the statement you made with regard to Figure 1 apply here too?
A Yes, and in addition there is the fact that General Loehr called me up towards the end of this leave and suggested or offered me an extension of the leave. I very thankfully accepted this offer and therefore came back later.
Q And the third entry is "Recreation leave from the 21st of November until the 9th and/or 10th of December 1941: Reason: Recreation leave." Is this entry complete?
A With regard to the leave days to be reckoned, yes, but on the journey back I went away two days earlier because, as far as I remember, I came back already on the 10th. At that time my family was living in Babelsberg, and because of the everlasting air attacks, I sent them off again earlier than planned and I came back myself much earlier.
Q The next document is Document Foertsch No. 20 on Page 9 of the Document Book, which I submit as Exhibit No. 19, This is an affidavit of the former Chief of the General Staff of the German Army Halder, from whom, in my Document Book I, I submitted this expert opinion about the official position of the Chief of the General Staff. Halders's states the following:
"Former General Hermann Foertsch has been personally well known to me for at least 10 years. I did not have any direct official contact with him. On the other hand, in my capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, I came to know of the opinion held by his official superiors and his regard within the General Staff."
I will now skip the next paragraphs and continue on page two in the second paragraph. Formerly Halder had given a general characterization of Foertsch and then he continued:
"I base this general opinion on official information which I received from others and on occasional impressions of my own. I remember such a case that Foertsch, at that time a colonel and Chief of the General Staff of the 12th army, had reported to me about the situation in the SouthEast during the second half of September 1941 in the Headquarters of the OKH. It is true that this theatre of was was taken from the authority of the OKH as a so-called army theatre of war. In spite of this, Foertsch requested aid from the OKH on orders from his supreme commander Generalfeldmarschall List, because the men in charge of this theatre of war saw themselves faced with insoluble tasks. Especially in question in this case was Serbai where the menace to railroad-and highway communications through insurgents became increasingly threatening and only 4 German divisions, in addition to a few regional rifle units, wore available in the vast and highly mountainous territory. These divisions, on account of their composition (2 weak infantry regiments, 1 artillery unit) the over all age of the men, their armament and equipment and because of their very low rate of mobility, were completely unsuitable for the tasks in question. These tasks could have only been solved, according to military principles, through the use of highly skilled and highly mobile units. The request submitted by Foertsch was therefore completely justified. The orders given by the OKW to the Army High Commander South-East were in gross misproportion to the means made available.
This was nothing now to me in view of the fact that, because of similar problems, I had a daily fight with the OKW and its methods of military leadership, For Foertsch who perhaps had this experience for the first time in his official sphere of responsibility," "it was a bitter perception which shook his confidence, He has expressed this to me in such a clear and open man-to-man language that I can clearly remember it. Beginning with this conversation I have considered Foertsch as one of those men whom I could rely upon when the day would come for settlement of the differences, existing between the army leadership and Hitler. In view of the impression this strong, true and unselfish person had made on me, the thought is inconceivable that this man on his own initiative has ever agreed to, or even proposed something which is in violation of the conception of decent German soldiership and rules of war.
At that time I was in no position to give Foertsch material help. The situation in the Russian theatre of war and the plans pending at that time (preparations for the battle of Vjasma - Briansk) had made it impossible to spare any troops for the South-East or to hold prospects for making them available in due course.
During the aforementioned conversation, Foertsch also mentioned the great difficulties in the transportation situation and the supply of the population depending on it, he furthermore mentioned currency questions and other points in connection with the welfare of the occupied territories. His brief statements give proof of the great sense of responsibility which Foertsch and his Supreme Commander, Generalfeldmarschall List felt towards the population in the occupied territories, in the same way, however, also his disappointment, even exasperation about the small support which he had found at the OKW.
In this respect too, his views were conforming with those of the OKH. Here too, where the decision alone rests with the OKW, I had to be satisfied with promising him any support possible within the sphere of activity of the Quartermaster General."
From this exhibit, there can be seen the contrast and contradictions which Foertsch stood towards the OKW and his attempts to strengthen the military occupation and in this way by military moans and in addition with economic means to provide the necessary means for the population to maintain peace in the Balkans.
The next document, Document Foertsch No. 21, is offered as Exhibit No. 20. This is a letter from Foertsch of 8 Oct 47' to his wife.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document in evidence. It consists of a sheet of paper with some handwriting on it which is nut identified. It is not addressed to anyone. The signature is an initial "H" which is completely unidentified. Finally, I object on the ground it is completely irrelevant and immaterial and has nothing to do with this case.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: With regard to the first objection, I will submit the original document. That is the whole letter of the defendant and will show it to him, and will ask him--did you send this letter at that time, that is on the 8th of October, 1941?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: Yes, I wrote this letter at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Witness, in connection with this letter which I have submitted to you, I have one question.
Was there a censorship in the German Wehrmacht of the Army letters which the German soldiers sent home--the letters from the front?
A. Yes, there was a regular army censorship through so-called army post checking centers.
Q. And from what points of view did those army post checking centers work? For instance, what did they look for in such army letters?
A. The army censorship had to look for absolute violations of discipline and any kind of suspicions with regard to offenses or crimes. For instance, plundering, theft etc. and then they had to check any kind of political statements by reason of the laws which I can't describe exactly but in general would fall under the term "undermining the morale of the Wehrmacht" or something like that.
Q. Witness, I am going to submit further numbers of army letters. Did you send your letters through the usual army post channels?
A. Yes, it is possible that individual letters for a certain sector were taken by a courier--that is, for instance from Athens to Belgrade, but they went through army channels.
Q. Was it admissible in army letters written by the soldiers home to criticize superiors or even the OKW or even to criticize them adversely?
A. Of course it was not allowed.
Q. And if such a letter had been stopped by the censorship and for instance submitted to the OKW, what happened then?
A. Then the writer of the letter was called to account for it or at any rate he had to risk the danger that he would be called to account for it.
Q. Your Honor, and now I will read one sentence in this letter which the witness wrote on the 8th of October, 1941, to his wife and which contains clearly his criticism. It states: "Yesterday and today there was no mail, instead I received silly teletypes from higher up."
And the last sentence as quoted in the document book: "One looks on powerless because there is no defense and, above all, one has to take stupid phrases from above."
The next document, Document Foertsch No. 22, Exhibit No. 21 is again such an excerpt from an army post setter and should help to prove that Foertsch was no war monger but thought very independently and not as the prosecution maintains took part in a brutal plan. Essential is only the last sentence.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document on two grounds: one, that it is a self-serving declaration and, two, that it is an attempt on the part of the defendant to bolster up his previous testimony by showing that he has previously made statements in the same tenor. Prior statements of that kind, I submit, are inadmissible. It is hearsay declaration of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: As is true with some material that was presented by the prosecution, this will re received for such consideration and evaluation as the Tribunal deems it merits.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. The last sentence of this letter -- I will submit to you first of all the complete letter, and please tell me whether you actually wrote it like this at that time.
A. Yes, I wrote this letter.
Q. And I will just read the last sentence which is contained in the document book. It runs as follows: "And this again enrages me against everything that cannot be changed and against all those whose names have brought about these times."
The next document -- witness, the following has just been pointed out to me. I asked you if you wrote the letter at that time and you only answered, "Yes, I wrote it."
A. Yes, I wrote the letter at that time under that date.
Q. And now, as next document, I submit Document Foertsch No. 24. I submit it as Exhibit No. 22. No. 23 I omit. Foertsch No. 24 on page 16 -- this stresses the statement which the defendant has already made in the witness stand about the attitude of the OKW towards the general staff and will also show how little influence the general staff had. It is only a short sentence and it runs: "To the Fuehrer the General Staff is just a 'Lodge' for which there is no need. One does all that by oneself. It's no use to get angry about it."
Witness, I submit you this letter as well, the complete letter dated the 27th of December, 1941. Did you write this letter on that day?
A. Yes, I wrote this letter at that time on the 27th of December 1841.
Q. And on the same subject, in order to prove that the members of the general staff actually had no decisive influence I offer Document Foertsch No. 25 as Exhibit No. 23 on page 17. I will read a sentence from the second paragraph of the document. "The new Supreme Commander of the Army makes his presence feld." Supreme Commander -- witness, who is meant by this?
A. Hitler who at that time took over the supreme command himself.
Q. "Many changes in places higher up seem to be imminent. Because an order arrived prohibiting those so dismissed to hold 'Demonstrations' in the form of farewell-edicts. I don't understand all this and consider the start of the new year as disappointing. Non-consideration of the General Staff on the independent promotional list means more than meets the eye. Well then they might just as well dissolve us and let this work be done by the NSV (National Socialist Welfare League.)" The next document which I submit is Foertsch No. 26, Exhibit No. 24.
It is on page 18 of the English. Witness, have I already asked you if you wrote this letter yourself -- the last letter?
A. No.
Q. Then I submit it to you. Witness, one question which concerns all these letters -- to whom is the letter written?
A. These letters are all written to my wife and also this letter of the 28th of December, 1841, which I wrote myself on this day.
Q. And what does the signature mean which is formulated differently. On some letters, for instance, there is only an "H".
A. That is the abbreviation of my Christian name Hermann and in this letter the signature runs "Big Boy" -- that is an expression used by my wife i.e. I often use it when signing my letters to my wife but I also recognize my handwriting.
Q. The next document, Document Foertsch No. 26 I submit as Exhibit No. 24 -- this is an affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar, sworn to in the Neustadt Camp on 22 August, 1947, and it is certified by the competent American officer. I submit this affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar who, himself, was chief of the operational department in the operational staff of the OKW, I submit this as proof that the defendant Foertsch tried everything possible in opposition to the attitude of the OKW to find a peaceful solution of the Balkan problems. The statement runs at the beginning, on page 18 of the document, as follows:
"From the 1st of January 1942 until the 16th of November 1944, I was Chief of the Operational Department in the Operational Staff of the Army High Command. In this capacity, General Foertsch as Chief of the General Staff in the Southeast became known to me and due to the official correspondence kept with the Army-group E or F respectively which was directly subordinate to the Army High Command and employed in the SouthEast, and long-distance calls and also personally because of the occasional visits to Fuehrer-Headquarters."
I skip the next paragraph and then it continued:
"General Foertsch favored rather decidedly the same opinion I did, that is, that the solution of problems operative in the Balkans depended largely on a successful solution of the political problem and that the road taken by the political leadership of the Reich was the wrong one and one of the main reasons for the steadily mounting formation of Partisan-bands and for the struggles of nationalities raging in the Balkans.
"General Foertsch considered the foremost task of the occupation army the preliminary defense preparations for an invasion by the enemy powers and established time and again in petitions and reports that this task could only be solved with the available army if it became possible to bring to an end the partisan and party fighting in the South-East area.
"He as well as I and the majority of the military commanders in the south-east saw this possibility in contrast to Hitler, who demanded the enforcement of the political aims by military action, in a fundamental change of these political aims. He voiced this opinion several times by demanding interference of the military command for operational reasons against the course taken by the Ustascha in Croatia as well as measures for political and economical pacification in the South-East.
"Of these suggestions I remember best of all:"
And then skip the next paragraph "a" and continue on page 20 at "b", page 20, paragraph "b".
"b) Suggestions as to getting in touch with different Commanders of the insurgent groups in order to bring them at least from the point of view of space and time to a limited suspension of their fighting among each other and against the occupation army, thereby preventing an increase of the civilian population's losses and favoring a development of the economic conditions.
"c) Reservation of a certain amount of trains for the import of economic goods to Greece in order to keep the economic conditions going there which at times were very much susceptible to a crisis. This proposal was made despite the fact that the very inefficient railroad to Greece was incapable of even carrying the necessary transports for the Occupation-Army.
"d) Increase of the Occupation-Forces in the entire South-Eastern area in order to bring about appeasement of the population by more closely stationed troop contingents and by their protection against the partisans' terror and to gain a better working of the economy.
"Stress was put on the fact by the Army-group and General Foertsch in almost every one of their reports and long-distance calls on the question that a peaceful, well supplied, and constructively working population whose sense of security was strengthened would be the best guaranty of a positive solution for the combat tasks of the Army-groups on the coasts, that they would therefore support all political and economic measures which would aim to bring this end any nearer."
Skip the next paragraph and then the next paragraph but one on page 20a:
"I remember that Hitler once or twice in connection with the situation of the commanders due to some setbacks in the fights against the partisans remarked, that the partisan - fights in the South-East would have been settled long ago if the Generals could finally decide to learn from Tito and act decidedly with the same lack of consideration as the leaders of the insurgent troops did."
And then I continue, skipping the next three sentences:
"The Army-group in some cases also acted according to its own point of view in opposition to the Fuehrer's and the Army High Command's orders as for instance in the exchange of prisoners and the start of negotiations with insurgent leaders. But such a procedure was generally only possible in less important individual cases, as the Fuehrer very often received notice of the evasion of his directions anyway sooner or later through special report channels and then usually interfered personally.
"The general situation with regard to personnel forced the personnel-office to retain experienced and proved Army and Army-group Chiefs in their positions as Chief, even if they were eligible for promotion by their years of service although it did not correspond to their employment as Chief of Staff any longer, and generally reject the repeated requests for frontline action. It is known to me that General Foertsch also requested several times to be sent to the front for duty but that this request was rejected before the Spring of the year 1944."
Before I submit the next affidavit, your Honor, which is rather lengthy, I would suggest that we take the recess now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 11:15 o'clock.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, before we pass from this last affidavit which has been put into evidence as Exhibit 24 I would like to read into the record, or perhaps Dr. Raschenbach will do it for me, certain other portions of the affidavit which he omitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The affidavit begins on Page 18, beginning with the sentence---
THE PRESIDENT: Let me make this statement and inquiry. The fact that he does not read it all does not necessarily mean it is not in evidence, does it, and that the Court does not take consideration of it? Unless you want to do it for the purpose of the transcript-doesn't it all go into the transcript?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No, I think only the portion which Dr. Fenstermacher reads goes into the transcript, your Honor. The emphasis I have in mind is that throughout direct case when we failed to read into the record certain portions of our documents the defense counsel asked if they could read the omitted portion.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER. The twelfth line on page 18 of the English Document Book: "I gained the impression from our official relations which according to the tasks of my department were restricted generally to the operational sphere and questions of organization insofar as operational tasks were concerned that General FOERTSCH had taken a special interest in and made himself thoroughly acquainted with the rather difficult problems of operations in the Balkans and that he possessed a considerable and well founded knowledge of a military as well as political and economical nature. General FOERTSCH concerned himself therefore mentally also in addition to his actual military tasks most intensively with all other problems of the Balkan area."
And then just two lines in the next page, page 19 of the English Document Book, the second paragraph: "Of these suggestions I remember best of all:
An exertion of political pressure on the Croatian leader of State in order to bring him to a peaceful agreement with the orthodox Slavs in Croatia."
DR. RASCHENBACH: If the Tribunal, please, I have no objections to the Prosecution reading from any of the documents which I have submitted, or asking me to read a paragraph or a paragraph which I have omitted. I only omit these paragraphs in order to save time and in order not to repeat things which have been expressed in other affidavits.
The next document is Foertsch document 26-A and I offer it as exhibit No. 25. It is an affidavit given by Dr. Hermann Hofmann. I want to prove with it what attitude was taken by General Foertsch so the Southeastern problems and all the questions in connection with the combatting of bands, together with the attitude which he expressed in the staff meetings, which was also part of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. This affidavit by Dr. Hofmann reads as follows and I shall read from the second paragraph, it is on page 23 of the document book, the first page of the document;
"From 1 August 1942 till the end of the war I belonged to the High Command of the 12th Army, Army Group E and F as Army Doctor and later as Army Group Doctor, I have therefore collaborated with General Foertsch as of that date until his withdraw in March 1944 and was constantly in touch with him in my official capacity."
I shall then read from the next page, page 24, the sentence at the top:
"My tasks consisted in the responsible management and directing of all measures, necessary for the maintaining of health of the troops, the care for the wounded and sick of the Army, including war prisoners, the fighting of epidemic, and the medical and hygienic supervision of the civilian population of the occupied territories."
Then read from page 26, the paragraph entitled "Attitude towards the Southeast questions:"
"Every officer of the staff participating in the discussions of the Chief knew with how many difficulties, obstructions and lack of understanding on the part of the Armed Forces High Command, the Chief of the General Staff was burdened in the Balkan territory, which was difficult to handle from a military standpoint and politically especially sensitive. The deficient organization, the political inability of the Armed Forces High Command and an entirely insufficient allocation of military forces, paralyzed every effective measure, which after the military occupation of the Balkan territory, could have effected its real pacification.
The already thin network of military effective troups, which had to cover the space which offered such difficulties from the point of view of communications became still thinner on account of the continuous departure of formations. All demands for allocation of military effective divisions were rejected by the O.K.W. Hitler was not interested in the Balkan territory. Improvisation and emergency solutions therefore dominated all measures and thus did not produce a satisfactory result. Rise, consolidation and continuous growing of the partisan movement was a necessary consequence due to the many 'soft spots' in the German occupation. In every conference of the Chief, General Foertsch found bitter words regarding this contrast between the ordered 'musts' and the actual 'can'."
As long as I worked together with him and knew and shared his intentions and hopes, his activity consisted in a continuous struggle with the OKW.
At the conferences of the Chiefs, he criticized in front of the leaders of the departments, and their aides the regulations of the OKW in a frank and open manner, and rejected them if they contradicted the given necessities, or the laws of military and general human ethics. This was done before an assembly of officers, some of whom did not share the political attitude of FOERTSCH at least not entirely----and he thus showed that he stood for his conviction without regard for his own person. This manly attitude was one of the foundations of the complete confidence which all those officers had in him who opposed, because they were deeply worried about the fate of their fatherland, the systematic abolition of all military conceptions of value. The standard of the conferences of the Chiefs, arranged by General FOERTSCH, excelled, apart from the open criticism of all wrong commands of the OKW, also in the clear and objective presentation of the military and political situation. In the notes of my diary, still in my possession, is nearly always mentioned that the situation was presented frankly and openly.
This was a real blessing for thinking people in view of the indiscriminating and highly colored reports, which were made in other places because of a lack of personal courage, or in blind execution of the notorious ("Fuehrerberehl"), that nobody should know anything about a matter, unless he had to do with it directly. The wrong policy on the Balkans, especially in Croatia, was condemned with the same open criticism. The fight which General FOERTSCH, waged against this policy of the OKW, the Croatian authorities and the Ustascha, was a road of suffering for an officer who saw clearly, had a sense of responsibility, and was deeply shocked about the methods of the Ustascha.
All effective measures were voided by the resistance of the O. K. W. or the refusal by Hitler himself. For example, in my diary is a note, dated 16 September 1942, characteristic for the then prevailing conditions, which mentions the report of the First Officer of the General Staff of the Division stationed at Serajewe, stating that a detachment of the Ustascha led by a notorious sadist and designated by the officer in question as a band of murderers, was arrested by German troops, but had to be returned to the Croats on 'highest' order. No measures whatsoever were taken on the part of the Croats. This one small example sheds light on the desperate fight which the High Command and with it the Chief of the General Staff had to wage against the Ustascha which was under the special protection of Hitler and his diplomats working at Zagreb."
From the third paragraph, the attitude toward National Socialism, this is a subject regarding which I have submitted several affidavits in book one, I want to read only one sentence toward the end of page 28. The second sentence in the second paragraph:
"Once in the winter of 1942 when he talked about his then Chief Foertsch, he reported to me a talk, this means Gen. Loehr, which had taken place between Goering and himself about Foertsch and which went as follows: Goering 'How do you get along with your Chief Foertsch?'
Loehr: 'Alright.' Goering: 'Well, that surprises me. Foertsch after all is to be considered an enemy of the Party and the Air Force.'" The next document which I offer is Foertsch document No. 27, which I want to give Exhibit No. 26.
This is a copy from a letter written by the defendant Foertsch to his wife. Let me ask you first, witness is that the complete letter which is contained in the original exhibit; is it your letter and did you write it at the time?
A I wrote that letter on 15 March 1942.
Q The letter deals again with the defendant's attitude toward the O.K.W. and his efforts against the O.K.W. I shall read only one sentence which is roughly in the middle of the letter of the extract in the document book:
"Total tendency: Our worries here are entirely uninteresting. 'If we cannot master the insurrections, the leadership, i.e., we are to be blamed.' This according to Jodl. Naturally, there is practically no help whatsoever. One may call it a success, that they don't take troops from us."
The next document I offer is Foertsch document No. 29, which in on page 33 and I shall give it the exhibit No. 27. It is a letter by the defendant addressed to his wife on 8 May, 1943. Witness, I am handing you the letter and I would like to ask you if this is the complete letter and did you write it at that time in that form?
A I wrote this letter on 8 May 1942 in Belgrade.
Q This letter again shows General Foertsch's efforts which were opposed to the O.K.W. in the period of May, 1942. It reads as follows:
"Tonight I returned from a 3 days inspection trip with Warlimont to B and am proceeding to S. at 1030."
Let me ask you a question, who was Warlimont at the time.
A He was the deputy chief of the Wehrmacht operational staff, he was Joel's constant deputy at the time.
Q What do the letters B and S stand for?
A B means Belgrade and at 1030 I went on to Salonina.
Q I continue:
"It was a journey obviously ordered by the O.K.W. for the purpose of a check-up, in order to find out who is to blame for the impardonable state of affairs prevailing in the Southeast."
Witness, what do you mean by "the impardonable state of affairs?"
A Well, the OKW designed our work in the Southeast, i.e. the whole state of affairs, an unforgivable mess.
Q Why did they?
A Because the O.K.W. was dissatisfied with the work and attitude of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q Does that mean that the O.K.W. was of the opinion that you had been too strong and too ruthless towards the bands and the population?
A No, on the contrary. I believe this letter shows this.
Q "Warlimont, who is very reasonable was deeply impressed by all things, realized as he repeated all the time that there was being done 'What was humanly possible', recognized the prejudices as such and is going to report just as we wish. How far he will thereby impress these Keitel and Joel in the first place who is the main instigator and nearly God-like, that I do not know. We are being blamed for not taking strong enough measures, that we are unnecessarily entangled with the Italians, that we do not report correctly, etc.
...
"L. is not coming back."
Who is L?
A Field Marshal List.
Q "He is chosen for a new task again with Creiffenberg as chief Ku is rather in disgrace."
Who is Ku?
A General Kuntze.
Q "I expect a change before long. For myself a change is out of question. I now have the reputation as an expert in the Balkans and am likely to finish my days here without thanks and distinction, unless I manage to make myself unpopular enough to be given a division..."
The next document which I offer is Foertsch document No. 30 on page 34 of the document book, which I offer as exhibit No. 28. I am handing the letter, which is again a letter addressed to General Foertsch's wife, to him. Did you write this letter at the time and is it complete in the exhibit?
A This is the complete letter which I wrote on 17 May 1942.
Q It concerns discussions held by the Commander in Chief Southeast with the O.K.W. I shall read the first paragraph of the extract in the document book.
"I was only exasperated by the damned way K and J up there thought fit to treat us, that means rather KU, regarding the people in Serbia as imbecile idlers and themselves showing off as demigods.
Witness, what does K, J and Ku stand for?
A K stands for Keitel, J for Jodl and Ku for General Kuntze.
Q My position is not different from that of the chiefs in the West, who cannot achieve anything at all. Now I have at least achieved that we here are recognized as operational area and are mentioned in the internal situation reports of the O.K.W., and in some matters are treated in the same way as the Eastern operational area. Au himself called that a great success of the open talks with Warl.
Who is Warl?
A That is Warlimont.
Q "If I can now manage to get him here to the Southern area and to show him what I told him during our ride through Serbia things will improve here too. Above all I am too glad not to sit in the O.K.W. like W., as a serf in the Byzantine forest..."
The next document is Foertsch document No. 31, which I offer as exhibit No. 29. It is again a letter by Foertsch to his wife of 26 May 1942. I will hand it to the defendant and would like to ask him whether the letter is complete in the exhibit and whether you wrote it at the time?
A The letter is complete and I wrote it on 26 May 1942.
Q I shall read the brief extract contained in the document book on page 35, it reads as follows:
OKW has made us a nice little present for Whitsuntide by a silly administrative decree. Silly stuff doesn't become more reasonable by being signed by a F.M.
What does F.M. stand for?
A I should read: "Silly stuff doesn't become more reasonable by being signed by a Field Marshal and I meant Keitel.
Q "Our request that the Referent should take the trouble to come here has been turned down of course."
Witness can you tell us whether that letter went through the Field post?
A Yes, certainly it must have done that.
Q The next document is Foertsch document No. 32, which I offer as exhibit 30. It is an affidavit given by Warlimont concerning the attitude taken by the command posts in the Southeast towards the O.K.W. and at the same time about experiences made by Warlimont concerning the bands in the Southeast. The affidavit reads as follows, but let me ask you first once more, who was Warlimont?
A Warlimont was the deputy chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff.